

IMPERIAL AGRICULTURAL  
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, NEW DELHI.

MGIPC—S4—III.1.93—22.8.45—5 000







Vol. VI, No. 1.

October, 1936.

# JOURNAL

OF THE

## ANNAMALAI UNIVERSITY

EDITOR

PROFESSOR B. V. NARAYANASWAMI NAIDU, M.A., B.COM., PH.D.,  
BAR-AT-LAW

EDITORIAL BOARD

PROFESSOR S. SOMASUNDARA  
BHARATI, M.A., B.L.


PROFESSOR S. RAMACHANDRA RAO,  
M.A., PH.D. (LOND.), F. INST. P.  
(LOND.).

PROFESSOR A. NARASINGA RAO,  
M.A., L.T.

PROFESSOR K. ASWATH NARAIN  
RAO, D.Sc. (LOND.), D.I.C.,  
F.I.C.

PROFESSOR M. S. SUNDARAM,  
M.A., B.LITT. (OXON).

MAHAMAHOPADHYAYA PROFESSOR  
S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRIAR.



PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY

ANNAMALAINAGAR



## CONTENTS

	PAGE
1. On "The Objectivistic Dogma in Scientific Methodology" <i>By P. S. Naidu, M.A.</i>	.. 1
2. A Brief History of English Scholarship <i>By M. S. Sundaram, M.A., B.Litt. (Oxon.)</i>	.. 18
3. Some Notes on "Sir Gawayn and the Greene Knight" <i>By V. S. Krishnan, B.A. (Oxon.)</i>	.. 26
4. Unemployment—its Causes and Cure <i>By B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu, M.A.</i>	.. 30
5. Sixty Years of Madras Cereal-Prices <i>By S. Subramanian, M.A. and S. Ramakrishnan,         B.Sc. (Hons.)</i>	.. 39
6. The Growth of India's Population <i>By S. Subramanian, M.A. and S. Ramakrishnan,         B.Sc. (Hons.)</i>	.. 47
7. On Waring's Problem III <i>By S. S. Pillai, D.Sc.</i>	.. 50
8. On Waring's Problem IV <i>By S. S. Pillai, D.Sc.</i>	.. 54
9. Bhartrhari a Bauddha ? <i>By V. A. Ramaswami Sastri, M.A.</i>	.. 65
10. Siddhitraya <i>By R. Ramanujachariar, M.A. and K. Srinivasachariar.</i>	
11. Nyayakulisa <i>By R. Ramanujachariar, M.A. and K. Srinivasachariar.</i>	
12. Lakshana vimarsah <i>By V. Subrahmanya Sastri.</i>	
13. University Notes <i>By B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu, M.A.</i>	.. 70
14. Reviews :—	.. 72
1. Economic Conditions in Southern India <i>By B. V. N.</i>	
2. Some Aspects of Economic Planning <i>By V. G. R.</i>	

3. A survey of Motor-Bus Transportation in Six Districts of  
the Bombay Presidency  
*By B. V. N.*
4. Conflicting Tendencies in Indian Economic Thought  
*By B. V. N.*
5. The Indian Sugar Industry  
*By B. V. N.*
6. Decay of Indian Industries  
*By B. V. N.*
7. Tāṇḍava Lakṣaṇam or The Fundamentals of Ancient  
Hindu Dancing  
*By K. A. N.*
8. Daśopaniṣads  
*By S. K.*
9. Prolegomena to the New Reforms  
*By K. A. N.*

## CONTENTS

	PAGE
1. The Horme in Purposivistic Psychology and Karma in the Gita—A comparative Study By P. S. Naidu, M.A.	.. 87
2. A Brief History of English Scholarship By M. S. Sundaram, M.A., B.Litt., (Oxon.)	.. 94
3. The Tariff and the Handloom—Some Aspects By M. K. Muniswami	.. 103
4. Optical Scattering by Colloidal Suspensions and Emulsions By S. Ramachandra Rao and N. Muthuswami	.. 107
5. The Age of Tholkappiam By S. S. Bharati M.A., B.L.	.. 121
6. Tholkappia Araichi By S. S. Bharati, M.A., B.L.	.. 139
7. The Semantic Principle of Expansion By A. Chidambaranatha Chettiar, M.A.	.. 147
8. Action of Sulphuric Acid on Glucose and Sucrose By K. Aswath Narain Rao and P.L. Narasimha Rao	.. 155
9. A Note on the Spirit and Pharmaceutical Industry of India By K. Aswath Narain Rao, D.Sc. (Lond.) D.I.C., F.I.C.	.. 156
10. Siddhitraya By R. Ramanujachariar, M.A., and K. Srinivasachariar	
11. Nyayakulisa By R. Ramanujachariar, M.A., and K. Srinivasachariar	
12. Lakshañavimarsah By V. Subrahmanya Sastri	
13. University Notes By B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu, M.A.	.. 159
14. Reviews	.. 167
1. The Mysore University English-Kannada Dictionary Part I By K. A. N. R.	
2. Acoustics By P. E. S.	
3. A Study of Economic Depression in Rural Kistna By C. W. B. Z.	



## CONTENTS

	PAGE
1. On Waring's Problem VI <i>By S. S. Pillai, D.Sc.</i>	.. 171
2. Some Experiments on the Utilisation of Indigenous Raw Materials <i>By K. Aswath Narain Rao, D.Sc.(Lond.), D.I.C., F.I.C.</i>	.. 198
3. The Present Status of the study of Human Emotions <i>By P. S. Naidu, M.A.</i>	.. 206
4. The Age of Tholkappiam <i>By S. S. Bharati, M.A., B.L.</i>	.. 216
5. Tholkappia Araichi <i>By S. S. Bharati, M.A., B.L.</i>	.. 230
6. Siddhitraya <i>By R. Ramanujachariar, M.A., and K. Srinivasachariar.</i>	
7. Nyayakulisa <i>By R. Ramanujachariar, M.A., and K. Srinivasachariar.</i>	
8. University Notes <i>By B. V. Narayanaswamy Naidu, M.A.</i>	.. 241
9. Reviews	.. 243
1. Svarasiddhanta Candrika <i>By V. S.</i>	





# JOURNAL

## OF THE

# ANNAMALAI UNIVERSITY

---

VOL. VI.

OCTOBER 1936.

NO. 1.

---

### On "The Objectivistic Dogma in Scientific Methodology"

By

P. S. NAIDU

(*Annamalai University*)

"But the strangest discovery was that this orderliness in Nature, and this intelligence in Man, seemed to have been specially created to play partners in a kind of cosmic cotillion of rationality. Mind made laws of reason; Nature obeyed them."

Dunne: *The Serial Universe*, p. 13.

Law in the scientific sense, declares Karl Pearson, is "essentially a product of the human mind and has no meaning apart from man. It owes its existence to the creative power of his intellect. There is more meaning in the statement that man gives laws to Nature than in its converse that Nature gives laws to man."

*Grammar of Science*, p. 87.

### THE DOGMA STATED

Science is purely objective. In contradistinction from the disciplines generally known as the humanities, it rules out rigorously the individual bias of the investigator. History, sociology and even archæology are coloured with the predilections of the historians, sociologists and archæologists. These view the world from a particular standpoint. Science is standpointless. Human temperament plays no part in scientific research. Science presents to us real reality—reality as it really is—as different from the apparent reality presented by the humanities. In reconstructing truth the historian and the archæologist have to depend upon records which are coloured, and in interpreting these records they introduce a further subjective element which is bound to vitiate their judgments. The facts of science, on the other hand, are purely objective. They are completely free from the distorting effects of human perspective.

## THE "SPECTATOR THEORY" OF SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY

The belief in the objectivity of the facts of science has resulted in, what may be described as, the *spectator theory* of scientific methodology. In recording the results of his observation, both controlled and uncontrolled, the scientist is ever on his guard to see that his individual prepossessions and peculiarities do not play any part. He effaces himself so completely that, for all practical purposes, we may take it that his mind registers facts as faithfully as a photographic plate. The camera tells no lies. It may be relied upon without reservation, while our eyes are unreliable. The observation of the scientist gives results that are as trustworthy as those yielded by careful photography.

An eminent astronomer says that the scientist looks upon the object of his observation as "something entirely detached from and external to himself ; something which he could study and explore from a distance as the astronomer studies the surface of the sun through his telescope, or the explorer the desert from his aeroplane." The laboratory is merely an observatory, and the mind of the observer is a photographic plate. The controlled experiments of the scientist introduce no more interference into the facts observed than do the astronomical telescopes into the sun and the moon.

## THE "SHERLOCK HOLMES" ATTITUDE

The objectivity of science may be further emphasised by another consideration. The attitude of the scientist is the attitude of the detective. The deed has been done ; the traces are all there. The observer has only to examine them carefully in order to lay his finger on the doer. Nature does not cover her tracks. The trained observer can explore these tracks at leisure and get at their source. Further, nature is prepared to repeat herself as often as the scientist wants such repetition. That experimenters working independently of one another secure the same results under identical conditions, and that natural phenomena produce uniform effects on recording instruments that are independent of the observer, constitute strong arguments in favour of the objectivity of scientific methodology.

## SCIENTIFIC REALISM

A contemporary realist says " . . . there is a world of reality quite independent of human experience, . . . a material world, a world of nature objects. . . . a real objective world, independent of our perceptions. Science usually makes this postulate and when made it is found to yield satisfactory results."<sup>1</sup>

1. Patrick : *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 364.

From *objective* facts observed in a rigorously impersonal manner, the scientist discovers the laws of nature. These laws are as objective as the facts themselves. They operate in complete independence of any perceiving mind. We have only to recall the fact that the living organism is a comparatively late comer in the scheme of evolution to realise that the laws of nature were holding sway long before the first human being was born, and will hold sway long after the last man is dead. The objectivity of the scientific law is so self-evident that a physicist once remarked that the principles of physics could be demonstrated to a person with no other sense organ but a single eye and that too colour-blind. The implication of this contention is that reality is so completely objective and utterly independent of human perception that one equipped with the barest minimum of sensory apparatus can acquire a knowledge of the physical world which is as complete as that possessed by a person gifted with the rich variety of sense organs.

The human temperament of the individual observer has no place in the observation of facts. Feeling is to be ruled out strictly from scientific inference. A judgment of feeling is necessarily individual and personal—scientific truth is not the private truth of an individual, but is objective and universal.

#### THE SLENDER FOUNDATIONS FOR THE OBJECTIVISTIC DOGMA

The claim of objectivity made by science requires to be examined in the light of modern knowledge. The type of naive realism outlined above, which leads to the crudest kind of materialism, needs only to be mentioned to be rejected. But only the most advanced scientific thinkers have realised that "a reality completely independent of the spirit that conceives it, sees it or feels it, is an utter impossibility." A vast majority still clings to the realistic dogma, which could be shattered to pieces by arguments drawn from the fold of science. The discipline of over-specialisation has narrowed the scientists' outlook on life.

The fallacy of standpointlessness of science may be dismissed at once. The scientist does take a stand and a very dogmatic stand too. Lockian realism and representationism have been assumed by all scientists. The positive scientist holds a very definite view regarding the external world and his relationship to such a world.

The contention of this paper is that a very large and important subjective element enters into all scientific observation and inference. The manner in which data are collected in science, the part played by mathematics in science, the causes that have led to the present *impasse* in physics, and the nature of scientific laws, will be examined. It will be shown how such an examination reveals the slender foundation for the objectivistic dogma of science.

## II

THE DATA OF SCIENCE ARE SUBJECTIVE—  
ASTRONOMICAL FACTS

It is a commonplace observation in psychology that the simplest act of perception involves interpretation. The objective fact acquires meaning only after it has been transformed into a percept by the subjective processes of memory and interest and imagination. The materialistic physicist belittles the significance of this important psychological process. Sir Arthur Eddington says, "It is the inexorable law of our acquaintance with the external world that that which is presented for knowing becomes transformed in the process of knowing."<sup>2</sup> This statement deserves careful consideration because astronomy is the science where the likelihood of the subjective factor entering into the investigation of facts is least. The stupendous distances separating the observer and the observed preclude all possibility of interference with facts. Yet we find an important subjective element in astronomical observation. Astronomical facts are gathered either through direct observation (that is through the telescope) or through photographic records. In the former case there is the persistent and ineliminable *reaction-time* factor which is thoroughly subjective. As a matter of fact the reaction-time experiments in psychology owe their (historical) origin to astronomy.<sup>2a</sup> In the latter case the subjective element is more pronounced. The photographic-record fallacy is so wide-spread in the scientific world that it is necessary to expose its foundations. No sensitive film can record all the radiations from a given body. The ordinary photographic plate has a very narrow range, and even granting that a certain fraction of the infra-red and the ultra-violet regions could be covered by specially prepared films and specially devised instruments, we must admit that the sensitive surface exercises a selective function. Besides, before the ray of light reaches the sensitive plate it has to pass through an elaborate system of lenses and mirrors which eliminate an appreciable part of the original radiation. The photographic record (if we grant that it represents the original object) is a very limited and partial representation of the object photographed. Such an incomplete record can have no significance without the interpretation of the observer. The discontinuous dots of varying density should be synthesised by a mind conferring unity and meaning on them. The patches of light and shade (the diffraction rings) presented by the photograph are said to constitute objective evidence for the existence of a star (which for aught we know sent out the ray of light several thousands of years

2. *New Pathways in Science*, p. 7.

2a. The unfortunate Kinnebrook incident in Maskelyne's Greenwich Observatory is an example relevant to this consideration.

ago). Such objective evidence is on a par with the evidence contained in a temple inscription for the existence of a group of villages which existed five hundred years ago. In both cases the objective fact is an inference, a conceptual hypothesis, into the structure of which the subjective element freely enters.

In the modern complicated processes of recording astronomical observations a much larger subjective element is introduced. At one of the observatories in Cambridge the ray of light from a distant star (generated several years ago) after suffering reduction in the process of passing through the telescope, is concentrated on a photo-electric cell. Here it is transformed into the electrical energy. Then it is passed into a galvanometer where it undergoes a further change. Finally it comes out as the movement of a pointer on a scale. The distant star has become a pointer reading !

### PHYSICAL FACTS

The models of Rutherford and Bohr continued to represent for a long time, what was believed to have been, the *real* atomic structure of matter. Now they are spoken of as conceptual models. Their place has been taken by sub-atomic entities, the electron, proton, positron, neutron, etc. These, it is claimed, are really real. The ultimate constituents (electrons, etc.) cannot be perceived. What we can possibly perceive is only the effect of their behaviour under certain conditions. The electron is made to collide with particles of water,<sup>3</sup> or a thin metal film, and the result of the collision is photographed. From the behaviour of the particle of water or the metal film (which is itself an inference from the photographic record) the nature of the colliding electron is inferred. Such an inference involves two large assumptions, (1) that we know all about the media of observation, and (2) that we have complete knowledge of the conditions at the moment of collision. Granted these assumptions, we find that there is still a considerable subjective element in the collection of data. The existence of the electrons, protons, positrons, etc., is inferred by a process similar to that by which we infer the existence of certain villages (in the twelfth century) presented to a temple by a certain king, which gift was recorded in an inscription on the walls of the temple, whose existence was recorded in a palm-leaf manuscript reported to have been seen by a traveller in the 17th century whose existence is vouchsafed by certain documents in the archives of the Historical Commission. We do not question the authenticity of these records, but we wish to point that this is not pure objective observation.

Spectroscopy plays an important part in modern physical research. The spectroscope reveals a series of lines on a photographic plate. Each

3. The Wilson Chamber cloud track is referred to here.

line is assigned a numerical value of a high degree of accuracy representing the frequency of the wave generating it. These values enter into the calculations which are supposed to determine the structure of the ultimate constituents of matter. But how are the wave-lengths measured? When we examine the manner in which the observations made with the diffraction grating are interpreted, we find that the so called objective measurements of wave-lengths acquire meaning only when we read them in the light of certain concepts which are purely subjective. Even the process of measurement is guided by such concepts as the wave-front, average values, etc.

The point that is being stressed here will become clear if we consider the nature of *aether*. Sir Arthur Eddington says, "As far as and beyond the remotest stars the world is filled with æther. It permeates the interstices of the atoms. Æther is everywhere. How dense is the æther? Is it fluid like water or rigid like steel? How fast is our earth moving through it? Which way do the particles of æther vibrate when an electro-magnetic wave travels across it? At one time these were regarded as among the most urgent questions in physics; but at the end of a century's study we have found no answer to any of them. We are, however, convinced that the unanswerableness of these questions is to be reckoned not as ignorance but as knowledge. What we have found out is that æther is not the sort of thing to which such questions would apply. Æther is not a kind of matter. Questions like these could be asked about matter but they could not be asked about *time* for example; and we must reckon æther as one of the entities to which they are inappropriate."<sup>4</sup>

This is a very significant statement. What it really means is that the physicist deluded himself into the belief that æther existed independently of mind, and then suddenly discovered that its nature is similar to the nature of *time*. *The hard objective facts of physics have turned out to be merely subjective conceptual hypotheses*. No one has any illusions about æther<sup>5</sup> now. It is an assumption, which should be discarded when it fails to work. The protons, electrons, and positrons are also subjective assumptions similar to æther. The physicist observes certain patches of light on a photographic plate, which he correlates with other patches on other sensitive surfaces, and then argues backwards until he hits upon a hypothesis which will fit into the patches. Proceeding by the method of trial and error he reaches a concept which he dubs electron, proton or positron. Just as "æther" is merely that which undulates, so "electron" is merely that which, on collision with certain known substances,

4. *New Pathways in Science*, pp. 38-39.

5. The noun 'Æther' is derived from a verb which means 'to undulate'.

gives rise to certain effects. These conceptual hypotheses are the facts in the objective world of science.

In his discussion of the nature of scientific experiments which are supposed to yield objective facts, Prof. Schrödinger points out that subjective interest enters into the very composition of such experiments. He says, "We cannot close the door to the entry of subjective factors in determining our scientific policy, and in giving a definite direction to our line of further advance. . . . . I mention this point in order to forestall the objection that from the very start a compulsory element might be attributed to the overpowering sway of objective facts. This is certainly not true, the origin of science being without any doubt the very anthropomorphic necessity of man's struggle for life."<sup>6</sup> Prof. Schrödinger's contention is that the scientific experiment is largely determined by subjective interests. While discussing the objectivity of the electron he says, "Do the electrons really exist on the orbits within the atom?, is it to be answered with a decisive no, unless we prefer to say that the putting of the question itself has absolutely no meaning. Indeed there does not seem to be much sense in enquiring about the real existence of something, if one is convinced that the effect through which the thing would manifest itself, in case it existed, is certainly not observed. . . . . Our doubts seem to be confirmed in the most brutal fashion by the attitude which quantum theory forces upon us. If the claim to "real existence" be based on the possibility of at least conceiving (if not perceiving) certain observations, and if the observations in question be in principle restricted by an impassable limit, then our claims for "real existence" will be in vain, not only with respect to the particular models of the interior of the atom to which we had clung up to the present (following Rutherford and Bohr), but also with respect to any other model which is satisfactorily distinct and definite."<sup>7</sup>

This desperate situation is the result of the dogma that the facts of science are *objective*, of the failure of science to realise that *its objects are merely so many hypotheses in the construction of which there enters a very appreciable subjective element*.

Sir Arthur Eddington says, ". . . . . it cannot be said that the content of the universe, as it is conceived in modern physics, consists of a number of particles called protons and electrons together with waves of radiation. . . . . the content of the universe is the "fog" and the laws of physics are the laws of propagation of waves of fog--the wave equations. . . . . it is awkward to have to refer to it colloquially as fog. I shall sometimes call it " $\psi$ ," that being the symbol by which it enters into our

6. *Science and the Human Temperament*, pp. 71-72.

7. *Science and the Human Temperament*, p. 131.



equations, though properly speaking  $\psi$  is a measure of the fog rather than the stuff itself . . . We ought therefore to say that on the present view the content of the universe consists, not of particles, but of waves of  $\psi$ . But at the same time it must be realised that a universe composed of  $\psi$  waves necessarily contains a large subjective element. . . . . We must concede therefore that 'the universe as it is conceived in modern physics' is not identical with what a philosopher would call 'the objective physical universe.'"<sup>8</sup> This is a vigorous plea in defence of an idealistic view of the world, and as it emanates from a positive scientist it is, (at least it ought to be), accepted by serious minded men. It was not very long ago that the metaphysician was accused *by the positive scientist* of speculating about *airy* concepts. Now the scientist speaks of the content of the universe as "*fog*."

At the close of his long argument against objectivism Sir Arthur says, "Between the universe of our experience and the universe of objective reality probability interposes like a smoke screen." After dismissing the models constructed by patient labour and admitting that physical objects are mental constructs, he still speaks of an objective reality behind the  $\psi$  waves (fog). This is typical of the positive scientist who is unwilling to give up the beautiful illusions he has built up, and so wistfully harks back to an objective world. The remedy for this tendency is to be found in psychology. A fearless psychological study of *the urge to scientific research* is bound to reveal the basis of many illusions. Prof. McDougall says, "The physicist is learning also that truth which psychologists themselves have been slow to appreciate, namely, that the scientist is not a passive observer, that he is essentially an active being, whose observing is an active intervention in the course of natural elements, an intervention governed by selective purpose ; that all his most purely intellectual operations upon his data (already selected, filtered and influenced by his intervention) are similarly selected and governed by his particular special purposes."<sup>9</sup> The extent to which *facts* are determined by subjective interests and even by subjective desires (working sub-consciously) is revealed by psycho-pathology. Palpable objects in the external world are invisible and inaudible to the psycho-pathic. When an analytic investigation is made it is found that an intense desire working unconsciously has blotted out a part of the external world. What we call an illusion is the reality for the patient. Little do we realise the extra-ordinary hypnotic influence which common words have over our minds. These words have given a twist to our minds and, in consequence, to our world. *Space* and *time* are two of those expressions which have had a ruinous effect on our outlook. It is exceedingly difficult to conceive the space-time con-

8. *New Pathways in Science*, pp. 44-46.

9. *Frontiers of Psychology*, p. 76.

tinuum, since the two words space and time have distorted, through their mutually exclusive connotations, our vision of reality. A large dose of psychology is the only dehypnotiser to our bewitched minds.

A significant question—'What is the colour of the election?'—emphasises the subjectivity of the scientific outlook.

An aspect of scientific methodology, to which very little attention has been paid so far, is the extensive use of analogy in inductive inference. The wave concept is analogical. The language used in describing the behaviour of electricity is unmistakably analogical. The descriptive terminology of sub-atomic physics is full of analogies. And analogy is subjective.

Confronted with difficulties of an insurmountable nature, Heisenberg says that physics should confine herself to the description of observable phenomena without attempting to peer into what is imagined to be behind these phenomena. His dictum amounts to this: the physicist should refrain from projecting his conceptual hypothesis into the external world, from cutting himself away from the hypotheses and then declaring that they have become objective facts. The significance of Heisenberg's view has not been grasped fully. "As Heisenberg pointed out, we have to infer the nature of the inside of an atom from what we observe coming out of it; and since the most definite things coming out of it are certain periodicities shown by the spectral lines, the most logical inference would seem to be that, whatever else may be in the atom, these periodicities are certainly there." Commenting on this in a footnote,<sup>10</sup> Sir Arthur says, "I have no high opinion of this argument (for after all the Bohr model did not put anything into the atom that had not been observed coming out of it)." This is a typical instance of the misunderstanding of the Heisenbergian principle. What is objected to is not the formulation of hypotheses which constitute the very life of inductive science, but the materialistic objectification of such hypotheses into external realities independent of the thinking mind. The scientist should remind himself constantly that these hypotheses (the periodicities, for example, mentioned above) contain an important subjective element.


"Heisenberg was not prepared," says Sir James Jeans, "to handicap his investigation at the outset by assuming a picture of any kind whatever to be possible. Just as the visual picture of light as waves in an ether had brought confusion into optical theory, so he thought that a picture of an atom as a structure of electrified particles was bound to bring confusion into atomic physics, as indeed it obviously was doing."<sup>11</sup>

10. *New Pathways in Science*, p. 47.

11. *The New Background of Science*, p. 171.

Sir James' view of the physical world fits with the main contention of this paper. He says, "Our mental activities are stimulated by sense-impressions which originate beyond our senses ; to account for these we invent an external world of objects and entities, but everything beyond our senses is pure inference....."

"The universe of the scientist may be expressed diagrammatically somewhat as follows :



All the items of the last two categories are purely inferential, but the type of inference is, of course, different in two categories. The observables certainly represent something objective, because they affect the senses of every one in the same way, and affect instruments which are independent of our individual senses, but the very existence of the unobservables is in doubt, because they do not affect our senses or instruments at all ; unobservables may represent nothing more than bad guesses. In brief, the properties of the observables are inferential, but the very existences of the unobservables are inferential."<sup>12</sup>

This is a fair sample of contemporary realism. As an instance of the unobservable æther is mentioned, and photon as an example of the observable. In the chain of argument it is forgotten that for the observable as well as for the unobservable the sense-datum (as transformed by thought) serves as the only guarantee for objective existence. Undoubtedly it is the subjective element which determines the structure of the observable and the unobservable. Hence the items in the scheme given above should be replaced by "conceptual hypotheses formulated by intelligence and projected into the external world."

*The so called objective facts of science obtained through three or four successive stages (vide the diagram given above) of active interpre-*

*tative observation contain an important subjective element. They are conceptual hypotheses framed by the observer's intelligence to fit into his observations and thereafter objectified by an illogical process.*

## II

### MATHEMATISATION OF SUB-ATOMIC PHYSICS

From facts, in the experimental determination and interpretation of which subjective attitude and interest play a dominant role, the laws of science are formulated. But before the laws can be formulated the facts have to be treated in a special way. The objective data have to be conceptualised through the application of mathematics.

The application of mathematical calculation to physical facts is of special significance to the epistemologist. At the present day physical data are reduced to pointer readings, and then are detached from sense data to be treated as symbols. Schuster once remarked, "Scientific thought rests content with equations correctly representing numerical relationships between different phenomena, even though no precise meaning can be attached to the symbols used." This statement raises a whole series of questions. When a given set of physical data is represented by mathematical symbols constituting an equation to be developed and solved, is there a one-to-one correspondence between the steps of the solution and the physical process symbolised by the equation? Is the conceptual mathematical development closely paralleled by the "objective" physical process? A very useful mathematical concept which is used extensively in solving equations is  $\sqrt{-1}$ . What is the reality corresponding to  $\sqrt{-1}$ ? In mathematical calculations, particularly in the calculus, certain *small*<sup>13</sup> quantities are eliminated. What is the significance of this omission? It means that either we have spirited away the reality corresponding to the "small" quantity or we consider it non-existent for our purposes. And when we find that the solution fits into reality, we should admit that we have succeeded in introducing the subjective element into the objective world so far that a procedure determined largely by subjective considerations yields objective verifiable results.  $\sqrt{-1}$  is a purely subjective concept. It is very helpful in solving refractory equations. The solution obtained by the introduction of this subjective concept corresponds to objective reality. Such a reality is certainly determined by subjective elements.

There is yet another implication in the application of mathematics to physics "... differential equations may really embody more physical

13. The notion of *smallness* is subjective.

phenomena than the physicist knowingly first puts into them, for after they have been manipulated mathematically, unknown and unsuspected further phenomena may be indicated, which may then be fully interpreted by the physicist."<sup>14</sup> We are familiar with astronomical discoveries made in this manner. Clerk Maxwell legislated for the wireless waves long before they were known. The equations for wave mechanics were worked out fully fifty years ago. These mathematical predictions point to one conclusion only, namely, that the structure of reality is determined by conditions which determine our subjective nature. "The general method of procedure—the collection of data, formulation of an equation, mathematical manipulation, solution, and physical reinterpretation—has proved exceedingly astonishingly fruitful," because the procedure is determined at every step by the subjective factors of interest and interpretation.

### SPECTROSCOPY AND MATHEMATICS

Spectroscopic data consisted originally of a vast meaningless mass of facts relating to the wave-lengths of radiation thrown off by atoms and molecules. The first ray of meaning penetrated into this mass when Balmer framed the formula for hydrogen

$$n = N \left( \frac{1}{m_1^2} - \frac{1}{m_2^2} \right)$$

This was extended by Rydelberg to cover a wider field

$$n = N \left\{ \frac{1}{(m_1 - t_1)^2} - \frac{1}{(m_2 - t_2)^2} \right\}$$

N is a constant,  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  are whole numbers,  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  are certain numbers varying from element to element. The constant N was replaced later by 4 N, 9 N etc. While the original data remained, the introduction of certain numerical relationships changed the outlook of the physicist so completely that he saw a new world rising before his eyes. N, m and t stand for certain conceptual relationships perceived by the mind of the scientist. The abstract forms symbolised by arithmetical numbers are so many moulds impressed by intelligence upon perceptual data. If objective reality is claimed for them, then it should be admitted that such objective reality is composed of a fabric which is mental in its essence.

Referring to the application of mathematical analysis to physics, Schrödinger says it is akin to mass production in modern industry.

It is "economising labour by making only an initial expenditure for our working machinery." "We have learned how to dominate the whole process with one differential equation. . . . . The art lies in formulating our knowledge in such a way that the form of the statement is the same for every point in time and space. This is the way of adapting our knowledge so that it can be dealt with in the same manner with regard to time and labour as the manufacturer deals with his machinery."<sup>15</sup> This is, no doubt, a very useful way of looking at the procedure of mathematical physics, since it points to the subjective element in the mathematical treatment of data. But the subjective element does not receive sufficient emphasis.

### THE UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE

The subjective element receives unexpected emphasis in Prof. Heisenberg's principle of Indeterminacy. The element of uncertainty revealed by the analysis of sub-atomic phenomena is present in the movement of macroscopic bodies also, but the error is so small in the latter case that we neglect it for all practical purposes. It is not this that surprises us, though even here we note the influence of subjective interests which render the neglect of small quantities permissible. What is astonishing is that this element of indeterminism is claimed to have a deterministic basis. "The product of the two uncertainties comes out as  $h$ , Planck's constant. The uncertainties have a basis of certainty. So the law of determinism is vindicated." In such an argument there are two fundamental assumptions which are illogical. (1) The mathematical constant is objectified into an existent reality; (2) It is forgotten that the number representing the constant is itself the result of a long series of mathematical deductions involving purely conceptual manipulations, omission of *small* quantities and similar subjective operations. No objection need be taken to the statement that indeterminism rests on a deterministic basis, if it be remembered that this deterministic basis in its turn rests upon a subjective basis which may become indeterministic at any moment.

### THE NATURAL CONSTANTS

Physics makes use of such constants as the cosmic constant, the velocity of light, Planck's constant, the mass of a hydrogen atom, etc. A natural constant is, according to Sir Arthur Eddington, "a name given to a measured quantity which is continually being used or referred to." Constants have to be measured by arbitrarily chosen standards of

length, but if we succeed in reducing them to some natural standard, then they will figure as pure mathematical ratios. Hence we cannot deny the proposition that the natural constant is a monumental evidence of the subjective element in physical data.

Prof. Dirac once exclaimed, "Beware of making any mathematical models or pictures at all!" His warning really amounts to this: the physicist should refrain from objectifying his conceptual hypotheses and claiming for them real existence independent of the mind.

The metaphysical implications of mathematical physics are brought out in an admirable chapter on "The Theory of Groups" in Sir Arthur Eddington's book, *New Pathways in Science*. "Our account of the external world" says Sir Arthur, "must necessarily be a 'Jabberwocky' of unknowable actors executing unknowable actions."..... ".....this mathematical way of describing 'everything with which we deal emphasises, perhaps inadvertantly, an important physical truth. Usually when we wish to consider a problem about a hydrogen atom, we take a blank sheet of paper and mark in first the proton and then the election, that is all there is to the problem unless or until we draw something else that we suppose to be present. The atom thus presents itself as a work of creation—a creation which can be stopped at any stage. When we have created our hydrogen atom, we may or may not go on to create a universe for it to be part of. But the real hydrogen atoms that we experiment on are something selected from an always present universe, often selected or segregated experimentally, and in any case selected in our thoughts. And we are learning to recognise that a hydrogen atom would not be what it is, were it not the result of a selective operation performed on that maze of interrelatedness which we call the Universe."

A critical examination of experimental science which depends so largely on mathematical calculations reveals the determining influence of the subjective element, and thus supports the conclusion of the previous section.

### III

#### THE LAWS OF SCIENCE

A law of science has been looked upon as something that is purely objective, Universal and rigorous in its operation admitting of no exception. The fascination that this conception of the scientific law exercised over the human mind has been so powerful that those who were unwilling to grant the permanence or objectivity of anything, of even a personal God, were prepared to admit the objectivity of law. All things in

the Universe obey the law. There was a time when the human mind fondly clung to the belief that these laws were merely *discovered* by scientific exploration, just as the invisible animalcule are revealed by the microscope. This belief is false, because law is a creation of the mind. In the creation of such a law the scientist uses subjectively determined elements called facts, which undergo a further subjective transformation in the process of computing the statistical average. The average is obtained by a method of subjective selection. Besides, the scientist proceeds on the pious hope that the errors (positive and negative) cancel themselves, and will, through mutual annihilation, show up the truth. So it turns out that "what we call a law of nature is nothing else than any one of the regularities observed in natural occurrences." It is merely the statement of a statistical average. "It states a numerical relation between qualities that are capable of being isolated, and the range of its applicability extends over the range of values of these qualities for which they can be mentally isolated."<sup>16</sup> Nature's laws are of a thoroughly statistical character. "The demand for an absolute law in the background of the statistical law goes beyond the reach of experience."

Law ; then, is heavily weighted with subjective elements.

The extra-ordinary claim of objectivity made on behalf of scientific law overlooks the fact that such law is progressively shaped through careful inductive reasoning. The hypothesis with which the scientist starts his inductive investigation is the result of thinking together the observed *facts* and of perceiving their inter-relationship. Such a hypothesis has to be developed and verified. The process of verification can never be completed and the progressive development of the hypothesis is an endless task. But there comes a moment in the history of such a process when the scientist feels the urge to raise the hypothesis to the level of a theory. Finding that, for the moment at least, the hypothesis explains all the known facts, he launches it forth as a law, and thereafter claims for it universal validity. When it has enjoyed undisputed sway over the scientific world for sometime, it comes to be believed in as a kind super-human force which all nature should obey.

In his book, "*The Nature of the Physical World*," Sir Arthur Eddington says, "An aged college Bursar once dwelt secluded in his rooms devoting himself entirely to accounts. He realised the intellectual and other activities of the college only as they presented themselves in bills. . . . . "Ha!" said the Bursar, "I have discovered one of the Great laws controlling the college. It is a perfect and exact law of the real



world. Credit must be called plus and debit minus ; and so we have the law of conservation of £. s. d. This is the true way to find out things.”<sup>17</sup> This is the way by which scientific laws were found out ; but the scientist unconsciously glides into the comforting belief that his laws are omniscient entities. But fortunately for him there occur in his world periodic upheavals which awaken him to a realisation of the subjective nature of his laws. At the present moment a shock of unprecedented severity is shaking science to its very foundations. More than the relativity and quantum theories, the principle of uncertainty is revealing the subjective element in the laws of physics. With the disappearance of the deterministic background, the scientist is forced to admit that all laws are of a statistical nature and that they are “ nothing else than . . . . regularities observed in natural occurrences.”

A scientific law is the result of the creative activity of the mind in which the relational faculty plays the most significant role. Such a law is bound to progress endlessly. To believe that it exists independently of the mind, and that the mind obeys these laws is the greatest conceivable illusion.

In his epoch-making British Association Presidential Address delivered at Aberdeen on September 5, 1924 Sir James Jeans says, “ what remains is in any case very different from the full-blooded and the forbidding materialism of the Victorian scientist. His objective and material universe is proved to consist of little more than constructs of our own minds. To this extent, then, modern physics has moved in the direction of philosophic idealism. Mind and matter, if not proved to be of similar nature, are at least found to be ingredients of one single system. There is no longer room for the kind of dualism which has haunted philosophy since the days of Descartes.”

We have, within our experience, witnessed the passing away of two types of dualism—the dualism of matter and energy, and of space and time—. It will not be long before the dualism of mind and matter fades out completely.

## REFERENCES

- Bavink :—The Anatomy of Modern Science.  
 Berkeley, H :—Mysticism in Modern Mathematics.  
 Broad :—Scientific Thought.  
 Burt :—Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science.

- Clifford :—The Common Sense of Exact Sciences.  
 Darwin :—The New Conceptions of Matter.  
 Eddington :—Nature of the Physical World.  
 Eddington :—New Pathways in Science.  
 Einstein :—The World as I see it.  
 Gregory :—Discovery.  
 Haldane :—Mechanism, Life and Personality.  
 Henry :—A new Fundamentalism.  
 Hobson :—The Domain of Natural Science.  
 Inge, W. R. :—God and the Astronomers.  
 Jeffreys :—Scientific Inference.  
 Jeans :—The Mysterious Universe.  
 Jeans :—The New Background of Science.  
 Joad :—The Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science.  
 Levy :—The Universe of Science.  
 McDougall :—The Frontiers of Psychology.  
 Milne :—Relativity, Gravitation and world Structure.  
 Parsons :—The Universe of our Experience.  
 Planck :—Where is Science Going ?  
 Poincare :—The Grammar of Science.  
 Poincare :—Science and Method.  
 Rast : Modern Views of Atomic Structure.  
 Richmond : The Dilemma of Modern Physics.  
 Silberstein :—Causality.  
 Sullivan :—The limitations of Science.  
 Schrödinger :—Science and the Human Temperament.  
 Tenant :—Philosophy of the Sciences.  
 Westaway :—The Endless Quest.  
 Whitehead :—Science and the Modern World.  
 Weyl :—The Open World.  
 Younghusband :—The Living Universe.

# A Brief History of English Scholarship

By

M. S. SUNDARAM

(*Annamalai University*)

N.B.—The following studies are based on the lectures of Prof. Nichol Smith given to a small class of research students in Oxford in the Michaelmas and Hilary terms 1933-34.

## EARLY ENGLISH ANTIQUARIES

Bishop Selden, a great collector of manuscripts, scholar and Orientalist, once made the cynical remark, "No man is wiser for his learning." And yet learning has had its devotees from the beginning of civilisation, and men have toiled hard in the mere acquisition of knowledge. Of the two classes of people, those that read to live and those that live to read, the former have always laughed at and ridiculed the latter. The men that live to read have generally been jeered at as book-worms, unfit for the great practical affairs of life. Lord Morley once set himself a problem, which he failed to pursue, to consider the relative importance between great literary performance and great political performance, between the making of history and the writing of it—a contrast which he believed "would contain matter enough not only for one, but for a whole series of edifying and instructive discourses." A similar contrast could be made between those that imparted learning and those that acquired it. Just as the makers of history would have been forgotten had it not been for the writers and recorders of it, so too would the givers of knowledge if the collectors of knowledge had failed to do their task. The man of letters writes out of the profundity of his thoughts, feelings and experiences, and in his wake comes the patient plodding scholar who discharges the rather dull laborious task of collecting, collating, editing, annotating and interpreting. We read the works of Homer, Chaucer, Shakespeare in up-to-date editions and texts, but we seldom realise that our good fortune in possessing the best that has been thought and said by these writers is due to the labours of scores of scholars who have spent many weary hours in acquiring and preserving in their purity what has been written by others. Imagine where Shakespeare would have been but for the labours of Hall, Hollinshed, Rowe, Pope, Hanmer, Warburton, Johnson and Theobald down to Boswell and Malone. A scholar is he who pursues knowledge for its own sake ; he does not ask for recognition, and he does not pursue knowledge for any social ends. The history of

English scholarship is a record of the lives and work of English scholars who have helped in the mighty task of handing down the great heritage of the language and literature of England.

### JOHN LELAND, 1506-1552

The term "Antiquary" was first bestowed as a title by king Henry VIII on John Leland. Twenty years after the death of Leland, the Society of Antiquaries was founded at the instance of Archbishop Parker, but it was soon suppressed on the accession of James I owing to suspicion of the political opinions of some of its members. The society was reconstituted only in 1718. Many English Antiquaries pursued their labours living obscure lives and unrecognised by contemporaries long before the inauguration of the society under royal charter. Earliest and foremost in their list was John Leland.

He was born in London and was educated first at St. Paul's School and later at Christ's College, Cambridge. In those days it was not unusual for students of one University to migrate to other Universities for completing their education. After leaving Cambridge, Leland joined All Soul's College, Oxford, and finally completed his studies at the University of Paris. He became a finished scholar in Latin and Greek and also acquired a thorough knowledge of French, Spanish and Italian. After the manner of the learned men of the day, he took holy orders and in 1536 obtained the patronage of the king who made him royal chaplain and keeper of the library in the royal household.

In 1533 Leland was made King's Antiquary, an office which had neither predecessor nor successor. In the same year a commission was granted him under the great seal "directing him to make a search for English antiquities in the libraries of all cathedrals, abbeys, priories and colleges, and all places where records, writings and secrets of antiquity were deposited." Leland had an inborn passion for knowledge, and a greed for collecting books and manuscripts wherever they were to be found. His antiquarian tour lasted nearly for nine years, during which, he says he spared himself neither labour nor cost. He claims to have visited "every bay, river, lake, mountain, valley, moor, heath, wood, city, castle, manor house, monastery, and college in the land." His object was to publish a monumental work on "The History and Antiquities of this Nation."

In his zeal for knowledge, he had to encounter a great many difficulties. The monasteries which were till then the safe repositories of books and manuscripts had suffered great havoc at the time of their dissolution, and many monks and scholars had run away with their cherished books into different parts of the country. Some had secreted these valuable

treasures abroad on the continent. Leland was greatly distressed and begged Thomas Cromwell, the king's minister, to extend his commission so as to enable him to collect whatever manuscripts he could obtain for the king's library. He wrote, "It would be a great profit to students and honour to this realm, whereas now the Germans perceiving our desidiousness and negligence do send daily young scholars hither that spoileth them and cutteth them out of libraries, returning home and putting them abroad as monuments of their own country," Leland's wish was partly satisfied, and he managed to despatch most of the valuable manuscripts from St. Augustine's Abbey in Canterbury.

In 1545 after completing his labours Leland presented an address to the king entitled "A New Year's Gift" in which he described the aims and manner of his antiquarian's researches. His ambitions were almost too high to be accomplished in a single life-time. He planned a work on the antiquities or civil history of the British Isles in 50 volumes; a survey of the islands adjoining Britain including the Isle of Wight, Anglesea and the Isle of Man in 6 volumes; and an account of the nobility in 3 volumes. By 1545 he had prepared a complete account of the Early English writers and a description of the places he had visited, and of Roman, Saxon and Danish remains of which he could obtain first-hand knowledge and also an account of many old coins and their inscriptions. He spent the remainder of his life in the parish of St. Michael arranging his notes. In the midst of his labour his already overworked brain suddenly gave way, and he became incurably insane and died in 1552 without recovering his reason. A contemporary attributed Leland's mental failure to his remorse at his having left the Catholic church, but there is no foundation for this statement.

More than a century was to pass before Leland's works were published. Leland's manuscript collections were dispersed through carelessness of the trustees to whose charge they were committed, and some of them were sold abroad. The five volumes of his *Collectanea* and the manuscript of his *Itinerary* together with his notes on antiquities, catalogues, and the account of the English writers passed into the hands of William Burton who presented them to the Bodleian Library. Some passed into the hands of Sir Robert Cotton and are found to-day in Cottonian collection in the British Museum. Many antiquaries had access to Leland's manuscripts and some actually plagiarised him. Bale who followed Leland's footsteps in collecting matter on English authors partly transcribed Leland's notes from the *Commentarii de Scriptoribus*. Holinshed, Harrison and Stow freely borrowed from Leland's works, and Camden, Dugdale and Burton owed a great deal of their information to his researches. Camden was rightly accused of "unfairly feathering his

nest with Leland's plumes." Bishop Tanner was engaged in arranging Leland's writings for publication when a surreptitious and hasty edition of Leland's *Commentarii de Scriptoribus* appeared under the editorship of Anthony Hall in 1709. But we owe our authentic publication of Leland's works to another great antiquary, Thomas Hearne, who, in 1710, brought out in Oxford the *Itinerary of John Leland, the Antiquary* in 9 volumes; the *Collectanea* was published by the same editor five years later in six volumes.

### JOHN BALE, 1495-1563

Though Leland's senior in years, Bale's antiquarian researches were made at a later date than Leland's, and he had not the advantages of royal patronage which went a long way in enabling Leland to collect much valuable material. He spent most of his life in exile owing to religious persecutions at home. He was educated at a Carmelite convent and then at Jesus College, Cambridge. He was at first an ardent Roman Catholic, and his conversion to Protestantism was rather sudden. He scandalised the Catholics by renouncing his monastic habit and the vows of his order and by taking a wife. He escaped punishment owing to the patronage of Thomas Cromwell who recognised in him a great scholar and man of letters. Bale was already known to the public as a dramatist; his dramas were some of the earliest moralities and interludes in the language, and their main object was to attack Catholicism. One of his well-known plays was entitled *A Breve Comedy or Enterlude of Johan Baptistes Preachynge in the Wyldernes; openynge the craftye Assaults of the Hypocrates (the monks) with the glorious Baptyme of the Lord Jesus Crist*. Another of his popular interludes was called *King Johan*.

Bale made several enemies by his violent outspokenness, and on the fall of Cromwell, he had to leave the country as an exile to Germany. He returned for a short period in the reign of Edward VI but had to go back to the continent on the accession of Mary Tudor. He came home finally in the reign of Elizabeth, and lived an obscure life as prebendary of Canterbury dying in that office in 1563.

Bale was less of a plodding scholar and more of a versatile genius than Leland. His historical and theological learning were of a high order. His scholarship was obscured by his bitter controversial nature which won him the name of "Bilious Bale." His most important work was the history of English writers which appeared in 1548 under the title *Illustrium Majoris Britannae Scriptorum Summarium in quinque centurias divisum*. In this he arranged chronologically the lives and works of English authors. He borrowed largely his information from Leland's

*Collectanea*, but very often he elaborated Leland's notes and added fresh information based on his own examination of manuscripts in the monasteries. Many of the manuscripts he mentions have been lost now.

### JOHN PITS, 1560-1616

While Bale in his zeal for the new faith wilfully neglected the Catholic writers, John Pits being a Catholic made a careful record of all Catholic writings and omitted mention of the Protestants or at best treated them with ridicule. Pits was a student of New College, Oxford, and would have been elected a permanent fellow of that house, but he chose a voluntary exile for conscience' sake and lived abroad. He became a member of the English College at Rome, studied philosophy and divinity for several years and was ordained priest.

His principal work was *De Illustribus Angliae Scriptoribus* in which he made a record of all the English writers, and although he abhorred Bale for his religious opinions, he borrowed freely from the latter's writings. He notes with derision Wycliffe and the Wycliffites, and says that their name denotes "Weak belief" or "Wicked belief." Pit's catalogues are indispensable for our knowledge of the Catholic writers of the century. He records several interesting anecdotes one of which is about John Heywood, the author of the *Four Ps*. It is said that when Heywood was on his deathbed the priest consoled him saying repeatedly that "the flesh was weak," to which the witty dramatist retorted, "But you are finding fault with the Almighty for not making me fish?"

Leland, Bale and Pits—"the three Johns"—are generally grouped together as the earliest English Antiquaries. A contemporary characterised them drawing a contrast between them that "Leland was the industrious bee working, Bale was the angry wasp stinging, and Pits was the idle drone stealing."

### THOMAS TANNER, 1674-1735

Among the antiquaries of the seventeenth century, Tanner, Bishop of St. Asaph, occupies a very high place. He graduated from Queen's College, Oxford, and became Warden of All Soul's College in 1695. When at Queen's he was deeply influenced by Leland's manuscripts, and in collaboration with Gibson, afterwards Bishop of London, he began his researches in antiquities. His great ambition was to bring out a complete edition of all Leland's works, and though his proposals received little encouragement, he laboured at it for several years. But another antiquary and member of Queen's College, Anthony Hall anticipated Tanner by publishing hastily Leland's *Commentarii* much to the vexation of Tanner. This edition was full of grave errors owing to Hall's impa-

tience to read the manuscripts correctly. Thomas Hearne had a poor opinion of Hall's attainments as a scholar—"A dull stupid sleepy fellow, a man of no industry, it being common with him to lye a bed till very near dinner time and to drink very freely of the strongest liquors."

Tanner's masterpiece was the *Bibliotheca Britannico-Hibernica* at which he laboured for nearly forty years. In this work Tanner proposed to give a detailed account of all the authors that flourished within the three kingdoms from the earliest times up to the beginning of the seventeenth century. This monumental work did not appear till 1748, thirteen years after the author's death.

Besides this Tanner amassed vast materials for a history of Wiltshire. He was also the author of another important work, *Notitia Monastica*, a short history of the religious houses of England and Wales. He was an indefatigable collector of manuscripts and books. He gave them as a free gift to the Bodleian Library, but they sustained serious damage as the boat in which they were brought from Norwich to Oxford was submerged in water, and the books remained for nearly twenty hours under water before they were reclaimed.

#### THOMAS HEARNE, 1678-1735

The foremost among the antiquaries of the seventeenth century was Thomas Hearne. Learning was his passion and books and manuscripts were his chief companions. Pope had a very poor opinion of researchers in general ; he called them

"the bookful blockheads ignorantly read  
With loads of learned lumber in their head."

For Thomas Hearne he had nothing short of contempt ; he included Hearne in the *Dunciad* under the name of Wormius :

"But who is he in closet close ypent  
Of sober face, with learned dust besprent ?  
Right well mine eyes arede the myster wight,  
On parchment scraps yfed, and Wormius hight,  
To future ages may thy dulness last  
As thou preservest the dulness of the past."

Hearne's life was remarkable in many ways. Born of a poor family, he was sent as a boy to do day labour for livelihood. A patron sent him to school, and later to St. Edmund Hall, Oxford. A born lover of books, he spent practically all his time in the Bodleian Library, and became Assistant Keeper, in which office, he amassed a minute knowledge of books of



all kinds in the library. He became so attached to the Bodleian that he refused several other offices including the Librarianship of the Royal Society and the Camden Professorship of History. In 1716 he was actually ejected out of the Bodleian as a result of his refusal to take the oath of loyalty to the Hanoverian dynasty. He boasted that "he preferred a good conscience before all manner of preferment and worldly honour." He remained in Edmund Hall for the rest of his life.

He was the first to succeed in doing full justice to the works of Leland. He published both the *Itinerary* and the *Collectanea* after careful revision in fifteen volumes. Such was his passion for antiquities that whatever was old had a special attraction for him, and he had a poor sense of discrimination between what was great and what was useless among antiquities. It was rightly inscribed on his tomb, "Who studied and preserved antiquities."

He left behind a great many volumes of diaries which have been published in recent years by the Oxford Historical Society. They contain an intimate and outspoken record of his opinions about men and things, of University and public matters, of books and authors. His opinions of his contemporaries are often damaging and brutally frank. For instance, Bishop Trelawny "was an illiterate, mean, silly, trifling, and impertinent fellow." Mr. Trapp, the Professor of Poetry, was "a most silly, rash, hot-headed fellow." Charlett was "of a strange unaccountable vanity." Lancaster, Provost of Queen's "was the worst Vice-Chancellor that ever was in Oxon who raised to himself a pillar of infamy." Hearne does not spare even the wives of his antagonists; "Tanner's wife is remarkable for drinking of brandy;" "Kennett's wife wears the breeches and manages him as his haughty insolent temper deserves." To his contemporaries Hearne was a very disagreeable man, but English scholarship owes him a great debt.

#### ANTHONY A WOOD, 1632-1695

It is hard to find a more notoriously disagreeable and peevish-tempered person among the great English antiquaries than Anthony a Wood. He matriculated at Merton College, Oxford, and was considered a dull pupil as he took five years to obtain the B.A. degree. He never thought of a profession seriously and spent his days in idling and amusing himself with music and books on History and Heraldry. Dugdale's *Warwickshire* inspired him to attempt a similar book for his own shire of Oxford. With this object in view he took lodgings opposite his College, and immersed himself in the task of collecting all possible materials in connection with Oxford. He planned a historical survey of the city of Oxford including the University, the colleges, the monasteries, the parish

churches, and devoted his whole time to this task for full six years. He worked all the morning at his books in the libraries or in his room, and in the afternoons wandered about all the bookshops picking up old books and pamphlets. In 1674 appeared his book *Historia et Antiquitates : Oxon : Univ.*

The book by which Wood is justly celebrated is the biographical dictionary of the Oxford writers and Bishops, known as *Athenae Oxonienses*. The idea of such a work originated from Dr. John Fell, Dean of Christ Church, and Wood immediately set out to the task. He made tireless researches in all the Oxford libraries and private collections for information about those connected with Oxford. The book appeared in two volumes in 1691-92. "This great work," said Sir Walter Raleigh, "as splendid a benefaction as has ever been conferred by a single donor on any University, was conceived and executed by its author out of love for the place where he was born and had his education. Like a disdainful beauty, the University of Oxford has often been careless of those who love and serve her best." Wood spent a lifetime in the service of Oxford, but he made innumerable enemies, and was forbidden to enter his own college on account of the quarrels with the fellows. He never held any office in the University, but lived an obscure life confined to his hermit's cell. Of the greatness of this work there can be no two opinions. Hundreds of later critics and biographers have used these volumes as trustworthy authority for their facts. "The *Athenae Oxonienses* is a monument of literature ; it records in its thousands of columns all that Oxford meant to the world, all of learning and beauty that she gave to the world, during centuries of her existence."

(To be continued)

# Some Notes on "Sir Gawayn and the Greene Knight"\*

By

V. S. KRISHNAN

(*Annamalai University*)

The purpose of this paper is to offer a few notes to certain passages in "Sir Gawayn and the Greene Knight." Tolkein and Gordon's Edition of the poem has met a long-felt need in the study of Middle English Literature. They have made the poem available for the first time, in a well-edited and well-printed text. In the transcription of the manuscript and in the interpretation of many difficult passages, they have shown great care and acuteness.

It is therefore all the more desirable that in the few instances where additional notes or corrections are required, they should be immediately supplied. A more intense study of the North and North-West Midland texts, and a greater acquaintance with the dialects have helped to throw light on certain phrases and passages, which were considered obscure even by Tolkein and Gordon. For instance, the discovery in a North-West Midland text, of the phrase "bi lag mon" has solved a passage in "Sir Gawayn" which had been a puzzle to editors. "bi lag mon" was a colloquial phrase quite common in that district, meaning "to lead astray." The MS. of "Sir Gawayn and the Greene Knight" reads at l. 1729 "bi lag mon". Not being able to make any sense out of it Tolkein and Gordon, following Napier and Gollancz, emended it to "bi lagged men." Now that a sense has been found for the MS. reading, the original is to be retained.

In the following paragraphs a few further notes are offered. There is one passage, in special, which has been much overlooked, but which fixes the date of the poem within a fairly definite period. I shall take that passage first.

(1) The word "Capados" occurs in two places in the poem. When the poet describes the appearance of the Green Knight, he compares his flowing hair and beard to a "capados".

\*I am greatly indebted to Dr. (Mrs.) Elizabeth Wright D. Litt. (Leeds), for valuable suggestions I received when I read the text with her. This paper is largely the result of those suggestions.

" in the Wyse  
Of a Kinges *Capados* that closes his Swyre." (185—6).

Again, in describing the different parts of Sir Gawain's dress he speaks of his *capados* :

" And sythen a crafty *capados*, closed aloft  
That with a bryzt *blaunner* was bounden within." (572—3).

In the N. E. D. this word is entered as rare and obsolete, and the only instances quoted of its use are these two passages in "Sir Gawayn". The word, however, occurs frequently in the wardrobe accounts of Edward III. The N. E. D. editors quote Madden's explanation of the word as French *cap-è-dos* meaning a "cape to the back". But they rightly say that this explanation is unsatisfactory, because this phrase is not found in any French Dictionary. The meaning they give to the word is : "a hood, a piece to protect the back of the neck."

Prof. Tolkein in his notes quotes Napier, and apparently agrees with his explanation that "it is *not a hood*, but a tunic made of cappadocian leather". But neither Napier nor Prof. Tolkein say why it should be called "Kinges *capados*". If *capados* meant only a tunic, what is the distinctive feature of the 'King's tunic' to which the hair and beard of the Green Knight are compared ?

As an explanation of "Kinges *capados*" I would refer to a parallel passage in the poem in l. 2297 :

" The hyze hode that Arthur the razt."

where the Green Knight speaks of the hood that Gawain wears, a hood that King Arthur has presented to him.

I would equate "*capados*" with "*hode*", agreeing with N. E. D. It is a separate garment made of cappadocian leather, lined inside with costly fur ("*blaunner*"). The illustrations of 14th century knightly armour show such a hood covering the head, with an oval opening for the face, which can be closed up tight round the neck (cf. "closes his swyre" and "closed aloft") and hanging down behind protecting the shoulder and chest,

" That half his armes ther-under were halched." (l. 185).

The order in which Sir Gawayne dons the different parts of his armour (see l. 580 et seq.) shows that *capados* was a hood, on the top of which, shielding the head, came the "*awentayle*" (l. 608) and above that the helmet. The *byrne* was worn over the doublet, and on that the surcoat

with armorial devices. In all these details the dress of Sir Gawayn corresponds exactly to that worn by the knights of the Order of the Garter in Edward III's time.

There are evidences—pointed out already by several editors—to prove that this is a “Garter poem”, composed to celebrate that order of knighthood founded recently. The sentence at the close of the poem : “Hony soyt qui mae pence” is the motto of the order of the Garter. We know that the order was founded by Edward III in about 1358. In the wardrobe accounts of Edward III there are references to the mantle, hood and surcoat belonging to this order from 1358-9 onwards. It was, besides, the King's custom to distribute among the knights of his household the cloth and fur for the surcoat and hood. Taking, therefore, that “capados” means “hood”, “Kinges capados”, would mean, as l. 2297 more explicitly says, the hood presented by the King to his knights, as was Edward III's custom.

The allusions to the Order of the Garter and the reference to the “Kinges capados” would confirm the date of the poem as somewhere between the founding of the order and the death of Edward III, i.e., between 1348 and 1377.

(2) In ll. 35-36 of the poem Tolkein has found “an interesting testimony of the continuity of the alliterative tradition” :

“With lel letters loken  
In londe so has been longe.”

He apparently takes “lel letters loken” to mean alliterative words, strung together in verse, according to the O. E. tradition, which persisted in the North-West Midlands down to the fourteenth century. But surely this is fanciful. The author of “Sir Gawayn” was a self-conscious artist ; but not so self-conscious as to start the poem announcing his thoroughly “nationalist” tradition ! Besides—and this is more conclusive—“loken”, the p.p. of *louken*, O.E. *lucan*, cannot mean the technical linking together of alliterative words in poetry. The N. E. D. does *not* give this as one of the meanings of this word. Prof. Tolkein's wish to prove a continuity of alliterative tradition is perhaps father to this explanation. More simply, the words may mean “cloathed in true language”.

(3) As Sir Gawain approaches the castle of the Green Knight, he sees from a distance its walls, ramparts and towers :

“And sythen garytes ful gaye gered betwene  
Wyth mony luflych loupe, that louked ful clene, (ll. 791—2).

Prof. Tolkein glosses the word "louked" rightly as a weak preterite of "louken", but takes it to mean "closed" or "locked", agreeing with the subject "loupe". He then would translate it thus: "(He then saw) fine towers built in the intervening spaces, with many beautiful windows that closed firmly." This interpretation seems somewhat ludicrous when the scene is visualised. Sir Gawain is yet at a good distance from the castle; he sees far away the wide ditches, high walls and towers of the castle. He certainly could not from his position see if the windows have been or could be properly and firmly closed without the aid of a telescope!

It seems, therefore, to make better sense if "louked" is taken as a verb agreeing with "Garytes", and the clause "wyth mony luflych loupe" is considered parenthetical. "Louken", as the N. E. D. points out, meant also "to form one mass, to close up". Eg. in "Genesis and Exodus" (1250) we have the sentence: "God him bad helden up his hand toward this water, in a morgen quile, pe se *luked*." The principal sentence would then be: "Garytes ful gaye gered betwene . . . pat louked ful clene" i.e. ("the towers erected in the intervening spaces . . . formed a fine mass").

(4) In l. 2012,

"And bade him bryng hym his bruny, and his blonk sadel."

the word "sadel" is surely a verb: "he bade him bring his hawberk, and saddle his horse." But in the glossary of Tolkein and Gordon's Edition of the poem it is put down as a noun! This is probably a slip.

# Unemployment—its Causes and Cure

By

B. V. NARAYANASWAMI NAIDU

(*Annamalai University*)

For more than a decade now the problem of unemployment has been very much before the public eye. The disproportionate number of applicants for Government appointments and the sight of educated and qualified young men rusting for want of work have roused the attention of public men and of Government. It is clear therefore that the problem of unemployment in this country was at first viewed from the standpoint of the middle-class educated young man, who was unable to secure suitable work. But it would be well if we try to remember that the problem of unemployment is by no means confined either to the educated or to the middle-class. The term unemployment itself is often loosely used. Here we may take it to mean the absence of suitable employment to those who are willing and qualified for work but who, due to various causes, have been unable to fit into the economic structure of society. Unemployment on a large scale is an economic waste and a political danger ; and no time or energy devoted to this pressing question would be superfluous.

The importance of this problem has been recognised in all the progressive countries of the world. Everywhere the state has recognised its duty to provide proper employment for its citizens by the promotion of industries and public works and to introduce unemployment insurance. The task of insuring employment for 36 crores of people is a stupendous one indeed ; yet for the ordered progress of this country the problem has to be faced. The socialist state in Russia claims to have abolished unemployment while the abolition of unemployment finds a prominent place in the political programmes of the leaders in Italy, Germany, America and England. For this purpose the Fascist state has assumed a rigid control of the economic machinery of the country. President Roosevelt with his New Deal is also facing the same problem by attempting a via-media between socialism and unbridled capitalism. Nazi policy in Germany is also largely influenced by the question of employment and it is well known to all that a national government came into existence in England in response to an urgent call for economic reorganisation. State action in all these countries has been directed to extending (if necessary) and improving industry by state help, to providing larger avenues for employment by increased public works

and spending policies and to enabling the profits of agriculture and industry to be distributed among as many men as possible by the help given to co-operative endeavour by the reduction of the number of hours of work and by the improvement of wages. It is increasingly realised that economic prosperity and the consequent disappearance of unemployment depend upon the co-ordination and the direction of all the powers of the state to this one end : peace should be assured, friendly treaties formed with foreign countries, credit extended to private enterprise, exchange and currency policy modified according to the demands of employment and education and transport so organised as to subserve the best interests of sustained economic progress. Large sums of money are spent by modern states to mitigate the evils of unemployment by unemployment insurance and relief and by social service for the unemployed.

The nature of the unemployment problem in India is peculiar. While it has been repeatedly asserted that the problem of unemployment has always been present in India no statistics are available to gauge the extent of industrial and agricultural unemployment in this country. It cannot be doubted that when India was under a complete mediæval economy the agricultural labourer could find work in his off-time in a host of minor industries—artistic and utilitarian—which are largely patronised by the well-to-do and aristocratic classes. But the impact of the machine has torn up the fabric of Indian economic life and far-reaching adjustments are inevitable if India should come within measurable distance of the more progressive nations of the world. Let us now try to study in greater detail the problem of middle-class educated unemployment.

The growing difficulty to secure employment began to be felt in the years after the war. Attention was drawn to this problem for the first time in Bengal in 1922 by a resolution in the local Legislative Council. Soon it was taken up in other provinces and the late Mr. A. Rangaswamy Ayyangar moved the following resolution in the Legislative Assembly on the 20th January, 1926 :

That this Assembly recommends to the Governor-General in Council that he may be pleased to appoint a committee having a non-official majority to investigate into the problem of unemployment among the middle-classes and suggest remedies for the same.

This resolution was carried by a narrow majority in spite of Government opposition. Two years later the question was again raised in the Council of State and the Government spokesman said, as his colleague in the Assembly had done, that the subject was primarily one of provincial concern. Later on some governments appointed committees to study



this question. So also in the Indian State of Travancore a committee reported on this problem. The latest of such reports is undoubtedly the best—that of the committee appointed by the U.P. Government and presided over by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. The question was referred to by Lord Willingdon in his farewell speech to the Assembly and it was touched upon by the present Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, in his broadcast message.

Though the acuteness of the problem of unemployment has been realised from the Viceregal Lodge down to the meanest hut, though the question has agitated press and platform alike, though much thinking silent and vocal has been expended on it, in spite of this unanimity as to its existence, there has been no agreement as to its causes. Causes many and various have been diagnosed for this economic malaise and it is to be hoped that while the wise doctors differ the patient does not continue to suffer. In spite of the divergence of opinion it is easy to perceive that there is a thread of truth running through all these explanations while each view in its exclusiveness of the others seems merely to lose sight of the forest in the presence of the trees. While the whole world is yet within the grip of unprecedented depression it is but fair to expect that India cannot escape the gale. This, however, is only a temporary feature and causes of a more permanent and fundamental nature should be sought in the temper and outlook of the people, in the attitude of the government and in the demands of a fast changing world economy. It has been contended that while India's population has grown and is growing out of proportion to her food supply—a journalist saying that there is a downpour of babies in India—the professional and official classes are too slow in adapting themselves to the new conditions; the educated are averse to manual labour while those classes which had hitherto never competed for office or profession now seem to see their salvation in these and nothing else. It is not true to say that the educated classes are averse to all physical labour; nor is it true that the labouring classes now crave only for office. The aversion of the educated man to manual work extends only to such forms of it as give no scope for him to employ his better brains and give play to his wider knowledge and larger outlook. The self-conscious and self-respecting labour classes fight merely against hereditary and customary restrictions; they are eager to take up any calling which brings in wealth provided it is not branded with the stigma of social inferiority. Therefore if there is economic stagnation and waste it is due to lack of the free play of opportunity.

Agriculture has ceased to be a paying industry and when prices are low there is no great incentive for agricultural expansion or for spontaneous agricultural colonisation. Lack of diversified employment, ab-

sence of new professions, inadequacy of large-scale industry and want of economic planning have left India a straggler in the race for industry, a weakling, poor and ill-fed, subsisting on the fast diminishing returns of a diseased and overburdened system of agriculture. In a fast changing world where decisions of far-reaching importance have to be taken quickly and courageously routine and rule of thumb cannot pay ; but what is wanted is bold and far-sighted planning to meet the future industrial and economic needs of the country.

It is easy to realise that whatever the causes a mine of potential wealth is lost to the country by the enforced idleness of numbers of young men who might have been employed in useful production. While the young men rust and deteriorate for want of healthy occupation society has to meet the additional burden of supporting hungry mouths which are unable to find food for themselves. Those who are trained to professions or skilled occupations lose their efficiency and are robbed of the cunning of their hands by the stealthy march of time and the extra money spent on their training is so much dead capital. Unable to find work the young men grow up without the habit of work, deteriorate physically and mentally. Helpless and hopeless they fall easy victims to any propaganda which dangles before them hopes of a change. It does not matter to them what that change is ; because no change whatsoever can be to them a change for the worse. Can any one wonder that advocates of extreme views find a congenial soil in our unhappy country ?

Coming next to the remedies for unemployment we have first to realise that the question of unemployment is indissolubly bound up with the question of education. The Sapru Report says thus regarding this point : “ The more we have studied the entire problem, the more we have felt convinced that the time has come for a revision of our entire educational policy . . . In short, our opinion is that education must be brought into line with the needs of the country. There must be some correlation between education and the use that is going to be made of the educational product. We are clearly of the opinion that in future education and employment must be viewed together.” Regarding Primary Education the Sapru Report observes that primary education should be calculated not merely to remove illiteracy but also to enable boys to become better agriculturists and more useful members of village communities and recommends compulsory education and the raising of the age limit to 12 or 13. In the matter of secondary education two types of certificates are recommended one qualifying for admission to industrial, commercial, and agricultural schools and the other qualifying for admission to Arts and Science Intermediate Colleges. For the intermediate there should be four parallel courses in industries, in commerce, in agri-

culture, and in arts and science. "Secondary schools should provide much more diversified courses of study, care being taken to give more practical than theoretical training to our boys. The industrial courses in Secondary schools should aim at giving technical training of a general character designed to develop skill of hand and eye and cultivate practical aptitudes so as to predispose them towards industrial life. Proper agencies should be created as to their careers." Regarding University education the committee believes that many of the students who are now in the Universities ought not to be there ; that a good number of them could be deflected to industrial and commercial pursuits and recommends that those who pass the S.S.L.C. in the third class ought not to be admitted to the Universities. Greater stress should be laid on scientific and vocational education. Research in Universities should relate to matters of industrial value. Attention is also drawn to the need for co-ordination of research and to the problem of Indian students in England.

While admitting the close connection between employment and education one cannot help wondering whether the committee has not taken a too narrowly utilitarian view of the problem. The recommendation to give rural bias to primary education seems to forget the urban population and their special needs. Compulsory education and the increase in the number of years during which boy or girl goes to school will help to stamp out illiteracy and increase employment. There is nothing to cavil against in their recommendations regarding Secondary education ; but one cannot agree that the number of graduates turned out to-day is too many and the implication that many of them are unfit for the college course. The proportion of graduates to the population in India is smaller than that in other countries. The late Sir Asutosh Mukherjee wanted India to have as many graduates as possible and held that the promotion of scientific research without reference to immediate needs would make for the cultural and intellectual well-being of the country. No country can have too much of liberal education and scientific advance. If science and literature are neglected in the interests of immediate utilitarian ends the consequences must be grave to any country. There is an excellent case for better technical education and industrial research ; there is a very good case for the improvement of the methods of instruction ; but there can be absolutely no case for a restriction of liberal education. Even if the deplorable effect is an unintended result of a narrow pursuit of material ends these very ends suffer in the long run for want of light and leading. The best course then should be not only to make adequate provision for liberal education but also to make commercial and technological studies easily possible for a large number of people who are likely to benefit by them and who may be absorbed by the commerce and industries of the land. But one must not forget that mere

improvement or reorganisation of education can never solve the problem of unemployment in India.

One potent means of solving the problem of unemployment in India is the improvement of agriculture. Though during the past century and a half agriculture has become increasingly the preponderating occupation of the Indian people it is a common place of economic thought that the methods of agriculture in India have undergone no appreciable change for thousands of years. The scope for improving the rate of production per acre is very good indeed, since in almost every other country in the world the yield per acre is much greater. A greater yield can certainly be secured by introducing scientific cultivation leading to the preservation of natural manures, introduction of artificial manures, improvement of the seed and extension of an ensured steady and continuous supply of water. The introduction of seasonal crops and the provision of subsidiary occupations by the encouragement of small-scale cottage industries will go a long way to wipe out the unemployment of the agriculturist. Improvement is called for in the direction of livestock, credit and education. The consolidation of scattered and divided holdings, the improvement of agricultural marketing, and the standardization of weights and measures would make for the rationalization of agricultural production and the amelioration of rural conditions.

But it is often contended that the educated man can never go back to the village and be satisfied by his few acres paternal or otherwise and that the introduction of scientific methods will only reduce the scope of labour and will promote, instead of reducing, unemployment. The unsoundness of these arguments will be clearly evident when it is realised that the educated young man is asked to return not to the sloth and stagnation of an antediluvian agriculture but to be pioneer and apostle of a new agriculture, more up-to-date and scientific and hence more paying and better calculated to draw out his powers of organization and direction. What is wanted in this country is that the Zamindars and big landlords should take a keener interest in the cultivation of their lands, and be the exemplars and exponents of a healthier and more paying system of agriculture. If they set their minds to improving seed and stock, plough and field, they can provide scope for the employment of trained men. The distinction between town and country will progressively disappear if the landed men settle in the villages and in their turn attract educated men, doctors, attorneys, chemists, scientists, and men of other professions. The best form of rural uplift will then be effected and the leaven of wealth and culture and a wide and sympathetic outlook will obliterate from the minds of men memories of sickness, poverty, and squalor which have too

long been associated with our country side. Improved methods of agriculture mean an increased income to those engaged in it and the consequent rise in their standards of life will cause a host of subsidiary occupations to spring up that will absorb a good section of those who are released from the plough. Thus a social life will be created in the country side which will in no way suffer when compared with the amenities of the towns.

It has also been suggested that the problem of unemployment can be tackled by an increase in the number of posts under Government notably in the Development departments, in health and medical, in sanitation and in education and by pursuing a vigorous policy of public works. In a country steeped in illiteracy and disease scope for greater activity in these services is almost unlimited ; but we have to recognise that this must involve a substantial rise in the tax burden of the people. One must not fight shy of all additional taxation but it should be preceded by efforts to improve the taxable capacity of the people.

This can be effected only by a far-reaching policy of industrialization. In a country abounding in all the pre-requisites of industry, abundant raw materials, central location and wealth of labour, industrialization should present no difficulty provided that the nation is determined. We cannot go back to the forest and the *peepal* tree, to the clothes of bark and the pots of clay ; so we are bound to go forward to organized production, to the comforts of civilized life, to the airship and the radio. We do not want to become slaves of the machine, and fodder for cannon ; we trust that man who invented the machine can also master it and make it subserve the best interests of a common humanity. Again it has been urged against industrialization in India that capital is shy, skilled labour is rare and that industry is unorganized. The working of the Sugar Industry Protection Act of 1932 has revealed the baselessness of these arguments. While barely three years ago thousands of bags of foreign sugar were dumped into this country to-day there has been such a spectacular growth of this industry that they have already begun to think of exporting sugar to other countries. To-day capital in India is waiting for the call of industry ; the only condition she demands is the assurance of a return however low it may be. The Protection Act has given such a fillip to the sugar industry that hundreds of chemists have been absorbed by the industry and thousands of labourers gain a livelihood from it. Recognizing the need for industrial development in India the authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report say : " On all grounds, a forward policy in industrial development is urgently called for, not merely to give India economic stability, but in order to satisfy the aspirations of her people who desire to see her stand before the world

as a well poised up-to-date country, in order to provide an outlet for the energies of her young men who are otherwise drawn exclusively to Government service or to a few overstocked professions, and in order that the too speculative and literary tendencies of Indian thought may be bent to more practical ends, and the people may be better qualified to shoulder the new responsibilities which the new constitution will lay upon them," and these words are even more true to-day than they were 17 years ago. The need of the hour is whole hearted support to the policy of rapid industrialization from Government and people. These far-reaching changes cannot be effected merely by pursuing a policy of hesitating protection. We must take courage in both our hands and proceed boldly trusting that to good-will and commonsense even the apparently impossible becomes an achieved fact.

Of late counsels of despair have begun to be heard in various parts of the country. The path of wisdom for India is the path of reform and not of revolution. Insuring of a reasonable standard of life for all the men and women of this country is not synonymous with a militant faith in revolutionary socialism. Socialism as a method of thought and as an ideal in life and religion has appealed to men from very early times. But always the faith in these principles has been guided and canalized by the conditions political, religious and social that existed in the world. As India is constituted to-day to advocate immediate socialism is to exhort men to leap in the dark. Nationalization of production and thorough going control of distribution in India must involve a complete upset of the social and religious fabric of India and is so opposed to the instincts and habits of the people that it cannot for many a long year be envisaged as at all within the realm of probability. So let us not cry ourselves hoarse over the barren issues of academic socialism but sit down to work and order educational, industrial and legislative machinery in such a way as to contribute to the greatest happiness of the greatest number of our countrymen.

In the industrial sphere the methods that can be pursued for the betterment of our position are briefly these : an industrial and economic survey of India in order to find out the possibilities of development, the formation of Investment Trusts for furnishing industry with initiative and direction, the pursuit of a steady policy of assisting the financing of industry and above all a firm policy of discriminating protection which will assist the development of existing industries and give scope for the springing up of new ones. To effect a happy correlation between education and industry, between the demand for labour and the supply of it Boards must be created which will function in the districts, in the provinces and at the seat of the Central Government. These will seek to

secure a liaison between education and employment and thus prevent waste in education and minimise the chances of the loss of national wealth by the enforced idleness which is another name for unemployment. The District Boards for Unemployment can function under the District Educational Council with some members co-opted for the purpose from the industrialists and large employers of the district. These can help to adjust the work of teaching in the district to the demands of those who seek a career within the district itself. The Provincial Employment Bureaus must be connected with the Universities and must tackle the question of employment and training and tune it to the larger needs of the provinces while the Central Employment Bureau must work under the Inter-University Board and tackle problems of a national character. In all these Boards close co-operation of Government and the commercial and industrial interests must be secured.

But one cannot help emphasizing the truth that improvement in education, industry and agriculture must all be calculated to increase the national dividend, to enable the worker and the peasant to get four annas where he now gets one, to give him more leisure, to lend him more knowledge and to enable him in every way to be healthier and happier and more prosperous. For securing this desirable consummation and for ensuring for our country her rightful place in the comity of nations what is wanted is planning, not patch-work. It is not beyond the wits of men of good-will in India as well as in England so to order the political and economic affairs of this country as to secure stable amity and co-operation on an equal footing between England and India. The question that confronts us to-day is : Shall we shut our eyes and harden our hearts, and be content with looking at the details of a hand-to-mouth policy which will keep India, famished, unhappy and sullen ? Or shall we open our eyes wide, look into the future and plan wisely and boldly so that India will become strong, contented and happy, an honoured partner in the British Commonwealth of Nations, an asset to the cause of spirituality and civilization ? And the answer is equally plain. We cannot stand still or hesitate, we must look ahead and go forward with courage in our heart and faith in our destiny.

# Sixty Years of Madras Cereal-Prices

By

S. SUBRAMANIAN AND S. RAMAKRISHNAN

(Annamalai University)

Index numbers of the prices of rice, *cholam*, *cumbu* and *ragi* for the Madras Presidency from 1874 to 1934 have already been published.<sup>1</sup> The method adopted in computing them was to group the districts of the Presidency into its five natural divisions, to work out individual figures for each division for the several food-grains and to calculate the simple arithmetic average of the corresponding figures to get the index number of each food-grain for the whole of the Presidency. The employment of the simple arithmetic mean formula even within a division is not above criticism though the dispersion in the data from district to district in a particular natural division is in most cases very small. Thus when striking the average of the division figures to get the value for the Presidency, taking into consideration the fairly wide range of the values of the individual divisions, it may be said that a proper system of weighting is necessary if our index number is to present a faithful picture of the state of things.

2. If the truth of the foregoing statement is admitted the question arises : what is the best system of weights that may be adopted ? The answer will depend on the purpose for which the index number is to be used. If it is desired to make use of this index in discussions pertaining to cost of living, then weights in accordance with the amounts consumed will be the most logical. If it is borne in mind that the index numbers that have been published have been computed from data relating to retail prices, the above system of weighting will be seen to be the best. But dependable statistics regarding the amounts consumed are not available at present. This method being out of the question then, it may be suggested that weighting may be done in accordance with the population in each area. This is open to the serious objection that the population in any area is no true index of the importance of the area with regard to a particular food-grain. Dependence exclusively on the number of persons would amount to ignoring the effects of such important factors as the habits of the people and the climatic conditions which more than any

1. Adyanthaya : *Journal of the Madras University* ; July 1933 and January, 1934.

Subramanian : *Journal of the Annamalai University* ; August, 1934.



others determine the relative importance of any division among others. We have only to consider the cases of the East Coast Central and East Coast South divisions in relation to rice to realise the strength of the objection to this system of weighting. Yet another suggestion may be weightage on the basis of the area of each division. This system is even weaker than the previous one for it ignores one more powerful factor, namely, the density of the population in each division. Thus it may be said, in short, that the construction of a satisfactory index number bearing on the cost of living is not possible now.

3. Cost of living having gone out of the scope of the discussion, an equally important question turns up. Can our index number be so constructed as to be useful in tackling problems concerning the assessment of land revenue? Remembering that the enhancement of the rates follows the average fluctuation in the prices, it may be admitted that an index number computed by an appropriate method of weighting will be of immense use to Government as well as the revenue payer. The choice of the proper weights is not difficult now; for the natural system of weighting in this case is in accordance with the relative importance of each area from the point of view of production. As pointed out earlier, each natural division of the Presidency is a more or less homogeneous area as regards prices. Thus it appears not quite necessary to introduce weights when working out the figures for each division. Nevertheless, it is highly desirable that when observations are made to the contrary weightage is introduced even within each division. Now objection may be raised to the inclusion of retail prices in the construction of index numbers for ostensible use in discussions concerning land revenue. It is no doubt true that wholesale prices with weights corresponding to production would give ideal indices but statistics of wholesale prices are not available for all the years of our sixty-year period and hence a uniform treatment is rendered impossible on this basis. Moreover it appears from a study of the figures for the years for which wholesale price statistics are available that wholesale prices move more or less in sympathy with retail prices. Further, since we are dealing only with ratios, no great error will be introduced by the employment of retail prices. It is hoped, however, that when wholesale prices for a sufficient number of years will have been collected it will be possible to construct indices employing wholesale prices.

4. The table in section 6 gives the index numbers of prices of rice, *cholan*, *cumbu* and *ragi*, for the years of the period 1874-1934, in the Madras Presidency after revision. The yield of a normal year has been chosen as the basis of weightage. The following scheme shows the weights actually assigned to each division for each crop.

	West Coast.	East Coast Central.	Deccan.	East Coast North.	East Coast South.
Rice.	5	8	1	17	9
<i>Cholam.</i>	0	5	8	7	4
<i>Cumbu.</i>	0	6	2	4	3
<i>Ragi.</i>	1	16	5	12	6


5. An attempt has also been made to average the variations in the prices of the four food-grains with a view to showing the fluctuation in the consolidated level of prices for the food-grains. Given the index numbers of the several food-grains for a particular year, the problem of assigning proper weights to these before averaging presents some difficulties. Shall the weights correspond to the production figure for each food-grain in terms of a common unit or to the value of the product? It is difficult to choose between these two when theoretical considerations alone prevail. The universal practice is, however, to assign weights to price relatives relating to different commodities in accordance with the value of each commodity produced or consumed as the case may be. Hence in the present case the weights have been chosen in proportion to the total values as nearly as possible. The best method will be to use the appropriate weights for each year which will differ from year to year. It has not been possible to do this here and therefore fixed weights have been assigned to food-grains, namely, 16 for rice, 4 for *cholam*, 2 for *cumbu*, and 3 for *ragi*. The results are shown in the table of the next section and their variations are illustrated by graphs at the end.

6. Average of 1874-75 to 1883-84 = 100.

Year.	Rice.	<i>Cholam.</i>	<i>Cumbu.</i>	<i>Ragi.</i>	Group.
1874-75	83·2	76·4	78·0	74·7	80·7
75-76	82·4	76·8	82·9	78·9	81·1
76-77	121·0	152·2	147·3	143·0	130·7
77-78	161·0	194·3	187·4	198·9	173·0
78-79	132·4	141·2	128·8	137·1	134·1
79-80	94·8	94·3	95·8	93·8	94·7
80-81	81·3	69·7	75·9	72·3	77·9
81-82	78·5	63·7	64·4	66·7	73·6
82-83	83·0	64·2	66·1	66·7	76·7
83-84	82·3	67·7	71·3	67·8	77·3
84-85	93·5	84·6	88·3	80·7	90·1
85-86	92·9	85·4	89·0	81·5	90·0
86-87	85·1	75·0	79·4	74·6	80·8
87-88	82·7	74·1	80·5	72·7	79·9
88-89	91·9	80·6	88·5	80·9	88·5

Year.	Rice.	Cholam.	Cumbu.	Ragi.	Group.
89-90	98·8	81·9	91·3	81·5	93·4
90-91	104·2	91·9	100·8	88·8	100·1
91-92	120·2	124·9	132·5	125·0	122·5
92-93	119·8	117·5	120·6	114·9	118·9
93-94	107·3	107·3	115·1	102·3	107·3
94-95	101·0	92·7	94·6	89·3	97·8
95-96	96·4	85·0	86·4	80·9	91·9
96-97	114·3	115·7	108·5	108·4	113·4
97-98	134·9	146·9	136·7	140·8	137·7
98-99	107·2	101·4	106·3	107·4	106·2
1899-1900	116·3	123·1	125·7	121·1	118·7
1900-01	125·4	146·0	140·9	148·5	132·7
01-02	117·1	121·3	117·9	122·7	118·5
02-03	102·8	87·9	87·0	89·4	97·5
03-04	96·4	74·9	77·9	76·9	89·1
04-05	107·5	101·4	107·2	103·1	106·0
05-06	133·6	131·5	139·2	139·9	134·5
06-07	146·8	130·6	147·6	152·6	145·0
07-08	158·8	153·1	162·7	164·2	158·8
08-09	172·5	164·8	173·5	174·2	171·6
09-10	147·6	150·6	156·4	155·9	149·8
10-11	137·5	142·6	139·5	143·0	139·1
11-12	156·7	154·0	157·5	152·3	155·8
12-13	177·5	171·2	168·7	167·9	174·6
13-14	170·0	160·3	168·5	164·7	167·7
14-15	159·8	148·7	154·2	154·2	156·9
15-16	160·8	141·9	147·6	148·0	155·2
16-17	165·4	154·9	158·3	154·9	161·9
17-18	164·5	180·3	168·0	161·0	166·9
18-19	227·7	274·7	251·4	231·5	234·4
19-20	284·0	344·0	340·3	340·9	304·9
20-21	252·9	277·6	289·4	283·5	263·4
21-22	238·2	256·6	260·3	252·4	244·6
22-23	223·7	219·8	243·6	231·7	225·6
23-24	220·2	233·2	248·3	228·3	225·5
24-25	252·1	255·0	264·7	251·6	253·5
25-26	234·9	225·7	242·6	229·1	233·3
26-27	234·7	233·6	252·0	237·1	236·2
27-28	231·7	240·2	252·4	239·7	235·7
28-29	213·9	218·8	228·9	227·4	217·5
29-30	198·0	192·4	209·4	196·6	197·8
30-31	154·7	137·3	156·4	141·4	150·5
31-32	132·1	128·5	128·5	125·1	130·4
32-33	118·2	120·0	132·1*	122·8	120·2
33-34	98·7	102·4	121·1	93·5	100·5

\* This figure is quite out of tune with the general trend ; it is highly probable that this is due to some defect in the price statistics.



7. The table given above exhibits some noteworthy features :—

(a) The years 1877-78, 1891-92, 1897-98, 1900-01, 1908-09, 1912-13, 1919-20 marked the ends of periods of rising prices ; 1895-96, 1903-04, 1910-11, 1914-15 the ends of periods of falling prices.

(b) In 1919-20 prices soared very high ; in fact they topped the 300 mark.

(c) 1923-24 saw a significant rise in the prices of cholam and cumbu as against a fall in the prices of rice and ragi.


(d) Rice has been falling steadily from 1924-25 onwards ; the others have joined it in 1927-28.

(e) Periods during which there was a simultaneous rise in all the food-grains or a simultaneous fall were in general not more than 5 years in length ; the period 1927-34 of falling prices being an exception.

(f) In 1933-34 prices swung back roughly to the average level of the seventies of the last century.

8. An analysis of the index numbers constructed on the simple arithmetic mean basis led to the following main conclusions<sup>2</sup> :—

(i) The increase in price in periods of rising prices has been least in the case of rice and the increases in the prices of the other food-grains have not varied much from each other.



(ii) The fall in price in periods of falling prices has been the smallest for rice ; the other three food-grains have shown falls more or less equal.

(iii) The price of rice has been the most stable of the four and that of cumbu the most unstable.

In the sections following, these conclusions are examined one by one in the light of the revised figures for price indices.

9. The following table shows the periods of rising prices and the amounts of increase in each period in the prices of the food-grains separately as percentages of the prices at the beginning of that period.

Period.	Rice.	Cholam.	Cumbu.	Ragi.
1875-78 <sup>3</sup>	95	153	126	152
1887-92	45	69	65	72
1895-98	40	73	58	74
1898-1901	17	44	33	38
1904-09	60	63	62	69
1910-13	29	21	21	17
1917-20	73	91	102	112

2. Adyanthaya : Op. cit.

3. 1875-78 denotes the period beginning with the fasli year 1875-76 and ending with 1877-78 ; similarly the others.

In six out of the seven period shown above, it will be seen that the increase in price has been the least in the case of rice. Again it may be noticed that the similarity exhibited by the increases in the prices of the other three food-grains on an examination of the simple means has disappeared now. *Cumbu* shows a marked tendency to follow rice rather than the other two. In five out of the seven periods *ragi* shows the greatest rise. In one period, namely, 1910-13, it shows the least rise. Next in unsteadiness comes *cholam*; in fact *cholam* and *ragi* show a mutual affinity. The order of steadiness during rising prices may be broadly indicated as rice, *cumbu*, *cholam* and *ragi*. It is remarkable, however, that the rises are well-balanced in 1904-09.

10. The table below gives the corresponding figures for periods of falling prices :—

Period.	Rice.	<i>Cholam</i> .	<i>Cumbu</i> .	<i>Ragi</i> .
1877-82	52	67	66	66
1891-96	20	32	35	35
1900-04	23	49	45	48
1908-11	20	13	20	18
1912-15	10	13	9	8
1919-23	21	36	28	32
1927-34	57	57	52	61

Only in four of the seven periods can the fall in the price of rice be called the least of the four. In 1908-11 rice and *cumbu* show the greatest fall, namely 20% while *cholam* shows only 13%. In 1912-15 rice fell by 10%, while *cumbu* and *ragi* did so only by 9% and 8% respectively. In 1927-34 *ragi* fell rather steeply with rice and *cholam* following it. *Cumbu* showed the greatest stability but that too fell by 52%. In times of falling prices, therefore, it is not quite correct to say that rice is the most steady as in times of rising prices. But when prices fall we see a better harmony among the cereals other than rice than in times of rising prices.

11. The question of the most stable and the most unstable of the four food-grains may be taken up now. The co-efficient of variation is one of the best measures of variation that we possess at present and the conclusions it points to are reliable. The distribution of the index numbers for rice gives a co-efficient 37·5. *Cholam* shows 44·2; *cumbu* 42·3 and *ragi*, 44·7. It is at once observed that the most stable on the whole is rice and the most unstable is *ragi*. It may be stated then that the introduction of a system of weighting has improved the position of *cumbu*

from the most unstable to the second stablest, and put *ragi* in its stead. Rice keeps its place but *cholam* which was the second originally had to give place to *cumbu* and go to the third place. Another fact that emerges from this discussion is that *cholam* and *ragi* are remarkably akin to each other in the matter of price variations.

In conclusion, we wish to express our indebtedness to Mr. N. K. Adyanthaya for his valuable help in connection with this investigation.

# The Growth of India's Population

By

S. SUBRAMANIAN AND S. RAMAKRISHNAN

(Annamalai University)

1. In a paper published in the *Indian Journal of Medical Research* (July 1935) Mr. K. C. K. E. Raja has exhaustively dealt with the "Probable Trend of Population Growth in India". According to him Dr. Enid Charles' statement that 'the population of India' "is probably slowly increasing" is likely to be a serious under-estimate of the trend of events. Among the several arguments advanced by him in support of his contention, there is one which is based on the age composition of India's female population as compared with that of Ukraine. Mr. Raja has worked out the expected number of births in India if the Ukrainian specific fertility rates prevailed (by a method analogous to that of Newsholme and Stevenson for calculating "index" fertility rates) and has come to the conclusion that "the present age constitution of India is more suitable to the growth of population than that of Ukraine."

Dr. Enid Charles in her memorandum on 'The Effect of Present Trends in Fertility and Mortality upon the Future Population of England and Wales and upon its Age Composition' has, in the absence of specific fertility rates for England and Wales, assumed in her computation that 'the total births were distributed among the women of different ages in the same proportion as they were distributed in Sweden in 1931.'<sup>1</sup> This appears to be the better method of approximation in such cases at least for the reason that it keeps the total number of births intact. Hence it is proposed in this note to study the population of India from this standpoint. In order that we may be able to compare Mr. Raja's results with ours, we have assumed that the births in India in 1931 were distributed among women of different ages in the same proportion as they were in Ukraine in 1926-27. The graduated female populations in India in 1931 at the various ages are extracted from Table VIII of Mr. Raja's paper.

Statistics of births are available for British India and a few Indian States. The figures for the other Indian States have not been published. However, as the Report of the Public Health Commissioner for India

1. Memorandum No. 55 : Published by the Royal Economic Society, p. 4.



in 1933 indicates, Indian States are in intimate relationship with the different parts of British India and it is possible to estimate the number of births for the whole of India with tolerable accuracy. In fact it can be assumed that the number of births for the whole of India is to the number for British India as 1·293 : 1 for the year 1931 (judging from population statistics).

2. The table given in this section is of the same form as the Combined Fertility and Life Table given by Dr. Enid Charles for Ukraine (1926—27).<sup>2</sup>

Year of age.	No. of Females.	Births per Annum.	Births per 1000 Females.	Survivors per 1000 Females born *	Offspring of survivors of 1000 newly born girls.
15	3,156,509	760·5	0·2	564	0·11
16	3,058,375	5,827·4	1·9	557	1·06
17	3,004,733	51,340·6	17·1	550	9·41
18	3,001,707	210,439·4	70·2	542	38·05
19	3,056,536	453,690·1	148·3	533	79·04
20	3,134,046	621,796·7	198·4	524	103·96
21	3,199,063	714,838·0	223·5	514	114·88
22	3,216,413	739,313·2	229·9	504	115·87
23	3,175,865	743,452·9	234·1	495	115·88
24	3,100,871	733,386·9	236·5	484	114·47
25	3,006,771	713,445·3	237·3	474	112·48
26	2,906,905	686,303·3	235·9	464	109·46
27	2,822,613	653,808·0	231·6	453	104·91
28	2,751,226	647,190·4	235·2	443	104·19
29	2,684,513	578,673·7	215·6	432	93·13
30	2,617,485	538,138·5	205·6	421	86·56
31	2,545,153	496,694·6	195·2	411	80·23
32	2,462,528	455,003·8	184·8	400	73·92
33	2,249,391	413,629·0	183·9	389	71·54
34	2,249,391	372,975·3	165·8	378	62·67
35	2,132,374	333,487·0	156·4	367	57·40
36	2,021,954	295,460·6	146·1	356	52·01
37	1,928,303	259,192·2	134·4	345	46·37
38	1,857,062	223,595·5	120·4	334	40·21
39	1,801,450	192,769·4	107·1	323	34·59
40	1,753,004	162,970·5	92·9	312	28·98
41	1,703,261	135,611·2	79·6	301	23·96
42	1,643,758	110,810·0	67·4	290	19·54
43	1,570,396	88,586·8	56·4	280	15·79
44	1,488,816	69,010·6	46·4	269	12·48
45	1,405,169	56,506·3	40·2	259	10·41
46	1,325,606	37,710·4	28·4	249	7·07
47	1,256,278	25,917·2	20·6	239	4·92
48	1,200,392	16,553·9	13·8	229	3·16
49	1,153,847	9,521·4	8·3	219	1·82
	81,757,206	11,848,410·6	4,569·4		1,950·53

\* This gives the probable number of survivors of 1,000 female children born in a certain year at the ages given in col. 1. See footnote 4.

2. Enid Charles : *The Twilight of Parenthood*, p. 72.

3. It is clear from the table that on an average a woman in India gives birth to 4·569 children in the course of her reproductive period. Multiplying this figure by 0·481, the sex-ratio for India<sup>3</sup> we arrive at an estimate of the gross reproduction rate for India at 2·20. By taking the mortality factor<sup>4</sup> also into consideration we obtain 0·94 as the Indian net reproduction rate. The corresponding figures for Ukraine are 2·49 and 1·68. Thus Mr. Raja's inference based on a comparison of the figures for India and Ukraine is open to objection.

A more detailed analysis of the problem is under preparation and will be published shortly.

3. Raja : *Indian Journal of Medical Research* (July 1935), p. 212.

4. *Vide* Table B. of Actuarial Report annexed to Census Report (1931) for India.

# On Waring's Problem III

By

S. S. PILLAI

(Annamalai University)

This note is a continuation of my two previous papers with the same title.\* I use the same notation as in paper II, which is referred to as R. In R, I proved that

*Theorem I* : If  $n \geq 30$  ;  $\{ (\frac{3}{2})^n \} \leq 1 - (l + 3)/2^n$ ,  
then  $g(n) = 2^n + l - 2$ .

In this note, I prove the complementary result :

*Theorem II* : If  $n \geq 30$  ;  $\{ (\frac{3}{2})^n \} \geq 1 - (l - 1)/2^n$ ,  
then (1)  $g(n) = 2^n + l + j - 2$ , when  $\{ (\frac{4}{3})^n \} \geq 1 - r/3^n$ ,  
and (2)  $g(n) = 2^n + l + j - 3$ , when  $\{ (\frac{4}{3})^n \} < 1 - r/3^n$  ;  
where  $3^n = l \cdot 2^n + r$ .

Now  $3^n = l \cdot 2^n + 2^n - l - 1$   
is obviously impossible when  $n \geq 3$ .

When  $n$  is even

$$3^n = l \cdot 2^n + 2^n - l - 2 \quad (1)$$

$$\text{and} \quad 3^n = l \cdot 2^n + 2^n - l \quad (2)$$

are also impossible.

Hence, when  $n$  is even,  $g(n)$  is exactly determined. When  $n$  is odd, we do not know the exact formula only when  $n$  satisfies either (1) or (2).

\*1. The Annamalai University Journal, Vol. V, No. 2.

2. The Journal of the Indian Mathematical Society, New Series, Vol. II, No. 1.

The results of this paper and the succeeding one were announced by Dr. S. Chowla in a recent number of the Proceedings of the Indian Academy of Science.

Throughout the rest of the paper it is assumed that

$$\{(\frac{3}{2})^n\} \geq 1 - l/2^n, \quad (A)$$

*Lemma (1)* If  $3^n = l \cdot 2^n + 2^n - i$ , where  $i \leq l$ ,  
then  $4^n = j \cdot 3^n + t \cdot 2^n + ji$ ,  
where  $t \leq l$ .

Let  $4^n = j \cdot 3^n + t \cdot 2^n + f$ , where  $f \leq 2^n - 1$ .

Then  $4^n = (jl + j + t)2^n - ji + f$ .

But  $ji \leq jl < 2^n$  and  $f \leq 2^n - 1$ .

So  $f = ji$ .

*Lemma (2)* If we put  $i = l - m$ ,  
then  $ji = 2^n - t - (m + 1)j$ .

Now  $ji = jl - jm = -(m + 1)j + j(l + 1)$

$$= -(m + 1)j + \left\{ \left( \frac{4}{3} \right)^n - \frac{t \cdot 2^n}{3^n} - \frac{ji}{3^n} \right\} \left\{ \left( \frac{3}{2} \right)^n + \frac{i}{2^n} \right\}$$

[from lemma (1)]

$$= -(m + 1)j + 2^n - t - \frac{ji}{2^n} + \frac{ji}{2^n}$$

$$= 2^n - t - (m + 1)j.$$

*Lemma (3)* If  $n \geq 30$ ;  $h = [d - (\frac{4}{3})^n + 1]$ ,  
then  $j > h + 5$ .

Now  $j > h + 5$ ,

if  $(\frac{4}{3})^n > h + 6$ ,

or if  $(\frac{4}{3})^n > 5(\frac{5}{4})^n + n\{5\frac{1}{6} \log n + 3 \cdot 2\} - 1$

or if  $(\frac{16}{15})^n > 5 + (\frac{4}{5})^n\{n(5\frac{1}{6} \log n + 3 \cdot 2) - 1\}$ .

Since  $n \geq 30$ , it can be easily verified that the last inequality is satisfied.

So the lemma follows.

*Lemma (4)* If  $m \geq 1$ ,

then  $j + t + ji - 1 \leq 2^n - h - 3$ .

From lemma (2), the result is true,

if  $j + t + 2^n - t - (m + 1)j - 1 \leq 2^n - h - 3$ ,

or if  $mj \geq h + 4$ ,

or if  $m \geq (h + 4)/j$ ,

or if  $m \geq 1$ , [from lemma (3)].

*Lemma (5)* If  $K \geq h + 4$ ,

then  $2^n - K + 1 \leq 2^n - h - 3$ .

*Lemma (6)* If  $K \leq ji$ ,

$$4^n - K \geq j \cdot 3^n + t \cdot 2^n$$

*Lemma (7)* If  $m \geq 1$ , there is a positive integer  $K$  such that every integer between  $4^n - K$  and  $4^n + 2^n - K$  requires at most  $2^n - h - 3$ ,  $n$ th powers.

Put  $K = h + 4$ .

Then every integer between  $4^n$  and  $4^n + 2^n - K$ , requires at most  $2^n - K + 1$ ; ( $= 2^n - h - 3$ ),  $n$ th powers.

Again  $K = h + 4 < j \leq ji$ , [from lemma (3)]

So every integer between  $4^n - K$  and  $4^n$ , requires at most  $j + t + ji - 1$  or  $2^n - h - 3$ ,  $n$ th powers. [from lemma (4)]

Combining the above two results, we get the lemma.

*Lemma (8)* Every integer greater than  $j \cdot 3^n + t \cdot 2^n$  requires at most  $2^n + l + j - 3$ ,  $n$ th powers.

From lemma (8) in  $R$  and lemma (7), every integer between  $4^n - K$  and  $\beta$  requires at most  $2^n - h - 3 + \delta$ ,  $n$ th powers.

But  $2^n - h - 3 + \delta \leq 2^n + l + j - 3$ .

From this and lemma (15) in  $R$ , the present lemma follows.

Now we shall prove our theorem.

Consider  $N = j \cdot 3^n + t \cdot 2^n - 1 = j \cdot 3^n + (t - 1) \cdot 2^n + 2^n - 1$ .

If  $j \cdot 3^n + t \cdot 2^n - 1 \leq 4^n - 1$ ,

then  $N$  requires exactly  $2^n + t + j - 2$ ,  $n$ th powers.

Therefore, if  $j \cdot 3^n + l \cdot 2^n - 1 \leq 4^n - 1$ ,

that is, if  $\{(\frac{1}{3})^n\} \geq \frac{l \cdot 2^n}{3^n} = 1 - r/3^n$ ,

then  $N$  requires exactly  $2^n + l + j - 2$ ,  $n$ th powers. (3)

Every integer less than  $j \cdot 3^n + l \cdot 2^n - 1$

can be put in the form

$$\mu \cdot 3^n + v \cdot 2^n + \omega,$$

where  $\mu \leq j$ ;  $v \leq l$ ;  $\omega \leq 2^n - 1$

and  $\mu + v + \omega \leq 2^n + l + j - 3$ .

But from R, we know that

$$N = (j - 1)3^n + (l - 1)2^n + 2^n - 1$$

requires exactly  $2^n + l + j - 3$ ,  $n$ th powers. (5)

By combining (3), (4), (5) and lemma (7), we get theorem II.

# On Waring's Problem IV

By

S. S. PILLAI

(*Annamalai University*)

In Vol II. No. 1 (New series) of the journal of the Indian Mathematical Society, I have proved that when  $8 \leq n \leq 100$ ,

$$g(n) = 2^n + l - 2.$$

The object of this paper is to prove that

$$g(7) = 143.$$

Throughout  $n \geq 6$ ,  $t = 2n + 1$ ,  $f = \frac{2}{t}$ .

(The above paper is referred to as R.)

## SECTION I.

### *Singular Series.*

In this section, the notation in Landau's *Vorlesungen uber Zahlen theorie* is used,

and L·301 means satz 301 in that book.

$s = 2n + 1$ . Instead of  $k$  in L,  $n$  is used here.

*Lemma (a)*  $\chi_p \geq 1/P^{-(r+1)}$ .

This follows from L·301.

*Lemma (b)* When  $p$  does not divide  $n$ ,

$$\chi_p \geq 1 - \frac{2}{p^n} - |A(p)|$$

Let  $l = mn + r$ ,  $1 \leq r \leq n$ .

From page 237 · L.,

$$\begin{aligned} |A(p^l)| &= |p^{-ls} \sum_{\mathfrak{q}} S_{\mathfrak{q}}^s \cdot \mathfrak{q}^{-n}| \leq p^{l(1-s)} |S_{\mathfrak{q}}^s| \\ &\leq p^{l(1-s)} \cdot p^{m(n-1)s} |S_{\mathfrak{q}}^s p^{mn}| \end{aligned} \quad (\text{L} \cdot 312)$$

$$\leq p^{l-s(m+1)} \cdot p^s \text{ or } p^{l-s(m+r)} \cdot p^{(r-1)s} \quad (\text{L} \cdot 307)$$

$$= p^{l-sm} \text{ or } p^{l-s(m+1)}$$

$$= p^{-m(s-n)+1} \text{ or } p^{-m(s-n)-s+r}$$

according as  $r = 1$  or  $\geq 2$ .

So

$$\begin{aligned} \left| \sum_{l=n+1}^{\infty} A(p^l) \right| &= \left| \sum_{m=1}^{\infty} \sum_{r=1}^n A(p^{m(n+r)}) \right| \\ &= \sum_{m=1}^{\infty} p^{-m(s-n)} \left\{ p + \sum_{r=2}^n p^{r-s} \right\} \\ &\leq p^{n-s} \left\{ p + p^{-s} \frac{p^{n+1} - 1}{p - 1} \right\} \left\{ 1 - p^{n-s} \right\}^{-1} \end{aligned}$$

Again

$$\left| \sum_{l=2}^n A(p^l) \right| \leq \sum_{l=2}^n p^{l(1-s)} \cdot p^{(l-1)s} = p^{-s} \cdot \frac{p^{n+1} - 1}{p - 1}.$$

Hence

$$\left| \sum_{l=2}^{\infty} A(p^l) \right| \leq p^{n-s} \cdot 2p = \frac{2}{p^n}.$$

Since  $\chi_p = 1 + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} A(p^t)$ , from the above the lemma follows.

\* Lemma (c)  $\mathfrak{u} \geq e^{-98}$ . {  $\mathfrak{u} = \mathfrak{u}$  (7) }

From lemma (a),

$$\log(\chi_7 \cdot \chi_{29} \cdot \chi_{43}) \geq \log 7^{-18} \cdot 29^{-8} \cdot 43^{-8} > -92 \cdot 18.$$

\* '  $\mathfrak{u}$  ' stands for the Greek capital letter which represents the singular series in Landau's Zahlen theorie.



$$\log \chi_{71} > -\log 3 > -1 \cdot 1.$$

$$A(71) \leq 6^{15/71} 1^{13/2} < \frac{1}{2} - 2/71^7.$$

So when  $72 < p < 216$ ,

$$|A(p)| < \frac{1}{2} - 2/p^7.$$

$$\text{Hence if } \Pi_1 = \chi_{113} \cdot \chi_{127} \cdot \chi_{197} \cdot \chi_{211}$$

$$\log \Pi_1 \geq -3 \cdot 5.$$

When  $p \equiv 1 \pmod{7}$ ,  $p \geq 216$ ,

$$\chi_p \geq 1 - 2/p^7 - 1/p^{3/2}.$$

$$\text{Let } \Pi_2 = \prod_p \chi_p \quad \{p \equiv 1 \pmod{7}, p \geq 216\}.$$

$$\log \Pi_2 \geq \sum_{p \geq 216} \log(1 - 1/p^{3/2} - 2/p^7) > - \cdot 3.$$

$$\text{Let } \Pi_3 = \prod \chi_p \quad \{p \text{ is not congruent to } 0, \text{ or } 1 \pmod{7}\}.$$

$$\text{Then } A(p) = 0.$$

$$\text{So } \log \Pi_2 = \sum \log(1 - 2/p^7) > - \cdot 02$$

Hence

$$\log \omega > -98.$$

## SECTION II.

*Lemma (d)* Every integer between 10016578 and 10016706 is a sum of 51, 7th powers.

This follows from the following :

$$10016578 = 10^7 + 6 \cdot 3^7 + 27 \cdot 2^7 \quad 34$$

$$10016589 = 10^7 + 7 \cdot 3^7 + 10 \cdot 2^7 \quad 18$$

$$10016623 = 9^7 + 6 \cdot 7^7 + 6^7 + 4 \cdot 3^7 + 29 \cdot 2^7 \quad 41$$

$$10016634 = 9^7 + 6 \cdot 7^7 + 6^7 + 5 \cdot 3^7 + 12 \cdot 2^7 \quad 25$$

$$10016640 = 10^7 + 4^7 + 2 \cdot 2^7 \quad 4$$

$$10016682 = 4 \cdot 8^7 + 7^7 + 2 \cdot 6^7 + 3 \cdot 5^7 + 4 \cdot 3^7 + 12 \cdot 2^7 \quad 26$$

*Lemma (e)* Every integer between 10016578, and  $10016706 + 37961407$  is the sum of 85, 7th powers.

This follows from lemma (d) and lemma (b) in R.

*Lemma (f)* Every integer  $\leq 10016578$  is the sm of 143, 7th powers.

This can be easily verified.

*Lemma (g)* Every integer  $\leq \alpha$ , when  $\log \log \alpha = 12 \cdot 548$ , is the sum of 143, 7th powers.

This follows from lemmas (d) and (e) and lemma (7) in R.

### SECTION III.

In this section, I closely follow R. For the sake of convenience, even the numbering is kept the same. In the course of the argument the conditions marked by A, B, etc., are assumed to be satisfied and in the end it is shown that they are actually satisfied. Letters and symbols have got the same meaning as in R, unless otherwise mentioned. I indicate only the alterations which we require in R; the rest is exactly as in R.

$$n \geq 6 \text{ and } n \neq 2^r; t = 2n + 1; f = v; v = 1/n.$$

A Conditions marked (3) in R.

$$\text{Lemma (2)} \quad |B_{a, q}| \leq n^{12/q^f}.$$

(a) As in R, when  $p \mid n$ ,

$$|B_{a, q}| \leq n/q^f \quad (4)$$

(b) When  $p$  does not divide  $n$

$$|B_{a, q}| \leq (q_2^n Q)^{-v} \prod_p |B_{a, p}|$$

$$\text{But } |B_{a,p}| \leq (n-1)/\sqrt{p} \leq 1/p^f,$$

$$\text{if } p \geq (n-1)^{\frac{2n}{n-2}} = \lambda. \quad (\text{Say}).$$

$$\text{Let } \Pi = \prod_p p^f \quad \{p \equiv 1 \pmod{n}, p \leq \lambda\}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Then } \log \Pi &\leq f \cdot \frac{\lambda}{n} \log \lambda = \frac{(n-1)^{\frac{2n}{n-2}}}{n^2} \times \frac{2n}{n-2} \log(n-1) \\ &\leq \frac{125}{12} \log n < 11 \log n. \end{aligned}$$

So in this case also

$$|B_{a,q}| \leq n^{11} \quad (5)$$

From (4) and (5) the lemma follows.

*Lemma (3)*  $A_q(N) = \theta\{n^{12t}/q^{1+f}\}.$

This follows easily from lemma (2).

*Lemma (5)*  $\mathfrak{U} \geq 1/B.$

Where B is a constant depending on  $n$  alone. This is assumed.

3.1. *The numbers u.* Trivial refinement of argument in R will give that

$$X > p^{n-1-\sigma}/n^{n-1} \quad (26)$$

$$\text{and } X_1 > P^{(1-\nu/2)(n-1-\sigma)}/n^{n-1} \quad (27)$$

$$3.3 \quad A = 2n^{12}Zq^{-f} \quad (37)$$

$$r_1 = 5Z^{-1}q^{1+f}/(2n^{12}).$$

$$tr_1 \leq \frac{5t}{2n^{12}} \cdot \frac{P^{(1+f)/2}}{(2n^{3n-1}P^{n-1/2})^\nu} < P^{-1/4} \quad (38)$$

$$B \quad \text{if } P^{1/4} > 1.$$

Then upto (52), no alteration is required. For (53), we get

$$E_y = \theta \{n^{12t} X^2 X_1 R q^{-2-\nu}\} \quad (53)$$

$$\int_0^{\tau^{-1}} z^t dz = \theta (2P^{t-n}) \quad (54)$$

$$\int_0^{\tau^{-1}} Z^t |z| dz = P^t \int_0^{P^{-n}} |z| dz + \int_{P^{-n}}^{\tau^{-1}} |z|^{1-\nu} dz - \frac{P^{t-2n}}{2} + n \cdot P^{t-2n} \quad (55)$$

Hence from (51) in R and (54), (55), (37),

$$\begin{aligned} L &= \theta \{X^2 X_1 R P^{-1/4} 2^t \cdot n^{12t} q^{-2-f}\} \{20 \int_0^{\tau^{-1}} Z^t dz + 44 \int_0^{\tau^{-1}} 3^n P^n Z^t |z| dz\} \\ &= \theta \{2^t \cdot n^{12t} X^2 X_1 R P^{-1/4} q^{-2-f}\} \{40 P^{t-n} + 44 (n + \frac{1}{2}) 3^n P^{t-n}\} \\ &= \theta \{48 \cdot 2^t \cdot n^{12t+1} \cdot 3^n \cdot X^2 X_1 R P^{t-n-1/4} q^{-2-f}\} \end{aligned} \quad (56)$$

$$\sum_{q < \sqrt{P}} \sum_a q^{-2-\nu} \leq \sum_{q < \sqrt{P}} q^{-1-\nu} < n \quad (57)$$

Since  $n \geq 7$  we see that (6)

$$48 \cdot 2^t \cdot 3^n \cdot n^2 = \theta(n^t) \quad (58)$$

So from (56) — (58), we get

$$\sum_{q \leq \sqrt{P}} \sum_a L = \theta \{n^{13t} \cdot X^2 X_1 R P^{t-n-1/4}\} \quad (59)$$

Therefore

$$H_{y,1} = Q_y D_y + \theta \{n^{13t} X^2 X_1 R P^{t-n-1/4}\} \quad (60)$$

#### 3.4. Estimation of $Q_y$ .

Upto (68), no alteration is required.

$$|S_2| \leq |Q_y| X^2 X_1 R \sum_{q=2}^{\sqrt{P}} n^{12t} q^{-2-\nu} \sum_a | \sum_N E\{-2\pi i a N/q\} |,$$

{from (52), (53).}

$$\begin{aligned}
&\leq \frac{1}{2} n^{12t} |Q_\nu| \cdot X^2 X_1 R \sum_{q=2}^{\sqrt{P}} q^{-2-\nu} \sum_q (q/a) \\
&< \frac{1}{2} n^{12t} |Q_\nu| \cdot X^2 X_1 R \sum_{q=2}^{\sqrt{P}} \frac{\log q + 1}{q} \\
&< \frac{1}{2} n^{12t} |Q_\nu| \cdot X^2 X_1 R \left\{ \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{\log^2 P}{4} + \frac{1}{2} \log P \right\} \\
&< \frac{1}{8} n^{12t} |Q_\nu| \cdot X^2 X_1 R \log^2 P
\end{aligned} \tag{69}$$

Hence from (67R), (68R) and (69)

$$\begin{aligned}
&\leq Q_\nu D_\nu \leq Q_\nu X^2 X_1 R \{N_0 P^{-1/4} + \theta(1) + \theta(\frac{1}{8} n^{12t} \log^2 P)\} \\
&\leq 2Q_\nu X^2 X_1 R \cdot 3^n \cdot P^{n-1/4}
\end{aligned} \tag{70}$$

$$C \quad \text{if} \quad \frac{n^{12t} \log^2 P}{8} \leq \frac{3^n \cdot P^{n-1/4}}{2}$$

Hence from (60) and (70),

$$\sum_N H_{\nu, 1} \leq 2 \cdot 3^n Q_\nu X^2 X_1 R P^{n-1/4} + \theta\{n^{13t} X^2 X_1 R P^{t-n-1/4}\}, \tag{71}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}
&|\sum_N H_{\nu, 2}| \leq n \cdot 3^n \cdot X X_1 R P^{t+n-11/2} \\
&\leq n^n \cdot 3^n X^2 X_1 R P^{t-1/2+\sigma}; \text{ from (26)}
\end{aligned} \tag{72}$$

Hence arguing as in R, from (71), (62 R), (64 R) and (72), we get that

$$\begin{aligned}
&2 \cdot 3^n \cdot Q_\nu X^2 X_1 R P^{n-1/4} \\
&\geq \frac{1}{n} X^2 X_1 R P^{t-1/4} \{2 - n^{n+1} \cdot 3^n \cdot P^{\sigma-1/4} - n^{13t+1} P^{-n}\} \\
&\geq \frac{1}{n} X^2 X_1 R P^{t-1/4};
\end{aligned}$$

provided

$$D \quad P^{1/4-\sigma} \geq 2 \cdot 3^n \cdot n^{n+1}.$$

$$E \quad \text{and} \quad P^n \geq 2 \cdot n^{13t+1}.$$

Hence

$$Q_\nu \geq P^{t-n}/(2n3^n). \quad (75)$$

$$\begin{aligned} 3 \cdot 5. \quad \left| \sum_{N_2} \sum_{q > \sqrt{P}} A_q(N_2) \right| &\leq X^2 X_1 R n^{12t} \sum_{q > \sqrt{P}} q^{-1-f} \\ &\leq X^2 X_1 R n^{12t+1} P^{-f/2} \leq (1 - 1/\sqrt{2}) X^2 X_1 R B^{-1}, \end{aligned}$$

$$F \quad \text{if} \quad P^{1/(2n)} \geq 4n^{12t+1} B.$$

Therefore from § 3.5 R,

$$Q_\nu D_\nu \geq \frac{X^2 X_1 R P^{t-n}}{2\sqrt{2} \cdot n \cdot 3^n B} = M, \quad (\text{say}) \quad (78)$$

Hence from (60) and (78),

$$H_{\nu, 1} \geq X^2 X_1 R P^{t-n}/(4n3^n) B, \quad (79)$$

provided

$$n^{13t} X^2 X_1 R P^{t-n-1/4} \leq M \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)$$

$$G \quad \text{or} \quad P^{1/4} \geq 8\sqrt{2} \cdot 3^n \cdot n^{13t+1} B.$$

$$3 \cdot 6. \quad H_1 \geq \frac{X^2 X_1 R Y P^{t-n}}{4n3^n B}. \quad (82)$$

Let  $f(c)$  denote the number of solutions of

$$c = y^n - y_1^n, \quad 0 \leq y \leq Y,$$

$$0 \leq y_1 \leq Y.$$

Then  $f(c) \leq Y$ .

$$S_2 \leq \sum_y \sum_{y_1} \frac{1}{2} (ac)^{-1} \quad c = y^n - y_1^n \neq 0,$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} \sum_c f(c) \left( \frac{ac}{q} + \frac{\theta c}{q\tau} \right)^{-1}$$

$$\leq q \sum_c f(c) \times \frac{1}{s} \quad s \leq q$$

$$\leq Yq \sum_s \frac{1}{s}, \quad s \leq Y \quad \{s \text{ is different for different } c\}$$

$$\leq Yq (\log Y + 1)$$

$$\leq Yq \left( \frac{v - v^2}{2} \log P + 1 \right)$$

$$\leq \frac{Yq}{2n} \log P,$$

provided

$$H \quad \log P \geq 2n^2$$

$$\text{Since} \quad q \leq \tau,$$

$$S_2 \leq 3^{n-1} Y P^{n-1} \log P.$$

$$\text{But} \quad S_1 = 2^n R^n Y \leq 2^n P^{n-1} \cdot Y$$

$$\text{So,} \quad S_1 + S_2 \leq Y P^{n-1} (3^{n-1} \log P + 2^n)$$

$$\leq \frac{3^n}{2} Y P^{n-1} \log P. \quad (84)$$

$$\text{Hence,} \quad K = \sum V_\nu S_\nu \leq \sqrt{\left\{ \frac{3^n}{2} X_1 R Y P^{n-1} \log P \right\}}$$

Therefore

$$\begin{aligned} |H_2| &\leq 3 \cdot K P^{t-2} \int_0^1 V^2 S^2 d\alpha \\ &= 3 \cdot K X P^{t-1} \\ &\leq \frac{3^{\frac{n+2}{2}}}{\sqrt{2}} X X_1^{\frac{1}{2}} Y^{\frac{1}{2}} R^{\frac{1}{2}} P^{t+n-\frac{1}{2}} \sqrt{(\log P)} \end{aligned} \quad (84a)$$

Now, from (82) and (84a),

$$|H_2| \leq \frac{1}{2} H_1,$$

$$\text{if } \frac{3^{\frac{n+2}{2}}}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot P^{n/2-5/4} (\log P)^{1/2} \leq XX_1^{1/2} Y^{1/2} R^{1/2} P^{-n} / (8n3^n) B$$

$$\text{or if } XX_1^{1/2} \geq 8n3^{\frac{3n+2}{2}} \cdot P^{\frac{3n}{2}} \cdot \frac{7}{4} + v^{7/2} (\log P)^{1/2} B$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{or if } \frac{P^{n-1-\sigma}}{n^{n-1}} \times \frac{P^{(1-v/2)(n-1-\sigma)/2}}{n^{(n-1)/2}} \\ \geq 24 \cdot n \cdot 3^{3n/2} \cdot P^{\frac{3n}{2}} \cdot \frac{7}{4} + v^{7/2} \times (\log P)^{1/2} B \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{I or if } P^{1/(4n)-1/(4n^2)-3\sigma} (1-1/6n)^{1/2} \geq 24 \cdot 3^{3n/2} n^{(3n-1)/2} B (\log P)^{1/2} \quad (86)$$

Hence

$$I_{N_0} > 0$$

3.7. *Lemma (15)* If  $N_0$  satisfies all conditions from A to I then  $N_0$  is the sum of

$$t + 3k - 2,$$

$n$ th powers, where  $k$  is chosen suitably.

#### SECTION IV.

*Proof of the main theorem.*

In this section, we put  $n = 7$  and  $k = 43$ .

Then  $t = 15$

$$\omega \geq 1/e^{98} \text{ from section I.}$$

$$3\sigma(1 - 1/6n)/2 \leq 1/73 \cdot 24$$

$$\text{and } \frac{1}{4n} - \frac{1}{4n^2} - \frac{3\sigma}{2}(1 - 1/6n) > .016958$$

$$\text{Let } \log \beta = 60000. \quad (87)$$

Then, if  $N_0 > \beta$ , we can easily verify that all the conditions from A to I are satisfied.



Therefore, from lemma (15), it follows that, every integer greater than  $\beta$  is the sum of 142, 7th powers (88)

Now  $\log \log \beta < 12$  (89)

But from lemma (g),

$$\log \log \alpha \geq 12 \cdot 5. \quad (90)$$

Therefore from lemma (g) and (88), it follows that

$$g(7) \leq 143.$$

But we know that

$$g(7) \geq 143.$$

Hence

$$g(7) = 143.$$

# Bhartr̥hari a Bauddha ?<sup>1</sup>

By

V. A. RAMASWAMI SASTRI

(Annamalai University)

Some students of Sanskrit literature are under the delusion that there existed at least two different authors with the name Bhartr̥hari, of whom one, the author of the famous *Satakas*, was a Hindu and the other, the author of the *Vākyapadīya*, was a Bauddha.<sup>2</sup> It is proposed, in this short paper, to *refute the view that the author of the Vākyapadīya was a Buddhist*.

The view that the author of the *Vākyapadīya* was a Buddhist is mainly based upon Itsing's statement. His account<sup>3</sup> that Bhartr̥hari entered into the monastery seven times, returned to the world and lived the life of a layman, shows that he was a Buddhist mendicant *at least for some time*. In that case, he must have written the *Vākyapadīya* either before he became a *Bauddha* or after his reversion to *Brahmanism*, since the work clearly indicates that Brahmanical convictions of its author, as will be shown in the sequel. It is also possible that Itsing's statement was based on mere hearsay.<sup>4</sup>

Another main reason advanced by these critics to call Bhartr̥hari a Buddhist is Vācaspatimiśra's reference in his *Tattvabindu*<sup>5</sup> to a verse found in Bhartr̥hari's *Vākyapadīya*, kāṇḍa I<sup>6</sup> with the prefatory note—*yadāhuḥ bāhyāḥ api*. An honest attempt is now being made by scholars to trace some verses in the *Vākyapadīya* to some ancient sources like Vyāḍi's *San̄graha* and the *Mahābhārata*.<sup>7</sup> It is not therefore impossible that Bhartr̥hari and Vācaspatimiśra borrowed the verse in question from

1. A part of this paper was read at the Eighth All-India Oriental Conference, Mysore, in December, 1935.

2. Vide Pathak's paper, 'Was Bhartr̥hari a Buddhist?', JBBRAS. Vol. XVIII; Keith's History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 176.

3. A Record of Buddhistic Religion, pp. 178-180.

4. See Dr. C. K. Raja's paper on 'Itsing and Bhartr̥hari's *Vākyapadīya*', (Dr. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar Commemoration Volume, 1936, pp. 285-298) where the author makes to call in question Itsing's date of Bhartr̥hari.

5. See the *Tattvabindu* (Annamalai University Sanskrit Series, No. III), p. 70.

6. Verse 35, p. 17 (Benares Edition).

7. Vide Cārudeva Śāstri's edition of the *Vākyapadīya*, kāṇḍa I, last page and his paper on 'Bhartr̥hari: a critical study of the *Vākyapadīya*.' (Proceedings of the Fifth All-India Oriental Conference, Lahore), pp. 630-655.

an ancient Buddhistic source, since there is no denying the fact that many Buddhistic works have influenced those on Hindu philosophy. Even granting that Vācaspatimiśra borrowed it from Bhartṛhari, the term *bāhya* need not necessarily mean a Buddhist. It may mean one who is *alien* (to the speaker)—its literal sense. In the *Tattvabindu*, Vācaspatimiśra, following the famous Mīmāṃsā Vārttikakāra Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, refutes the Sphoṭa doctrine (as maintained by Maṇḍanamiśra in his *Sphoṭasiddhi*) and holds the view that varṇas are *artha-pratyāyakas*. And it is not quite unnatural to call by the term *bāhya* the exponent of the Sphoṭa doctrine in the science of Sanskrit Grammar, especially when he advocates the *Varṇavāda*, which should be accepted by all Mīmāṃsakas including Maṇḍanamiśra.

A more decisive argument going against Bhartṛhari's Buddhistic faith is the quotation of a verse from Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*, kāṇḍa III, by Pratyagrūpa, the celebrated commentator on Citsukhācārya's *Tattva-pradīpikā*,\* who refers to Bhartṛhari with the honorific title—*brahmavit-prakāṇḍa* :— “अत एव धातुसमीक्षायां ब्रह्मवित्प्रकाण्डैः भर्तृहरिभिरभिहितम् —

शुद्धतत्त्वं प्रपञ्चस्य न हेतुरनिवृत्तिः ।

ज्ञानज्ञेयादिरूपस्य मायैव जननी ततः ॥ ”

(*Nayanaprasādinī*, N. S. Ed., 1915, p. 60.)

This is an unmistakable proof of Bhartṛhari's Advaitic faith.

A close study of the Brahmakāṇḍa of the *Vākyapadīya* would convince even a casual reader that the author, Bhartṛhari, is a great monistic philosopher, accepting *śabda* as the ultimate reality of the world. Careful students of Indian Philosophy are aware of the fact that the Upaniṣads, which are otherwise known as *Vedānta*, contain expositions of three kinds of Monism—*śabda-monism*, *viññāna-monism* and *sattā-monism* ; and it may be noted that Patañjali and Bhartṛhari developed and systematised the *śabda-monism* in their works on grammar, just as Buddha and his disciples and Śrī Saṅkarācārya and his commentators systematised respectively the *viññāna-monism* and *sattā-* or *Brahman-monism*, the latter having further synthesised all these phases of Monism and presented them as *Ātman-monism*.

The five opening verses of the *Vākyapadīya*, which explain the *anubandhacatuṣṭaya*, give the essence of Bhartṛhari's monistic philosophy. He belongs to the school of Vivartavāda<sup>8</sup> which is one of the

\*For this reference I am indebted to my friend Dr. T. R. Chintamani, M.A., Ph.D., Senior Lecturer in Sanskrit, Madras University.

8. *Vivartavādins* explain this universe as a *vivarta* (seeming manifestation) of Brahman, without any separate reality behind it except that of Brahman, in con-

basic doctrines of Śaṅkara's monistic system ; and this gives him a very high place as a *pre-Śaṅkara Advaitin* in the history of Indian Philosophy. His characterisation of *Śabda brahman*,<sup>9</sup>—as one that has neither beginning nor end, as the essence of śabda or speech, as the cause of the audible varṇas, as manifesting itself in the form of the phenomenal world, as the only efficient cause of this Universe—mostly resembles Śaṅkarācārya's description of Brahman in his *Jijñāsādhikaraṇabhāṣya* and *Janmādyadhikaraṇabhāṣya*.<sup>10</sup> What is known in the Upaniṣads as *eka-advitīya-brahman* is ordinarily experienced by all in different forms ; and this, Bhartṛhari says, is due to various *upādhis*<sup>11</sup>—limiting conditions imposed on Brahman. Hence the experiences representing the six stages of the phenomenal world—birth, existence, transformation, growth, decay and destruction—present the characteristics of *kālaśakti* which is popularly known as *māyā* or *avidyā* in Śaṅkara's monistic system. As the Advaitins say, this *kālaśakti* possesses different and sometimes opposite properties like *sattva* and *asattva* and consequently, this Universe appears differently as *bhoktṛ*, *bhoktavya* and *bhōga*. It is again through this *kālaśakti* that the Absolute Brahman manifests itself in the form of this manifold world. It is on the ground of its extraordinary nature that this *kālaśakti* or *māyā* is generally described

trast with the school of *pariṇāmavādins* who accept the transformation of Brahman into this phenomenal world with separate reality. Cf. अतात्त्विकान्यथाभावोविवर्तः। तात्त्विकान्यथाभावः परिणामः ॥

‘अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।

विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥ (Vākyapadīya, K. I. V. 1.)

10. “अस्ति तावद्ब्रह्म नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितम्; ब्रह्मशब्दस्य हि व्युत्पाद्यमानस्य नित्यशुद्धत्वादयोऽर्थाः प्रतीयन्ते, बृहतेर्धातोरर्था नुगमात् । सर्वस्यात्मत्वाच्च ब्रह्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः”.....जिज्ञासाधिकरणभाष्यम् ॥ “अस्य जगतो नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य अनेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य प्रतिनियतदेशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्य मनसाप्यविन्त्यरचनारूपस्य जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं यतः सर्वज्ञात्सर्वशक्तेः कारणात् भवति तद्ब्रह्म इति वाक्यशेषः ।.....जन्माद्यधिकरणभाष्यम् ॥

11. ‘एकमेव यदाम्नातं भिन्नं शक्तिव्यपाश्रयात् ।

अपृथक्त्वेऽपि शक्तिभ्यः पृथक्त्वेनेव वर्तते ॥

अव्याहताः कला यस्य कालशक्तमुपाश्रिताः ।

जन्माद्यो विकाराः षट् भावभेदस्य योनयः ॥

एकस्य सर्वबीजस्य यस्य चेयमनेकधा ।

भोक्तृभोक्तव्यरूपेण भोगरूपेण च स्थितिः ॥

(Vākyapadīya, kāṇḍa I, verses 2-4).

by *Śāstrakāras* as *anirvacanīya*—neither *sat* nor *asat*, neither separate from, nor identical with, the Absolute.<sup>12</sup> The acceptance of such an eternal reality viz. *Śabda brahman* and the explanation of the phenomenal world as the seeming manifestation of the eternal reality by the power of *kālaśakti*, go against the view that Bhartṛhari, the author of the *Vākya-padiya*, was a Buddhist, since no Buddhist is known as yet to have accepted anything as eternal.

Again, Bhartṛhari's masterly elucidation of the *āgamaprāmāṇya*<sup>13</sup> in this section of the *Vākya-padiya* contains a direct proof of Bhartṛhari's non-Buddhistic faith. Following the hoary traditions of the Vedic seers, Bhartṛhari speaks out as a great champion of Hindu religion and philosophy his firm belief and conviction that *āgama*—Vedas, Smṛtis, etc.—is the sole authority on *dharma* which is transcendental and as such, cannot be understood by other *pramāṇas* like *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*.<sup>14</sup> In this connection he revels in the glorification of the Vedas in that they as self-revelations, explain the mystic nature of *dharma* and *mokṣa*. He strongly asserts that mankind cannot find better means than the Vedas for understanding the hidden truth of this Universe. Man may naturally rely on his fertile and powerful reason but it has not only not helped him but has even spoiled him, firstly because it has not given him any

12. “सत्त्वे न भ्रान्तिबाधौ स्तां नासत्त्वे ख्यातिबाधकौ ।

‘सदसद्भयामनिर्वाच्याविद्या वेद्यैः सह भ्रमाः’ ॥

*Iṣṭasiddhi*, I. 9, p. 47, G. O. Series.

Compare the *Vibhramaviveka*. Verse 29.

‘सदसद्भयामनिर्वाच्यां तामविद्यां प्रचक्षते’ ॥

‘सा चानिर्वचनीयत्वादस्ति नास्तीति चोच्यते ।

शून्ये तु बुद्धिशब्दानां प्रवृत्तिर्न कथञ्चन ॥’

*Iṣṭasiddhi*, I.20, G. O. Series, Vol. 65, p. 192.

‘तवासन्न तु मायैव वाच्यातस्सदसद्भिदा ।

सदसद्भयामनिर्वाच्यां मायां तां मा विजीघटः ॥’ (*Ibid.*, I. 68, p. 165.)

18. प्राप्स्युपायोऽनुकारश्च तस्य वेदोमहर्षिभिः ।

एकोऽप्यनेकवर्त्मैव समाम्नातः पृथक्पृथक् ॥

(*Vākya-padiya*, kāṇḍa I, verse 5.)

14. न चागमादृते धर्मस्तर्केण व्यवतिष्ठते ।

ऋषीणामपि यज्ज्ञानं तदप्यागमपूर्वकम् (*Ibid.*, verse 30.)

न जात्वकर्तृकं कञ्चिदागमं प्रतिपद्यते ।

बीजं सर्वांगमापाये त्रय्येवादौ व्यवस्थिता ॥ (*Ibid.*, verse 134.)

अस्तं यातेषु वादेषु कर्तृष्वन्येष्वस्तत्त्वपि ।

श्रुतिस्मृतिगतं धर्मं लोको न व्यतिवर्तते ॥ (*Ibid.*, verse 135.)

satisfactory solution for many vital problems of this world ; and secondly because it leaves behind a residue of doubt in him so much so that he is disinclined to accept the solution given in the Vedas for these puzzling problems. Bhartṛhari lays down the general principle that on questions of super-normal character, *āgama* or *śāstra* is the only authority and *tarka* is unreliable ;<sup>15</sup> for, however great might be a man's intellectual attainment, his well-thought-out syllogism will in no time be proved fallacious by a greater intellectual giant.<sup>16</sup> He adds<sup>17</sup> that a man who trusts his reason in transcendental matters is for ever doomed just as a blind man who feels his way only by touch through the slope of a huge precipice and advances further is destined to death by an instantaneous fall. *Tarka* or *anumāna* has only a timely effect by helping a man in examining his belief, but it fails often to convey the truth. *Tarka* may be accepted as an accessory to *āgama*, but it should not direct its path against *āgama*. cf. *vedaśāstrāvirodhī ca tarkaścaḥśuraśyaśyatām*. (*Vākyapadīya*, kāṇḍa I, verse 137). This is an important view that has been endorsed by the Upaniṣads and established by Śaṅkarācārya and his followers.<sup>18</sup>

15. धर्मस्य चाव्यवच्छिन्नाः पन्थानो ये व्यवस्थिताः ।

न ताल्लोकप्रसिद्धत्वात्कश्चित्कर्णे बाधते ॥ (*Vākyapadīya*, verse 31.)

16. यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः ।

अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपपाद्यते । (*Ibid.*, verse 34.)

17. हस्तस्पर्शादिवान्धेन विषमेऽप्यभिधावता ।

अनुमानप्रधानेन विनिपातो न दुर्लभः । (*Ibid.*, verse 42.)

18. “सस्सु च वेदान्तवाक्येषु जगतो जन्मादिकारणवादिषु तदर्थग्रहणदाढ्या-  
यानुमानमपि वेदान्तवाक्याविरोधि प्रमाणं भवत् न निवार्यते, श्रुत्यैव च सहायत्वेन  
तर्कस्याप्यभ्युपेयत्वात् ।” (जन्माद्यधिकरणभाष्यम्) “इतश्च नागमगम्येऽर्थे  
केवलेन तर्केण प्रत्यवस्थातव्यम् । यस्मान्निरागमाः पुरुषोप्रेक्षामात्रनिबन्धनास्त-  
का अप्रतिष्ठिता भवन्ति, उप्रेक्षाया निरङ्कुशत्वात्”.....“श्रुत्यर्थविप्रतिपत्तौ  
चार्थाभासनिराकरणेन सम्यगर्थनिर्धारणं तर्केणैव वाक्यवृत्तिनिरूपणरूपेण क्रियते -  
मनुरपि चैवं मन्यते—

“प्रत्यक्षमनुमान च शास्त्रं च विविधागमम् ।

अयं सुविदितं कार्यं धर्मशुद्धिमभीप्सता॥” इति॥

“आर्षं धर्मोपदेशं च वेदशास्त्राविरोधिना ।

यस्तर्केणानुसन्धत्ते स धर्मं वेद नेतरः ॥ इति

च ब्रुवन् । अयमेव च तर्कस्यालङ्कारः यदप्रतिष्ठितत्वं नाम । एवं हि  
सावद्यतर्कपरित्यागेन निरवद्यस्तर्कः प्रतिपत्तव्यो भवति ” ॥



# SIDDHITRAYA

By

YĀMUNĀCĀRYA

*Edited with English Translation and Notes*

By

R. RAMANUJACHARI

AND

K. SRINIVASACHARI





न च विशेषमात्रं निर्धूतनिखिलविषयविशेषोपश्लेषं वा वित्तिमात्रमस्ति, येन सहो-  
पलम्भनियमः संवेदितुरभिधीयेत । सामान्यं तु सदपि सौगतैर्न वस्तुतयाऽऽस्थीयते ।  
समस्तवृत्तिप्रत्यस्तमयेऽपि स्वयंज्योतिरयमात्माऽवतिष्ठत इति च वक्ष्यामः ।

स्ववाग्विघातश्च; एकं द्वाविति निर्देशात् । द्वयोर्हि एकक्रियानुप्रवेशे सहश-  
ब्दः; शिष्येण सहागच्छत्याचार्य इति यथा । अपि च नीलतद्वियोरिति द्वे उपादाया-  
भेद इत्येकत्वविधिः सवित्रीवन्ध्यात्वविधिरिव ।

Besides, there is neither an object (*viṣaya*) apart (from its knowledge) nor pure knowledge divested of any relation to all parti-  
cular objects ; if either existed, then the invariable concomitance of the  
manifestation of knower with knowledge could be posited.<sup>98</sup> And even if  
the property common to all knowledge (*jñānasāmānya*) is existent, it  
is not considered to be a positive entity by the Buddhists.<sup>99</sup> We shall  
show that even in the absence of all (knowledge due to mental) modifi-  
cations, the soul exists as a self-luminous entity. From the assertion  
that the two (i.e., knowledge and knower) are one, there arises a contra-  
diction in his own (the opponent's) statement ; for, the word *saha* (with)  
is used only when two entities enter on an identical course of action, as in  
the instance ' with the pupil, the preceptor comes'. Further, after refer-  
ring to the two (i.e. blue and its awareness) by the expression *nīla-*  
*taddhiyoḥ* to assert (their) identity by the word *abhedaḥ* (non-  
difference)<sup>100</sup> is like stating that one's mother is a barren woman

98. Having pointed out that the *sahopalambhaniyama* itself is impossible for  
the reason that there is the presentation of the 'I' even in the absence of any parti-  
cular item of knowledge, Yāmunācārya proceeds to establish the defective nature  
of the illustrative example, which the opponent must cite in his argument, namely,  
wherever there is invariable apprehension of two things together there must be  
non-difference between them, as in the case of knowledge and its object. In order  
to prove that knowledge and its *viṣaya* are non-different, the object by itself and  
the knowledge by itself must be taken and shown to be invariably concomitant. But,  
in truth, neither exists apart from the other. Hence, the illustrative example is  
subject to the charge of being unproven.

99. The Buddhists cannot hope to escape the difficulty by saying that between  
*viṣayatva* (the property of being an object of knowledge) and *jñānatva* (the property  
common to all knowledge) there is invariable concomitance, for they do not consider  
*sāmānya* (universal) to be a positive entity. Its admission, they say, leads to all  
sorts of absurdities. The universal is, at best, a working fiction, a useful device in  
thinking. When certain things are regarded as similar, it is not in virtue of their  
possessing some common features, but because of their distinction from the rest. The  
perception of a cow, for example, does not indicate that cowness, as a positive quality,  
exists in that creature ; it only signifies that it is different from all non-cows (*apoha*).  
See *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*.

100. The reference here is to the Buddhist dictum—*sahopalambhaniyamāda-*  
*bhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ*.

अनेकान्तश्च, संविदि प्रतिषिध्यमानैर्जडत्वादिभिः सर्वज्ञज्ञानेन सहोपलम्भनियम-  
भागिभिः संसारिज्ञानैश्च । तेषामभेदाभ्युपगमे ज्ञानस्य जडत्वमूर्तत्वादि, बुद्धस्य बद्ध-  
त्वमित्यापद्येत । नियमेन एकज्ञानसिद्धत्वमप्युक्तप्रकारेण प्रत्युक्तम् । विपक्षव्यतिरे-  
कश्चासिद्धः । भवतु नियमेन एकज्ञानसिद्धत्वं ज्ञानज्ञेयज्ञातृणाम्, मा च भूदभेदः ।  
को विरोधः ?

किमप्रकाशरूपत्वात्प्रकाशमनुरुध्यते ।

व्यवहाराय नीलादिराहोस्वित्तदभेदतः ॥

Besides, in view of the fact that qualities such as non-intelligence and the like are denied to consciousness, and in view of the fact that the knowledge of the soul in bondage is invariably apprehended along with the all-embracing knowledge of the omniscient being (sarvajña) (your hetu) is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa*.<sup>101</sup> If, in their case (i.e., between consciousness and its object and between the knowledge of the soul in bondage and that of the sarvajña), non-difference is admitted, the quality of non-intelligence and that of having a form and the like would have to be ascribed to consciousness, and the quality of being a bound soul would have to be attributed to the Buddha. As shown before, even the contention of their (knowledge and knower) being invariably the objects (viṣaya) of one and the same knowledge stands condemned.<sup>102</sup> Besides, here the non-existence of the hetu in cases where the sādhyā is known to be absent (vipakṣa) cannot be established ; for, there may be the invariable presentation of knowledge, the known and the knower in one and the same knowledge, and still there may not be non-difference between them.<sup>103</sup> What is the inconsistency here ? Do (objects of knowledge, such as) blue and the like depend for their apprehension and consideration on knowledge either because they are not self-luminous or because of their non-difference (from knowledge) ? As, in this manner, it becomes a matter

101. By drawing attention to the fact that the hetu (sahopalambhaniyama) is present even in cases where the sādhyā (non-difference) is not known to exist, Yāmunācārya exposes the fallacy (i.e. *anekānta*) vitiating the argument of the opponent. The latter may try to meet this by admitting that even in those cases the sādhyā is really present. In reply to this, Yāmunā says in this next sentence that this admission leads to absurdities.

102. To obviate the contradiction involved in sahopalambhaniyama to which the attention of the opponent was drawn, he shifts his ground and employs a different hetu, namely, *niyamena ekajñānasiddhatvam*.

103. The opponent argues that knowledge and the knower must be identical ; for they are invariably apprehended together in one and the same knowledge.

इति सन्दिह्यमानत्वान्नाभेदः शक्यनिर्णयः ।

बोध्यस्थश्चैष नियमो न पुनर्बुद्धिबोद्धव्यः ॥

स्पष्टश्च प्रत्यक्षबाधः, सर्वज्ञानेषु वेद्यादिव वित्तेरपि वेदितुर्भेदस्यापरोक्षत्वात् । न च प्रतियोगिनः प्रत्यक्षत्वं दृश्यत्वं वा भेदस्यापरोक्ष्ये त्वपेक्षितव्यम् ; सिद्धिमात्रेण तदुप-  
पत्तावप्रयोजकत्वेन तद्विशेषस्यानाक्षेपात् । अनवभासमानेऽपि प्रतियोगिनि भावाः  
स्वरूपत एव विलक्षणाः प्रत्यक्ष्यन्त इति सर्वलोकस्वसाक्षिकमेतत् ।

for doubt, it is impossible to determine that there is this non-difference. And this generalisation (that everything depends for its manifestation on consciousness) obtains only in the case of objects known and not in that of knowledge or the knower.

Besides, the conflict (of this theory) with perceptual experience is obvious ; for, in every knowledge, the distinction of the knower from knowledge is directly perceived, even as his distinction from objects of knowledge is apprehended. (At this stage the opponent may object and say that the distinction of knower from knowledge cannot be perceived, since the counter-correlative (i.e., knowledge) is not perceived ; and that even if it is admitted to be perceptible on the strength of the doctrine of *svayamprakāśatva*, it does not help, since it is not visible. To this we reply) in the matter of the perception of difference there is no necessity for the counter-correlative (*pratiyogi*) to be either perceptible or visible ; for when the direct perception of difference is possible with the aid of the mere thought of the counter-correlative, a particular variety of this knowledge is not required, in as much as it is not responsible (for the perception of difference). (We may go a step further and say that) even when the counter-correlative is not apprehended, things are directly perceived as being distinct in themselves ;<sup>101</sup> and this will be testified to by everybody from his own experience.

Against the possible objection that they may be so apprehended and still may not be identical, he must adduce the indirect proof (*tarka*) that if they were not identical, they could not be apprehended together in the self-same knowledge. It is shown here that he is unable to do so.

104. The apprehension of the generic property (*jāti*) of a thing, say a pot, is nothing more than the apprehension of the distinction from other things, i.e., non-pots ; and it prevents erroneous identifications. In fact, difference (*bheda*) is nothing more than generic property (*jāti*). To grasp the generic property in itself it is unnecessary that the counter-correlative (*pratiyogi*) should have been perceived. But the generic property, in its aspect of eliminating erroneous identifications, is known as *bheda* (difference), and is, certainly, found to pre-suppose knowledge of the *pratiyogi*. See *Śrī Bhāṣya*. Ānanda Press edn. p. 29 ; see also verses 13-14 of *Ādravyāsara* in *Tattvamuktākalāpa* and *Sarvārthasiddhi* 'yadā punaḥ adhyāsa

ननु जीवतो भेदप्रत्यक्षस्य शिरसि पदनिधानेन सहोपलम्भनियमस्याभेदेन प्रतिबन्ध-  
ग्रहणमिति कथमिव ततस्तद्वाधसम्भवः । तथा सति हि ज्वालाभेदानुमानमपि तदे-  
कत्वप्रत्यभिज्ञयापोद्येत । अविशेषज्ञो देवानांप्रियः । तत्र हि क्लृप्तकारणदोषानुवृत्तौ  
सत्यां जायमानोऽपरोक्षावभासः न निरवद्यप्रत्यक्षपूर्वकमनुमानं बाधितुमर्हति । तथाहि—  
अचिरनिर्वापितारोपितेषु एकवर्तिभागवर्तिषु बहुषु दीपेषु तद्भेदादर्शिनः सुसदृशतया  
स एवायमिति स्मृतिरुपजायत इति दृष्टम् । अतोऽन्यत्राप्यप्रतिबन्धपुष्कलकारणक्रमोप-  
निपातादवयवविश्लेषाच्च सुसदृशनिरन्तरप्रवृत्तप्रदीपप्रवाहालम्बनैव तथा मतिरिति निश्चीयते ।  
तथा एकस्मिन्नानात्वप्रत्ययः स्वतःप्राप्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिविपर्ययप्रयुक्तः समसमयोपजायमानानेकान-

(The opponent may ask) since, by trampling on the head of the percep-  
tion of difference which is alive, (we) notice the universal concomitance  
between the invariable manifestation (of two things) together and their  
non-difference, how can the sublation of non-difference be effected by  
perception of difference? If it could be effected, even the  
inference regarding the difference of the flames (at successive  
moments) would be nullified by the recognition of their identity. (The  
reply is that) the fool (of an opponent) is ignorant of the distinction  
(between these two cases). Indeed, in the case of the flame, the percep-  
tual knowledge, which arises when there is continuity of the defects in  
the settled causes (of knowledge) is incapable of sublating the inference  
which is based upon defectless perception. To make the point clear—it is  
found that, on account of close similarity between the different flames that  
are extinguished and lighted immediately after and which exist in the parts  
of one and the same wick, the remembrance “This is, certainly, that  
flame which I saw before” occurs to one who has not noticed their differ-  
ence. Therefore, even in other cases (where the flames are not extin-  
guished and kindled afresh), as there is the occurrence of a series of the  
complete set of causal factors, which have no counter-acting circum-  
stances, and as there is the separation of parts (of the causal conditions)  
it is to be concluded that such a knowledge (of identity) has for its  
object closely similar and incessantly flowing flame-series. Similarly, as  
the cognition of diversity in regard to one and the same thing  
is found in the case of seeing the moon double and the like  
as being occasioned by the swerving from the normal mode

---

nivartakatvarūpadharmāntaravaiśiṣṭyena vyavahriyante, tadā bhedā iti ucyante |  
tena teṣāmeva dharmānām vastusvarūpeṇa vyavahriyamāṇānām na pratiyogi-  
sāpekṣatvam | adhyāsanivartakatvarūpadharmāntaravaiśiṣṭyena vyavahriyamāṇānām  
pratiyogisāpekṣatvam iti |'

वद्यप्रत्यक्षप्रतिक्षिप्तविषयश्च द्विचन्द्रादौ दृष्ट इति नासौ तत्रैकत्वानुमानमभिभवितुं प्रभवति । न चैवमिह ज्ञातृज्ञानज्ञेयविवेकसाक्षात्कारी प्रत्यय इति प्रतिरूपद्वयेवायमिहाभेदानुमानोदयप्रसक्तिम् ।

न चोपलब्धिसाहित्यनियमादेव तथात्वमत्रानुमेयमिति युक्तम् ; विपक्षे बाधकानु-

of the working of the sense-organ,<sup>105</sup> and as having its object contradicted by the simultaneously arising defectless cognitions of many persons, this (perception of diversity) is not capable of setting aside the inference of identity in those cases. But here, the knowledge which immediately apprehends the distinction of the knower, knowledge and the known is not of such a nature ; hence, here it certainly does prevent the very possibility of the birth of the inference of identity.

But, here it is not proper to say that identity is inferable on the mere basis of the invariable manifestation of two things together ;<sup>106</sup> for we know of no obstacle preventing the existence of this *hetu* (*probans*) in

105. Either through pressure of the finger upon the eye or on account of some defect in the visual mechanism, the rays of the organ of sight (*nāyanaraśmi*) split and travel in two directions, thereby creating, for all practical purposes, two mutually independent apparatuses of vision. One apparatus apprehends the moon in her proper place, without, however, apprehending her unity ; the other, which moves somewhat obliquely, apprehends, at first, a place close by the moon, and subsequently the moon herself, without, however, noticing the intervening space separating this place and the moon. These two perceptions—one manifesting the moon in her proper place, and the other in a place close by—arise in such quick succession that the perceiver fails to notice the order of their occurrence, and thereby omits to note their varying natures. Thus, the double apparatus causes two apprehensions ; and as the apprehensions differ, there is also difference in the character of the object apprehended. The mistake here lies in the failure to notice the fact that the duality found in the places is unrelated to the moon. Hence, the perception of two moons. The *Prābhākara* account, which is closely similar to this, would, however, say that the double apparatus yields a duality of apprehensions, but it fails to grasp that the duality present in the apprehensions is unrelated to the moon. Compare : ' *netravṛttiḥ vittigatadvitvam candraṇa aṅghritabhedam gr̥hṇātīti Prābhākaraḥ | yathā Samvitsiddhau Prābhākaramatopanyāse "netravṛttir dvidhābhūtā dve tu vṛtti vitanvati | dvitvam candraṇa yugapat nirbhāsayati tatra naḥ" | iti deśagatadvitvam candraṇa aṅghritabhedam gr̥hṇātīti tatotra vaiṣamyam* ' *Śrutaprakāśikā*. The verse quoted from *Samvitsiddhi* is not found in the printed books and manuscripts examined so far.

106. *Upalabdhisāhityaniyama* and *sahopalambhaniyama* are identical. The fallacy of *anekānta* vitiating this *hetu* was first exposed. Here it is shown that the inability to cite indirect proof applies to this, as it does to the other *hetu*, namely, *niyamena ekajñānasiddhatvam*.

पलब्धेः । संविदधीनसिद्धितयापि तथा नियमोपपत्तेः । अनैन्द्रियकत्वेन च तद्भूति-  
विपर्ययस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वात् । योग्यानुपलम्भपराकृतत्वाच्च बाधकप्रत्ययस्य ।

अपि च विषयसिद्धिर्हि संवित् । सा च स्वयंप्रकाशेत्यविवादः । तेनावर्जनी-  
यस्तथा नियमः । न च भेदोऽपि सिद्धिमन्तरेण सिद्धयेदित्यनुन्मत्तेन युक्तमापादयितु-  
मित्यलमनेनानुभवपराहतमतातिव्याकुलीकरणेन ।

अप्रकाशात्मनश्च नीलादेः प्रकाश इत्यनुभवसिद्धत्वान्न समर्थनान्तरं प्रार्थयते ।  
आत्मा तु प्रकाशस्वभाव एव । न च तावता ज्ञानत्वम्, स्वतन्त्रत्वात् । परतन्त्रमा-  
गन्तु यावदर्थेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादिकारणसन्निधानमवतिष्ठमानमर्थावच्छिन्नरूपं ज्ञानमिति प्रागे-  
वावोचाम । आत्मा तु स्वतन्त्रो ज्ञाताऽहमिति प्रत्यात्मं प्रथते ।

cases where the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved) is absent. It may as well be that this invariable apprehension is due to objects depending for their manifestation on consciousness. Since the reference to the deviation from the normal mode of working of the senses serves no purpose for the reason that (knowledge and knower) are not cognised by the senses, (you cannot point out that the perception of difference, like the perception of two moons, is due to the deviation from the normal mode of working of the senses). As the existence of a sublating cognition is denied by effectual non-perception, (the perception of difference cannot be declared to be false).

Moreover, consciousness is well-known to be the manifestation of objects ;<sup>107</sup> and that it is self-luminous is beyond dispute ; hence, such an invariable manifestation of knowledge and the known is unavoidable. The contention that distinction (of objects from one another) can be established without the aid of consciousness is not likely to be put forward by any one who is not mad. Let this violent shaking of the doctrine which is opposed to experience suffice.

Since the notion that the manifestation of objects, such as, blue and the like, which, in their nature, are not self-luminous, (is effected by consciousness) is vouched for by experience, it requires no other proof. The self, on the contrary, is essentially self-luminous. On this count alone, the self cannot be said to be knowledge, as the former is self-dependent. It has already been stated that knowledge is dependent (on the self), that it is occasional, that it exists only so long as the causes, such as, the contact of the senses with their objects, persist, and that its nature is to pertain to some object or other. The self, on the contrary, is independent, and is the knowing subject ; it shines as the 'I' in every self.

\*The Benares edition reads *vitti* ; the variant reading found in the Telugu edition and in some manuscripts has been preferred.

107. See note 104.

यदि पुनरीदृशोऽप्ययमनन्याधीनसिद्धितया ज्ञानमभिलप्यते, अभिलप्यतां कामम् ; तथापि ज्ञानवदेवेदं ज्ञानम् । न ज्ञप्तिमात्रं तथा । अत एव हि छन्दोगाः “अथ यो वेदेदं जिघ्राणीति स आत्मा” इत्याद्यामनन्ति । तथा “कतम आत्मा” इति प्रश्नपूर्वकमिदमेव लक्षणमामनन्ति वाजसनेयिनः “योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तज्योतिः पुरुषः” इति । अत्र हि योऽयं सर्वलोकानुभवसिद्धो विविधविषयवेदनप्रचुरः प्राणेषु प्रेरकतया स्थितो हृदयायतने अन्तज्योतिरहमिति प्रत्यक्षत्वेन प्रकाशते, स पुरुष इति यथोदितमेवात्मस्वरूपमुपदिश्यते । “एष हि द्रष्टा श्रोता घ्राता रसयिता मन्ता बोद्धा कर्ता विज्ञानात्मा पुरुषः” इत्यार्थवर्णाः । तथा “विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयादिति,” “न पश्यो मृत्युं पश्यति न रोगं नोत दुःखताम्” “स उत्तमः पुरुषः” “नोपजनं स्मरन्निदं

Even when it is of this nature, if the self is termed knowledge, on the ground that it does not depend for its manifestation on something other than itself, you are welcome to say so. Even when it is so (described), surely, this knowledge is the possessor of knowledge, and not such a pure consciousness (as is held by you). Indeed, for that very reason, the *Chandogās* (those who chant the *Sāma-veda*) declare “He who has the awareness of ‘let me smell this’ he is the self.”<sup>108</sup> Similarly, after the question “what is the soul?” has been raised, *Vājasaneyins* offer the same definition (of the soul, namely “He who is in the midst of the senses and vital breath, who has knowledge for his essence and who is the light inside the heart, he is the person.”<sup>109</sup> It is only in the manner indicated already that the true nature of the soul has been here described as follows—“He who is experienced by everybody, who is filled with knowledge concerning diverse objects, who resides among the senses and the breath as their director, who is the inward light in the region of the heart, and who shines for his own sake as the ‘I,’ is the *puruṣa*.” The followers of *Atharvaveda* say “Truly, this entity, the seer, hearer, smeller, taster, thinker (*māntr*), knower (*boddhṛ*), doer (*kartā*), he who has knowledge for his essence, is the *puruṣa*.”<sup>110</sup> Similarly, the following and other passages are found :—“Lo ! whereby would one understand the understander ?”<sup>111</sup> “The seer sees neither death nor sickness, nor the evil in the world”<sup>112</sup> ; “He (the highest light to which the *jīva* reaches up)

108. *Chānd. Up.* VII.xii.4.

109. *Bṛh. Up.* IV. iii. 7.

110. *Praśna. Up.* IV.

111. *Bṛh. Up.* II. iv. 14.

112. *Chānd. Up.* VII. xxvi. 2.



शरीरम्, ” “ एवमेवास्य परिदृष्टुरिमाः षोडश कलाः पुरुषायणाः पुरुषं प्राप्यास्तं गच्छन्ति, ” “ तस्माद्वा एतस्मान्मनोमयादन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमयः ” इत्याद्याः ।

सत्यं ज्ञानमित्यत्रापि ब्रह्मलक्षणनिर्देशे ज्ञानशब्दो न ज्ञानमात्रवचनः । अपि तु तद्वचनः ; तद्वचनत्वे “ लिति ” इति आद्युदात्तत्वप्रसक्तेः । अन्तोदात्तश्चायं ज्ञानशब्दः । मत्वर्थीयाच्प्रत्ययान्तत्वे तथात्वं घटते, नान्यथेत्येतत् परमात्मनिरूपणेऽतिनिपुणमुपपादयिष्यामः । ऐतरेयकोपनिषदपि “ प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म ” इत्युक्त्वा “ स एतेन प्राज्ञेनात्मना ” इति प्रकृष्टज्ञानवन्तमेवेश्वरं दर्शयति । तत्सिद्धं ज्ञातैवायमात्मेति ।

is the Supreme Person,” “ The jīva experiences him in diverse ways . . . not thinking of the body cast behind in the midst of his kin ”;<sup>113</sup> “ Even so, the sixteen parts (kalās) of the experiencer (jīva), which depend (for their existence, nature and continuance) on the Highest Person, on reaching Him, become incapable of entangling Him in pleasure, pain, etc.”; <sup>114</sup> “ Different from that made of mind is another inner soul consisting of knowledge.” <sup>115</sup>

Even while defining Brahman, in the text—‘Brahman is satya, jñāna.....’ the word jñāna does not refer to mere knowledge, but to the possessor of it; for, if it referred to the former according to the sūtra-litī<sup>116</sup>—it would follow that the first syllable must have the principal accent. But this word, jñāna has its principal accent on the last syllable. The word jñāna being so accented will be appropriate only if it has, at its termination, the suffix *ac*, which conveys the same meaning as the suffix *matup*. Otherwise, it would not be (appropriate). We shall explain this very clearly while treating of the Supreme self. The Aitareya Upaniṣad also, after describing Brahman in the words ‘Prajñāna is Brahman’, refers to the lord as the possessor of supreme intelligence, by the expression ‘he (Vāmadeva), by means of this Self possessed of intelligence.’<sup>117</sup> Therefore, it is clear that this soul is truly the knower.

113. Chānd. Up. VIII.xii.3.

114. Praśna. Up. V.

115. Tait. Up. II.4.

116. Aṣṭādhyāyī. VI.i.193.

117. Ait. Up. Part V.

२५. किं पुनरस्मिन् देहादिव्यतिरेकिणि चेतने प्रत्यगात्मनि प्रमाणम् । अनुमानमिति नयविचक्षणोऽक्षपादः । यदाह “ इच्छाद्वेषमुखदुःखज्ञानान्यात्मलिङ्गम् ” इति ।

किममीषामात्मना अविनाभावो दृष्टः, धूमध्वजविशेषेणैव धूमविशेषस्य । हन्तैवं तत एव तत्प्रमितेः किमनुमानेन । मामूद्विशेषतोदर्शनं सामान्यतस्तु भविष्यति । तथाहि—इच्छादयः कार्यत्वानित्यत्वगुणत्वादिभिः शब्दादय इवाश्रिततयानुमीयन्ते । यश्चैषामाश्रयः स आत्मा । गुणत्वञ्च परिशेषात् । न सामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावाः, अनित्यत्वात् । न द्रव्यं कर्म वा, व्यापकद्रव्यसमवायादिति । विशेषगुणत्वञ्चानित्यत्वे सत्यस्मदाद्येकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वनियमात्, रूपादिवत् ।

### THE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE BY WHICH THE EXISTENCE OF THE JĪVA IS ESTABLISHED

Established through Inference—(a) The Nyāya View.

25. What is the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) by which this individual self, which is distinct from the body and the like, and which is intelligent, is established? *Akṣapāda*, who is master of the science of logic, thinks that it is inference. What he says is—‘ Desire, hate, pleasure, pain and knowledge are the reasons pointing to the existence of the soul.’<sup>118</sup> Has invariable concomitance between these and the soul, like that between smoke and fire (*dhūmadhvaja*), been observed anywhere? Indeed, if so, as the knowledge of the self is obtained thence itself, what is the need for inference? (The opponent replies) no invariable concomitance may have been observed in particular (between qualities such as desire, etc., and the soul); but, in general (i.e., between qualities and their substrate), it may be noticed. To make the point clear—Desire and other qualities, like sound and so on, are inferred to be dependent upon something, for the reason of their being effects, non-eternal (entities), attributes, and so on. That which is the substrate of these (qualities) is the self. That desire and the like are qualities is inferred by elimination. Being non-eternal, they cannot be either generality (*sāmānya*), or particularity (*viśeṣa*), or inherence (*samavāya*), or non-existence (*abhāva*). As they are inherent in all-pervasive substances, they cannot be either substance (*dravya*) or action (*karma*). That they are specific qualities (*viśeṣaguna*) is established by the fact that at all times, like colour and other qualities, they, while being non-eternal, are grasped by one of our senses.

118. *Icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduhkhajñānānyātmano liṅgāni. Nyāya-Sūtra*, I. i. 10,

एवमाश्रयमात्रमुपस्थापयन्तोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकिणो हेतवः द्रव्यान्तरगुणत्वं प्रत्याचक्ष्णौ केवलव्यतिरेकिसाधनैरात्मगोचरतया नियम्यन्ते । तथाहि भवति—इच्छादयो न महा-भूतगुणाः; स्वात्मन एव प्रत्यक्षत्वात्, अबाह्येन्द्रियप्राप्तत्वाद्वा । ये भूतगुणास्ते स्वात्म-परात्मप्रत्यक्षा बाह्यकरणप्रत्यक्षाश्च, यथा रूपादयः ; न तथा इच्छादय इति न तद्गुणाः । दिक्कालमनांसि पुनर्न विशेषगुणवन्ति, नापि तद्गुणानां प्रत्यक्षत्वमिति न तेषामपि गुणाः । अकारणगुणपूर्वत्वात् अयावच्छरीरभावित्वादित्यादयः शरीरविशेषगुण-त्वप्रतिषेधहेतवः प्राचीनाश्च अत्रानुकष्टव्याः । तेन इच्छादयो न शरीरगुणाः तद्गुण-भावापवादकप्रमाणवत्त्वे सति गुणत्वात्, ये यथोक्तसाध्या न भवन्ति ते यथोक्तसाधना अपि न भवन्ति, यथा रूपादयः । यथोक्तसाधनाः पुनरिच्छादय इति यथोक्तसाध्या एवेति ।

The reasons concomitant in affirmation and negation (*anvaya-vyatiirekiṇo hetavaḥ*), which, in this manner, indicate only (the need of) some substrate (for desire, etc.), are narrowed down in their scope in such a way as to refer to the soul by the reasons which are concomitant in negation only (*kevalavyatiirekisādhanaḥ*) and which disprove the view that they are the qualities of substances other than the soul. That this is so is evident from the following :—Desire and the like are not the qualities of the primal elements (*mahābhūtas*), because they are perceived only by oneself, or because they are not to be grasped by the outer senses. The qualities belonging to the primal elements, as colour and the like, are perceivable by oneself and others and are perceived by the outer senses ; but desire and the like are not so (perceivable); hence, they are not the qualities of primal elements. Again, space (*dik*), time and mind (*manas*) do not have specific qualities ; and their attributes are not open to perception ; hence, desire and the like are not their qualities. Reasons, such as the following—since they are not dependent on the causal substances ; since they do not exist as long as the body lasts—(reasons) which were cited before, and which refute the view that they are the specific qualities of the body, are to be brought forward and applied here also. Therefore, desire and the like are not the qualities of the body ; for, while there is evidence contradicting the view that they are the qualities of the body, they are qualities. Whatever does not possess the *sādhya* does not have the aforesaid *sādhana* either, as in the case of colour. Desires and the like, however, possess the aforesaid *hetu*, and hence, they possess the *sādhya*.

विमतिपदास्पदेभ्यः शरीरादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरगुणा इच्छादय इति वा प्रतिज्ञा ; यथोक्त एव हेतुः उदाहरणञ्च प्रयोक्तव्यम् । सामान्येन वाऽन्वयः प्रदर्शनीयः । यो यद्गुणभावापवादकप्रमाणवत्त्वे सति गुणः, स ततोऽर्थान्तरस्य गुणः, यथा पृथिव्यादिभ्यः शब्दः, इति आकाशसिद्धिवदात्मसिद्धिरिति ।

२६. इदमपि न समीचीनमित्येके । तथाहि—अन्वयव्यतिरेकिहेतुभिर्देहादि-साधारणमाश्रयमात्रमवगमितम् । न च तावताऽऽत्मसिद्धिः । केवलव्यतिरेकी तु साधनदशमेव नासादयति, सपक्षान्वयविरहादसाधारणवत् । न चैवं केवलान्वयिनो विप-

Or, the thesis to be proved (instead of being 'Desire and the like are not the qualities of the body') may be the following—Desires and the like are the qualities of some substance other than the body, which is the point under dispute.<sup>119</sup> The aforesaid hetu and illustrative example may be cited (in the case of this thesis also). Positive concomitance too may be shown in a somewhat general way. That which is a quality, when there is evidence contradicting the view that it is the quality of a given entity, is the attribute of something other than that given entity, just as sound is the quality of something other than earth and the like. In this way, just as ether (ākāśa) is proved (to be the substrate of sound), the self is established (to be the substrate of desire and the like).

#### Refutation of the Nyāya View

26. Some consider that this (view) is not correct. To elucidate this point :—with the aid of reasons concomitant in affirmation and negation (*anvayavyatirekī*) it was only made known that there is some support (for desire and other qualities), which might be either the body or some other substance. By this reasoning alone, the soul is not established (to be that substrate); whereas, the reason concomitant in negation alone (*kevalavyatirekī*) does not even possess the quality of being a correct reason; for, as in the case of the fallacy called *asādhāraṇa*, there is absence of the probans in instances where the sādhyā is surely met with (*sapakṣa*).<sup>120</sup> The objection that on this admission, even the reason con-

119. The point at dispute is not the existence of the body, but its possessing desires, etc., as attributes.

120. In the argument, 'sound is eternal, because it is sound' the hetu is vitiated by the fallacy of *asādhāraṇa*; for, it is not present in any *sapakṣa* (i.e., similar examples where the sādhyā is present) even as it is not present in the *vipakṣa*. Similarly, in cases where reasons concomitant in negation alone (*kevalavyatirekī*) are employed, there being no *sapakṣa*, it is impossible to show the presence of the hetu in *sapakṣas*. Hence, *kevalavyatirekī* is considered fallacious. It is defective for another reason also. In order to show that wherever the sādhyā is absent the

क्षव्यतिरेकदर्शनविकलतया साधारणवदसाधनत्वम् । देशकालादिशक्तितोपाधिविगमेऽप्यनव्यदर्शनेन साध्यान्वितस्वभावतया परिनिश्चितत्वात् । न च साधनाभावे साध्याभावदर्शनमात्रेण साध्यान्वितस्वभावत्वं शक्यं निश्चेतुम् । अभावस्यानन्तदेशव्यापितया अनवयवेन ग्रहणस्यैव दुष्करत्वात् । कलयाऽप्यन्यत्र वृत्तौ सम्बन्धे नियमासम्भवात् । सन्देहग्रस्तत्वाच्च किं साधनाभावप्रयुक्तः साध्याभावः, किं वा निमित्तान्तरप्रयुक्त इति । पृथिव्यादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरगुणत्वप्रतिज्ञापि द्रव्यान्तराप्रसिद्धेरप्रसिद्धविशेषणा ।

comitant in affirmation alone cannot be considered a correct reason, for, as in the fallacy known as *sādhāraṇa*, there is the failure to show the absence of the reason in the counter-example (*vipakṣa*)<sup>121</sup>—(this objection) does not stand. Since, even in the absence of suspected limiting conditions (*upādhis*), such as space, time and the like, the co-presence (of the *hetu* and the *sādhya*) is found, it is definitely ascertained that the *hetu* has the character of being connected with the *sādhya*. From the mere observation of the absence of the *sādhya* when there is the absence of the *hetu*, it is not possible to ascertain that the *hetu* has the character of being connected with the *sādhya*. As the non-existence of the *sādhya* is met with in innumerable places, it is impossible even to take note of them all exhaustively. If even in a single place the *hetu* were to be present in some manner, the universality of the connection cannot be maintained. Besides, it is a matter for doubt whether the non-existence of the *sādhya* is due to the absence of the *hetu* or to some other cause. Even the thesis (that desire and the like) are the qualities of some entity other than earth and the like may be charged with having an unproven attribute (*aprasiddha-viśeṣaṇa*), for that other entity has not been proved.

*hetu* is also absent, the *sādhya* must first have been understood previously ; but it is not met with anywhere. Hence, the Vedāntins dismiss *kevalavyatirekī* as being faulty. Cf. 'sādhyaḥbhāvo vipakṣe kathamiva viditāḥ tasya sādhyaḥprasiddheḥ.' *Tattva-muktākalāpa*, *Buddhisara*, verse 53. See also *Nyāya-Pārisuddhi* (Memorial edition, pp. 66-75) and *Didhiti*. The *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* rejects *kevalānvayī* also, on the score that the *kevalānvayī* requires a *sādhya* which is present everywhere, and such a *sādhya* is inadmissible on the theory that Brahman is *nirguṇa*.

121. The opponent says—In the argument 'the mountain has fire, because it is knowable,' the *hetu* is defective (*sādhāraṇa*), because it is not absent in the *vipakṣa*. Similarly, in arguments employing reasons concomitant in affirmation alone (*kevalānvayī*), there being no *vipakṣa*, the absence of the *hetu* in the *vipakṣa* cannot be cited. Hence, *kevalānvayī* also is a defective process of reasoning.

२७. एतेन साङ्ख्योदीरितसाधनभेदा अपि अपोदिता वेदितव्याः सङ्घातपरार्थत्वादयः । तथा च तानेव तावदादितो व्याकुर्महे ।

“ सङ्घातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।

पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात्कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ ”

अयमर्थः—देहेन्द्रियादयः परार्थाः सङ्घातत्वात् , शयनासनशरणादिवत् । प्रत्यक्षञ्च शरीरस्य सङ्घातत्वं भूतानाञ्च । अव्यक्तमहदहङ्कारेन्द्रियाणाञ्च सुखदुःखमोहात्मतया तथात्वमनुमेयं तद्वदेव ।

न चेन्द्रियाणामाहङ्कारिकत्वस्याभ्युपेतस्य साध्यत्वाभिमतपारार्थ्यधर्मस्य चासंहतपरार्थत्वस्यान्यथात्वापादनादुभयविशेषविरुद्धत्वं हेतोः । अहङ्कारान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानेन

#### (b) The Sāṅkhya View

27. By the same reasoning, even the various reasons (such as, that collocations exist for the sake of others) are to be understood as having been set aside. Let us analyse them in the order of their presentation. “Since collocations exist for the sake of something other than themselves, since (in this other) there is the absence of the three guṇas and the like, since there must be control (of these collocations), since there must be an experiencer, and since there is activity for securing aloofness (from prakṛti), the soul exists.”<sup>122</sup> This means—Being collocations, the body, the senses and so on, like a bed, a seat, a house, etc., exist for the sake of something other than themselves. The character of being a collocation attributed to the body and the primal elements is vouched for by perception. That the same character (of being a collocation) belongs to unmanifest prakṛti (avyakta), mahat, ahamkāra and the senses, as to the body and elements, is to be inferred from the fact that the former are of the nature of pleasure, misery and delusion.

(A possible objection is that) when the senses are admitted to be derived from the ahamkāra and when the meaning of what is accepted as the sādhyā, namely, the quality of existing for the sake of another is the quality of existing for the sake of another which is itself not a collocation, the respective reasons for the above only prove the opposite, and hence, they are subject to the fallacy of *ubhaya-viśeṣaviruddha*.<sup>123</sup> (The Sāṅkhya replies) this objection can-

122. *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*. verse 17.

123. It is interesting to note that this identical argument has been cited as an example of *ubhaya-viśeṣaviruddha* (i.e. Dharmadharmaubhaya, viśeṣaviruddha), by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in his *Śloka-Vārttika, Anumānapariccheda*. sl. 105-7. The six varieties of *viruddha*—Dharmasvarūpabādhā, Dharmaviśeṣabādhā, Dharmisvarūpabādhā, Dharmiviśeṣabādhā, Dharmadharmaubhaya-svarūpabādhā and Dharmadharmaub-

“देवा वैकारिकाः स्मृताः” इत्याद्यागमबलेन प्रकाशलाघवगुणान्वयेन च वैकारिकाभिधान-  
सात्त्विकाहङ्कारभेदयोनित्वस्येन्द्रियाणां प्रमाणसिद्धस्यापवादानुपपत्तेः । आत्मनस्तु सङ्घा-  
तत्वे तस्यापि सङ्घातान्तरार्थतयाऽनवस्थापत्त्या निष्प्रमाणकानेककल्पनाप्रसङ्गात् । अप्र-  
योजकत्वाच्च सङ्घातत्वस्य शेषित्वे । दृष्टान्तदृष्टाशेषधर्मोपस्थापनेऽनुमानप्रामाण्यस्यैवासम्भ-  
वापत्तेः, तदसङ्घातत्वस्य चाप्रचाल्यत्वात् । न च प्रमाणान्तरबलेनाऽनाहङ्कारिकत्वसङ्घातान्त-  
रार्थत्वयोर्बाधेऽबाधितेन सङ्घातपरार्थत्वेनापि न भवितव्यम् । एवञ्च संहतत्वव्यापकाव-  
रुद्धत्रैगुण्यादिरहितोऽसंहत आत्मा सिद्धः

not be raised. Since the presence or the absence of the senses is depend-  
ent respectively upon the presence or the absence of ahamkāra, since  
there is the support of scriptural passages, such as, “The senses are con-  
sidered to proceed from ahamkāra,”<sup>124</sup> since there is contact of qualities,  
viz., brightness and lightness<sup>125</sup> (with the senses), the fact that the senses  
have for their source that variety of ahamkāra wherein the sattva quality  
predominates and which is known as *vaikārika* is well supported by  
evidence; hence, it would be improper to deny this fact. Even so, the  
belief that the self is not a collocation is unshakable, for the reason that  
(1) if the soul were itself a collocation as it would have to exist for the  
sake of another collocation, there would result an unending series,  
and, as a consequence, many things for which evidence is  
lacking would have to be assumed; (2) the quality of being  
a collocation is not responsible for an entity being a *śeṣi* (i.e. one for  
whose sake others exist); and (3) inference itself would lose its validity,  
if all the qualities found in the illustrative examples are taken into con-  
sideration.<sup>126</sup> When the refutation of the statements—that the senses  
do not proceed from ahamkāra; and that the body, senses and the  
like exist for the sake of other collocations—is effected on the strength  
of some evidence, it will not necessarily follow that even the facts of their  
being a collocation and of their existing for the sake of others, which are  
uncontradicted, should stand condemned. Thus, it is evident that the  
soul, which is itself not a collocation, is free from the three guṇas (sat-  
tva, rajas and tamas) which are associated with the quality of existing  
for the sake of another—a quality which never fails to be present when-  
ever the character of being a collocation exists.

bhayaviśeṣabādha—have, in later times, been reduced to one, since all of them,  
in the last resort, only prove the opposite of what is intended to be proved.

124. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*. I.ii.47.

125. *Sattvam laghu prakāśakamiṣṭam. Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*. verse 13.

126. Cf. *yadi vivakṣitārthavyatirekeṇa anumānasya avivakṣitamapi viśayaḥ, nanvetasyām kalpanāyām sarvānumānam vyāhanyeta. Nyāya-Vārtika* (Chowkamba edn. pp. 344-45). See also *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā* (Benares edn. p. 600).

तथा देहादयः सुखदुःखमोहात्मकतया परेणाधिष्ठीयन्ते, यन्त्रादिभिरिव रथादयः । अपिचानुकूलप्रतिकूलवेदनीये सुखदुःखे भृत्यभ्रातृव्यवदनुकूलनीयप्रतिकूलनीयवती । दृश्यत्वाद्देहादयो घटादय इव विलक्षणद्रष्टृका इति अधिष्ठातुरनुकूलप्रतिकूलवेदकस्य द्रष्टृ-  
स्त्रैगुण्यादिविपर्ययः पूर्ववदेव निर्णेतव्यः ।

तथा देहादेरव्यक्तान्तस्य कृत्स्नस्य त्रिगुणात्मकतयाऽत्यन्तदुःखोपशमनलक्षणमोक्ष-  
दशानुपपत्तेः, तदर्थञ्च शास्त्राणां महाधियाञ्च प्रवृत्तेरस्ति देहादिव्यतिरिक्तोऽसंहतस्त्रैगुण्याद्य-  
संस्पृष्टः पुरुष इति ।

२८. अत्रापि सङ्घातपारार्थ्यादिभिर्यद्यपि परः कोऽप्यधिष्ठाता द्रष्टा सिद्धः, तथापि

Being of the nature of pleasure, pain and misery, the body and the like are controlled by some other entity, even as the chariot and other objects by the charioteer and the like. Further, pleasure and pain, which are respectively known as agreeable and disagreeable experiences, point to a person who is pleased or displeased, even as the servant and the foe (imply a person who is ministered unto or one who is hated). Since the body, etc., are perceptible, like pots and similar objects, they must have a perceiver<sup>127</sup> distinct from themselves. As shown before, the absence of the three guṇas from the soul, who is (thus known to be) a controller, a knower of agreeable and disagreeable things and a perceiver, is definitely ascertainable.

Similarly, as all things commencing from the body and ending with unmanifest matter (avyakta) are of the nature of the three guṇas, the state of release, which is essentially the annihilation of all miseries, is impossible of attainment by them ; but, since the śāstras and wise men endeavour to attain (release), there must be a soul (puruṣa) that is distinct from the body, that is not a collocation, and that is untouched by the three guṇas.

### Refutation of the Sāṅkhya View

28. Even here, although with the aid of reasons, such as that collo-  
cations exist for the sake of others, the existence of some other entity  
(than the body), who is a controller and perceiver is established,

127. In interpreting bhokṭṛbhāvāt, some have understood 'bhoktā' as enjoyer, and some, as perceiver. Both the interpretations have been mentioned here. See *Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī*, Kārikā, 17.



न तस्यासंहतत्वात्रिगुणत्वादिरभिमतविशेषः शक्यनिश्चयः । तथाहि—सङ्घातस्य सङ्घा-  
तान्तरार्थत्वनियमदर्शनबलादापतन्ती परा परा सङ्घातकल्पना न दोषाय कार्यतयेवानादि-  
कारणपरम्पराकल्पना

न चाप्रयोजकत्वमपि । असङ्घातस्यासङ्गस्याशेषविक्रियाशून्यस्याऽनाधेयातिशयकूटस्थ-  
चितिमात्रवपुषः पुरुषस्य सङ्घातं प्रति परत्वानुपपत्तेः । तद्धि तस्य शेषीभवति, तच्च तदर्थम् ,  
यद्येनोपक्रियते क्रियते वा, यच्चोपकरोति करोति वा । न च तथा साङ्ख्यपुरुष इति कथं  
तस्य सङ्घातं प्रति परत्वं कथन्तरां च सङ्घातस्य तादर्थ्यम् । अनुपकार्योऽप्युपकार्यतया  
आत्मानं मन्यत इति चेत् ; कामं मन्यतां किमायातमुपकार्यत्वस्य । न खलु बालास्तल-  
मलिनतादिमत्तया गगनमभिमन्यन्त इति तस्य तथात्वं भवति ।

yet, (with their aid) the qualities of not being a collocation and of not  
possessing the three guṇas, which are admitted by you, cannot be deter-  
mined as belonging to it. To explain—The positing of a series of  
collocations, made on the strength of the observation that a collocation,  
always exists only for another collocation, like the positing of a series of  
causes having no beginning, made for the reason that something is an  
effect, is not wrong.

It cannot be said that (the quality of being a collocation) is not  
responsible (for anything being a śeṣi, an independent being for  
whose sake others exist) ; for, in respect of any collocation,  
the soul, which is not a collocation, which is unattached, which is bereft  
of all modifications and which is mere consciousness itself, which is un-  
changing and for which no service is rendered by anything else, cannot  
be that other for whose sake the collocation exists. That which is served or  
produced by another becomes the śeṣi in respect of that other. That  
which serves or produces anything exists for the sake of the latter.<sup>128</sup>  
But, since the puruṣa admitted by the Sāṅkhyas is not so (served or pro-  
duced by a collocation), how can he be regarded as being that other in  
respect of the collocation ? What is more, how can the collocation be  
treated as existing for his sake ? If it be said that though the puruṣa is  
not really rendered any service, he imagines himself as being served, (we  
reply) by all means let him imagine like that ; how does it help to estab-  
lish that he is being served ? For the reason that children imagine  
ether to possess the dirt found in a region, the character of being dirty  
will not belong to it.

अपि च तथाविधभ्रमोऽपि कस्य कथमुदयत इति विवेचनीयम् । न तावच्चिच्छक्तेः, सर्वविक्रियाशून्यतया अतिविशुद्धायामशुभशतनिदानभूतभ्रमपरिणामासम्भवात् । अन्तःकरणं तु बुद्ध्यपरपरिभाषाभिधानमचेतनतया तनुरिव न भ्राम्यति ।

अचिदपि स्वच्छतया चिच्छायामापन्नं चेतनायत इति चेन्न ; नीरूपायाश्चितेर्बुद्धेश्च छायातद्ग्रहणानुपपत्तेः । छायेव छायेति चेत् ; कः खल्विवार्थः ? चितिसरूपत्वमिति चेत् ; हन्तैवमशेषविकाररहितचितिसरूपतापत्तावन्तःकरणमपि प्रत्यस्तमितसमस्तवृत्तिकमापद्यत इति दुरुपपादतरोऽयं भ्रमसुखदुःखादिविकारयोगः प्रत्यात्मसिद्धः ।

चेतनत्वेन सरूपत्वमिति चेन्न ; चित्तिरेव हि ते पुरुषः, न चेतयिता । यथाह तत्र भगवान् पतञ्जलिः “ यदा चित्तिरेव पुरुषः किमत्र केन व्यपदिश्यते ” इति ।

Further, to whom such an illusion occurs and how must be investigated. It cannot occur to the power of consciousness ; for, the illusion, which is a mode of change and which is the root cause of a hundred ills, cannot arise in the exceedingly pure consciousness, as it is devoid of all modifications. The internal organ (antahkarana) too, for which buddhi is another technical expression, cannot experience the illusion ; for, like the body, it is non-intelligent.

If it be urged that, though it is non-intelligent, the internal organ, being transparent, receives the reflection of consciousness and becomes a conscious subject, as it were, (we reply) not so ; for, reflection and its reception cannot properly belong (respectively) to consciousness and buddhi, which are alike formless. If it be contended that to be a reflection is to be like it, (we ask) what is meant by ‘being like’ (consciousness)? If the reply is that it consists in having a nature similar to that of consciousness, (we rejoin) if, indeed, that were so, when buddhi attains similarity with consciousness, which is free from all modifications, it too becomes devoid of all modifications ; and hence, it would be impossible to account for the contact of modifications, such as, illusion, pleasure and pain, which are met with in every soul.

If it be said that buddhi has a nature similar to that of consciousness only in so far as it possesses consciousness, (we reply) not so ; for, on your view, the soul is, in fact, consciousness itself and not a conscious entity ; the venerable Patañjali, for instance, says, ‘ If consciousness alone is the soul, what is it that is referred to here, and by what.’

अजडायमानत्वमिवार्थ इति चेत्; अजडत्वमपि न ज्ञातृत्वातिरिक्तं किञ्चिदित्युक्तमेव, तेनैव तद्विवरणमिति च न किञ्चिदेतत् ।

अपि च चितिसन्निधानाधीनां बुद्धिसिद्धिमभिधानः कथमिव तदजडिमानं प्रति-जानीयात् । न च चितिस्वान्तयोः बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बाधाराभिमतयोरन्यतरस्मिन्नप्यविद्यमानस्य विषयविशेषोपरक्तज्ञातृत्वलक्षणधर्मभेदस्य प्रतिबिम्बे सम्भवः । प्रत्युक्तश्चायं प्रतिबिम्बवादः प्रच्छन्नबाह्यमतप्रत्यादेशे ।

यदुच्यते निर्विकारायापि पुंसे तत्सन्निधिमहिमसमुत्थापितप्रमाणविपर्ययादिविचित्र-वृत्तिभेदं स्वान्तमेव स्ववृत्तिं विषयविशेषांश्चोपदर्शयति, सामन्तचक्रमिव पराक्रमीयः\* प्रति-

If it be urged that 'being like' (consciousness) means 'being like not-non-intelligent', (we reply that) it has already been shown that not being not-intelligent is nothing more than the quality of being a knower and that the explanation of 'being like' (a conscious entity) is sought to be made in terms of itself; <sup>129</sup> and hence, this (interpretation of 'being like') is pointless.

Further, how (we ask) can he who maintains that the existence of buddhi is dependent upon the nearness of consciousness posit its being not-non-intelligent? And, when this particular quality, known as the character of being a knower—a quality associated with some object or other—does not exist in either consciousness or buddhi, which are considered to be the original and the basis of reflection, it cannot occur in the reflection. This reflection theory has already been refuted while discarding the view of the heretics in disguise.

It may be said that, though the puruṣa (self) is changeless, the antaḥkaraṇa itself, which possesses wonderful and diverse activities, such as *pramāṇa* and *viparyaya*<sup>130</sup> produced by the power belonging to the nearness of the puruṣa, exhibits its activities and different objects to the puruṣa; and thereby, he comes to be called witness (sākṣi), enjoyer

129. "Being like a reflection of consciousness, it becomes a conscious entity as it were" was the reply to the question "How can the antaḥkaraṇa, which is non-intelligent, be a conscious entity and experience illusions?" "Being like a reflection of consciousness," when explained, finally amounts to 'being like a conscious entity.' Thus, the answer reduces itself to the tautologous proposition "Being like a conscious entity, it becomes a conscious entity, as it were."

130. *Pramāṇa*, *viparyaya*, *vikalpa*, *nidrā* and *smṛti* are the five *vṛttis* of the antaḥkaraṇa. For an account of these see *Yoga-Sūtras* I.5-11.

\* The word *parākramīyaḥ* has been formed in accordance with Pāṇini's sūtra 'vinmatorluk' (V. iii. 65). Compare the stems *srajiyas*, *tvacyias*. *Atiśayena parākramavat parākramīyaḥ* (one possessing extremely great valour).

All printed books and manuscripts read *pratibalavilolanādivṛtti*; but *prati-balavilolanādivṛttim* is obviously a better reading.

बलविलोलनादिवृत्तिं स्वामिने; ततस्साक्षी भोक्ता चापदिश्यते राजेति विक्रमी विजयी चेति। तदनुपपन्नम् । द्रष्ट्रे हि दर्शनीयं दृश्यते । न च दृशिमात्रात्मवादिनां साङ्ख्यानानां तदुपजीविनाञ्च प्रच्छन्नानां द्रष्टृत्वं वास्तवमस्ति । न च काल्पनिकेन शेषित्वसम्भवः । कल्पनापि न सम्भवतीत्युक्तमेव । राजा तु सामान्यतो विशेषतो वा तेषु कर्मस्वमात्यान्त्रियुज्जानस्तत्फलमैश्वर्यादि चाशुनवानः स्वस्वामिभावहेतुक्यप्रतिग्रहजननादिव्यापारयोगी न निष्क्रियस्यानाधेयातिशयस्य पुंसो निदर्शनमिति यत्किञ्चिदेतत् ।

स्थूलोऽहं गच्छाम्यहमित्यादि प्रत्यक्षमृदितविषयतया प्रसिद्धैवातीतकालता व्यतिरेकानुमानभेदानामित्यानुमानिकीमप्यात्मसिद्धिमश्रद्धानाः श्रौतीमेव तां श्रोत्रियाः सङ्गि-

(bhoktā); just as the gathering of generals possessing extremely great valour exhibits to the master its activities, such as entering the enemy's camp and causing consternation therein, and, as a consequence, he comes to be termed a monarch, a man of valour and a conqueror.

But, this view is unsound. In fact, it is only for the sake of the seer that the visible object is found to exist; and for the Sāṅkhyas or for their followers, the heretics in disguise, who alike maintain that consciousness alone is the soul, the quality of being the seer is not real. And, the quality of being a *śeṣi* (one for whose sake others exist) cannot be brought about by the fictitiously imagined quality of being the seer. Besides, it has already been said that even this fictitious imagination cannot arise. (As for the analogy), the king, who commands his generals, in a general or in a specific manner, in those activities, and who acquires the fruits resulting therefrom, such as, sovereignty, and who engages in activities such as purchasing, receiving and inheriting,<sup>131</sup> which are responsible for the relation of being owner and property, is not an analogue to the soul, which is inactive, and which is rendered no service by anybody; hence this view is valueless.

The different arguments seeking to prove that the soul is distinct from the body and the like are well known to be stultified (*atītakālātā*),<sup>132</sup> in as much as their subject-matter is shattered by perceptual knowledge, such as, 'I am stout,' 'I go,'; for this reason, those well-versed in the vedas, having no faith even in the view that the proof of the soul is afforded by inference, assert that this proof is furnished by the vedas

131. Perhaps, in preference to birth (*janana*) mention may be made of conquest (*jaya*), since, in the case of *kṣatriyas*, conquest is regarded as a special title to ownership. cf. *svāmī rikthakrayasamvibhāga parigrahādhiḡgameṣu | brāhṛa-nasya adhikam labdham | kṣatriyasya vijitam | nirviṣṭam vaiśyasūdrayoḥ. Gautama Dharma-Sūtra. X. 38-41.*

132. The fallacy of *atītakālātā* or *kālātyāyāpadeśa* has, in later Nyāya terminology, come to be called *bādhā*.

रन्ते—श्रुतयो हि साक्षादेवात्मनः शरीरादिव्यतिरेकमादर्शयन्ति—“ स एष नेति नेति ” “ अकायमव्रणमस्नाविरं शुद्धमपापविद्धम् ” “ योनिमन्ये प्रपद्यन्ते शरीरत्वाय देहिनः स्थाणुमन्ये ” “ न जायते म्रियते वा कदाचित् ” “ जीवापेतं वाव किलेदं म्रियते ” “ न ह वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति ” “ अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रिया-प्रिये स्पृशतः ” इत्याद्याः । कालान्तरभाविस्वर्गादिसाधनविधयश्चाक्षिपन्ति देहादिव्यतिरिक्तं नित्य चेतनमिति श्रुतितदनुपपत्तिप्रमाणकोऽयं प्रत्यगात्मेति ।

२९. ननु हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारमात्रपरस्यान्नायस्य शिरसि किमिति महानयं भारः प्रक्षिप्यते । अनुमानागमाद्यशेषप्रमाणमूलभूतेन प्रत्यक्षेणैव ह्येनं प्रतिपद्यामहे । ममेदं शरीरं इदमहं जानामीति घटादिदृश्येभ्य इवायं द्रष्टा देहादपि पृथग्भूतः प्रत्यक्षम् परिस्फुरति ।

alone. In fact, scriptural passages, such as the following, directly reveal the distinctness of the soul from the body and the like. “ The soul (ātman) is not this ; it is not that.”<sup>133</sup> “ The bodiless, the scatheless, the sinewless, the pure (śuddha), unpierced by sins (apāpaviddha)” ;<sup>134</sup> “ Some go into a womb for assuming bodily form ; others become immovable objects ” ;<sup>135</sup> “ He is never born, nor does he die ” ; “ Indeed, only this (body) which is devoid of life dies ”<sup>136</sup> ; “ Verily, there is no freedom from pleasure and pain so long as he is embodied ; when he is bodiless, pleasure and pain do not touch him.”<sup>137</sup> Even the injunctions prescribing means for realising heavenly bliss and the like, which are to accrue after bodily death, lead to the positing of an eternal, conscious entity, that is distinct from the body, and so on ; hence, the individual soul has for its means of proof the scripture and the presumptive testimony connected therewith (*śrūtārthāpatti*).

#### The Existence of the Jiva deduced from Perception by External Senses

29. (One may ask) why should this heavy load be placed on the head of the vedas, whose sole aim is to teach the means for realising the good and avoiding the evil ? Indeed, we know the soul with the aid of the testimony of perception itself, which is the basis of all *pramāṇas*, such as, inference and scripture. From cognitions such as, ‘ This is my body,’ ‘ I know this,’ it is evident that this seer shines forth in direct perception as being distinct from the body also, just as he is distinct from objects known, such as, the pot.

133. *Bṛh. Up.*

134. *Īśa. Up.* 8.

135. *Kaṭha. Up.* V. 7.

136. *Chānd. Up.* VI.xi.3.

137. *Chānd. Up.* VIII.xii.1.

३०. मैवं वोचः। इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजं हि विज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्, न चेन्द्रियाणि रूपादि-  
व्यतिरेकिणि निरतिशयसूक्ष्मे प्रतीचि परागर्थ इव सन्निकर्षेण ज्ञानं जनयितुमर्हन्ति ।  
यथाम्नायते “पराञ्चि खानि व्यतृणत्स्वयंभूः ” इति ।

अचित्त्वप्रतिबद्धश्च सर्वोऽपीन्द्रियगोचरः ।

तेन नैन्द्रियकं ज्ञानमात्मानं स्पष्टुमर्हति ॥

३२. स्यान्मतं भौतिकत्वाद्बहिरिन्द्रियाणि मा नामात्मनि प्रवर्तिषतः; मनस्तु  
प्रवर्तिष्यते, अभौतिकत्वादिति । तन्न । तस्यापीन्द्रियत्वे भौतिकत्वस्यापरिहार्यत्वान्  
यथाम्नायते—“अन्नमयं हि सोम्य मन ” इति । प्रपञ्चितञ्चैतन्निरूपणे ।

अथोच्येत, अस्ति तावदहमित्यपरोक्षावभासः प्रत्ययः । न चैन्द्रियकत्वमन्तरेणासौ  
सम्भवति । क्लृप्तं च बहिरिन्द्रियागोचरेऽपि सुखादौ स्वान्तस्वातन्त्र्यमिति तन्निमित्त

#### Refutation of this View

30. (We reply) do not say so ; for, that is perceptual knowledge which arises from the contact of the senses with objects ; <sup>138</sup> and from their contact with the inward soul, which is devoid of colour and other qualities, and which is exceedingly subtle, unlike their contact with outward objects, the senses are incapable of originating knowledge (concerning the soul). It has been so declared in the vedas : “ The self-existent (svayambhūh) made the senses proceed outward (and thus troubled them).”<sup>139</sup> All objects revealed by the senses will invariably be accompanied by the quality of non-intelligence ; therefore the knowledge born of the senses is incapable of touching the soul.

The Existence of the Soul established through Perception by Manas

31. It may be said, “ Let the external senses not come into contact with the soul and present it, since they are elemental (bhautika); but the manas, being non-elemental, may enter into contact with the soul and present it.” (Against this, we reply) it is not so ; for, if that too be a sense-organ, it must inevitably be elemental. It has been so declared in the vedas : ‘ Gentle sir ; the manas is, indeed, made of food (anna)’<sup>140</sup>; when dealing with this (manas) it has been fully explained.

It may be urged : “ Certainly, there is a cognition of ‘ I ’—a cognition which is direct awareness. And this (cognition) cannot but be what has arisen from the senses. The claim of manas in regard to (the manifestation of) pleasure and the like, even though they do not fall within the

138. indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam . . . pratyakṣam. *Nyāya-Sūtras*, I. i. 4.

139. *Kaṭha. Up.* IV.1.

140. *Chānd. Up.* VI.v.4.

एवायमहंप्रत्ययो युक्तः । प्रयोगश्च भवति, आत्मा मानसप्रत्यक्षग्राह्यः, बहिरिन्द्रियायोग्य-  
त्वे सति प्रत्यक्षत्वात् सुखादिवदिति ।

३२. तन्न । संवेदनेन व्यभिचारात् । न च तदप्रत्यक्षम्; जानामीत्यनन्यो-  
पाधिकतया प्रतिमानात् । अप्रत्यक्षत्वे च संवेदनस्यासिद्धिरेव स्यादित्युक्तमेव ।

न च तदपि मानसप्रत्यक्षतया सपक्षे निक्षेपमर्हति; विमर्दासहत्वात् । यदा  
खलु कुतश्चिदात्ममनस्संयोगाद्विषयसंविदुदयमासादयति, तदैव किं तत एव तद्गोचरमपि  
वेदनं जन्यते, उतान्यदान्येनेतिवाच्यम् । न च युगपदुभयजननं सम्भाव्यते; तथाहि  
सति परापरतत्तद्गोचरनिरवधिकधीनिकुरुम्बजन्म तत्कालमेवापद्येत । न च तदस्ति । युगप-

scope of the external senses, is well established. Hence, it is but proper  
that the cognition of 'I' should have this (manas) for its cause. This  
can be expressed syllogistically. The soul, like pleasure and so on, is to  
be grasped by mental perception; for, while it is not capable of being  
grasped by the external senses, it is still an object of perception.

#### Refutation of this View

32. (Our reply is) it is not so; for, from the case of (samvedana)  
jñāna, (where the sādhyā is absent while the hetu is present), it is found  
that this argument commits the fallacy of *vyabhicāra*. (To escape this  
fallacy), you cannot point out that jñāna is not open to perception; for,  
without depending on anything else, it manifests itself as 'I know; ' and  
it has already been stated that if it were not an object of perception, it  
would, in fact, cease to be knowledge.

It cannot be contended that, since it is an object of mental perception,  
jñāna too is fit to rank among similar examples (sapakṣa); for this con-  
tention will not stand scrutiny. (If that is your view), you must point  
out whether even the knowledge concerning the knowledge of an object  
is produced exactly at the time when, by virtue of a certain conjunction  
between soul and manas, the knowledge of an object takes birth, and  
whether (it is produced) by the selfsame contact, or whether it is pro-  
duced at a different time and by a different contact. (Regarding the  
first alternative), the origination of the two (i.e. knowledge of an object  
and knowledge concerning the knowledge of an object) at the same time  
is impossible. If that were so, the birth of a collection of limitless items  
of knowledge, each of which has the other for its respective object, would  
have to take place at the same time. But, it does not take place. If it

दुत्पत्तौ विषयविषयित्वनियमश्च निर्निबन्धनः । असमसमयजन्मना ज्ञानेन वेद्यत्वे न प्रत्यक्षत्वम्, क्षणिकत्वेनाऽग्रिमज्ञानस्याऽऽग्राहकज्ञानोदयमवस्थानाभावात् । भावे च सर्वज्ञानानां सर्वदावस्थानप्रसङ्गात् । कार्यविरोधित्वे चानन्तरमेव संस्कारोदयान्न कालान्तरे स्थितिरितिसंविदो न मानसप्रत्यक्षवेद्यत्वम् । न चाप्रत्यक्षा संविदिति स्फुटो व्यभिचारः ।

ऐन्द्रियकत्वस्यानात्मत्वप्रतिबद्धत्वाद्विरुद्धता च । साध्यविकलश्च दृष्टान्तः; सुख-दुःखयोः प्रत्यक्षत्वानभ्युपगमात् । अनभ्युपगमश्च इन्द्रियपौष्कल्यनाशयोरेव सुखदुःख-त्वात् । न हि तस्मिन्नप्रत्यक्षे तत्पौष्कल्यं वैकल्यं वा प्रत्यक्षं भवति । इन्द्रियस्वरूप इव अभ्यासपाटवात्तयोरपरोक्षत्वाभिमानः, मनोऽवस्थाभेदेष्विव चानुमेयमनोवादिनाम् ।

takes place simultaneously, the distinction made between being an object of knowledge and owning the object (*viṣaya viṣayitvanyamāḥ*) would become baseless. (Regarding the second alternative), if it (knowledge concerning knowledge) is made known by a knowledge arising at a different time, it would cease to be an object of perception; for, as knowledge is momentary, the earlier knowledge will not last till the rise of the knowledge which reveals it. If it lasts, all cognitions would have to exist at all times. If it be urged that it is incompatible with its effect (i.e. if it perishes as soon as its effect springs up), (we reply that) as its effect, namely, the mental impression arises immediately after, it will not exist at a different time (i.e. at a time when the revealing consciousness arises). Hence, *jñāna* cannot be an object of mental perception. And it cannot be said that it is obvious that the argument commits the fallacy of *vyābhicāra*. Besides, as the quality of being grasped by the senses is invariably concomitant with the quality of being non-soul, your argument commits the fallacy of *viruddha* also (i.e. is guilty of employing adverse probans). Further, the illustrative example cited in the argument is defective in not possessing the *sādhya*; for, pleasure and pain are not admitted to be objects of perception. And it is not so admitted, because pleasure and pain are nothing more than the flourishing or the decaying state of the senses. Indeed, when the senses are not perceptible, their flourishing or decaying state will not be the object of perception.

In the case of pleasure and pain, as in that of the senses, or again, in that of the different states of mind (*manas*) on the view of those who maintain that *manas* is inferable, the false impression that they are directly perceived is due to the power of long continued experience.<sup>141</sup>

141. With continued practice one infers the existence of pleasure, pain, the states of mind and the like so effortlessly and quickly and without noticing the



यस्तु सुगतमतावलम्बी विज्ञानाभिन्नहेतुजतया तयोरपि तदन्तर्भावमभिमन्यते कणभक्षपक्षाश्रयणेन वा तयोरात्मविशेषगुणत्वं ताभ्यां सुखदुःखाधिकरणं व्याचक्षीत, स्वतःसुखीत्येतद्विमर्शं वात्रत्यम् ।

The section dealing with pleasure and pain (*sukhaduḥkhādhikaraṇa*)<sup>142</sup> or the discussion of the description of the soul (vide p. 8) as being in its essential nature blissful (*svatassukhī*) found in this work itself<sup>143</sup> ought to be explained to those who, following the Buddhistic doctrine, believe that pleasure and pain are included in the category of knowledge, for the reason that they are produced by causes which are non-different from knowledge, and to those who, by accepting the system of Kaṇabhakṣa (the exponent of the Vaiśeṣika system), believe that they are the special qualities of the soul (and not the flourishing and the decaying states of the senses).<sup>144</sup>

several steps of the argument, that one comes to think that he directly perceives them.

142. *Sukhaduḥkhādhikaraṇa* is the sixth section of the first pāda of Nāthamuni's *Nyāyatattva-śāstra*, a work which is not extant now. Yāmuna refers to a few other *adhikaraṇas* of this *śāstra*. In fact, his *Ātmasiddhi* may be regarded as a brief exposition of *Nyāyatattva*. Compare *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*, *Buddhipariccheda*—"Nyāyatattva-prakaraṇam hi Ātmasiddhiḥ."

143. This discussion over *svatassukhī* is included among the portions of *Ātmasiddhi* lost.

144. Those who identify pleasure and pain with the flourishing or the decaying state of the senses mean by 'senses' the internal sense (*manas*) and not the outer senses; for, pleasure and pain are nothing more than the tranquil and the disturbed states of *manas*. cf. "tathā ca antaḥkaraṇaprasādāvasādāyoreva sukhadvaduḥkhatva-vyapadeśadarśanāt tatprasādāvasādāveva sukhaduḥkharūpāvityarthah." Rāṅgārāmānuja *ṭikā* on *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*, *Buddhipariccheda*.

Though this view is defended here and elsewhere in *Ātmasiddhi*, it cannot be considered to be his final view, for, later on, he says that all reference to certainty, doubt, pleasure, pain and the like has for its object either some particular form of contact of knowledge with its object or knowledge possessing that contact. cf. *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*, *Buddhipariccheda* ". . . sukhaduḥkheca nātmadharmau ityāditu vaiḥbhavena matāntareṇa vā abhihitam anyathā kathamevam upasamhārārambhe brūyāt 'tadevam ātmasvabhāvabhūtasya caitanyasya viśayasamśleṣaviśeṣagocara eva niścayaśamsāyādi vyavahārabhedah tadviśeṣabhāji caitanyevā.'" Rāmānuja says, in *Vedārthasamgraha*, 'that knowledge, which is in contact with a particular object, and which is considered the cause of pleasure or pain, is really pleasure or pain itself and not its cause. Besides knowledge, nothing else which could be called pleasure or pain is noticed.' 'yena viśayaviśeṣena viśeṣitam jñānam sukhasya janakamityabhimatam tadviśayajñānameva sukham tadatireki padārthāntaram nopalabhyate.'

# NYAYAKULISA

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

By

R. RAMANUJACHARI

AND

K. SRINIVASACHARI



॥ श्रीः ॥

## ॥ ख्यातिनिरूपणवादस्तृतीयः ॥

अत्र <sup>1</sup>केचिदाहुः—तत्त्वानुभूतिः प्रमेति न वाच्यम् । अनुभूतिरित्येव पर्याप्तेः । अतत्त्वानुभूतेः शुक्तिकारजतादिसंविदो व्यवच्छेदाय तत्त्वविशेषणमुपादेयमिति चेन्न, तदसिद्धेः । न हि शुक्तिकारजतसंविदिति काचिदस्ति । शुक्तिकासंविदश्शुक्तिविषयत्वात् रजतसंविदोऽपि रजतविषयत्वात् । उभयविषयायाश्च संविदो घटपटविषयत्ववत् (विषयकवत् ?) तत्त्वावगाहनाविरोधात् । तथापि शुक्तिकामेव रजततया यानुभूतिर्विषयीकरोति, असावतत्त्वानुभूतिरिति चेन्न । तथाविधायाः कस्याश्चिदनुपलब्धेः, अनुपपत्तेश्च । तथाहि—विषयविशेषण (विशेष ?) विशिष्टा बुद्धयो भासन्ते । यदि शुक्तिकैव रजतात्मिका भवेत्, ततस्तेन विषयेण विशेषिता शुक्तिकारजतबुद्धिरुपलभ्येत । न चासतो विषयतया बुद्धिविशेषकत्वम् ; निस्स्वाभावत्वात् । किञ्चित्स्वभावत्वे सत्त्वप्रसङ्गात्, ज्ञानान्तरेष्वप्यसद्विषयत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च । बाधाबाधाभ्यां विशेष<sup>2</sup> इति चेन्न, प्रत्ययत्वाद्वाधानुमानप्रसङ्गात् । देशान्तरादिषु यथा तथा वा सत एवार्थस्य मिथ्याज्ञानेष्वप्यालम्बनत्वान्नात्यन्तासद्विषयत्वानुमानं शक्यमिति चेत् ; हन्तैवं मिथ्याज्ञानमेव न स्यात्, सद्विषयत्वात्तस्य । असत्संसर्गोचरं मिथ्याज्ञानमिति चेत्, असत्संसर्गोचरं किमिति नेप्यते । असतो विषयत्वानुप-

1. केचित्—गुह्यतानुसारिणः । “अत्रोच्यते ” इति समाधानारम्भावध्येतत्पक्षोपन्यास इत्यवगन्तव्यम् । अन्यथाख्यातिरत्र निरस्यते । “अत्रोच्यते” इत्यादिना सा स्थाप्यते । “त्रययन्तनिष्णातास्तु” इत्यादिना पुनर्यथार्थख्यातिरुपवर्ण्यते । अन्ते चानिर्वचनीयख्यातिः प्रतीक्षिष्यते ।

2. अर्थस्य बाधितत्वमेवासत्त्वम् । ईदृशासद्विषयकत्वं न सत्यरजतादिज्ञानान्तरेष्विति भावः ।

पत्तेरिति चेत्, संसर्गोऽपि समानम् । अत एव संसर्गोऽपि कचिदिष्यत इति चेत्, तर्हि तस्यैव भाने मिथ्याज्ञानं न स्यात् । अथ संसर्गो यत्र क्वचित्सन्नपि शुक्तिकारजतयोरसन्नेव तत्संसर्गतया भातीति मिथ्याज्ञानमिति चेत् ; तत्संसर्गत्वमेव सत्यमसत्यं वा ? । प्रथमे मिथ्याज्ञानाभावः । द्वितीये त्वसत्यस्यापि भानादसत्ख्यातिप्रसङ्गः । <sup>1</sup> एतावन्मात्रमभ्युपगम्यत इति चेन्न ; एतावत्पर्यवसानात् (एतावत्पर्यवसानात् ?) विप्रतिपन्नमसत्, ख्यातत्वात्, संसर्गविशेषवत्<sup>2</sup> इत्यनुमानात् ॥

<sup>3</sup>बाधाबाधाभ्यां विशेष इति चेन्न । <sup>4</sup>अस्यैवानुमानस्य <sup>5</sup>बाधकत्वात् । अस्ति व्यवहारबाध इति चेन्न ; देशान्तरादिषु सत्त्वेनाभ्युपेतस्य रजतस्यापि व्यवहरबाधात् । न ह्यसत् (न हि सत्) सर्वत्र सर्वदा सर्वं व्यवहारमातनोति । कस्यचिद (द्) व्यवहरणमात्मनोऽपि नास्ति । ज्ञानस्यैव तदसिद्धेः । तस्मादसतो बुद्ध्यवच्छेदकत्वानुपपत्तेः भासमानेनैव रूपेण सर्वस्य सत्यतामभ्युपेत्य (सत्यताऽभ्युपेत्येत्य) तत्त्वार्थगोचरां शुक्तिकारजतबुद्धिं नोपलभामहे । न च तथाविधज्ञानोत्पत्तौ सामग्री चकास्ति । इन्द्रियाणां प्राप्यकारित्वेनाप्राप्तार्थप्रकाशनानुपपत्तेः । न च दोषसहकृतस्य चक्षुषस्तत्र सामर्थ्यमिति युक्तम् । दोषाणां कार्यविधातमात्रहेतुत्वेन कार्यान्तरोपजनकत्वायोगात् । न ह्यभिसंसृष्टस्य कळमवीजस्याङ्कुरान्तरे सामर्थ्यमस्ति । न च कार्यदर्शनादस्यैव दोषविशेषस्यैषा रीतिरिति युक्तम् ।

1. रजतत्वस्य संसर्गस्य चान्यत्र सद्भावाच्च तद्विषयेऽसत्ख्यातिप्रसङ्गः । सत एव संसर्गस्य शुक्तिकारजतसंसर्गत्वमात्रमसदेव भासत इत्यङ्गीक्रियते, गत्यन्तराभावादित्यर्थः ।

2. संसर्गविशेषवत्—रजतसंसर्गं शुक्तिकानिरूपितत्ववदिति यावत् ।

3. उक्तानुमाने बाधितत्वमुपाधिरिति भावः । तत्र बाधेत्यंशेन सपक्षवृत्तित्वं, अबाधेत्यंशेन पक्षावृत्तित्वञ्च प्रदर्शितम्, इति ध्येयम् ।

4. अस्यैवानुमानस्य—ख्यातत्वरूपहेतोः ।

5. बाधकत्वात्—सोपाधिकत्वबाधकत्वात् । अयं भावः—विप्रतिपन्नं बाधितं ख्यातत्वादित्यनुमानेन रजतत्वेऽपि बाधितत्वसाधनात्पक्षवृत्तित्वेन न सोपाधिकत्वमिति ॥

कार्यस्यैवासिद्धेरुपपादितत्वात्, इदमिति पुरोवर्तिन्यनुभवः रजतमिति च पूर्वानुभूतरजत-  
विषयस्मृतिरित्येवमेवोपपत्तेश्च । रजतस्मृतिस्तत्र रजतमित्येवोल्लिखन्ती देशकालान्त-  
रमुल्लिख्यैवोत्पद्यते, इयन्तु रजतमित्यनुभवाकारा बुद्धिरिति चेत्सत्यम् । तत  
एव दोषात्प्रमुषिततदवमर्शा सेति वदामः । ननु पुरोवर्तिनि पिण्डमात्रेऽवसिते  
रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तिरनुपलब्धा । रजतस्मृतिरपि न पुरोवर्तिनिखिलशिलाकाष्टादौ प्रवृत्तिमुपजन-  
यति<sup>१</sup> । तस्माच्छुक्तिवैव रजताकारेणानुभूयत इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति चेन्न । भेदाग्रहादपि  
प्रवृत्त्युपपत्तेः । स्वरूपभेदवादिनां भासमानयोरेव रजतपुरोवर्तिनोर्भेदाग्रहो दुरुपपाद इति  
चेन्न । संसर्गविरोधिवैधर्म्यविशेषरूपभेदाग्रहः प्रवृत्तिहेतुरिति विवक्षितत्वात्<sup>२</sup> । भावाति-  
रिक्ताभावानभ्युपगमादग्रहासिद्धिरिति तु स्थूलावलोकिवचनम् । यतः तदधिकरणमात्र-  
गोचरधियामधिकरणानां वा अभावेति । सर्वत्र निर्वाहाद्भेदाग्रहादेव व्यवहारोपपत्तौ तत-  
स्संसर्गबोधासिद्धेः<sup>३</sup> कार्यान्वितस्वार्थे शब्दानां व्युत्पत्त्ययोगादन्विताभिधानासिद्धिरिति  
शब्दाप्रामाण्यं प्रसज्यत इति चेन्न । व्यवहारवैलक्षण्यात् । न हि वयं शुक्तिकायां रजतार्थिनो  
व्यवहारमिव बाध्यं संसर्गबोधानुमापकं ब्रूमः । अपि त्वबाध्यम् । अतः कार्यवैजात्यात्कारण-  
भेदसिद्धिः । अतो बाध्यमानस्य व्यवहारभेदस्य संसर्गग्रहमन्तरेणासंसर्गाग्रहादप्युपपत्तेः

१. उपजनयतीति—इदं रजतमित्यत्र शुक्तिरेव रजततया भातीत्यङ्गीकार्यम् । अन्यथा  
प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । न हि कश्चिदिदमंशमात्रज्ञानवान्प्रवर्तमानो दृश्यते । एवं रजतस्मरणं चेत्पृथ-  
गुच्यते तर्हि शुक्तिमात्रविषया प्रवृत्तिर्नैवोपपद्यते । नियामकाभावात् । रजतत्वस्य पुरोवर्तिभास्वर-  
द्रव्यविशेषनिष्ठतया भानाभावेऽविशेषात्सर्वत्र प्रवृत्तिस्स्यात् । कुत्रापि वा न स्यात् । अतः रजतत्व-  
द्विषयकमेकं ज्ञानं तदेष्टव्यमिति भावः ।

२. विवक्षितत्वादिति—धर्म्यन्तरतादात्म्यभ्रमविरोधी विलक्षणो धर्मविशेष एव स्वेतर-  
भेदः । न धर्मिस्वरूपम् । प्रकृते च शुक्तित्वस्यैव भेदरूपत्वेन तस्य चाभानाद्भेदाग्रहस्याक्षततया न  
प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिरिति भावः ।

३. ततस्संसर्गबोधासिद्धेरिति—व्यवहारेण विशिष्टज्ञानानुमित्ययोगादित्यर्थः ।

संसर्गग्रहकल्पनायां बाधकस्योपन्यस्तत्वात् विभ्रमव्यवहारस्य <sup>1</sup>बाध्यव्यवहारबुद्धिविषय-  
त्वेनाप्युपपत्तेः न कचिदतत्त्वानुभूतिरिति काचिदस्तीति किं तद्व्यवच्छेदेनेति ॥

अत्रोच्यते

वादिनां विमतेर्बाधाद्व्यवहाराद्भ्रमोक्तिः ।

स्वार्स्याच्चान्यथाख्यातिः प्रसिद्धा नापनीयताम् ॥

इह खलु मिथोविरुद्धविविधस्वमतपरिपालनाय<sup>1</sup> विवदमाना वादिनस्तावदिदमित्थं  
मन्यन्त इति (इदमित्थमन्यथेति) च प्रतिजानते । तदिदमविरुद्धबुद्धीनां नोपपद्यते ।  
तथाहि;—कश्चित् शब्दो नित्य इति वदति । अन्यश्चानित्य इति । तयोस्तावदन्यतरेणा-  
न्यथाख्यातिशालिना भवितव्यम् । नित्यत्वानित्यत्वयोरेकस्मिन् शब्दे विरोधात् । ननु  
शब्दानित्यत्ववादिनोऽपि द्वे बुद्धी व्यवहारमुपजनयतः, शब्दगोचरा काचित् घटादिस्था-  
नित्यत्वगोचरा च काचिदिति चेन्न । अविरोधाद्विवादानुपपत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । व्यवहारविरोधाद्वि-  
वाद इति चेन्न । अर्थविरोधमन्तरेण व्यवहारस्याविरोधात्<sup>2</sup> । दोषवशादपराभ्रष्टाधिकरणविशेष-  
स्यानित्यत्वस्य शब्दासंसर्गग्रहादेव संसर्गवत् विरोधाभिमान<sup>3</sup> इति चेत्, सिद्धं नस्समीहि-  
तम् । अविरोधे विरोधाभिमानस्यान्यथाख्यातित्वात् । अथ शब्दानित्यत्वयोरसंसर्गग्रहो  
नैयायिकानाम्, असंसर्गग्रहोऽस्माकमिति ग्रहणाग्रहणयोर्विरोध इति चेत् ; तत्किमेवमधिकरण-  
भेदेऽपि विरोध उत सामानाधिकरण्ये वा । नाद्यः । नीलपीतयोरिव भिन्नाधिकरणत्वेन

1. बाध्यव्यवहारेति बहुव्रीहिः ।

2. शब्दप्रयोगात्मकस्य व्यवहारस्य न स्वतः परस्परविरोधः । अपित्वर्थद्वारैव ,  
इत्थं च शब्दोऽनित्य इति नैयायिकवाक्येन शब्देऽनित्यत्वबोधोऽवश्यंभावीत्यन्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिः ।  
स यदि तव न जायते तदा शब्दे नित्यत्वानित्यत्वरूपविरुद्धधर्मद्वयसमावेशस्याप्रसक्ततया कथं  
व्यवहारविरोधशक्योपपादन इति भावः ।

3. विरोधाभिमान इति;—अनित्यत्वशब्दयोरसंसर्गग्रहमूलो युष्माकं संसर्गाभिमान  
इवास्माकं विरोधाभिमानः ।

ग्रहणाग्रहणयोरविरोधात् । विरोधे वान्यतरस्य कचिदपि सद्भावो न स्यात् । तथा च कस्य केन विरोधः । विरोधे च शब्दस्य न विवादविषयता<sup>१</sup> स्यात् वादिद्वयावगतविरुद्धधर्मनिरूपकतया । ताटस्थेन स्वयं<sup>२</sup> तदधिकरणताप्रसङ्गविधुरत्वात्<sup>३</sup> । नापि द्वितीयः । अप्रसक्तेः । न चासमानाधिकरणस्य सामानाधिकरण्यं प्रसञ्जनमन्तरेण वस्तुतस्सिद्धयति । प्रसक्तौ चान्यथाख्यातिस्स्यात् ।

अथ युष्मदनवबुद्धासंसर्गबोधायास्माभिर्विगीर्यत इति मनुषे, तथापि न जानता भवतापि वेदितव्यम् । (विवदितव्यम् ।) न हि<sup>४</sup> कस्य चित्पार्श्वस्थमनवबुद्धं सर्वं (सर्प) मनवबोधयं (मवबोधयं) स्तेन विवदमानो दृश्यते । अत्र तु सोऽपि प्रतिवदतीति चेत्, स किं स्वाज्ञानमात्रकृतं वचो व्याहरति उत विपरीतज्ञानकृतम्, अथ स्वाज्ञातासम्बन्धवद्वस्तुद्वयावबोधजनितम् । नायः । न जानामीतिवत्तस्याविवादरूपत्वात् । व्यवहारविशेषस्य विवादरूपतेति चेत् । अर्थविशेषमन्तरेण शब्दमात्रभेदेन विवादत्वानिर्वाहात्, न जानामि नाधिगच्छामीत्यादिवत् । न द्वितीयः । भवद्विरनभ्युपगमात् । अभ्युपगमे वा कृतं विवादेन । न तृतीयः । अविरोधाद्विवादत्वानुपपत्तिः (तेः) । न हि पदार्थव्यवहारस्तदसंसर्गप्रतिपादनं विरुणद्धि । प्रत्युतानुकूल एव । नह्यव्यवहृतयोः पदार्थयोरसंसर्गस्संसर्गो वा वक्तुं शक्यते । अतश्च स्वोपादेयं<sup>५</sup> स्वयमेव प्रतिषेधन्नसावन्यथाख्यातिवादी वक्तव्यः ।

कथारम्भे वादिना प्रतिज्ञायां कृतायां हेतुरपि वक्तव्यो न वा ? । वक्तव्योऽपि प्रतिज्ञावाक्येनैव साध्यधर्मज्ञाने तदज्ञाने वेति । न तावदवक्तव्यो हेतुः । उदाहरणान्ता-

१. वादिद्वयाभिमतनित्यत्वानित्यत्वात्मकविरुद्धधर्मवत्तया विवादविषयता, पक्षतेति यावत् ।

२. तदधिकरणतेत्यत्र तत्पदं विरुद्धधर्मपरम् ।

३. विधुरत्वादिति—ग्रहणे सत्यग्रहणस्य कुत्राप्यसिद्धेरनित्यत्वकोटेरनुन्मेषादिति भावः ।

४. कस्यचिदवबोधयन्नित्यन्वयः ।

५. स्वोपादेयमिति—स्वानुकूलत्वेनोपादेयं पदार्थद्वयव्यवहारमनुपादेयत्वबुद्ध्या प्रतिषेध-  
नान्यथाख्यातिवादित्वेन व्यवहर्तव्य इत्यर्थः ।



वयवत्रयाभ्युपगमविरोधात् । नचाविज्ञातेऽपि<sup>1</sup>पक्षे हेतुप्रयोगः कार्याय घटते । प्रतिज्ञा-  
वैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात् । न च धर्मिमात्रज्ञानाय प्रतिज्ञापेक्ष्यते । साध्यविशेषाप्रतीतौ हेतोरनै-  
कान्तिकत्वादिदोषचिन्तानवसरप्रसङ्गात्<sup>2</sup> । न च साध्यमात्रज्ञानाय ।<sup>3</sup> व्यधिकरणासि-  
द्ध्यादेरनवकाशप्रसङ्गात् । न चानन्वितोभयज्ञानाय । अनन्वयप्रसङ्गात् । न हि धर्म्यनिष्ठतया  
साध्यतयावबोधः कस्यापि जायते । सामान्यमात्रस्य सिद्धत्वात् ।<sup>4</sup> न च सिषाधयिषितधर्मान्व-  
याप्रतीतावधिकरणत्वप्रतीतित्संभवति । न चानन्वयेऽपि प्रतिज्ञावाक्यस्थपदस्मारिततया  
साध्यत्वमधिकरणत्वं वाध्यवसातुं शक्यम् । धर्मधर्मिणोर्व्यत्यासप्रसङ्गात्<sup>5</sup> । ततश्च<sup>6</sup> धर्मि-  
णो हेतोरनुगमाभावा<sup>7</sup>द्व्याप्यसिद्धिः । साध्यधर्मे च हेतोरवृत्तेस्वरूपासिद्धि<sup>8</sup>व्यधिकरणा-  
सिद्धिर्वेत्यादिदूषणोद्भावनप्रसङ्गः । तस्मात्साध्यधर्मवत्तया धर्मिणः प्रतिज्ञावाक्येनैवावगमे सिद्धे  
हेत्वपेक्षेति वक्तव्यम् । सा चान्यथाख्यात्यनभ्युपगमे न स्यात् । वाक्यजन्यबोधस्य प्रामाण्ये

1. अविज्ञातेऽपीति—साध्यधर्म इति शेषः । यद्वा—साध्यधर्मवत्तयेत्यादिः ।

2. प्रसङ्गादिति—साध्याभाववद्वृत्तित्वरूपस्यनैकान्तिकत्वस्य साध्यघटितमूर्तिकत्वेन प्रति-  
ज्ञावाक्येन साध्यबोध एव हेतौ साध्यवद्वृत्तित्ववत्तदभाववद्वृत्तित्वमप्यस्ति न चेति विचारस्यावका-  
शस्त्यात् ।

3. व्यधिकरणेति—व्यधिकरणासिद्धेः साध्याधिकरणावृत्तित्वरूपतया प्रतिज्ञावाक्येन धर्मि  
रूपाधिकरणाज्ञाने हेतुरधिकरणवृत्तिर्न चेति विचारस्यानवकाश इति भावः ।

4. एवं धर्मस्य पक्षानन्वये साध्यत्वानुपपत्तिमुपपाद्य धर्मिणो धर्मानन्वये पक्षत्वानुपपत्ति-  
मुपपादयति—न चेति । साध्यधर्माश्रयत्वस्यैव पक्षत्वादिति भावः ।

5. प्रसङ्गादिति—प्रतिज्ञावाक्यस्थपदस्मारितत्वस्याविशेषात् बह्वयादेः पक्षत्वं पर्वतादे-  
स्साध्यत्वं च प्रसज्येतेति भावः ।

6. ततश्च—पर्वतादेस्साध्यत्वे बह्वयादेः पक्षत्वे च ।

7. अनुगमाभावात्—पर्वतादिना धूमस्य नियतसम्बन्धाभावात् ।

8. व्यधिकरणेति—पक्षे हेत्वभावमालं स्वरूपासिद्धिः, यथा—शब्दो गुणः चाक्षुषत्वादिति ।  
व्यधिकरणासिद्धिस्तु पक्ष इवान्यत्रापि साध्यसामानाधिकरण्याभावः । यथा—शब्दो गुणः द्रव्यत्वा-  
दिति । प्रयोक्तृत्व्यन्तासामर्थ्यसूचनं प्रयोजनम् ।

सिद्धे हेत्वपेक्षानुपपत्तेः । उपपत्तौ वा वेदवाक्येऽपि सा किं न स्यात् । अतोऽनवधृतासमा-  
वस्य पुरुषस्य वाक्यमन्यथामतिमपि जनयेदिति तदप्रामाण्ये स्थिते प्रामाण्यसिद्ध्यर्थं हेत्व-  
पेक्षेत्येव शोभनम् ।

किमर्थञ्च भवन्तः परेषां विपरीतधियां बोधविशेषमाधातुकामाः प्रबन्धेन हेतुजाल  
मुल्लासयन्ति । न हि परेषां तत्तदज्ञानमात्रेण भवतां सिद्धान्तोऽभिधीयेत (ऽभिभूयेत ?) ।  
न हि पामरजनाज्ञानेनाचेतनकाष्ठलोष्टाद्यज्ञानेन वा सर्वस्सिद्धान्तो व्याकुलीभवति । न च  
भवत्सिद्धान्तं यथावदनुभाष्य दूषयतां परेषामज्ञानमेवेति वचोऽर्थवत् । स्वयं च कदाचित्परा-  
जितो महीयसीमाध्यात्मिकीं वेदनामनुभवसीति । एवं वादिनां विवादकार्यकारणतयान्यथा-  
ख्यातिसिद्धिः ।

तथा बाधकस्य ज्ञानस्य <sup>1</sup>बाध्यप्रतिसम्बन्धिसापेक्षत्वात् बाध्यस्यान्यथाख्यानस्य  
सिद्धिः । तथा हि—इदं रजतमिति कदाचिदेको दोषदूषिताध्यक्षसामग्रीकः शुक्तिकां रज-  
तमित्यध्यस्य समनन्तरमेव सम्पन्नपरिशुद्धसामग्रीकः स एव नेदं रजतमिति जानाति । तत्र  
यत् नेदं रजतमिति बाधकज्ञानं त<sup>2</sup>तथाविधशुक्तिकारजतज्ञानाभावे न बाधकं भवति ।  
पक्षान्तरेऽपि भवत्येव तयोस्समानसमयत्वं<sup>3</sup>विरोधादिति चेन्न । <sup>4</sup>तावन्मात्रेण बाधकत्वाभ्यु-  
पगमे समानविषयस्यापि तथाभावप्रसङ्गात् । न च नाशलक्षणो बाधः । बाधकाभिमतं ज्ञा-  
नान्तरेण नित्यं तदभावात् । संस्कारस्य बाधकत्वेऽतिप्रसङ्गात् । <sup>5</sup>न च भेदाग्रहोपश्लेषात्स्व-

1. बाध्यप्रतिसम्बन्धीति—बाध्यरूपप्रतिसम्बन्धीत्यर्थः ।

2. तथाविधेति—पुरोवर्तिवस्तुविशेष्यकरजतत्वप्रकारकेत्यर्थः ।

3. विरोधेति—ज्ञानद्वयस्य युगपदुत्पत्तिविरोधादिति भावः ।

4. तावन्मात्रेणेति — तत्तदभावावगाहिवरूपविरुद्धविषयकत्वमुपेक्ष्य ज्ञानयोर्योगपद्या-  
सम्भवमात्रेण बाध्यबाधकभावाङ्गीकारे अयं घटः अयमपि घट इत्यादि समानविषयज्ञानयोरपि  
तत्प्रसङ्ग इत्यर्थः ।

5. अन्यथाख्यात्यनभ्युपगमेऽपि बाधकत्वसम्भवमाशङ्क्य परिहरति—न चेति ।

रूपमात्रस्यैव भेदज्ञानं बाधकमिति वाच्यम् । <sup>1</sup>पूर्वज्ञानस्यैवोत्तरं बाधकमिति प्रसिद्धेः । बाधकं हि यत्र ज्ञानमुत्पद्यत इत्यादि भाष्यप्रसिद्धेश्च । सर्वेषाञ्च ज्ञानानां स्वप्रागभाव-बाधात्, बाधकत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च । न च भेदाग्रहोपश्लेषात्स्वरूपमात्रज्ञाने बाध्यताव्यवहारः, तदपेक्षया चोत्तरस्य बाधकत्वमिति युक्तम् । <sup>2</sup>बाध्यसंसर्गेऽपि बाध्यताव्यवहारेऽतिप्रसङ्गात् । बाध्यभेदाग्रहा (बाध्याभेदग्रहा) तस्यादिति चेन्न । <sup>3</sup>अत्रैवान्यथाख्यातिप्रसङ्गात् । <sup>4</sup>न चात्रापि भेदाग्रहश्शङ्कनीयः । बाध्यबाधकभावस्याप्रामाणिकत्वप्रसङ्गात् ॥

कश्चायं भेदाग्रहः ? । न ताव<sup>5</sup>त्स्वरूपभेदाग्रहः । गृह्यमाणे स्वरूपे तदनुपपत्तेः । नापि वैधर्म्याग्रहः । निश्शेषवैधर्म्यग्रहस्य दुश्शङ्कत्वेन तदग्रहस्या<sup>6</sup>निवर्तनीयत्वात् । वैधर्म्य-मात्राग्रहस्तु पुरोवर्तिरजतत्वयोर्न संभवति । पुरोवर्तिनो द्रव्यत्वादिरूपेण प्रतीतेः । रजतादेश्चाकारतया प्रतीतेः । भ्रान्तिवेळायामपि तथैव हि प्रतीतिः । इतरथा <sup>7</sup>शुक्तिव्यवहारा-नुदयप्रसङ्गात् । <sup>8</sup>रजतव्यक्तिस्त्वप्रतीतेति किं तस्या वैधर्म्य(र्म्या)ग्रहणेन । पश्चादपि च

1. भेदाग्रहोपश्लेषस्वरूपज्ञाने भेदाग्रहांश एव भेदग्रहो बाधक इति पर्यवसानात्प्रसिद्धि-विरोध इति भावः ।

2. बाध्यसंसर्गेऽपीति—वस्तुतः स्वयमबाध्यस्यापि बाध्यसंसर्गमात्रेणेत्यर्थः ।

3. अत्रैवेति — भेदाग्रहभिन्नस्य स्वरूपज्ञानस्य तदभिन्नत्वेन ग्रहणमन्यथाख्यान-मेवेत्यर्थः ।

4. न चात्रापि—शुक्तौ योऽयं रजतभेदाग्रहः भेदज्ञानबाध्यः तद्भेदाग्रहेण ज्ञानद्वये बाध्यत्वव्यवहार इति नातिप्रसंगः । न वान्यथाख्यानमित्यर्थः ।

5. स्वरूपेति—स्वरूपात्मकस्य भेदस्याग्रहः ।

6. अनिवर्तनीयत्वादिति—निवर्तयितुमशक्यत्वादित्यर्थः ।

7. शुक्तिकाव्यवहारेति—वस्तुतः शुक्तिकाविषयः रजतशुद्धिप्रयोज्यो य उपादानरूपो व्यवहारः तदनुदयप्रसङ्गादित्यर्थः ।

8. रजतव्यक्तिस्त्विति—रजतत्वस्यैव स्मर्यमाणत्वादिति भावः ।

न तद्वततया वैधर्म्यं गृह्यते, किन्तु शुक्तिगततया । <sup>1</sup>एतद्देशकालादिवैधर्म्यग्रहशुक्तिकायां भ्रान्तावपि जायत एव । न हि सर्वरजतव्यक्तीनां तच्छुक्तिव्यक्तिदेशकालविशेषसम्बन्ध-सम्भवः । <sup>2</sup>यस्तु रजतजातीयमात्रे न सम्भवतीति तद्विरुद्धं <sup>3</sup> प्रतिपन्नस्स भेद इति चेत् ; हन्त नेदं रजतमिति बाधो न स्यात् ; भवत्पक्षे तदा तद्विरोधिधर्मान्तराप्रतीतेः । शुक्तित्व-प्रतिपत्तौ च नेदं रजतमिति बाधकल्पनं न स्यात् ; <sup>4</sup>तस्यैव साक्षाद्धारूपत्वात् । बाध्यस्य (बाधस्य) विधिरूपत्वे विधिनिषेधा(ध ?) व्यत्यासश्च । निषेधो बाध इति तुल्यार्थत्वात् । तस्मादसंसर्गाग्रहशिष्यते ।

तत्रेदं चिन्तनीयम्—कोऽयमसंसर्गो नामेति । न तावत्संसर्गाभावस्तत्त्वान्तरं भवद्वि-रूपेयते । दृश्ये प्रतियोगिनि <sup>5</sup>तन्मात्रोपलम्भस्य वा तन्मात्रस्य वा तदभावत्वेन स्वीकारात् । तन्मात्रोपलम्भस्याभावत्वे स्वयंप्रकाशोपलम्भवादिनः तदग्रहस्य सर्वत्र दुर्बचत्वापातः । न चात्र ग्रहणान्तरकर्मता नास्तीति तदग्रहशक्यो वक्तुम् । स्वयंप्रकाशतया व्यवहारसिद्धौ तस्याग्रहस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वात् । एकज्ञानवेद्यस्यान्यज्ञानावेद्यत्वात् । तन्मात्राभावपक्षे चात्रा-ग्रहो न संभवति । दृश्ये प्रतियोगिनि सति स्मर्यमाणे पुरोवर्तिमात्रस्य गृह्यमाणत्वात् । न चात्र रजतस्य तत्संसर्गस्य वा दृश्यत्वं नास्तीति वाच्यम् । दृश्यमानसमरामग्रीक-त्वात् रजतस्य । तत्संसर्गदृश्यतायाश्चानपेक्षणात् । तदपेक्षणे वा प्रत्यक्षबाधस्य रज-तेऽनुपपन्नत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न चास्मर्यमाणत्वम् । भवत्पक्षे तस्य तदानीं स्मर्यमाणत्वात् । <sup>6</sup>तदंश-खण्डने तस्य स्मरणता न प्रतीयत <sup>7</sup> इति चेत् । प्रतीतिमात्रेण तस्याभावप्रतियोगितोप-

1. 2. 3. वैधर्म्येत्यनेन किं यत्किञ्चिद्रजतवैधर्म्यं विवक्षितमुत सर्वरजतवैधर्म्यम् । नाद्य इत्याह—एतदिति । नान्त्य इत्याह—यस्त्विति । विरुद्धमिति च प्रतिपत्तिक्रिया-विशेषणम् ।

4. तस्यैवेति—शुक्तित्वस्यैव रजतत्वाभावात्मकत्वादित्यर्थः ।

5. तत्पदमधिकरणपरम् ।

6. तदंशखण्डन इति—ज्ञानद्वये स्मरणांशस्य विवेचन इत्यर्थः ।

7. न प्रतीयत इति—तथा च दृश्ये प्रतियोगिनि स्मृतित्वेन प्रतीयमानस्मृतिविषय एवा-भावज्ञान अधिकरणादेरभावरूपत्वं चाङ्गीक्रियत इति भावः ।

पत्तेः । <sup>1</sup>इतरथा गृह्यमाणाभावोद्देशभेदेन पुरो न प्रतीयेत । <sup>2</sup>न चास्य प्रतियोगिता अबुभु-  
त्सितेति वाच्यम् । रजतमस्ति वा न वेति प्रश्ने तद्बुभुत्सोपपत्तेः तदनन्तरमपि शुक्तिकारजत  
विज्ञानोदयात् । तस्मात्संसर्गप्रतियोगिनि रजते स्मर्यमाणे पुरोवर्तिमात्रोपलम्भं पुरोवर्तिमात्रं  
वा रजतसंसर्गाभावं वदतामिदं रजतमिति बाध्यज्ञानमेव बाधकमसंसर्गग्रहणमित्यापद्येत ।  
अबुभुत्सामात्रं तु रजतजातीयप्रश्नोत्तरं विनिवर्तत एव । अतो भेदाग्रहस्यैवानुपपत्तेः कथं  
तर्हि(स्य) बाधः, तदुपश्लिष्टबाधो वा ।

व्यवहारस्य बाध इति चेत् । तर्हि शब्दप्रयोगलक्षणस्य उत हानादिलक्षणस्य ? ।  
न तावदाद्यः पक्षः । शब्दजनकस्य तज्जन्य (तज्जन्यस्य वा) वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्य बाधमन्तरेण  
तद्वाधानुपपत्तेः । <sup>3</sup>तज्ज्ञानसमानयोगक्षेमत्वात्तच्छब्दस्य । नापि द्वितीयः । हानादेः  
क्रियारूपस्याबाधात् । तत्र कस्याप्यविप्रतिपत्तेः । न च तदनुपपत्ति(तदनुत्पत्ति)मात्रेण  
बाधकत्वम्, तस्य <sup>4</sup>प्रमाणसाधारणत्वात् । न च तत्कार्यस्य; तत्तत्सामग्रीसमुत्पन्नस्य तत्त-  
त्कार्यस्य सिद्धेः । कार्यवैजात्यं बाध इति चेन्न । अतिप्रसङ्गात् । तत्रैतत्स्यात्—साक्षा-

1. इतरथेत्यादि—इतरथा स्मरणस्य, तत्र स्मृतित्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वविशेषणस्य चापेक्षणे ।  
गृह्यमाणेति—गृह्यमाणस्य घटादेरभाव इत्यर्थः । घटवत्प्रदेशासन्नप्रदेशान्तरावच्छेदेन यदा अत्र  
घटो नास्तीति प्रतीतिर्जायते तदा तत्र प्रतियोगिनः प्रदेशान्तरावच्छेदेन प्रत्यक्षत्वादेवाभाव-  
प्रतियोगित्वोपपत्त्या स्मृतिरेवानपेक्षितेति का प्रत्याशा स्मृतौ स्मृतित्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वविशेषण-  
स्येति भावः ।

2. प्रतियोगी बुभुक्षितप्रतियोगिताकत्वेन विशेष्यते । तथा च प्रकृते तदभावाज्ञाभाव-  
ज्ञानमभावस्याधिकरणादिरूपत्वं चेत्यब्राह्म—न चेति ।

3. तज्ज्ञानेति—ज्ञानबाधो हि विषयबाध एव । ज्ञानस्य स्वतो बाधासंभवात् । एवं  
शब्दप्रयोगस्य बाधोऽपि प्रयुज्यमानशब्दार्थबाध एव, शब्दस्यापि स्वतो बाधासंभवात् । इत्थं  
च शब्दप्रयोगबाधाभ्युपगमे ज्ञानबाध एवाभ्युपगतो भवति ।

4. प्रमाणेति—इदं रजतमिति प्रमास्थलेऽपि तादृशज्ञानानन्तरं नियमेनोपादानरूपव्यव-  
हारादर्शनात्तादृशज्ञानस्यापि बाधकत्वव्यवहारप्रसङ्ग इत्यर्थः ॥ तस्य—व्यवहारानुत्पादकत्वरूप-  
बाधकत्वस्य ।

द्रजतजनितव्यवहारेण रजतजातीयमङ्गुलीयकादि जायमानमुपलब्धम् । अनेन पुनः भस्म जायते । तत्कार्यवैजात्यमत्र बाधोऽभिधीयते । बाध्यते हि रजतकार्यवत्तया भस्महेतुर्व्यवहार इति । तच्च नैवम् । अतिप्रसङ्गात् । अयं खलु शुक्तिकाविषयोऽग्निप्रयोगादिव्यवहारो भस्महेतुः । रजतविषयश्चाङ्गुलीयकादिहेतुः । अन्ये च सर्वे व्यवहारा अन्यस्यान्यस्य कार्यस्य हेतवः । तत्र स्वकार्यवतो व्यवहारस्य इतरकार्यवत्तया बाधस्सर्वत्र सुलभ इति कथमनेन बाध्यबाधकभावव्यवस्थावर्णनं कर्तुं शक्यते । यदि त्वंगुलीयकहेतुतयाभिमतस्य व्यवहारस्य भस्महेतुत्वमेव, को ह्यत्र विशेषः ? । अन्यहेतुव्यवहारोऽन्यहेतुतयावगतः, अन्यश्चार्थोऽन्यात्मनावगत इत्युभयत्राप्यन्यथाख्यातिसिद्धेः । यदि चात्रापि भेदाग्रहशरणं स्यात्, ततोऽभिमानविशेषकृतबाधव्यवस्था न सिद्धयेत् । अयञ्च व्यवहारभेदाग्रहो वस्तु-भेदाग्रहान्नातिरिच्यत<sup>1</sup> इति कृतमत्र प्रपञ्चेन ।

ननु किमनेन विकल्पज्ञानेन । यद्यथा लोके व्यवहियते तत्तथाभ्युपगममर्हति । इदं नेदमिति च ज्ञाने बाध्यबाधकभावेन लोके व्यवहियेते । किमत्र चोदनीयमिति चेत् ; सत्यम्, तदेवात्र विविच्यते कथमयं लोकव्यवहारो वृत्त इति । न हि कञ्चिदुपाधिमनालम्ब्य लोके शब्दप्रयोगोऽवकल्पते । तस्माद्बाध्यबाधकभावान्यथानुपपत्त्यान्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिः ।

<sup>2</sup>व्यवहारोदयान्यथानुपपत्त्या च । स हि न संसर्गज्ञानमन्तरेणोदेति । भेदाग्रहे स्वरूपज्ञानमात्रेण व्यवहारस्सिद्धयतीति चेत् । (शुक्ति) व्यवहारस्यापि तत्रोदयप्रसङ्गात्, नेयं शुक्तिरिति शुक्तेरपि स्फुरणात् । न च तदा शुक्तिभेदो गृहीत इति वाच्यम् । तत्रैवान्यथाख्यातिसिद्ध्यात् । असति भेदे भेदज्ञानमप्यन्यथाख्यातिरेव । न च शुक्तिव्यवहारस्य संसर्गज्ञानं हेतुः, रजतव्यवहारस्य तु भेदाग्रहमात्रमिति वाच्यम् । विशेषाभावात्, रजत एव नेदं रजतमिति मत्वापि प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गाच्च । न च तत्रापि नेदं रजतमिति रजतासंसर्गो गृहीत इति

1. नातिरिच्यत इति—वस्तुभेदाग्रहतुल्ययोगक्षेमत्वात्तत्रोक्तदूषणानिस्तार इति भावः । यद्वा—व्यवहारस्यापि वस्तुत्वेनायं वस्तुभेदाग्रहरूप एव पर्यवस्यतीति भावः ।

2. बादिनां विमतेरिति कारिकोक्तेन तृतीयेन हेतुना तस्सिद्धिप्रकारमुपपादयितुमारभते—व्यवहारेत्यादिना ।

वाच्यम् । तत्रैवान्यथाख्यातिप्रसङ्गात् । तत्र संसर्गग्रहो निवृत्तिकारणमप्यस्ति, तदभावोऽपि प्रवृत्तावपेक्षणीय इति चेत् ; तर्त्तिक भ्रान्तौ संसर्गग्रहमङ्गीकुरुषे, यतोऽत्र निवृत्तिकारणं न स्यात् । अतः <sup>1</sup>उभयत्रापि प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योरविशेषेण प्रसक्तेरर्थान्तरव्यवहारस्य चात्रैव प्रसक्तेर्न भेदाग्रहात्प्रवृत्तिरिति युक्तम् ॥

अपि च यदि संसर्गज्ञानमुपेक्ष्य भेदाग्रहमात्रात्प्रवृत्तिरिति कथ्यते तर्हि शब्दाप्रामाण्यं प्रसज्यते । तथा हि ;—पदार्थसिद्धेः प्रमाणान्तरतस्मृत्या वोपपत्तेर्वाक्यार्थसिद्धिरेवानन्यथासिद्धा शब्दं प्रमाणान्तरमवस्थापयति । तद्यदि विशिष्टावबोधमन्तरेण प्रयोज्यवृद्धव्यवहारो नाव-  
कल्पत इति तद्यवहारेण तस्य विशिष्टबोधो नानुमीयते, ततस्तद्बोधज्ञानलब्धविशिष्टवाचकत्व-  
व्युत्पत्त्यनवकल्पेर्वाक्यार्थ(र्था)सिद्धौ शब्दप्रामाण्यमेवोत्सीदेत् । <sup>2</sup>ननु प्रयोज्यवृद्धव्यव-  
हारो न भ्रान्तव्यवहारतुल्यः; अबाध्यत्वात् । बाध्यस्तु भ्रान्तव्यवहार इति चेत् ; स्यादेवं  
यद्यन्यथाख्यात्यनङ्गीकारेऽपि व्यवहारस्य बाधाबाधौ स्याताम् ; तौ न सम्भवत इत्यनन्तर-  
मेवोक्तम् । अपि च सम्भवेतां व्यवहारबाधाबाधौ । <sup>3</sup>तथापि कार्यवैजात्यं सामग्रीवैजात्ये

1. उभयत्रापीति—अयं भावः; शुक्तिरजतस्थले रजतभेदाग्रहात्प्रवृत्तिः, रजताभेदाग्रहान्नि-  
वृत्तिरित्येवाङ्गीकार्यम् । न च वाच्यं निवृत्तौ रजतभेदग्रहस्यैव कारणत्वमङ्गीक्रियते बाधकाभावात्  
लाघवाच्चेति । सत्यरजतस्थले नेदं रजतमिति भ्रमदशायां निवृत्तेरिष्टतया तत्र रजतभेदग्रहाभ्युपग-  
मेऽन्यथाख्यातिप्रसङ्गेन रजताभेदाग्रहस्यैव कारणताया एष्टव्यतयान्यत्रापि तथैवाश्रयणीयत्वात् ।  
इत्थं च स्थलद्वयेऽपि प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिकारणयोः रजतभेदाग्रहतदभेदाग्रहयोस्त्वनेनोभयप्रसङ्गः । तत्र  
शुक्तिरजतस्थले भ्रमदशायां निवृत्तिरनिष्टा । सत्यरजतस्थले भ्रमदशायां प्रवृत्तिरनिष्टेति ।

2. नन्वित्यादि—न शब्दप्रामाण्योत्सादप्रसङ्गः । व्यवहारबाधस्थल एव हि भेदाग्रहस्य  
कारणत्वादिति भावः ।

3. तथापीत्यादि—व्यवहारबाधाबाधरूपकार्यवैजात्येन भेदाग्रहसंसर्गज्ञानरूपकारण-  
वैजात्याङ्गीकारो न सम्भवति । कार्यवैजात्यस्य सामग्रीवैजात्यकल्पनमात्रेणापि चरितार्थतया  
त्वदभिमतसाधकत्वासंभवात् । तच्च सामग्रीवैजात्यमर्थसदसजावाभ्यामेवोपपन्नमिति नाबाध्यव्य-  
वहारं प्रति विशिष्टज्ञानस्य कारणत्वकल्पनं शक्यमिति भावः ।

विश्राम्यति । अर्थसदसद्भावाभ्यां च तद्वैजात्ये सिद्धे विशिष्टबोधकारणत्वकल्पनमप्रामाणि-  
कमेव ॥

१अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां संसर्गबोधोऽपि कारणं किं नेष्यते । २अन्यथासिद्धत्वात्तयोः ।  
न चार्थान्वयव्यतिरेकावन्यथासिद्धाविति वाच्यम् ; अन्तरङ्गत्वात् । कार्यविशेषस्य ह्यर्थ एव  
साक्षात्कारणम् । मणिप्रभायां मणिबुद्ध्या प्रवृत्तस्य निर्वाधेऽपि व्यवहारे न संसर्गज्ञानं भव-  
तामस्तोति कथमन्वयव्यतिरेकौ च सम्पद्येते । अतस्सर्वत्र व्यवहारे संसर्गबोधः कारणमित्य-  
वश्याभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । अतो व्यवहारान्यथानुपपत्त्या अन्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिः ॥

तथा भ्रान्तिशब्दोऽपि यथार्थेभ्यो व्यावर्तमानोऽयथार्थ एव ज्ञाने पर्यवस्यति । भेदाग्रहे  
भ्रान्तिशब्द इति चेन्न । ज्ञानविशेषगोचरत्वात् । अन्यथा सुषुप्तावपि प्रसङ्गात् । भेदाग्रहे  
भेद(दि)ज्ञानमेव भ्रान्तिरिति चेन्न । कस्यचिदग्रहे तत्त्वज्ञानस्य भ्रान्तिशब्दवाच्यत्वाददर्श-  
नात् । बाध्यव्यवहारहेतुत्वेन स्यादिति चेन्न । निराकृतत्वात्तस्य । मिथ्याज्ञानं भ्रान्तिरिति च  
पर्यायौ । अतोऽपि न तत्त्वज्ञानं भ्रान्तिशब्दार्थः । तथा इदं रजतमिति मे मतिरासी-  
दिति विशिष्टज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षमवसीयते । एवमनभ्युपगमे सर्वत्र संसर्गस्तज्ज्ञानं च न स्याताम् ।  
विपरीतमवगतं मयेति हि भ्रान्तौ सार्वलौकिकः प्रतिभासः । न पुनरसंसर्गो नानुभूत इति ।  
तस्माल्लोकप्रतीतिस्वारस्याच्चान्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिः ॥

यत्तुक्तं विषयमन्तरेण कथमेतज्ज्ञानमिति । क एवमाह नेति ? । एवं तर्हि शुक्तिका-  
रजतसंसर्गस्य पारमार्थिकत्वं स्यात् । न स्यात् । विषयत्वपारमार्थिकत्वयोरर्थान्तरत्वात् । कथ-  
मसतो विषयत्वमिति चेत् ; किमिदमत्रैव ? । अभ्रान्तविशिष्टबोधेऽपि समवायस्य सम्बन्धा-  
न्तराभावात् । अत एवासौ स्वयं सम्बन्धिभ्यामात्मसम्बन्धोऽपीति चेत् ; एवमत्राप्यस्तु ।  
अत्र तु समवाय एव नास्तीति चेत् , सत्यम् । अन्यत्रास्तीत्युक्तमेव । एवमेतदुक्तं भवति ;—  
सम्बन्धसंसर्गबोधेऽपि समवायस्सम्बन्धिनौ च गोचरीभवन्ति, नार्थान्तरं च । समवायसंबन्धि-

1. शङ्कते—अन्वयेति
2. परिहरति—अन्यथेति ।



समवायस्यापि समवायस्वरूपानतिरेकात् । एवमसमीचीनबोधेऽपीति न क्वचिदत्यन्तासतो भानमिति ॥

कथमसन्निकृष्टस्यापीन्द्रियेण भानमिति चेत् ; सन्निकृष्टस्यापि कथमिति कथ्यताम् । संसर्गस्य सहकारिणस्सत्त्वादिति चेत् , अत्रापि दोषस्य सहकारिणस्सत्त्वादित्यस्तु । दोषस्य सहकारित्वमसिद्धमिति चेन्न । संसर्गस्य वा कथं सिद्धम् । कार्यदर्शनादिति चेत् ; तुल्यम् । दोषान्तरस्य कार्यप्रतिबन्धकत्वमेव दृष्टमिति चेन्न । दोषवैचित्र्यात् । यत्र हि दोषेण सामग्रीशैथिल्यं भवति तत्र कार्यानुत्पाद एव । यत् तु स एव सामग्र्यन्तरीभवति तत्र कार्यान्तरोत्पादः । नह्येकस्यैकमेव सहकरोतीति नियमः । कालभेदेन बहुभिस्सहकृतस्यैकस्यैव विचितकार्यहेतुत्वदर्शनात्<sup>1</sup> । तत्राभिमतकार्यविशेषप्रतिपक्षसहकार्यन्तरस्य दोषशब्देन कीर्तनमेवात्र विशिष्यते । सर्वत्र च गुणदोषशब्दावभिमत्यनभिमती एव सू(च)येते इति न किञ्चिदपहीनम् ॥

एतेन संशयापलापोऽपि प्रत्युक्त एव । स खलु संशयेऽहमिति मानसप्रत्यक्षसिद्धो नापलापमर्हति । विरुद्धानियतानेकार्थावलम्बनश्च सः । नह्यसौ स्मृतिरिति संभवति । सा हि तत्तदनुभवजनितसंस्कारोन्मेषलब्धात्मा भिन्नेति न मिथो विरोधमनुभवितुमुत्सहते । अत एवानियमोऽपि न संभवति, प्रत्येकं स्वविषयनियतत्वात् ।

विप्रतिपन्नं ज्ञानं यथार्थं ज्ञानत्वात् संप्रतिपन्नवदित्यनुमान<sup>2</sup>माश्रयासिद्धिकालात्ययापदेशयोरन्यतरेण निरस्तमिति वेदितव्यम् ॥

एवं प्रमाणसिद्धयोस्संशयविपर्यययोरतत्त्वविषययोरप्रमात्वात्तद्व्यवच्छेदाय तत्त्वानुभूतिः प्रमेति सविशेषणमेव लक्षणं लाक्षणिः केचिद्विलक्षणास्संचक्षते ।

1. एवं च एकस्यैवेन्द्रियस्य संसर्गरूपसहकारिसमवधाने प्रमात्मकार्यजनकत्वम् । दोषरूपसहकारिसमवधाने भ्रमात्मकार्यजनकत्वं च नानुपपन्नमिति भावः ।

2. आश्रयासिद्धीत्यादि—विशिष्टज्ञानरूपस्य पक्षस्यान्यथाख्यातिभीतेन त्वयानभ्युपगमा-दाश्रयासिद्धिः । तदभ्युपगमे तस्मिन् याथार्थ्यसम्पादनस्य दुर्लभतया बाध इत्यर्थः ॥

त्रयन्तनिष्णाताः कतिचिदन्यथा व्याचक्षते । सर्वमेव ज्ञानं यथार्थम् । पञ्चीकृत-  
भूतारब्धत्वाद्विश्वस्य, सर्वस्य सर्वत्र यथासंभवं विद्यमानत्वात् तत्तदल्पभूयस्त्वाभ्यां बाधा-  
बाधव्यवस्थोपपत्तेः । स्वामार्थानां यथानुभवं परमार्थानामेव ईश्वरसृष्टत्वस्य सूत्रकारैरेव सन्ध्ये  
सृष्टिराह हीत्युपपादितत्वात्, क्वचिद्वेदाग्रहाद्यवहारोपपत्तेरचेति । <sup>1</sup>तथाहि ;—

व्यवहारविरोधेन बाधाद्विमितिसंभवः ।

भेदाग्रहाद्यवहतिर्नैरन्तर्येण भातयोः ॥

यो यस्मिन्न संभवतीति निरूपितो धर्मः स तस्माद्भेदः । यथा शुक्तित्वं रजतेऽसंभ-  
वत् रजतात् । तस्य भेदस्याग्रहे सति स्वरूपेण निरन्तरं भातयो<sup>2</sup> श्शुक्त्यधिष्ठानरजतत्वयो-  
र्विपरीतबाध्यव्यवहारहेतुत्वमुपलभ्यते । यद्यपि भूतानां पञ्चीकरणलब्धपरस्परव्याप्त्या शुक्ति-  
कायामपि सादृश्याद्रजतैकदेशो विद्यत एवेति सिद्धान्तः । तथापि न विद्यत इति कृत्वा  
चिन्त्यते बाधुदाहरणप्रसिद्धघनुरोधायेति ॥

तत्र यदुक्तं भिन्नसहकारिसन्निपातात् भिन्नास्वर्थक्रियासु केयं बाध्यबाधकभावव्यव-  
स्थेति । तत्रोच्यते—

भेदाग्रहावळिं प्राप्तिं (वळिप्राप्तं) (वधिप्राप्तं) बाध्यमित्यभिधीयते ।

<sup>3</sup>भेदग्रहस्तथा तस्य बाधकत्वेन निश्चितः ॥

1. पूर्वं वादिनां विमतेरित्यादिना तार्किकेण हेतुपञ्चकेनान्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिरुपवर्णिता ।  
तत्र विमतिबाधव्यवहाराणां शुक्तिकारजतादिस्थले विशिष्टज्ञानरूपान्यथाख्यात्यभावेऽप्युपपत्ति-  
रुपवर्ण्यते—तथा हीत्यादिना ।

2. निरन्तरं भातयोरिति—अधिष्ठानं न शुक्तिस्वरूपधर्माश्रयतया भासते, रजतत्वं च  
नापणस्थव्यक्तविशेषनिष्ठतया ;—अतोऽत्र निरन्तरभानं रूपरूपिणोरिति ज्ञेयम् ।

3. अत्र भेदग्रहपदमभेदग्रहस्याप्युपलक्षकम् ; तथा भेदाग्रहपदमभेदाग्रहस्याप्युप-  
लक्षकम् । तेन सत्यरजतस्थले नेदं रजतमिति भ्रमदशायां जायमानस्य पुरोवर्तिनि रजताभेदा-  
ग्रहप्राप्तस्य हानस्य बाध्यत्वम् । तदभेदग्रहप्राप्तस्योपादानस्य बाधकत्वञ्च सिद्धयति ॥ अत एव  
कदाचिदिति कारिकायां अग्रहोत्थमिति सामान्योक्तिः ।

व्यवहारद्वयस्य परस्परविरोधः प्रत्यक्षसिद्ध एव । रजतार्थिनो हि रजताद्भेदाग्रहे शुक्तिकायामुपादानम् । भेदग्रहे च हानम् । तयोर्हानोपादानयोरेकेन क्रियमाणयोरेकत्रैकदा विरोधे सिद्धे कस्य केन बाध इति चिन्तायां संसर्गज्ञानपक्ष इव प्रबलस्य बाधकत्वम् इतरस्य बाध्यत्वमिति किं न निश्चीयते

कदाचित्कस्य चित्प्राप्तमग्रहोत्थं हि दुर्बलम् ।

सर्वेषां सर्वदा चैव <sup>1</sup>तत्त्वग्रहणसंभवात् ॥

२अपि च

अग्रहोत्थव्यवहृतौ न सिद्धघेदभिसंहितम् ।

वस्तुभेदस्य तस्यैव तत्त्वकार्येषु शक्तिः ॥

न चात्रापि सि(बु)द्धेरन्यथाख्यातित्वम् । <sup>3</sup>आत्मनो रजताभिलाषस्य पारमार्थिकत्वात् । सामान्यतो रजतस्य च परमार्थत्वेनाभिलषितत्वात् । साभिलाषस्य तस्याभिलषितरूप्यभेदाग्रहसमुत्थप्रवृत्तिभेदेनाभिलषितार्थानवाप्तौ (प्राप्ता) प्रवर्तमानाभिसंहितानवापकत्व-लक्षणः प्रवृत्तेर्बाधो भवति । न चात्राभिलषितप्रापकोऽयं व्यवहार इत्यध्यवसायोऽन्यथाख्या-तिरिति वाच्यम् । तत्रापि भेदाग्रहादेव तथा व्यवहारोपपत्तेः । अभिलषितप्रापकाद्रजतव्यव-हारादन्य(स्य) व्यवहारस्य तदा हि भेदो गृह्येत, यदा समीचीनविशिष्टरजतज्ञानादस्य

1. तत्त्वग्रहणसंभवादिति बहुव्रीहिः । यथावस्थितवस्तुग्रहणात्मकभेदग्रहसंभूताद्वा-नादिकात् अग्रहोत्थमुपादानादिकं दुर्बलमित्यन्वयः ।

2. एवं हानोपादानरूपव्यवहारयोः प्राबल्यदौर्बल्यहेतू सर्वसम्बन्धित्वविशिष्टसार्वकालि-कत्वकतिपयसम्बन्धित्वविशिष्टकादाचित्कत्वे इत्यभिधाय अभिमतप्रापकत्वतदप्रापकत्वयोरपि प्राबल्यदौर्बल्यहेतुत्वं संभवतीत्याह—अपि चेत्यादिना ।

3. उपादानरूपो मदीयो व्यवहारः मज्जिष्ठाभिलाषविषयरजतप्रापक इति बुद्धेः अभिलाषा-भावादन्यथाख्यातित्वमुच्यते, उत तद्विषयरजताभावात्, अथ व्यवहारस्य तत्प्रापकत्वा-भावादिति विकल्पमभिप्रेत्य क्रमेण समाधत्ते—आत्मन इत्यादिना ।

ग्रहणस्मरणात्मकज्ञानद्वयस्य भेदग्रहः। स च तदा, यदा रजतादेव शुक्तेः<sup>1</sup>। अतो विशिष्ट-  
रजतज्ञानादस्य ज्ञानद्वयस्य भेदाग्रहात्तत्कार्यभूतो व्यवहारः प्रवर्तते ॥ तद्वाधा<sup>2</sup>त्तदर्थं ज्ञान-  
मपि बाधितं भवति। न चैवमिन्द्रियादेरपि बाध्यत्वप्रसङ्गः, साधारण्यात्।<sup>3</sup>(असा-  
धारण्यात्) असाधारणस्तु रचनाविशेषवान् शब्दोऽपि बाध्यत एव। एवं विरुद्धव्यव-  
हारयोर्द्वयोर्वादिनोः परस्परं वादोऽपि युक्तः जयपराजयौ च। ते च तत्र भेदाग्रहविशेषा-  
स्वयमूहनीयाः। भेदग्रहणहेतुर्दौर्बल्याभिमानेन भेदाग्रहः प्रतितिष्ठत्येव। अभिमानश्च  
भेदाग्रहान्तरमिति न सङ्कटं किञ्चित्।

यत्तु भेदाग्रहात्प्रवृत्तावभेदाग्रहान्निवृत्तिरपि स्यात्। भेदग्रहादेव निवृत्तावरजत-  
बुद्ध्या रजतान्निवृत्तिर्न स्यादिति। नैतद्युक्तम्;

यतो रजतवैधर्म्यात्तत्र भेदाग्रहे सति।

तन्नैरन्तर्यभावेन तत्प्रवृत्तिः प्रता(जा)र्य(य)ते ॥

नेदं रजतमिति रजतादेव तदर्थिनोऽपि निवर्तमानस्य इदमिति पुरोवर्तिग्रहो न  
रजतमिति रजताभावस्मरणं यथा इदं रजतमित्यत्र वर्णितम्।<sup>4</sup>ताभ्यां निरन्तरवृत्ताभ्यां  
यस्साक्षाद्रजतज्ञानेन व्यवहारः स जायते। न चात्र रजतसंसर्गप्रतीतिमभ्युपेयः, यतोऽन्यथा-  
ख्यातिस्स्यात्। न रजतसंसर्गाग्रहमात्राधीनं (हानम्), यतो हानोपादाने युगपत्प्रसज्येया-  
ताम्। अतो यत्किञ्चिदेतत् ॥

यत्तु भेदाग्रहमात्रेण व्यवहारोत्पत्तौ प्रयोज्यवृद्धस्य संसर्गज्ञानानुमानं न स्यादिति।  
तदपि व्यवहारे वैषम्यात्परिहर्तव्यम्।

1. शुक्तेरिति—भेदग्रह इत्यनुषङ्गः।

2. तदर्थमिति—व्यवहारफलकमित्यर्थः।

3. असाधारण्यादिति पाठे ज्ञानस्येत्यादिः।

4. ताभ्यामित्यादिग्रन्थः शुक्तिरजतस्थलविषयः। ताभ्यां-पुरोवर्तिग्रहरजतस्मरणाभ्याम्।

व्यवहारवैषम्यस्य सामग्रीवैषम्यमात्रेण चरितार्थत्वात् , वस्तुसदसद्भावाभ्यां च सामग्रीभेदसिद्धेः किं संसर्गज्ञानेनेति चेदुच्यते ॥

सर्वोऽर्थश्चेतनैर्ज्ञातो व्यवहाराय कल्पते ।

अज्ञानं हि कचित्कल्प्यं भ्रान्तौ बाधकदर्शनात् ॥

इच्छातो हि चेतनानां प्रवृत्तिः । सा चोपकारस्मृत्या । उपकारश्च तत्तज्जात्यादिधर्म-  
विशिष्टैः पदार्थैः । यदि ते विशिष्टा न प्रतीयेरन् कथमुपकारस्मृतिरुपजायेत । न हि  
जात्यादिमात्रादाश्रयान्तराद्वा कश्चिदुपकारः । अतस्स्वरसवाहिविशिष्टज्ञानजनितोप-  
कारस्मृत्या सर्वस्मिन्व्यवहारे सामान्यतस्सिद्धे क्वचित् बाधकदर्शनात् (अ)संसर्गा(र्ग)ग्रहेऽपि  
संसृष्टबोधभेदाग्रहात् संसृष्टबोधवदुपकारस्मृतिर्जायते (इति) केवलमग्रह एव कल्प्यः । भेदग्रहस्य  
प्रतिबन्धकत्वात्, तदभावस्तु प्रतिबन्धकाभावमात्रम् । न च मूलभूते संसर्गज्ञाने प्रवृत्तिकारणे  
सिद्धे तदुपजीविनो निरन्तरज्ञानस्य प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वमिति युक्तं वक्तुम् । <sup>1</sup>एतेन कदाचित्संसर्ग-  
सद्भावे तज्ज्ञानमन्तरेणापि निरन्तरसंसर्गज्ञानमात्रेण प्रवृत्तस्य <sup>2</sup>संवादोऽप्युपपन्न इति द्रष्ट-  
व्यम् ॥

यत्तु प्रतिज्ञानन्तरं हेतूपन्यासोऽन्यथाख्यात्यनभ्युपगमे न स्यादिति । तत्रोच्यते;—

नैरन्तर्येण शब्देन स्मृतयोर्धर्मधर्मिणोः ।

अन्वयज्ञानसिद्धयर्थं हेतूपन्यासकांक्षणम् ॥

वैधर्म्याग्रहमात्रेण व्याहारो धर्मधर्मिवत् ।

प्रागुक्तेनैव मार्गेणेत्यवयवं नैव किञ्चन ॥

1. एतेनेति—अबाध्यव्यवहारं प्रति संसर्गज्ञानं कारणम् । बाध्यव्यवहारं प्रति भेदा-  
ग्रहः तन्मूलकं ज्ञानद्वयं वा कारणम् इति विविच्यानङ्गीकृत्य उत्सर्गतस्संसर्गज्ञानस्यैव कारणत्वम् ।  
कचिद्भेदाग्रहे विशिष्टज्ञानभेदाग्रहात्प्रवृत्तिरित्यङ्गीकारेणेत्यर्थः ।

2. प्रवृत्तस्येति—मणिप्रभायां मणिबुद्ध्या प्रवृत्तस्येत्यर्थः ।

निरन्तरसामग्रीसन्निपातानिरन्तरधर्मधर्मिविज्ञाने जाते विशिष्टबोधवत् व्यवहारस्सर्वो-  
ऽपि प्रवर्तते एव । भवत्पक्ष इव यथार्थं संसर्गं बोध्यमिच्छद्भिरस्माभिरपि हेत्वपेक्षा अनाप्त-  
वाक्येषु नियत (नीयत) इति (किं) नोपपद्यते । तथा हि—

१अयोग्येभ्यस्समुत्कृष्टाः पदार्थास्त्वैः पदैस्समृताः ।

यया बुद्ध्या प्रकाश्यन्ते सा विमर्श इति स्मृता ॥

२सा समष्टिस्समृतीनां हि निरन्तरसमुद्भवा ।

भेदाग्रहेण प्राप्नोति वाक्यार्थमतितुल्यताम् ॥

अत एव हि लोके सर्वत्र पुरुषवाक्येषु तत्तत्पदार्थनिरन्तरस्मृतिमात्रे सिद्धे मूल-  
प्रमाणोपजीवनेनान्विताभिधानमभियुक्ता बहुमन्वते । यद्यपि पूर्वोत्तरप्रतीत्योराकारभेदो  
नोपलभ्यते, तथापि व्यवहारविशेषसिद्ध्यर्थमभिधानञ्चाभ्युपेतव्यमेव । यद्यभिहितमपि  
बाध्येत, ततो बाधाबाधव्यवस्थैव शाब्दे न स्यात् । ३अभिधानशैथिल्ये च दोषाणां  
व्यापारः । नैराकाङ्क्ष्यादेस्तथा दर्शनात् । ४ज्ञानस्य च विषयाभावेऽसत्ख्यातिरित्येवा-  
पद्येत । अन्यत्र सत्त्वान्नैवमिति चेन्न । प्रतीतदेशेऽसत्त्वात् । अन्यत्र सत्त्वस्यार्थान्तरसत्त्वव-  
दनुपकारकत्वात् । यदाकारो हि प्रकाशः तदाकारस्य सत्त्वाभावात् । तस्मात्सर्वा एव  
बुद्धयो यथार्था इत्येव शोभनम् ॥

१. हेत्वपेक्षायाः विमर्शोपयोगित्वं सूचयितुं विमर्शस्वरूपमाह—अयोग्येभ्य इति ।

२. पूर्वं वैधर्म्याग्रहमात्रेणेत्यनेन शुक्तौ रजतभेदाग्रहस्थानीयः शब्दप्रयोगस्थले पर्वतगदौ  
साध्यवद्भेदाग्रह उक्तः । इदानीं तत्रत्यग्रहणस्मरणात्मकज्ञानद्वये विशिष्टज्ञानभेदाग्रहस्थानीयः  
तत्तत्पदार्थस्मृतिसमुदाये विशिष्टज्ञानभेदाग्रह उच्यते—सा समष्टिरिति ।

३. अभिधानेति—दोषस्तावदभिधानमेव निरूप्ये, नत्वभिहितं बाधते । नैराका-  
ङ्क्ष्यासाक्षिभ्यरूपदोषद्वयविषये युष्माभिरपि तथैवाभ्युपगमादयोग्यत्वरूपदोषविषयेऽपि तस्यै-  
वोचितत्वादिति भावः ।

४. यदि संसर्गासद्भावस्थलेऽपि तस्य बोध्यत्वमिष्यते तदाऽसत्ख्यातिप्रसङ्ग इत्याह—  
ज्ञानस्येत्यादिना ।

<sup>1</sup>यत्तु कश्चिदाह—परमार्थविषया बुद्धिरिति नोचितम् । परमार्थस्य विषयभावानुपपत्तेः । यत्तु विषयीभवति तज्जडमेव । इतरथा प्रकाशनैरपेक्ष्यात् । <sup>2</sup>न हि स्वयंप्रकाशाया ज्ञप्तेर्विषयभावो दृष्टः । सापेक्षत्वानपेक्षत्वयोरेकत्र विरोधात् । अतो जडस्याजडायां संविदिसिद्धयस्तत्राध्यस्तत्वात्पारमार्थ्यं दुर्भणम् । बहिरेव परमार्थसतोऽर्थस्य ज्ञानेन विषयभावसिद्धिरिति चेत् ; कोऽयं विषयभावो नाम । न तावत्संयोगादिलक्षणस्सम्बन्धो ज्ञानार्थयोरुपपन्नः । ज्ञानस्य निर्धर्मकत्वात् । बाह्यार्थस्य च सधर्मकत्वेऽपि प्राकट्यवादप्रतिक्षेपात् । तदतिरिक्तार्थधर्मस्य स्वाभाविकत्वे सर्वदा प्रकाशप्रसङ्गात् । ज्ञानसमानयोगक्षेमस्य कादाचित्कस्य प्राकट्यवत्प्रतिक्षेपात् । ज्ञानज्ञेययोरध्यासाधिकरणत्वव्यतिरेकेण तत्सं(न सं)बन्धः कश्चिदुपपद्यते । किञ्च दृश्योऽयमखिलः प्रपञ्चः <sup>3</sup>ख्यातिबाधान्यथानुपपत्त्या अनिर्वचनीय इत्यर्थापत्त्यावसीयते । अतः कथं परमार्थविषया बुद्धिरिति ।

अत्रोच्यते—

पारमार्थ्यं विनार्थस्य न स्वरूपान्तरं भवेत् ।

ज्ञानस्य च स्वभावोऽयं <sup>4</sup>यदर्थप्रवणात्मता ॥

एतत्किलोक्तं विश्वमपि दृश्यं जडरूपमेवेति । किमतः ? न हि जडमित्यपरमार्थपर्यायं लौकिका मन्यन्ते । न हि जडाजडयोरध्यासमन्तरेणान्यस्सम्बन्धो नोपपद्यत इति युक्तम् । विषयविषयिलक्षणस्य सिद्धेः । यद्यपि ज्ञेयसमवेतं प्राकट्यादिपदवेदनीयं न किञ्चिद्रूपान्तर-

1. अथानिर्वचनीयख्यातिं दूषयितुमुपन्यस्यति— यस्त्विति ।

2. नह्वीति—स्वप्रकाशस्वरूपमजडत्वं प्रकाशनिरपेक्षत्वपर्यवसन्नम् । तथा च प्रकाशसापेक्षत्वतस्त्रिरपेक्षत्वयोरेकत्र समावेशो दुर्घटः ।

3. ख्यातीत्यादि—ख्यातिबाधान्यथानुपपत्तिरूपया अर्थापत्त्या अनिर्वचनीय इत्यवसीयत इत्यन्वयः ।

4. अर्थप्रवणात्मतेति—परमार्थप्रकाशकत्वस्वरूपतेत्यर्थः । ज्ञानस्य निर्विषयकत्वं न वा असत्यविषयकत्वं स्वभाव इत्यर्थः ।

मस्ति, तथापि ज्ञानं ज्ञेयप्रवणस्वभावमिति तत्त्वभाव एव सम्बन्धपक्षे निक्षिप्यते । न हि ज्ञानं कस्यचिदित्यपहाय रूपान्तरेण चकास्ति । इदमेव हि रूपमस्य प्रामाण्यं स्वतो निर्बहतीत्युक्तं स्वतोः प्रामाण्ये । न च निर्धर्मकत्वाज्ज्ञानस्येदं रूपमसम्भावनीयमिति वाच्यम् । धर्मिस्वरूपानन्तर्गतत्वस्य (न्तर्गतत्वात्) स्वभावस्य । न च निर्धर्मकत्वमपि ज्ञानस्य । पारोक्ष्यापरोक्ष्यानुभवत्वस्मृतित्वादीनां बहुलमुपलब्धेः । न च तैजसमेव (जडमेव) ज्ञानेन वेद्यत इति नियमः । अतीतानागतानां अन्यसमवेतानाञ्च ज्ञानानामप्यनुमानादिगम्यत्वदर्शनात् । अहमर्थस्यात्मनस्सोऽहमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वदर्शनाच्च । न चैषामपि जडपक्षान्तर्भावो युक्तः । तथा...[सत्य]जडस्य कार्यस्यापि (कस्याप्य)सिद्धेः अनुपपत्तेश्च । न चैषां वर्तमानानां स्वाश्रयं प्रत्यन्येन सिद्धिरस्ति । स्वयं सिद्धयतोऽपि जडत्वे कस्तर्ह्यन्योऽजडो नाम; यः<sup>१</sup>परमार्थस्यात् । वृत्त्यनवच्छिन्नं चैतन्यमेवात्मा, <sup>२</sup>तत्रापि स्वयं प्रकाशत इति चेन्न । न चैवं प्रत्यक्षमनुभूयते । जानामीति सकर्मकस्य सकर्तृकस्यैव ज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् । तदतिरिक्तस्य योग्यानुपलब्ध्या निरस्तत्वात् । तदेतदात्मनिरूपणे विस्तरेण प्रतिपादयामः । तस्माज्जडमजडं वा यत् ज्ञानेन भासते व्यवहारयोग्यां दशमनुभवतीति यावत् तत् ज्ञेयम् - अत एव हि स्वतो निराकारमपि ज्ञानं पटज्ञानं घटज्ञानमिति नानावच्छेदभिन्नमवभासते । न च ज्ञेयस्य बाधादपरमार्थत्वम् । ज्ञानविषयत्वस्य बाधे प्रतिभासविरोधात् । तत्सत्त्वबाधे ज्ञानस्य निरालम्बनत्वप्रसङ्गात् । अनवभासमानेन रूपेणालम्बनत्वानुपपत्तेः । सद्विलक्षणस्यापि सदात्मना भानाभ्युपगमेऽन्यथाख्यातिप्रसङ्गात् । बाधस्य च निवर्तकत्वे <sup>३</sup>रूपान्तरसिद्धयनुपपत्तेः । अबाधकत्वे सत्त्वस्यैव सिद्धेः । तस्मात्ख्यातिबला(बाधा)वलम्बनेना(न)-वलम्बने वा न किञ्चित्सद्विलक्षणं नाम सिद्धिमृच्छति ।

<sup>४</sup>विशेषतश्चानिर्वचनीयख्यातिपक्षानुपपत्तिः । स हि न तावदनिर्वचनीयमित्येव भाया-

१. परमार्थस्यादिति—त्वन्मते जडस्यापरमार्थपर्यायत्वादिति भावः ।
२. तत्रापीति—अतीतानागतपरगतज्ञानानुमानादिस्थलेऽपीत्यर्थः ।
३. रूपान्तरेति—रूपान्तरं = अनिर्वचनीयत्वम्, धर्मिण एव निवृत्तेरिति भावः ।
४. एतावता प्रपञ्चस्य सद्विलक्षणत्वविशिष्टासद्विलक्षणत्वात्मकानिर्वचनीयत्वघटकस्सद्वि-



(ना)त् । असिद्धेः । अस्तीति हि प्रतिभासः । न च तत्प्रतीतिबाधाभ्यां कल्प्यः । तथाप्यन्यथाख्यातिप्रसङ्गात् । अपि च प्रतीतिस्त्वं व्यवस्थापयति । बाधश्चासत्त्वम् । केनानिर्वचनीयत्वं सिद्धयतीति न विद्वः । द्वाभ्यामेवेति चेत् न । स्वस्वमात्रविषयमन्तरेणार्थान्तरासिद्धेः । न हि घटपटबुद्धिभ्यां <sup>१</sup>पुरुषाध्यवसायस्सम्भवति । किञ्च यद्यनयो<sup>२</sup>विरोधोऽन्यतरत्सत्यम् । अथाविरोध उभयमेव सत्यम् । प्रकारान्तरं नोपलभामहे । किञ्चोभयविधिर्यथा विरोधान्नोपपन्नस्तथोभयनिषेधोऽपि । नचोभयविवेचरथान्तरमुभयनिषेधः । अन्यतरप्रतिक्षेपरूपत्वादन्यतरान्तरस्य । नीलपीतवत्परस्परप्रतिक्षेपेऽपि पक्षान्तरावकाशो न विरुध्यत इति चेन्न । उभयप्रतीतिमन्तरेण प्रतीत्यन्तरादर्शनात् । न ह्यस्तीति नास्तीति वादिना (विना) प्रतीतिरस्ति । <sup>३</sup>तदवान्तरभेदत्वाद्विश्वस्य । <sup>४</sup>नीलपीतयोस्तु श्वेतादिप्रतीत्या पक्षान्तरसिद्धिः । <sup>५</sup>तत्राप्यर्थपत्त्या पक्षान्तरं सिद्धयतीति चेन्न । अन्यथैवोपपत्तेः । सदसत्प्रत्ययो हि स्वविषयाभ्यां सदसद्भ्यामेवोपपद्यते । अपि चोभयप्रतिक्षेपाविरोधे पक्षान्तरसिद्धिः । पक्षान्तरसिद्ध्या चोभयप्रतिक्षेपाविरोध इत्यन्योन्याश्रयता । न हि नीलपीतानपेक्षश्चेतप्रतीतिवत्सदसदवभासनिरपेक्षार्थान्तरप्रतीतिरस्ति । स्यादेतत् । सम्प्रतिपन्ने सत्यात्मनि बाधो नोपलब्धः । असति च विप्रतिपन्ने

लक्षणत्वांशो दूषितः । अंशान्तरस्याभिमतत्वात्स न दूषितः । इदानीं विशिष्टमनिर्वचनीयत्वं प्रकारान्तरेण दूषयितुमारभते—विशेषत इत्यादिना ।

१. पुरुषाध्यवसायः—पुरुष इत्यध्यवसायः ।

२. अनयोः—सत्त्वासत्त्वयोः ।

३. तदवान्तरेति—सदसदवान्तरेत्यर्थः ।

४. नीलेत्यादि—नीलपीतप्रतिक्षेपस्थले तु प्रतीतिबलेन श्वेतस्य कस्यचिसिद्धौ प्रतिक्षेपयोस्तद्रूपत्वसम्भवः । नैवं प्रकृते प्रतीत्या सदसदतिरिक्तसिद्धिः । सत्त्वासत्त्वप्रतीत्यतिरिक्तप्रतीतेः शशशृङ्गायमाणत्वादिति भावः ।

५. तत्राप्यर्थपत्त्येति—प्रतीतिबाधान्यथानुपपत्त्येत्यर्थः । सतो बाधानुपपत्तेरसत्तश्च प्रतीतिबाधोभयानुपपत्तेश्च सदसद्विलक्षणत्वं घटादेरभ्युपेयमित्यर्थः ।

घटादिवद्बाधोऽपि<sup>१</sup>नोपलब्धः । तदुभयमपि घटादावनुभूयमानं कथमुभयरूपातिरेकमन्तरेण निरुद्धेतेति चेत्, विरोधेऽन्यतररूपबाधेनेतरपरिरक्षणेनाविरोधे चोभयसमर्थनेनेत्युक्तम् । कस्य बाधः कस्य परिरक्षणमिति चेत्, शक्तो विविनक्तु । न हि त्वया न विदितमिति तत्त्वं विनिवर्तते । तस्याध्यशक्यमस्मदुत्थापितैर्बाधकैरिति चेन्न । बाधकानां<sup>२</sup>सदसत्त्वयोरुपपत्तेः असतोऽ(त्य)पि बाधके स्वकार्यं सिद्धयतीति चेत्, किमस्यासत्त्वम्? आत्मवैलक्षण्यमिति चेत्, अस्त्वेवम् । आत्मनो बाधकवैलक्षण्यवत् ।<sup>३</sup>न हि सतामेव परस्परवैलक्षण्यमन्योन्यमसत्त्वमापादयति । बाध्यमानत्वमिति चेत्, किमयं बाधः कार्यकरं रूपं न व्याहन्ति किमनेन बाध्यते । अथ व्याहन्ति कथमसतोऽपि बाधकस्य, <sup>४</sup>उभयथाऽपि सदसद्विवेकसिद्धिः । समानयोगक्षेमत्वादुभयोः<sup>५</sup> । कथमन्यतरत्र सत्त्वमसत्त्वं वा व्यवस्थाप्यतामिति चेत्, सत्यम् । एवंविधस्वव्याघातकमात्रालोचनेऽव्यवस्थैव । अत एव हेत्वन्तरेणैषामाभासानाभासव्यवस्था । तस्यैव हेत्वन्तरस्य विचाराङ्गत्वम् ।<sup>६</sup>सर्वगोचरव्याहतवचसस्तव (स्त्व)तदङ्गत्वं तद्वावाभावयोः प्रयोजनाभावादित्यादि जातिपरीक्षायां न्यायाचार्योक्तमनु-

१. बाधोऽपीत्यपि ना ख्यातिसङ्ग्रहः ।

२. सदसत्त्वयोरिति—त्वयदुपन्यस्तस्य बाधकस्य सत्त्वमसत्त्वं वा? आद्ये प्रपञ्चान्तर्गतस्य तस्यैकस्य सत्त्वे तुल्यन्यायेन सर्वस्यापि सत्त्वसिद्धिः, द्वितीये हेतोरमत्त्वे साध्ययोगेन सुतरां प्रपञ्चसत्त्वसिद्धिरित्युभयथाऽप्यस्माकमुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः ।

३. न हीति—कस्यचिद्वस्तुनो वस्त्वन्तरवैलक्षण्यं नासत्त्वरूपं भवितुमर्हति । तथा सत्यात्मनोऽपि बाधकवैलक्षण्यमसत्त्वरूपं स्यादिति भावः ।

४. उभयथाऽपीति—बाधकबाधकस्य बाधकगतकार्यकररूपव्याहन्तृत्वे बाधकबाधकस्यार्थक्रियाकारित्वेन सत्त्वसिद्धिः । हेतोर्बाधित्वेन प्रपञ्चसत्त्वसिद्धिश्च । तस्य तदव्याहन्तृत्वे बाधकस्य कार्यकरत्वेन सत्त्वसिद्धिः । बाधकबाधकस्य प्रपञ्चस्य चासत्त्वसिद्धिरित्युभयथापि त्वदभिमतं ब्रह्मभिक्षस्य सर्वस्यासत्त्वं न सिद्धयतीत्यर्थः ।

५. उभयोः—बाधकबाधकयोः ।

६. सर्वेत्यादि—सर्वविषयकं व्याहतञ्च यद्वचः, सर्वं मिथ्या, मदुक्तं सर्वं वाक्यमसत्यमित्यादिरूपं स्वव्याघातकं, तस्य विचाराङ्गत्वं नास्तीति स्वव्याघातकोत्तररूपजातिविचारावसरे-न्यायाचार्यैरुक्तमित्यर्थः ।

सन्धातव्यम् । व्याघातमात्रस्य कचिदूषणकक्ष्यासूपन्यासोऽपि नोत्तरस्य दूषणविवक्षया,  
किन्तु पूर्वस्यादूषणजातीयत्वविवक्षयेति द्रष्टव्यम् ।

अथैवं मनुषे, <sup>1</sup>अखिलगोचराणि परमार्था नैव (बाधकानि परमार्थतामेव) बाधन्ते,  
न तु कार्यं व्यापादयन्ति । धूमादीनां सत्त्वैलक्षण्ये समर्थितेऽपि भवत्येव धूमध्वजानुमानम् ।  
नैतावता तस्य पारमार्थिकत्वमेवेति मन्तव्यम् । विश्वविनिवर्तकेन निवर्तयिष्यमाणत्वादिति ।  
तदेतदपेशलम् । प्रमाणस्य बाधकस्य व्यवहारविशेषोत्पत्तिप्रतिबन्धकस्य बाध्यव्यवहारमात्र  
निवर्तकस्य <sup>2</sup>वस्तु(प्व)व्यापारात् । अभ्युपेत्य वा ब्रूमः उक्तस्य बाधकस्य भविष्यद्बाध-  
कतुल्यप्रमाणत्वेऽमुनैव प्रपञ्चविलयप्रसङ्गात् । अप्रमाणत्वे बाध्यत्वात् । भविष्यतो वा  
विश्वनिवर्तकस्य प्रमाणमात्रत्वेऽस्यैवानिवर्तकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । प्रामाण्योत्तीर्णरूपान्त-  
रनिवर्तकत्वे प्रपञ्चस्य सत्त्वप्रसङ्गात् । प्रमाणबाधितं रजतादि मिथ्या मुद्गराद्यर्था-  
न्तरबाधितं घटादि सत्यमित्येव हि व्युत्पत्तिः । हेत्वन्तरबाधिते मिथ्येति भाष-  
णमात्रमस्माकमभिमतमिति चेत्, कस्तर्हि भवन्तं वारयेत् । असद्यवहारस्य हि तथात्वं  
ज्ञापयामः, न तु तमेव निवर्तयितुं शक्नुम इति । प्रमाणबाधिते द्विचन्द्रादावनुवृत्ति-  
रपि दृश्यत इति चेत्, उच्यते । बाधकं हि प्रमाणं तदेव निवर्तयति, यदध्यस्तमपि सत्प्रा-  
माणिकाभिमानेन कार्यं करोति, यथा रज्ज्वाद्यधिष्ठानं सर्पादिकं बाष्पाद्यधिष्ठानं धूमादिकं  
वा । तत्र हि बाधकदर्शनसमनन्तरं न भीतिर्वह्यनुमानं वा जायते । पुनस्तर्पविज्ञानानु-  
दयस्तु सामग्रीविच्छेदान्नतु <sup>3</sup>प्रमाणबलात् । एवमत्रापि चन्द्रद्वित्वेन प्रामाणिकाभि-  
मतेन यदि कार्यं किञ्चित्स्यात्तदेव निवर्तनीयम्, न तु चन्द्रद्वित्वज्ञानमपि, तस्यानध्यस्त-

1. अखिलेत्यादि—विश्वनिवर्तके नभविष्यता ब्रह्मनिर्दिशेषत्वज्ञानरूपेण बाधकेनेदानी-  
न्तनस्य मदुत्थापितस्य बाधकस्य बाधो भवत्येव । स च न कार्यकरत्वनिवृत्त्यात्मकः, अपि तु  
परमार्थाभावात्मकः । तथैव हि धूमादिविषयेऽभ्युपगन्तव्यमित्यर्थः ।

2. वस्तुपु व्यापारादिति कचित्पाठः । वस्तुप्वव्यापारादिति पाठे ज्ञानस्य वस्तुबाध  
बाधविषयेऽन्यापृतेरित्यर्थो बोध्यः ।

3. प्रमाणबलादिति—बाधकप्रमाणबलादित्यर्थः ।

कारणत्वात् । यत्र च वस्तुनि ज्ञायमानतया कारणत्वं तत्रैव बाधकप्रमाणाधीनविनिवृत्ति-  
शङ्कावकाशः, न तु सत्तया कारणे । विश्वञ्च न ज्ञायमानतया स्वकार्ये वर्तते । कथमस्य  
प्रमाणेन विलयशङ्कायेत । अपि च यद्येनाकारेणार्थक्रियां किञ्चिदुत्पादयितुं शक्नोति, तत्ते-  
नाकारेण सत्, यत्र शक्नोति तत्र सत् इत्येवं हि लोकव्यवहारसिद्धे सदसत्त्वम् । तत्र  
यदि सत्त्वं व्यावर्तयति, कथं कार्यं न व्याहन्यात् ? । अथैतदुत्तीर्णं सत्त्वं व्यावर्तयति वय-  
मपि तदभ्युपगच्छामः । न हि लोकव्यवहारसिद्धे सत्त्वे व्यवस्थितेऽन्यदपि सत्त्वमभिल-  
षामः । न च तदस्ति, क्वचिदपि तस्याप्रतीतिः । लौकिकं सत् (सत्त्वं) कदाचिद्विनि-  
वर्तयिष्यत इति चेत्, तत्रेदं वक्तव्यम् । केयं विनिवृत्तिरिति । यदि लौकिकसत्त्वस्य पूर्वमपि  
निवृत्तिरासीदिति प्रतीतिस्तदा तदानीन्तनकार्यकरणव्याघातः । यथा रज्जुसर्पस्य प्रागेवा  
सत्त्वोदितस्य (प्रागेवासत्त्वेन तस्य) प्राक्कार्यालम्भः । सत्यमिदानीमपि परमार्थतो न  
किञ्चित्कार्यं करोतीति चेत्, परमार्थत इति कोऽर्थः । न तावल्लौकिकपरमार्थत्वम् ।  
अभ्युपगमविरोधात् । भवद्विरपि हि व्यावहारिकपरमार्थकार्यकरणमभ्युपगम्यत एव । न  
तदुत्तीर्णम् । अनपेक्षणात् । न हि लौकिकसत्त्वनिर्वाहायाल्लौकिकपरमार्थकार्यकरणमभ्यु-  
पगम्यते । तत्प्रयुक्ततया लौकिकसत्त्वस्य क्वचिदप्यहृष्टेः । तस्मान्न तस्य पूर्वनिवृत्तिस्तदानीं  
ज्ञास्यते । अलौकिकसत्त्वस्य गगनकुमुदकल्पस्य निवृत्तिस्सर्वदैवेष्टेति किं तत्समर्थनप्रया-  
सेन ? । अथ लौकिकसत्त्वस्य पश्चान्निवृत्तिः, तर्हेतदुक्तं भवति, विश्वं कदाचिद्विलयमुप-  
यास्यतीति । हन्तैवमनित्यतैवोपपादिता स्यान्नासत्यतेति । तत्रापि को विप्रतिपद्यते ? । न  
च सर्वस्यानित्यत्वमपि । प्रकृतिपुरुषकालादीनानित्यत्वश्रुतेः । त्वदुपन्यस्तबाधकसमानयो-  
गक्षेमतया च पाश्चात्यमपि बाधकं न विलयकूप्यै प्रभवतीत्युक्तम् ।

प्रत्यक्षमधिष्ठानयाथात्म्यज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षारोपनिवर्तनक्षमं नेतरदिति च भ्रान्तभाषितमेव ।  
भ्रान्त्युत्पत्तिनिवृत्तिः स्वसामग्रीनिवृत्त्यैव, न प्रमाणफलेन विषयपरिच्छेदेनेति स्थितत्वात् ।  
इतरथा हि चन्द्रैकत्वापरोक्ष्यानन्तरं अङ्गुल्यवष्टब्धचक्षुषः चन्द्रद्वित्वन्न प्रतीयेत । प्रामाण्य-  
मेव हि भ्रमस्य तत्त्वज्ञानबलान्नास्तीति ज्ञाप्यते । तच्चेदानीमपि शक्येत । यदि  
(यद्यपि) विश्वज्ञानं प्रमाणं स्यादित्यपि (स्यात्तथापि) स्वामप्रपञ्चविलक्षणो जाग्रत्प्रपञ्च इत्य-

शक्यनिष्कष्टम् । स्वप्नेऽपि हि तत्तदर्थक्रियापरम्परा समर्थवस्तुमालानुभवदर्शनादिति चेत्, न तावदेतच्छ्रुतिपरायणेष्वस्मासु वक्तुमुचितम् । स्वाप्नप्रपञ्चस्यापि पारमार्थिकत्वस्य वेदान्त-वाक्यप्रमाणकत्वात् । तथा च सूत्रकारैरेव सन्ध्ये सृष्टिराह हीत्युपपादितम् । अन्येषां तु पक्षे

स्वा(स्व)प्ने ज्ञाने न तत्कार्यमर्थेन कृतमन्यदा ।

यदि जाग्रद्विद्यान्नार्थास्वाप्नज्ञानञ्च नो भवेत् ॥

तत्तदर्थानुभवजनितसंस्काराणामदृष्टोद्बोधितानां साचिन्मनसा तेषु ज्ञानेषु निरन्तरमुपजायमानेषु स्वप्ने यन्नाम हर्षशोकादिकार्यमुपजायते तत्सर्वं ज्ञानेनैव । न च तदानीन्तनं ज्ञानमपि नासीदिति कस्यचित्किमपि बाधकमुदेति । अबाधितमपि मिथ्येति भवतामेव वक्तुमुचितम् । विषयबाधान्मिथ्येति चेत्, किमन्यबाधेऽन्यस्य मिथ्यात्वम् ? । अतिप्रसङ्गो हि दुर्वारः । न चात्यन्तविषयबाधोऽपि, येन देशान्तरेष्वपि तदभावात् ज्ञानस्य निरालम्बनत्वं स्यात् । अतो ज्ञानमेव स्वप्ने परमार्थो नार्थ इति सिद्धे यदर्थानामेव केषाञ्चित्तदानीमपि हेतुसाध्यभाववावलोकनं तन्निपुणतरनिरन्तरावर्तितमनोरथविपरिवर्तिहेतुसाध्यभाववदित्यूहनीयम् । इदञ्च जागरितावस्थानुसंहितपरमार्थपदार्थहेतुसाध्यभावानुभवबलप्रभावितमिति तदेव <sup>1</sup>स्थिरीकरोति । न ह्यविदितगोचरस्वप्नो मनोरथो वा सम्पद्यते । तत्राख्यातिपक्षे निरन्तरास्मृतयः । अन्यथाख्यातिपक्षे स्मर्यमाणारोप इति विशेषः । अदृष्टवशोद्बोधितसंस्कारसम्पत्त्या विसदृशसमारोपे च अधिकरणसम्पत्तिर्यथासम्भवमूहनीयेति । न चैवं जाग्रदज्ञानमपि निर्वोढुं शक्यम् । स्वरूपसत्तामात्रनिबन्धनस्यानादिकार्यकारणप्रवाहस्याशेषजनसंवादेनानुवर्तमानस्यानन्यथासिद्धत्वात् । अतः कथं स्वप्नज्ञनदृष्टान्तबलेन बाह्यापलापः । यदि च कदाचिद्बाधकमुपयास्यति, कथमिदानीं कार्यमुत्पादयेत् ।

1. जाग्रदशायामेव कदाचिन्मनसा हेतुसाध्यभावमननवत्स्वप्नदशायामपि भवतीति भावः । तथा च स्वाप्नो हेतुसाध्यभावानुभवः जाग्रदशायां हेतुसाध्यभावानुभवप्रयोज्यसंस्कारायत्त इति स जागरितावस्थायां तादृशानुभवपारमार्थ्यं द्रढयतीत्यर्थः ।

न च बाधासत्तिविप्रकर्षाभ्यामर्थविशेषसिद्धिः । बाधविप्रकर्षेण कस्यचित्परमार्थोऽपि किञ्चित्प्रति बाध्यमानत्वादपरमार्थस्स्यात् ।

यत्तु शशविषाणाद्यसदिति । तत्र शशो विषाणं संसर्गश्च सन्त्येव । तान्येव च प्रकाशन्त इति पूर्वमेवोक्तम् । अथ शशाधिकरणाभावप्रतियोगिनो विषाणस्य तत्रैव प्रतीयमानस्य तत्रत्याभावप्रतियोगितैवासत्त्वमिति मनुषे, हन्तैवमस्मादसतो व्यावृत्तिर्घटादीनां सत्त्वमेव स्थापयतीति न सतोऽपि व्यावृत्तिस्स्यात् । बाधा<sup>१</sup>त्सापीति चेत्, <sup>२</sup>तर्हीसतो व्यावृत्तिर्न स्यात् । न हि क्वचित्कदाचित्कस्यचिदपि वा बाधप्रस्तावे सति उक्तरूपादसतो व्यावृत्तिः । न च भानमात्रादसद्व्यावृत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । असतोऽपि भाने ततो व्यावृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । भानेऽपि व्यवहारे प्रवृत्त्यर्हतानर्हताभ्यां विशेष इति चेत्, व्यवहारश्च यदि जातो न बाधितश्च कथमस्य बाधो सत्ये (बाधोऽस्त्ये) वेत्युक्तम् । यदि च नित्यतया प्रमाणेन प्रतिपन्नानां नित्यमेव व्यवहारो जायेत, कथं विश्वनिवृत्तिः । यदि न जायेत कथं व्यवहाराबाधः । व्यवहाराबाधे वा नासद्व्यावृत्तिः । <sup>३</sup>सामान्यतश्च बाध्यसिद्धौ न विश्वबाधः । तदसिद्धौ च कार्यं (कथं) बाधः । बाधो हि तस्याभावावेदनम् । न चाभावो भावमन्तरेण निरूपयितुं शक्यः । विश्वं मिथ्येत्यादौ <sup>४</sup>प्रतिज्ञाविरोधश्च । उपजीव्यविरोधोऽपि । साध्यविधानस्य <sup>५</sup>धर्म्याद्युपजीविनस्तद्विरोधित्वात् ।

१. सापीति—सद्व्यावृत्तिरपीत्यर्थः ।

२. तर्हीति—सद्व्यावृत्तेरसत्त्वरूपतया सत्त्वविरुद्धासद्व्यावृत्तिर्न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः ।

३. बाध्यत्वेनाभिमतो घटतिरूपः प्रपञ्चः सामान्यतः केनचित्प्रमाणेन सिद्धो न वा, सिद्धश्चेन्न तस्य बाधसम्भवः । असिद्धश्चेत्प्रतियोग्यप्रसिद्धया न तस्याभावात्मको बाधस्तुवच इति सिद्धयसिद्धिभ्यां व्याघातमाह—सामान्यत इत्यादिना ।

४. प्रतिज्ञाविरोध इति—विश्वं मिथ्या दृश्यात्वादित्यनुमाने विश्वपदार्थस्य केनचित्प्रमाणेन सिद्धौ मिथ्यात्वासम्भवेन विरोधः । असिद्धौ निरालम्बनसाध्यधर्मोक्तिरिति विरोध इत्यर्थः ।

५. धर्म्याद्युपजीविन इति—पक्षहेतूपजीविन इत्यर्थः । तथा च मिथ्यात्वस्य साध्यत्वे तदुपजीव्ययोः पक्षहेत्वोः विनाशोऽवश्यम्भावीति भावः ।

ननु च यद्यथा प्रतीयते तत्सर्वमविद्यावशात्तथा भ्रान्त्या अवसोयत इति शङ्कायां किमुत्तरम् ? । यच्चोत्तरं दीयते, तदप्यविद्यान्तर्गतमित्येवं शङ्क्यते । अनाविद्यत्वे सत्युत्तरं सिद्धयेत् । उत्तरेण (न) कस्यचिदप्यनाविद्यत्वमिति चेत् ; किमयमहो महानुभावः यदशङ्कां सुमहतीमकस्मादेवोत्पादयति । यस्य तु शङ्का कारणेनोत्पद्यते तस्य तदुच्छेदौपयिकतया पूर्वोक्तहेतुराशिरनुसन्धेय इति कृतमतिविस्तरेण । अतस्सिद्धमनिर्वचनीयस्यातिपक्षोऽत्यन्तं तुच्छ इति सर्वं विज्ञानजातं यथार्थमेवेति सुन्दरम् ॥

इति श्रीभगवद्रामानुजमुनिवरमतधुरन्धरस्यात्रिगोत्रप्रदीपश्रीपद्मनाभार्यनन्दनस्य

वादिहंसनवाम्बुदस्य श्रीमद्रामानुजाचार्यस्य कृतौ

न्यायकुलिशे ख्यातिनिरूपण-

वादस्तृतीयः.

॥ श्रीगुरुभ्यो नमः ॥

## ॥ लक्षणाविमर्शः ॥

[ प्रथमो भागः ]

। वे. सुब्रह्मण्यशास्त्री ।

। अण्णामलैविश्वविद्यालयः ।

साक्षी मुकुन्दकेळीनां यमुनायामयं व्रजः, गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यादयः प्रयोगा-  
लाक्षणिका इत्यविवादम् । विवदन्ते च लक्षणायां तान्त्रिकाः । तदत्र स्वमतिशुद्धये  
तान्त्रिकाणां पक्षभेदा निरूप्यन्ते ।

(१) नव्यवैयाकरणाः, आरोपितशक्यतावच्छेदकरूपेण शक्त्यैव तत्पदवाच्य-  
त्वेन प्रसिद्धान्यव्यक्तिबोधे व्यक्तिविशेषबोधे वा लक्षणेति व्यवहारः । छत्रिणो यान्ती-  
त्यादौ अच्छत्रिषु साहचर्याच्छत्रित्वारोपः । काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यतामित्यत्र दध्युपघातक-  
मात्रे काकत्वारोपः । कमलानि कमलानीत्यादौ कमलत्वेनैव व्यक्तिविशेषबोधः ।  
गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यत्र शक्यतावच्छेदकगङ्गात्वेन तीरबोधः । युज्यते चैतत् । कथम-  
न्यथा गङ्गायां मीनघोषौ स्त इत्यत्र द्वन्द्वस्य साधुता । तथाहि देवदत्ते अजधनत्वस्य  
यज्ञदत्ते अविधनत्वस्य चान्वयतात्पर्येण अजाविधनौ देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तौ इति प्रयोगो न  
प्रामाणिकः । एवं नीधात्वर्थक्रियासंयोगयोः क्रमेण अजाम्रामयोरन्वयतात्पर्येण अजाम्रामौ  
नयति इति प्रयोगोऽपि न प्रामाणिकः । अनयोश्च प्रयोगयोः प्रामाण्यवारणाय द्वन्द्वार्थस्य  
एकधर्मावच्छिन्नान्वय एव द्वन्द्वः साधुरिति नियमः स्वीकरणीयः । तथासति निरुक्त-  
स्थले एकधर्मावच्छिन्नान्वयविरहाद्वन्द्वस्यासाधुता । एवञ्च गङ्गायां मीनघोषौ स्त इत्यत्र  
मञ्जूषाकृतः नागेशभट्टाः



गङ्गाशब्दालक्षणा तीरत्वेन तीरबोधे मीनस्य गङ्गात्वावच्छिन्नेन घोषस्य तीरत्वावच्छिन्नेन च अन्वयात् द्वन्द्वार्थस्य एकधर्मावच्छिन्नेनान्वयाभावात् द्वन्द्वस्यासाधुता स्यात् । गङ्गात्वेनैव तीरस्यापि बोधे तु उभयोरपि गङ्गात्वरूपैकधर्मावच्छिन्नान्वयात्समासासाधुता निर्वहति । न च लक्ष्यस्यापि शक्यतावच्छेदकरूपेणैव बोधस्वीकारे ' शक्यादन्येन रूपेण ज्ञाते भवति लक्षणा ' इत्यभियुक्तोक्तिविरोध इति वाच्यम् । तादृशोक्तेः प्रामादिकत्वात् । प्रामाणिकत्वाभिनिवेशे शक्यादन्येन रूपेण ज्ञाते शक्यतावच्छेदकभिन्नरूपवत्त्वेन गृहीते तीरत्वविशिष्टे तीरादौ लक्षणा शक्यतावच्छेदकारोपः इति तदर्थत् । महाभाष्यकारोऽपीदृशं बोधमनुमन्यते । पुंयोगादाख्यायामिति सूत्रे भाष्ये “चतुर्भिः प्रकारैः अतस्मिन्स इत्येतद्भवति तात्स्थ्यात् तादृम्यात् तत्सामीप्यात् तत्साहचर्यात् मञ्चा हसन्ति सिंहो माणवकः गङ्गायां घोषः यष्टीः प्रवेशय इत्युक्तेः । कैयटोप्याह स्पष्टमेवारोपम् आरोप्यते तादृष्यम् न तु मुख्यम् बालेषु मञ्चत्वारोपान्मञ्चपदप्रवृत्तिः हसन्तीति पदान्तरप्रयोगाद्विज्ञायते इति ।

न्यायसूत्रकारोऽपि सहचरणस्थानतादर्थ्यवृत्तमानधारणसामीप्ययोगसाधनाधिपत्येभ्यो ब्राह्मणबालकटराजसक्तुचन्दनगङ्गाशकटान्नपुरुषेवतद्भावेऽपि तदुपचारः इति सूत्रयामास । तस्य भावः तद्धर्मः तदभावेऽपि तदुपचारः तच्छब्दव्यवहार इत्यर्थः । स च तद्धर्मरोपेण । आरोपनिमित्तानि च सहचरणादीनि । यष्टीः प्रवेशयेत्यादीनि उदाहरणानि । यष्टित्वारोपो ब्राह्मणे साहचर्यात् । मञ्चत्वारोपो बालेषु तात्स्थ्यात् । गङ्गायां तीरधर्माधारत्वारोपः तत्सामीप्यादित्यादि तद्व्याख्यातारो वदन्ति । एवञ्च शक्यार्थप्रवाहेणात्यन्तसामीप्ये गङ्गायां तीरधर्मं घोषाधारत्वमारोप्य गङ्गायां घोषः इति प्रयोगः । व्यवहितसामीप्ये तु तीरे गङ्गात्वमारोप्य गङ्गायां घोषः इति प्रयोगः । गौतमसम्मतोऽप्यारोपः पतञ्जलिसम्मतः । स्वरितेनाधिकारः इति सूत्रे भाष्ये तथाविधस्याप्यारोपस्य कथनात् । न्यायवार्तिककारोऽपि “यष्टिकायां तावदयं यष्टिकाशब्दो यष्टिकात्वजातिनिमित्तकः तत्र संयुक्तसमवेतां जातिं ब्राह्मणे समवायेनाध्यारोप्य ब्राह्मणं यष्टिकेत्याह ” इति सहचरणसूत्रव्याख्यानावसरे निरूपयन् शक्यतावच्छेदकरूपेण लक्ष्यार्थबोधमङ्गीकरोति ।

न च गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यादौ आरोपितगङ्गात्वेन तीरस्य बोधेऽपि तस्य ज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वात् शास्त्रज्ञानवतां सर्वथा भ्रमत्वेन ग्रहाच्च ततो बोधात् गङ्गागतशैत्यपावनत्वादिप्रतीतिरूपं फलं नसिद्ध्येदितिवाच्यम् । गङ्गायां घोषः इति वाक्यात्प्रथमं प्रवाहवृत्तिर्घोषः इति शाब्दबोधो जायते । ततः तत्र अनुपपत्तिप्रतिसन्धानम् ततः तादृशबोधे वक्तृतात्पर्याविषयत्वज्ञानम् ततश्च गङ्गात्वेन लक्ष्यतीरशाब्दबोधः । ततो व्यञ्जनया तीरे मुख्यगङ्गामेदप्रतीतिः । तथा चोक्तप्रयोजनं सिद्ध्यति । बाधग्रहश्च व्यञ्जनाजन्यबोधे अप्रामाण्यज्ञानं न जनयति । वस्तुतस्तु बाधग्रहः शाब्दे अनुपपत्तिमूलकारोपितार्थबोधे अप्रामाण्यज्ञानं न जनयति इति स्वीक्रियते । तथा च मध्ये गङ्गामेदप्रतीतेरनङ्गीकारेऽपि न क्षतिः । एवं सति लक्ष्यार्थबोधे अप्रामाण्यज्ञानानुदयात् ततः पूर्वोक्तप्रयोजनं सिद्ध्यति ।

सा लक्षणा द्विविधा गौणी शुद्धा चेति । स्वसादृश्याधिकरणत्वसंबन्धेन शक्यसंबन्ध्यर्थप्रतिपादिका गौणी । सादृश्यभिन्नसंबन्धेन शक्यसंबन्ध्यर्थप्रतिपादिका शुद्धा । गौर्वाहीक इति गौणीस्थलेऽपि बाहोक्तस्य शक्यतावच्छेदकगोत्वेनैव बोधः । न च तत्र जाड्यादिगुणानां लक्ष्यतानवच्छेदकत्वे ‘लक्ष्यमाणगुणैर्योगाद्वृत्तेरिष्टा तु गौणता’ इत्यभियुक्तोक्तिविरोध इति वाच्यम् । लक्ष्यमाणेत्यस्य बाहीके गोशब्दप्रयोगहेतुज्ञानविषयोऽर्थः । गुणैरित्यत्र तृतीयार्थः अभेदः योगशब्दार्थसम्बन्धान्वया । बाहीके गोवृत्तियद्गुणज्ञानात् गोशब्दप्रयोगः तादृशगुणरूपात्संबन्धात् वृत्तेः गौणता इत्येवंपरत्वात्तदुक्तेः । गौणीस्थलेऽप्येव परंपरासंबन्धस्य लक्षणानियामकत्वं न शुद्धायाम् । शैत्यपावनत्वादौ गङ्गापदशक्यप्रवाहनिरूपितपरंपरासंबन्धस्य सत्त्वेऽपि “प्रयोजनं न लक्ष्यसंबन्धाभावात्” इति काव्यप्रकाशोक्तेः । अत एव द्विरेफपदात् स्ववाच्यरेफद्वयवद्भ्रमरपदवाच्यत्वरूपपरंपरासंबन्धेन लक्षणया भ्रमरबोध इत्यसंगतम् । गौण्यतिरिक्तस्थले परंपरासंबन्धस्य लक्षणानियामकत्वाभावात् । अपि तु द्विरेफपदस्य भ्रमरे रूढिशक्तिरेव । त्वचा ज्ञातमित्यत्र त्वक्पदस्य चर्मणि शक्तस्य त्वगिन्द्रये निरूढलक्षणा । निरूढलक्षणाव्यतिरिक्ता सर्वापि लक्षणा प्रयोजनवती । अत एव रूढिप्रयोजनान्यतरस्य लक्षणानियामकत्वमुक्तं तत्र तत्र ।

इयं लक्षणा प्रकारान्तरेण द्विविधा जहत्स्वार्था अजहत्स्वार्था चेति । न च सर्वत्र लक्ष्यार्थबोधे स्वार्थस्य शक्यतावच्छेदकस्य प्रकारतया भानात् लक्षणाया जहत्स्वार्थत्वादिविभागो न संभवतीति वाच्यम् । यत्र शक्यार्थस्य धर्मिणः केनापि रूपेण लक्ष्यार्थान्वयिना अनन्वयः तत्र जहत्स्वार्थलक्षणा गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यादौ । शक्यार्थस्य येन केनापि रूपेण लक्ष्यार्थान्वयिना अन्वये अजहत्स्वार्था काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यतां, छत्रिणो यान्तीत्यादौ इति वदन्ति ॥

अथैतन्मते लक्षणावृत्तेः स्वरूपं विचार्यते । बोधे लक्षणाव्यवहार इत्युक्तेः न बोधस्य लक्षणात्वम् । शाब्दबोधौपयिकवृत्तेरेव लक्षणात्वात् । तस्मात् बोधे सति लक्षणाव्यवहार इति तदुक्तिर्व्याख्येया । शक्यतावच्छेदकारोपो लक्षणेति वैयाकरणाः इति ग्रन्थान्तरदर्शनात्, इहापि अन्नं प्राणाः, चन्दनं तुला इत्यादौ आहार्यारोपस्यैव लक्षणात्वादित्युक्तेः, शक्यादन्येन रूपेण ज्ञाते भवति लक्षणा इति श्लोकघटकलक्षणापदस्य शक्यतावच्छेदकारोपार्थकतया व्याख्यानात्, आरोप्य प्रयोग इत्युक्तेश्च शाब्दबोधसमानाकारः शब्दप्रयोगहेतुः वक्तृनिष्ठः तीरे गङ्गात्वारोपः गङ्गापदस्य तीरे लक्षणेति प्रतिभाति । (१) परन्तु शक्यतावच्छेदकारोपाख्यविलक्षणवृत्तिस्वीकारे सर्वेषां शब्दानां सर्वार्थवाचकत्वस्वीकारो व्याहन्येता न चैतत्पक्षे सर्वेषां सर्वार्थवाचकत्वं नास्तीति शङ्क्यम् । परेतित्यादिना लक्षणास्वरूपनिरूपणोपक्रमे शक्त्यैव बोधे लक्षणाव्यवहारः इत्युक्तेः, उपसंहारे हरिरप्याह

“ एकमाहुरनेकार्थं शब्दमन्ये परीक्षकाः ।

निमित्तभेदादेकस्य सार्वार्थ्यं तस्य भिद्यते ॥

सर्वशक्तेस्तु तस्यैव शब्दस्यानेकधर्मणः ।

प्रसिद्धिभेदाद्गौणत्वं मुख्यत्वञ्चोपचर्यते ॥ ” इति

इत्यभिधानाच्च सर्वेषां सर्वार्थवाचकत्वस्याङ्गीकृतत्वात् । एवञ्च लक्षणाख्यवृत्त्यन्तरस्वीकारो व्यर्थः ।

(२) किञ्च “अन्वयानुपपत्तिज्ञानपूर्वकं शक्यत्वेन गृहीतार्थसंबन्धज्ञानेन उद्बुद्ध-  
शक्तिसंस्कारतो बोधे लक्षणेति व्यवहारः” इति मञ्जूषाग्रन्थं बोधे इति प्रतीकमुपा-  
दाय ‘तस्मिन्सति तज्जनकतादृशसंस्कारे तच्छक्तौ वा लक्षणेति व्यवहार इत्यर्थः,  
इति व्याचल्युः वैद्यनाथमट्टाः । अतो ज्ञायते अप्रसिद्धार्थे शक्तिरेव लक्षणेति । न च  
निरुक्तग्रन्थः परेतुकल्पात्प्राक्तनः न तत्कल्पतात्पर्यनिर्णायक इति वाच्यम् । पूर्वकल्पान्  
परेतुकल्पे लक्ष्यार्थे शक्यतावच्छेदकारोपस्यैव विशेषत्वात् । अत्रापि कल्पे तीरे शक्तेः  
कण्ठरवेणैवाभिधानात् ।

“(३) परेतुकल्पेऽपि शक्त्यैवेति ग्रन्थव्याख्याने “एवेन तस्या अतिरिक्तत्वनिरास  
इति भावः” इति टीकोक्तेश्च स्पष्टं ज्ञायते शक्त्यतिरिक्ता न लक्षणेति ।

(४) अपि च इयं लक्षणेत्यनभिधाय अप्रसिद्धार्थबोधे व्यक्तिविशेषबोधे वा लक्षणेति  
व्यवहारः इत्यभिधानेनैव अतिरिक्ता लक्षणा नास्तीति गम्यते ।

(५) वैयाकरणमते सर्वेषां शब्दानां सर्वार्थवाचकत्वात् तान्त्रिकाणां लक्षणा-  
व्यवहारः कथमुपपद्यते इति शङ्कानिरासाय लक्षणाग्रन्थावतारश्चैतमर्थमुपोद्ब्रूयति ।

(६) किञ्च व्यक्तिविशेषबोधे वा लक्षणेति व्यवहार इति निरूपयता ग्रन्थकृता  
कमलानि कमलानि इत्यत्र कमलपदस्य सौरभविशिष्टकमलव्यक्तिविशेषे लक्षणा स्वीकृता ।  
नच तत्र शक्यतावच्छेदकस्य कमलत्वस्य कमलव्यक्तिविशेषे आरोपः संभवति समवायेन  
तस्य तत्र सत्त्वात् । न च तत्रापि कमलत्वे व्यक्तिविशेषमात्रवृत्तित्वमारोप्यैव कमलानि  
कमलानि इति प्रयोग इति वाच्यम् । निरुक्तारोपः कमलत्वे व्यक्तिविशेषभिन्नकमला-  
वृत्तित्वस्यारोपे पर्यवसितः । शक्यतावच्छेदकविशेष्यकस्यापि तस्य न शक्यतावच्छेद-  
कारोपत्वम् । शक्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकारोपस्यैव शक्यतावच्छेदकारोपशब्देन व्यवहारात् ।  
एवञ्च निरुक्तस्थले शक्यतावच्छेदकारोपासंभवात् लक्षणाव्यवहारो न स्यात् । तस्मात्  
शक्तिविशेष एव लक्षणाव्यवहारविषयः ।

एवञ्च लक्षणास्थले शाब्दबोधः शक्यतावच्छेदकरूपेण लक्ष्यार्थविषयकः ।  
प्रयोक्तुरपि तत्समानविषयकः प्रयोगहेतुभूतः शक्यतावच्छेदकारोपः इत्याशयेन शक्यता-

वच्छेदकारोपो लक्षणेति ग्रन्थान्तरव्यवहार उपपद्यते । एवं तात्पर्येण लक्षणानिरूपक-  
वाक्यात् पूर्वोक्तार्थावगतौ सत्यां, शक्यादन्येन रूपेण ज्ञाते भवति लक्षणा इति श्लोकघट-  
कलक्षणापदस्य शक्यतावच्छेदकारोपार्थकतया व्याख्यानात् आरोपस्य लक्षणावृत्तित्वकथनं न  
युज्यते । तत्र लक्षणापदाल्लक्षणया तादृशारोपस्य लाभसंभवात् । न च लक्षणास्थले  
सर्वत्र शाब्दबोधः न शक्यतावच्छेदकारोपात्मकः कमलानि कमलानीत्यत्र तदसंभवादिति  
वाच्यम् । तत्रारोपस्यानावश्यकत्वात् । न च तथा सति आरोपितशक्यतावच्छेदक-  
रूपेण बोधे लक्षणाव्यवहारः इति ग्रन्थासंगतिरिति वाच्यम् । आरोपितशक्यतावच्छेद-  
करूपेण शक्त्यैव तत्पदवाच्यत्वेन प्रसिद्धान्यव्यक्तिबोधे, शक्त्यैव व्यक्तिविशेषबोधे वा  
लक्षणाव्यवहारः इति योजना । न तु व्यक्तिविशेषेत्यत्रापि आरोपितेत्यादितृतीयान्त-  
स्यान्वयः । तथाच शक्यत्वेन प्रसिद्धान्यव्यक्तिबोधौपयिका शक्तिः व्यक्तिविशेषबोधौपयि-  
का च शक्तिः लक्षणापदेन व्यवहियत इति भावः । नच गङ्गापदस्यापि तीरवाचकत्वे  
तीरत्वस्यापि गङ्गात्ववदेव शक्यतावच्छेदकत्वात् गङ्गात्वमात्रस्य शक्यतावच्छेदकत्वकथनं  
न संगच्छते इति वाच्यम् । आरोपितशक्यतावच्छेदकरूपेणेत्यस्य आरोपितं यत्  
शक्यतावच्छेदकत्वेन प्रसिद्धं रूपं तेनेति व्याख्याने दोषाभावात् । तथा च अप्रसिद्धार्थ-  
बोधौपयिकशक्तेरेव लक्षणापदेन व्यवहृतायाः शक्यतावच्छेदकारोपमूलशक्यसंबन्धभेदात्  
गौणीत्वादिना विभागः कृत इति बोध्यम् ।

अत्रेदं विचार्यते गङ्गायां घोषः इति वाक्यात् किं आरोपितगङ्गात्वेन तीरशाब्द-  
बोधः, उत गङ्गात्वेनेति । आरोपितशक्यतावच्छेदकरूपेण शक्यत्वेन प्रसिद्धान्यव्यक्ति-  
बोधे इति, न चैवमारोपितगङ्गात्वेन बोधे इति च ग्रन्थपर्यालोचने आरोपितगङ्गात्वेन तीरबोध  
इति भाति । परन्तु शक्त्या बोधविशेषे लक्षणाव्यवहार इत्युपक्रान्तम् । आरोपित-  
त्वविशिष्टं च गङ्गात्वं न गङ्गापदशक्यतावच्छेदकमिति तेन रूपेण शक्त्या बोधो न  
संभवति । आरोपितत्वबोधकञ्च पदं नास्ति येन गङ्गात्वे आरोपितत्वस्य बोधो भवेत् ।  
न च आरोपितत्वबोधकपदाभावेन आरोपितत्वस्य प्रकारतया भानासंभवेऽपि तीरे गङ्गा-  
त्वसंसर्गतया तस्य भानं संभवतीति वाच्यम् । समवायातिरिक्तसंबन्धेन जातेः स्वरूपतः

प्रकारतया भानासंभवात् । नच प्रकारितांशे निरूपितत्वसंबन्धेन स्वरूपतो गोत्वावगाहिनः अनुव्यवसायस्यानुरोधात् समवायातिरिक्तनिरूपितत्वसंबन्धेनापि स्वरूपतो भानवत् लाक्षणिकस्थलीयानुभवानुरोधात् आरोपसंबन्धेनापि गङ्गात्वस्य (जातेः) स्वरूपतो भानं संभवतीति वाच्यम् । समवायसंसर्गकगङ्गात्वप्रकारकशाब्दबोधस्यैव गङ्गापदशक्तिज्ञानप्रयोज्यत्वेन आरोपसंसर्गकगङ्गात्वप्रकारकबोधस्य शक्तिप्रयोज्यत्वाभावेन शक्त्यैव बोधे लक्षणव्यवहारः इति ग्रन्थासंगतेः । तादृशबोधस्य भ्रमत्वानापत्तिश्च तीरे समवायेन गङ्गात्वस्यासत्त्वेऽपि आरोपसंबन्धेन सत्त्वात् । न चेष्टापत्तिः, लक्ष्यार्थबोधे भ्रमत्वज्ञानानुदयप्रयोजककथनस्यासंगतत्वापत्तेः । तस्मात् समवायसंबन्धेनैव गङ्गात्वं तीरे भासते । एवञ्च तस्य बोधस्य शक्तिप्रयोज्यत्वं भ्रमत्वञ्चोपपद्यते । स्वमतोपष्टम्भकतयोपन्यस्तः “ समवायेन यष्टिकात्वमारोप्य ब्राह्मणं यष्टिकेत्याह ” इति न्यायवार्तिकग्रन्थोऽप्येतमर्थमुपोद्बल्यति । एवञ्च गङ्गात्वे आरोपविषयत्वसत्त्वात् वास्तवारोपितत्वाभिप्रायकः आरोपितगङ्गात्वेनेति ग्रन्थः । अत एव अग्रे कमलत्वेन व्यक्तिविशेषबोधः, कचतस्त्रस्यति वदनमित्यत्र कचत्वेन राहुत्वविशिष्टबोधः भावप्रधाननिर्देशस्थले घटत्वप्रकारकघटत्वबोधो लक्षणया इत्यादिग्रन्थः संगच्छते ।

न च तीरत्वेनोपस्थिते शक्यसंबन्धज्ञानमावश्यकं तत्रापि । एवञ्च नियतोपस्थितस्य तीरत्वस्याभाने किं नियामकमिति वाच्यम् । लक्षणास्वभावस्यैव नियामकत्वात् । न च विशेषदर्शिनः पुंसः गङ्गायां घोषः इति वाक्यात् गङ्गात्वेन तीरावगाहो आहार्यशाब्दबोधो वाच्यः । स च न संभवति आहार्यपरोक्षाप्रसिद्धेरिति वाच्यम् । आहार्यपरोक्षज्ञानं नास्तीत्यस्य नैयायिकवासनाविजृम्भितत्वात् । अनुभवानुरोधेन आहार्यशाब्दबोधस्याङ्गीकारात् ।

ननु गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यत्र गङ्गापदार्थे प्रवाहे तीरधर्मस्य घोषाधारत्वस्यारोपः स्वीकृतः । तत्र पक्षे किंपदशक्यतावच्छेदकस्य कुत्रारोपः । न तावत्तत्र गङ्गापदशक्यतावच्छेदकस्य गङ्गात्वस्यारोपः गङ्गात्वेन प्रवाहस्यैव तत्र भानात् । न च घोषान्विसप्तम्यर्थाधारत्वस्य प्रवाहे आरोप इति वाच्यम् । घोषान्विताधारत्वस्य किंचित्पद-

शक्यतानवच्छेदकत्वात् । न च गङ्गानिष्ठाधारतायां घोषाधारतात्वस्य सप्तमीशक्यता-  
वच्छेदकस्यारोप इति वाच्यम् । घोषाधारतात्वेन आधारतायाः सप्तम्यवाच्यत्वेन  
तादृशाधारतात्वस्य सप्तमीशक्यतानवच्छेदकत्वात् शक्यतावच्छेदकारोपासंभवात् इति चेन्न ।  
यत्र यत्र लक्षणाव्यवहारः प्रामाणिकः तत्र सर्वत्र यथाकथञ्चिदारोपो वर्तते इत्यत्रैव ग्रन्थ-  
कारतात्पर्योपगमात् ।

न च आयुर्वृतमिति वेदवाक्यात् आयुष्टेन घृतविषयकः शब्दबोधो वक्तव्यः ।  
तथा च वेदकर्तुरीश्वरस्य तादृशबोधसमानाकारारोपः आवश्यक इतीश्वरस्य भ्रमवत्त्वापत्ति-  
रिति वाच्यम् । तन्मते वेदस्यापौरुषेयत्वेन ईश्वरकर्तृकत्वाभावात् । न च तथापि  
आयुर्वृतमिति वेदवाक्यस्य भ्रमजनकत्वेनाप्रामाण्यं स्यादिति वाच्यम् । प्रजापति-  
रात्मनो वपामुदखिदत् इत्याद्यर्थवादानामिव अस्यापि स्वार्थे अप्रामाण्यस्येष्टत्वात् ।

ननु वृक्षः महीरुहः इत्यतः वृक्षत्वावच्छिन्ने महीरुहत्वावच्छिन्नाभेदान्वयो न  
संभवति । उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकविधेयतावच्छेदकयोरैक्ये अभेदसंसर्गकान्वयबोधस्याव्युत्पन्न-  
त्वात् । अतः वृक्षः महीरुहपदप्रतिपाद्यः इति बोधो वक्तव्यः । यदि लक्षणया  
शक्यतावच्छेदकरूपेण लक्ष्यभानं तदा वृक्षत्वादिनैव तत्पदप्रतिपाद्यस्य बोधात् उद्दे-  
श्यतावच्छेदकविधेयतावच्छेदकयोरैक्यापरिहारेण निरुक्तव्याख्यानवाक्यस्य घटो घट इति  
निराकांक्षवाक्यतुल्यता स्यादिति चेन्न । सर्वस्मिन्नपि ज्ञाने तत्तद्वाचकशब्दो भासते ।  
तदुक्तं हरिणा “ न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यश्शब्दानुगमादृते । अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं  
शब्देन भासते ” ॥ इति । एवञ्च वृक्षविशेषणतया वृक्षशब्दस्य महीरुहविशेषणतया मही-  
रुहशब्दस्य च भानेन वृक्षमहीरुहशब्दयोः उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकविधेयतावच्छेदकयोर्भेदेन न  
तद्वाक्यस्य निराकांक्षता । न च घटो घट इत्यपि प्रमा स्यात् उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकघट-  
शब्दव्यक्तिभेदस्य विधेयतावच्छेदकघटशब्दव्यक्तौ सत्त्वादिति वाच्यम् । शब्द-  
व्यक्तयोर्भिन्नत्वेऽपि समानानुपूर्वीकत्वात् । असमानानुपूर्वीकशब्दोपरागेण एकार्थबोधस्य  
सम्मतत्वात् । न चायमपसिद्धान्तः । घटः कुम्भः इति सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रतीतेः वैया-  
करणसंमतत्वात् । प्रथममिथ्यात्वनिरूपणावसरे हि “ मूले घटः कुम्भ इत्यत्र घटो घट

इति वक्तव्ये कुम्भपदं, सर्वं शब्दानुविद्धं भासते इत्युपगम्य घटकुम्भादिपर्यायपदानामपि स्वात्मकविभिन्नप्रकारकबोधजनकत्वमिति शाब्दिकमतानादरसूचनाय ” इति विदुलमिश्रा निरूपयन्ति । तेन स्पष्टं ज्ञायते घटः कुम्भः इति सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रतीतिः वैयाकरण-संमतेति ।

अथ कमलानि कमलानि इति वाक्याच्छाब्दबोधो न स्यात् । लाक्षणिक-कमलपदेनापि कमलत्वेनैव व्यक्तिविशेषबोधोपगमे कमलत्वस्यैवोद्देश्यतावच्छेदकत्वाद्विधेयता-वच्छेदकत्वाच्च उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकविधेयतावच्छेदकयोर्भेदाभावात् । वृक्षो महीरुह इत्यत्रेव तत्तद्वाचकपदरूपावच्छेदकभेदोऽप्यत्र न संभवति । समानानुपूर्विककमलपदस्यैव उद्देश्यकोटौ विधेयकोटौ च भानादिति चेन्न । पदार्थः पदार्थेनान्वेति न तदेकदेशेन इति व्युत्पत्तिः चैत्रस्य गुरुरित्यादिस्थले गुरुत्वरूपैकदेशान्वयबोधस्यानुभवसिद्धत्वात् यथा ससंबन्धकार्यकस्थले संकोच्यते । तथा तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नाभेदसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतावच्छेदकतासंबन्धेन शाब्दबुद्धिं प्रति तद्धर्मभेदः कारणमिति कार्य-कारणभावः कमलानि कमलानोत्यादौ कमलत्वावच्छिन्ने कमलत्वेन व्यक्तिविशेषाभेदान्वयबोधस्यानुभवसिद्धत्वात्संकोच्यः । तथा च निरुक्तकार्यतावच्छेदककोटौ लाक्षणिक-व्यक्तिविशेषबोधभिन्नत्वं देयमिति ग्रन्थकृतात्पर्यात् ।

अथ उपकृतं बहु नामेत्यत्र उपकारशब्दः अपकारे लाक्षणिकः । तत्र शक्यार्थेनोप-कारेण लक्ष्यस्यापकारस्य न साक्षात्संबन्धः । अपि तु स्वनिरूपितविरोधाधिकरणत्वं परम्परासंबन्धः । तदुक्तम् वृत्तिवार्तिके “ न हि साक्षात्संबन्धे सत्येव लक्षणेति नियमः । व्यतिरेकलक्षणास्थले तन्निरूपितविरोधाधिकरणत्वादिपरम्परासंबन्धमात्रेण तादृशेन लक्षणा-कल्लेस्त्वैव ” इति । एवं इन्द्रार्थायां स्थूणायां इन्द्रशब्दो लाक्षणिकः । तत्र स्थूणायां इन्द्रशब्दशक्यार्थसंबन्धः तादर्थ्यम् । तच्च तत्कर्मकपूजाप्रयोजनकत्वम् । तदपि परम्परा-संबन्ध एव । तथा च गौण्यतिरिक्तस्थले परम्परासंबन्धस्य लक्षणानियामकत्वाभावकथनं न संगच्छते इति चेन्न । विरुद्धत्वं तादर्थ्यञ्च अखण्डः संबन्धः न परम्परासंबन्ध इत्या-शयात् । न चैवं सादृश्याधिकरणत्वमपि अखण्डसंबन्ध इति गौणीस्थले परम्परासंबन्धस्य



लक्षणानियामकत्वस्वीकारो व्यर्थ इति वाच्यम् । सादृश्याधिकरणत्वस्य अखण्डत्वेन ग्रन्थकारानुभवविरहात् अखण्डत्वसखण्डत्वादीनां तत्तद्ग्रन्थकारानुभवानुरोधित्वात् ।

ननु निरूढलक्षणाभिन्नलक्षणास्थले सर्वत्र प्रयोजनं न संभवति । अयमर्थ इति मूलं अयमाशय इति विवृण्वन्ति व्याख्यातारः । तत्र अर्थशब्दः आशये लाक्षणिकः । न हि तत्र किमपि प्रयोजनमस्ति । एवं भावप्रधाननिर्देशस्थलेऽपि । तदर्थवाचकपदस्यान्यत्र प्रयोगः तद्धर्मप्रतिपत्त्यर्थः इत्युत्सर्गः इत्युक्तत्वाच्च सर्वत्र लक्षणायां प्रयोजनं नास्तीति गम्यते । यदि आयुरेवेदमित्यत्र यथा घृते आयुषः अत्यन्ताभेदप्रतीतिः प्रयोजनम् । तथा निरुक्तस्थलेऽपि तत्तत्पदशक्यार्थात्यन्ताभेदप्रतीतिः प्रयोजनं संभवतीत्युच्यते । तदा त्वचा ज्ञातमित्यादिनिरूढलक्षणास्थलेऽपि त्वगिन्द्रिये त्वक्शब्दशक्यार्थचर्मणा अत्यन्ताभेदप्रतीतिः प्रयोजनत्वसंभवात् तत्र प्रयोजनाभावकथनमसंगतमिति चेत् । सत्यं वर्तन्ते प्रयोजनाभावेऽपि लाक्षणिकाः प्रयोगाः । तेषु स्थलेषु काव्यदोष एव । आयुरेवेदमित्यादौ प्रयोजनान्तराभावेन शक्यार्थात्यन्ताभेदप्रतीतिरेव प्रयोजनत्वेन विवक्ष्यते । त्वगिन्द्रिये शक्यार्थचर्मात्यन्ताभेदप्रत्ययं प्रयोजनमनभिसन्धायैव त्वचा ज्ञातमित्यादीन् निरूढलक्षणिकान्शब्दान्प्रयुञ्जते । अतस्तत्र प्रयोजनं नास्तीत्युच्यते इति रसिकानुभवसिद्धः पन्थाः । तमनुससार ग्रन्थकारः इति ॥

(२) प्राचीनवैयाकरणाश्च स्पष्टमेव लक्षणा नास्तीति प्रतिपादयन्ति । तेषामयमाशयः । व्यवहारो मुख्यः शक्तिप्राहकः । स च लक्ष्यत्वाभिमतोऽपि तुल्यः । न च प्रवाहे गङ्गाव्यवहारः स्वाभाविकः तीरेत्वौपाधिक इति व्यवहारस्य नोभयसाधारण्यमिति वाच्यम् । गङ्गायां घोषः प्रतिवसति तमानयेत्युक्तौ तीरान्वितघोषानयनरूपव्यवहारेण व्युत्पत्सोः तीरेऽपि गङ्गापदशक्तिज्ञानस्य संभवात् । तथा च शक्तिप्राहकस्य व्यवहारस्य मुख्यलाक्षणिकोभयसाधारणत्वात् लाक्षणिकत्वाभिमतोऽपि शक्तिरेव न लक्षणा । लक्षणाख्यवृत्त्यन्तरकल्पने गौरवात् । न च शक्यसन्बन्धो लक्षणा, गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यत्र च गङ्गापदशक्यप्रवाहसंबन्धः तीरे क्लृप्त एवेति वाच्यम् । यतः न लक्षणानास्तित्ववादिनः शक्यसंबन्धमेव निषेधन्ति । अपि तु तस्य पदपदार्थसंबन्धत्वं तज्जन्योपस्थितेः शाब्दबोधानुकूलत्वञ्चेति ।

ननु शक्यसंबन्धरूपा लक्षणा क्लृप्ता । तस्याश्च तीरादिरूपसंबन्धिस्मृतिजनकत्वमपि क्लृप्तमेव । परन्तु लक्षणावादिना शक्यसंबन्धप्रयोज्यतीरोपस्थितेः शाब्दबोधानुकूलत्वरूपो धर्मः कल्प्यते । शक्तिवादिना तु गङ्गापदस्य तीरे शक्तिः (धर्मी) कल्पनीया । एवञ्च धर्मिकल्पनातः धर्मकल्पनाया ज्यायस्त्वात् तदेवोचितम् । किञ्च शक्तिवादिनोऽपि गङ्गापदजन्या तीरस्मृतिः तीरशाब्दबोधानुकूलेति संमतम् । तादृशतीरस्मृतिजनकत्वञ्च क्लृप्तस्य शक्यसंबन्धस्यैव कल्पयितुमुचितम् न त्वक्लृप्तायाः शक्तेः । एव गङ्गापदस्य लक्षणीयतीरादिषु अनेकार्थेषु शक्तिकल्पने गौरवमिति चेन्न । ‘ इन्द्रियाणां स्वविषयेष्वनादिर्योग्यता यथा । अनादिरर्थैश्शब्दानां संबन्धो योग्यता तथा ’ ॥ इति ह्युक्तेः बोधकत्वमेव शक्तिः । गङ्गापदश्च तीरबोधकमिति तवापि संमतम् । एवञ्च गङ्गापदे तीरबोधकत्वरूपतीरशक्तेः क्लृप्ततया तत्र शाब्दबोधानुकूलतीरोपस्थितिजनकत्वकल्पनमप्युचितमेव । एवं लक्षणीयानां सर्वेषामर्थानां बोधकत्वस्य पदे क्लृप्तत्वात् न अनन्तलक्षणीयपदार्थेषु शक्तिकल्पनागौरवम् । न च अस्मात्पदादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इतीश्वरेच्छायाः शक्तित्वे गङ्गापदस्य लक्षणीयतीरादिषु शक्तिकल्पने गौरवमिति वाच्यम् । गङ्गापदात्तीरानुभवस्य जायमानत्वात् सन्मात्रविषयिण्यां भगवदिच्छायां तीरादौ गङ्गापदबोद्धव्यत्वावगाहिताया अपि क्लृप्तत्वात् । न च गाव्यादयोऽपभ्रंशा न वाचकाः । अतः तेषु शक्तिज्ञानं भ्रम इति निरूपणोपयम् । तच्च न संभवति गाव्यादिशब्दाद्बोधस्य जायमानत्वेन सर्वविषयिण्या ईश्वरेच्छायाः गौः गावीशब्दजन्यबोधविषयो भवत्वित्याकारिकायाः संभवेन गावीशब्दे शक्तेरेव सत्त्वात् । अतः संबन्धत्वगर्भा ईश्वरेच्छा शक्तिः । भगवदिच्छायाश्च नापभ्रंशसंबन्धत्वं कल्प्यते इति अपभ्रंशे निरुक्तशक्तिज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वमुपपादनीयम् । तथा च शक्तिवादिना ईश्वरेच्छायां तीराद्यनन्तलक्ष्यपदार्थसंबन्धत्वं कल्पनीयम् । एवं संबन्धत्वगर्भातादृशसंकेतप्रयोज्यायाः तीराद्युपस्थितेः शाब्दबोधानुकूलत्वमपि कल्पनीयमिति गौरवमिति वाच्यम् । अपभ्रंशानामपि वाचकत्वस्यैव वैयाकरणसिद्धान्तसिद्धतया तत्र शक्तिज्ञाने भ्रमत्वोपपादनस्यानावश्यकत्वेन नानापदार्थसंबन्धत्वादिकल्पनागौरवस्यानवकाशात् ।

एवं लक्षणास्वीकारे शाब्दबोधे शक्तिजन्योपस्थितेः लक्षणाजन्योपस्थितेश्च कारणत्वे परस्परं व्यभिचारवारणाय तत्तदुपस्थित्यव्यवहितोत्तरत्वस्य तत्तदुपस्थितिकार्यतावच्छेदके प्रवेशेन गौरवम् । एवं पदार्थोपस्थितिं प्रति शक्तिज्ञानस्य लक्षणाज्ञानस्य च प्रत्येकं

कारणत्वं कल्पनीयमिति गौरवम् । तस्माल्लक्षणाख्यं वृत्त्यन्तरमेव नास्ति । अत एव प्रायः सर्वे सर्वार्थाः इति वैयाकरणप्रवादः संगच्छते इति ॥

तत्रेदं बोध्यम् । वाचकः लक्षकः इति प्रामाणिको व्यवहारः सर्वतान्त्रिकाणाम् । गङ्गापदस्यापि तीरे शक्तिस्वीकारे गङ्गापदं तीरवाचकमिति व्यावहार आपद्येत । अतः यः शब्दः यस्मिन्नर्थे प्रसिद्धः स शब्दः तदर्थवाचकत्वेन व्यवहियते । यस्मिन्नर्थे न प्रसिद्धः तत्र गौणत्वेन व्यवहियते । तीरादौ च गङ्गापदस्य प्रचुरप्रयोगो नास्ति । अतः गङ्गापदं तीरवाचकमिति न व्यवहार इति वक्तव्यम् । एवञ्च निरुक्तव्यवहारनयने क्लेशः ।

अपि च बोधकत्वस्य शक्तित्वसंभवे गङ्गापदे तीरबोधकत्वसत्त्वेन तीरे शक्तिः सिद्ध्यति । पदे बोधजनकत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या कल्प्यमानः संबन्धः न बोधकत्वमित्यादिना बोधकत्वं न शक्तिरिति प्रतिपादितम् । एवञ्च लक्ष्यव्यावृत्तस्यैव शक्तिस्वरूपस्य धर्मि-ग्राहकमानसिद्धत्वात् लक्ष्योपस्थितये लक्षणा स्वीकरणीयैव । न च वाच्यवाचकभावाख्यस्य पदार्थान्तरस्य शक्तित्वं स्वीकुर्वतां मते तथा संभवेऽपि अस्मात्पदादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इतीश्वरसंकेतस्य शक्तित्वमते गङ्गापदस्य तीरे शक्तिः सिद्धैव गङ्गापदातीरबो-धोदयेन सन्मात्रविषयिण्याः भगवदिच्छायाः तीरे गङ्गापदबोद्धव्यत्वावगाहित्वादिति वाच्यम् । गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यादौ गङ्गापदसमभिव्याहृतघोषपदादेव तीरान्वितविषयकः शाब्दबोधो जायते इति पक्षे गङ्गापदजन्यस्य तीरबोधस्य अलीकत्वेन तद्विषयकत्वस्य भगवदिच्छायामकृतत्वात् ।

ननु कुमतिः पशुः इति सर्वलाक्षणिकस्थलेऽपि शाब्दबोधस्यानुभवसिद्धत्वालाक्षणि-कस्याप्यनुभावकत्वपक्ष एव साधुः । तत्पक्षे च गङ्गापदजन्यतीरबोधस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात् तीरे गङ्गापदजन्यबोधविषयत्वावगाहित्वं सिद्धमेवेति न शक्तिः कल्पनीयेति चेन्न । अस्मा-त्पदादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इतीच्छया ईश्वरेणोच्चरितत्वं शक्तिरिति मिश्रमते गङ्गापदातीरबोधो भवत्वितीच्छया ईश्वरोच्चरितत्वस्य गङ्गापदे, शाब्दबोधानुकूलत्वस्य च तत्प्रयोज्यतीरोपस्थितौ कल्पनामपेक्ष्य क्लृप्तशक्यसंबन्धप्रयोज्योपस्थितेः शाब्दबोधानुकूलत्वमात्रकल्पने लाघवात् ।

यदि च निरुक्तेच्छया ईश्वरोच्चरितत्वं न शक्तिः अस्मदायुच्चरितषटादिपदस्य, पित्रादिभिः संकेतितस्य देवदत्तादिनाम्नश्च ईश्वरोच्चरितत्वाभावेन अशक्तत्वापत्तेः । अतो निरुक्तसंकेत एव शक्तिः । सा च सिद्धैवेत्युच्यते । तदापि लक्षणा स्वीकरणीया । तथाहि एकैकस्य संस्कृतशब्दस्य अनेके अपभ्रंशाः सन्ति । गवादिवाचकत्वस्य अनेकेषु कल्पनायां गौरवमिति संस्कृतशब्द एव शक्तिः नापभ्रंशेषु । तदुक्तं जैमिनिना अन्याय्यश्चानेकशब्दत्वमिति । एवञ्चापभ्रंशा न वाचकाः । न चैवं सति घटपदस्यैव घट-वाचकत्वं न कलशादिपदानां अनेकत्र घटवाचकत्वकल्पनायां गौरवादिति पर्यायोच्छेद इति वाच्यम् । तत्र विनिगमनाविरहात् कलशादिपदेष्वपि शक्तिः सिद्धयति । अत्र तु संस्कृतस्य सर्वदेशेष्वेकत्वं अपभ्रंशानान्तु देशभेदेन नानात्वमित्यस्ति विनिगमकम् । अतः संस्कृतशब्द एव शक्तिः । अत एव शक्तिप्राहककोशादिषु अपभ्रंशाः पर्यायतया न परिगणिताः । अन्यथा साधूनामेव कोशादौ कथनमिति नियमकल्पनेन गौरवं स्यात् । न चापभ्रंशस्यावाचकत्वे कथं तस्माच्छाब्दबोध इति वाच्यम् । व्युत्पन्नस्य गाव्यादि-शब्दश्रवणे साधोर्गोशब्दस्य स्मरणं जायते । तेनैव तस्य शाब्दबोधः । असंस्कृतज्ञानां देशभाषामात्रविदाञ्च अपभ्रंशेषु शक्तत्वभ्रमाच्छाब्दबोधः । कथं तेषां अपभ्रंशेषु शक्त-त्वभ्रमो जात इति चेदित्थम् । केनचिद्गौरिति शब्दे प्रयोक्तव्ये प्रमादात् गावी-शब्दे प्रयुक्ते, व्युत्पन्नः तेन गावीशब्देन गोशब्दमुन्नीय ततो गां प्रतीत्य व्यवहृतवान् । पार्श्वस्थश्च व्युत्पित्तुः गावीशब्दादेवायं गां प्रतीतवानित्यवगम्य गावीशब्दमेव गोशक्तत्वेन प्रतीत्य अन्येषां व्युत्पादको बभूव । ततोऽन्येषां तेषु शक्तत्वभ्रमो जातः । एवञ्च अपभ्रंशे ईश्वरसंकेतस्य सत्त्वेऽपि तस्य अपभ्रंशसंबन्धत्वे मानाभाव इति संबन्धत्वघटित-शक्तेस्तत्र भ्रमो वाच्यः । तथा च लक्षणाया अनङ्गीकारे गङ्गापदसंकेतस्य तीरादि-नानापदार्थसंबन्धत्वं, तत्प्रयोज्यतीरायुपस्थितेः शाब्दबोधानुकूलत्वञ्च कल्पनीयम् । लक्षणा-स्वीकारे तु क्लृप्तसंबन्धभावशक्यसंबन्धप्रयोज्यतीरोपस्थितेः शाब्दबोधानुकूलत्वमात्रं कल्पनी-यमिति लाघवम् । तस्मात् गङ्गापदस्य तीरे लक्षणैवोचिता ।

# University Notes

## FOUNDER'S DAY

The Seventh Founder's Day was celebrated on the 30th September, 1936. Mr. T. R. Venkatarama Sastriar, B.A., B.L., C.I.E., delivered the address.

\* \* \* \* \*

## STAFF

We congratulate Mr. B. Ramamurthi, M.A., Lecturer in Mathematics in the University, on obtaining the Degree of Doctor of Science of the Madras University. The thesis which secured him the degree is entitled "Binary Geometry of the Rational Norm Curve." Dr. B. Ramamurthi has been contributing frequently to various learned mathematical Journals in India and Europe.

\* \* \* \* \*

## PUBLICATIONS

The University has published the following books this year :—

1. Tattvabindu with Tattvavibhavana (Annamalai University Samskrit Series No. 3) by Mr. V. A. Ramaswami Sastriar, M.A.
2. Acoustics by Mr. R. K. Viswanathan, B.A. (Hons.).

\* \* \* \* \*

## RESEARCH STUDENTSHIPS

The following research studentships were awarded during the year :

### *Junior.*

K. Subrahmanyam	..	History
C. Jagannathachari	..	Economics
K. Venkata Rao	..	Economics
V. Sitaraman	..	Mathematics
A. S. Narayanaswami	..	Physics
P. L. Narasimha Rao	..	Chemistry
P. R. Venkataraman	..	Chemistry
K. Vellaivaranan	..	Tamil
V. Mallaiya	..	Sanskrit
Tirugnanasambandam	..	Sanskrit

### *Senior.*

- V. Sivaraman, M.A., M.Litt.  
P. S. Varadachari, M.A., M.Sc.

### THE SANGITA VIDVANS' CONFERENCE PRIZE

This endowment was founded by the members of the Working Committee of the Music Conference held at Annamalainagar in February, 1936, and consists of Rs. 731-10-6 invested in fixed deposit with the Urban Bank, Chidambaram, yielding an interest of 5% per annum ; the interest to be utilised for the award of a prize annually to the student who obtains the highest percentage of marks at the Sangita Bhushana Title Final Examination at his first appearance.

### NEW BUILDINGS

The construction of the following buildings is in progress : —

The University Union,  
The Music College,  
New Hostel Buildings,  
Guest House and Staff Club.

The New Hospital Buildings were opened on the 30th September, 1936 by Dr. S. Padmanabha Sarma, District Medical Officer, South Arcot. The hospital is intended to serve the needs of not only the students and staff of the University but also the inhabitants of the neighbourhood. It is equipped with up-to-date arrangements. The total cost of buildings and equipment comes to Rs. 33,000.

On that occasion the portraits of the Pro-Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor were unveiled by Mr. S. Venkateswaran, I.C.S., Collector of South Arcot.

The prize of Rs. 750 to the author of the best Text-book in Tamil on Music suitable for use in the Sangita Bhushana Title Course was awarded to Mr. K. Ponniah Pillai, Pandit in Music of this University.

A prize of Rs. 1000 has been instituted for the best manuscript in Tamil on Physics for use as a text-book for the Intermediate Examination and manuscripts have been invited to be sent by the 31st July, 1938.

## Reviews

*Economic Conditions in Southern India (1000—1500 A.D.), 2 Vols.—*  
By Dr. A. Appadorai, M.A., Ph. D. (University of Madras. Price Rs. 10).

“Economic History” writes Mr. Edward Hughes “is the salt of history.” It is not a separate branch of history, it is one way of approach, perhaps the safest way of it. The Middle Ages in India had so far been considered as a dark period at least as regards this aspect. That this has been so is due not only to the comparatively scanty nature of the materials available for research, but also due to the nature of the life of the people of the times. It is well known that in ancient India custom and religion rather than economic forces determined the activities of the people. Hence to unravel those economic forces which played a part in their lives from the tangled web of other social factors is no easy task. Dr. Appadorai has undertaken this apparently impossible task and a pioneer attempt of this nature deserves our hearty welcome and encouragement.

He has tried to prove that even the “unchanging East” has changed through the centuries. The vicissitudes of economic life of the village, commerce, trade, industry and standard of life of the people in S. India through the five centuries from 1000—1500 are painted graphically.

Chapter I begins with an introductory section which in a nutshell explains the scope and nature of the whole treatise. The sources of the material used are then elaborately discussed and their relative claims to authenticity determined. The physical characteristics of S. India and the elements of population comprising it are the subject of the next section and the chapter concludes with a succinct account of the political history of S. India from the end of the tenth century up to the coming of the Portuguese which forms a useful background for a proper understanding of the economic history of the period.

Coming to the subject proper, the economic life of the village community claims the first attention of the author. Accounts of foreign travellers supplemented by evidences of the inscriptions are fully utilised in drawing a clear picture of the village settlement. The village was the economic unit except in Malabar. It was in the mediæval ages an aggregate of cultivated holdings, generally with some waste land attached to it, and the utilisation of the land of the village for the various needs of the villagers formed its economic characteristic. While the mediæval village was given the scope for expansion, in some cases a limit was also set to it. The important topic of land tenures forms the subject for treat-

ment in the next section. The time-honoured "war of words" on the topic whether private property in land existed in mediæval S. India is opened afresh by the author. He lays down a right criterion of private property, viz., the power to alienate. With this criterion as the basis, he examines the views of the law-givers and jurists, but the most reliable conclusions are drawn from an examination of a variety of inscriptions. We learn that kings of mediæval S. India attached extraordinary sanctity to private property. They deemed it unfair to touch even the land of the childless. (A short paragraph is devoted to the term *Kaniyatci* which might very well have been relegated to a Note or Appendix outside the chapter.) Having substantiated the existence of private property in land, the author proceeds to examine whether this private property in land was individual or corporate; in other words, whether they followed the ryotwari or joint village system. The author distinguishes three classes of joint villages marked by the degree of collective ownership over the land; in the first, land was collective property, the individual having a share only in the yield; in the second, individual property existed for a period after which there was re-distribution; and in the third, a part was held in common and a part in severalty. The author is inclined to suggest a natural evolution through these three stages before unrestricted individual rights in property appeared, although, he admits it is "difficult" to postulate it from the available evidences.

In our opinion the most noteworthy contribution of Dr. Appadorai, to the subject, is his conclusions regarding two points, both very much contrary to the prevalent ideas, about them. In the first place Baden-Powell's deductions regarding the existence of ryotwari along with joint tenure are astonishingly confirmed by the author's study of the inscriptions. Nay, we even get a clearer view of the tenures of the times. The *vellālan vagāi* or ryotwari was the common feature of tenure in the Tamil land and the joint tenures were only the exceptions occurring in certain *caturvedi mangalams* (which were the result of deliberate colonization) owned chiefly by a set of non-cultivating landlords. The second point to which we would draw the attention of the readers is the wide difference that existed in the constitution of these two types of tenurial villages. The generalization from a study of Uttaramallur inscriptions that local government in ancient India reached a high stage of development implying wide devolution of powers is disposed of by Dr. Appadorai as "wide assumptions." The author has ably shown that the elaborate development of the committee organization was prevalent only in certain types of villages like the *Taniyurs* or *Caturvedi-mangalams* which were sporadic and few in number. In the face of his own deductions, we are unable to find the gravamen of the author's criticism of Altekar. However, it is to



the credit of Dr. Appadorai to have given a clear perspective of the local administration of the Cōla times. The author then deals with a few types of other forms of tenure, discusses the problems of tenancy and concludes with the modes of payment, in *Vāram* and *Kuttagāi* (kind and cash) and the shares received by the landlord.

The agricultural practice of the period takes up a considerable part of the work. Under it, the crops grown in S. India in the Middle Ages are enumerated from the evidence of inscriptions and foreign travellers and Nelson's ingenious inference that dry crops were practically unknown in those times is easily refuted. The crops that were grown in S. India then do not seem very much to have differed from those existing now. There was a vast extent of land under the plough and a continual process of active land reclamation was also in progress. This was encouraged both by the State and private agencies like the temple, landlords and the village community and inducements were offered to this end by way of concessions in taxation, grant of a portion of reclaimed land, etc. But the important activity to which these agencies paid even greater attention was the construction and maintenance of irrigational works. Detailed information regarding the skill of the Hydraulic engineers, the financing of these public works, the agencies of distribution and the respective importance of the parts played by the State and local bodies in the discharge of their task are all gathered from the inscriptions. And the author agrees with Prof. Vincent Smith that the Muhammadan sovereigns in the Dekhan continued to maintain and extend the work started by their Hindu predecessors. As regards either the process of cultivation or the implements of ploughing, the author rightly remarks that there has been little change since the days when Kamban sang his *Erelupadu*. (Tamil scholars are divided regarding the authorship of the poem.) The accounts left by Varthema and Ibn Batūtā regarding the pepper cultivation are also incorporated. Regarding such points as the breeding of livestock, maintenance of pasture, etc., the author bases his conclusions mainly on the theorists. Information regarding the yield of land is scanty as also that regarding the efficiency of agricultural labour, hired and permanent, and the rates of remuneration. The author infers that the agricultural slaves of the Middle Ages were in a better economic condition than is commonly supposed.

From this, the author proceeds to consider the topic of land values. Mentioning the great part that land played in the mediæval economy, the author refutes the assumption of Baden-Powell that in the Dekhan land had no market value during the Hindu days with a reference to contemporary inscriptions and enumerates a few available transactions of land sales. Next he takes up the question of village servants which is so intimately connected with the village economy of the Middle Ages. The

inscriptions are availed of a great deal and from them we learn that the economic organization of S. India in the Middle Ages was not uniform even in the Tamil country, much less so in S. India. The method of payment by *mēra* is dealt with in detail, and the economic origin and incidence of such a system are examined. The place of the temple in the mediæval economy is the next subject for research. This is in view of the position of the temple as a huge employer and landlord, consumer, lender, etc., in almost all the villages in the Middle Ages. The services rendered by them were manifold. They often financed the needy agriculturists, encouraged agriculture and handicrafts, shone as centres of poor relief, and imparted instruction to poor students; and as if for these services rendered, the temple enjoyed certain privileges in the form of concessions in taxation, tolls, etc. An interesting parallel lies between the mediæval European church and the South Indian Hindu temple in the sphere of economic activities. The author concludes that "a study of the temple in its economic aspect warns us against exaggerating the isolation and self-sufficiency of the mediæval village." The temple by owning land in different localities created a closer economic relationship between village and village. The question of contact between villages takes the author to the study of the question of internal migration. Apart from political and social causes, migrations, particularly occurring in groups in those days, were due to such economic causes as famine, epidemics, pressure of taxation, pressure on land, etc. Evidences of urban migration are also cited. The result of such an internal movement was, according to the author, a shifting of population, extension of cultivation, wider distribution of handicrafts and breakage of the village isolation. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the economic characteristics of the village and sounds a note of warning against the commonly entertained notion of the economic self-sufficiency and isolation of the village, particularly by Western authors.

Chapter III deals with towns and internal trade. The factors which helped the growth of towns in S. India are enumerated, of which the most important were, "river, government, site, pleasure resort, commerce, fairs, etc." The conclusions of the author regarding the life in towns are mainly based on the accounts of Vijayanagar by Nuniz and Paes and a tendency to generalize for the whole of S. India is visible throughout the chapter. The author draws a clear-cut line between city life and village life and though this might be largely true of Vijayanagar, it is doubtful if it could be applied with equal force to the rest of the country and to the rest of the period under review.

The second volume begins with a survey of industries in the Middle Ages. From the comparatively meagre evidence available for this aspect

of the question, which mainly consists of the notices of travellers, we can gather only in outline an account of the main industries and the system of production prevalent. Among the handicrafts, the metal industries occupy the first place. The demand for the articles produced by these industries arose from temples, courts, armies and households. Weaving, according to the author, comes only second. The demand for textiles was both internal and external. Next comes tailoring. The author sets out to correct with the aid of inscriptions the irresponsible statements of foreigners that people went about naked and that tailors did not exist. But it must be remembered that this statement by foreigners was only relative as compared with the countries from which they came and that it could never mean that people went about nude. This is particularly clear when they attribute this condition to "climate." One Chinese account says : "The Moors in India are said to have dressed themselves according to their custom in *jibbi* and *balandran*. Others are said to have worn shirts, long shirts, and cloaks thrown over shoulders." Anyway that tailoring was an industry that did not play any prominent part in the economic structure of the country is beyond doubt. The other handicraft that is mentioned by the author is wood-work. Here again the author disproves the belief based on the statement of some of the foreigners that wheeled carriages were unknown south of the Vindhya in the Middle Ages. Still it is difficult to believe that convenient carriages of efficient construction were prevalent then in the face of such evidences as the Report of the Public Works Commission of 1852 who "found only carts with wheels either formed of solid pieces of timber or cut from a single block of stone." In the ship-building industry, S. India did not attain any measure of prominence worthy of notice. Leather industry also seems to have existed and there was of course pottery. Then the author deals with mining, fishing, etc. An account of the demand for precious stones, of the methods of procuring diamonds and of the way in which pearl fisheries were worked is given, based on the notices of foreigners. The mining of gold, iron, sulphur, copper and salt was also actively carried on. Other industries are chiefly agricultural industries like the tapping of toddy, preparation of jaggery, extraction of coir, mat-making, umbrella-constructing, etc. Then there were industries relating to food products like grinding of corn into flour, extraction of sugar from cane, and oil from seeds. Dyeing, according to the author, was also an agricultural industry. The author's inference that dyeing was the monopoly of a particular caste and that occasionally dyers migrated where there was demand for their services from a solitary instance at Parasurama Perunteru in Kottar has no special significance whatsoever, as the same can be said of most of the industries and artisans of the times.

Available evidences regarding the system of production are brought together. The system in the villages is described in the following terms : "The handworkers were small farmers who were not able to live from the product of their allotments alone ; they were attached to the village subject to the disposal of any one who had need of industrial service. They were essentially village serfs . . . The distinguishing feature of the system was absence of localization in contrast with the town where whole villages or streets consisted of artisans of the same trade." The point which has an interesting parallel to the system prevalent in mediæval Europe was the combination of agriculture with industrial pursuits.

The systems of production in the urban area, according to the author, were different from those existing in the villages and were mainly three. These were piece-work, wage-work and work of the itinerant type. The noticeable feature of the first was that the producer in the presence of the consumer felt responsibility for his work and there appears to have existed regulations to protect the consumer, a provision which has a close analogy in the German law of the period. In the wage-work system, abuses like the misappropriation of part of the raw material given to the handicraftsmen are well protected against. Regarding the wage-work of the migratory type, the author draws two inferences from the evidences of inscriptions. One was the encouragement given by rulers of the land to such migrations, and another hostility of the people of the new places to the incoming of the strangers. The latter statement is based only on one piece of evidence, viz., the incident at Kottar. This, however, is but a solitary instance where the animosity of the superior castes was not due to any dislike of the aliens or jealousy of their profession, but due to the violation of certain social privileges and infringement of certain rights of local autonomy till then enjoyed by the higher castes who dominated the administration of Nanjanad. The opposition never came from rival dyers or weavers. In this connection we would like to suggest that the author could have profitably used the indigenous literary evidence to draw a more vivid picture of the industries of the times. We feel that all the materials of this source have not been exhausted. Many technical works particularly in Tamil are assigned to this period which will throw further light on the economic aspect of a variety of pursuits like architecture, medicine, alchemy, etc. Hence the picture is lacking in such details as the raw materials of industry, the process of production, the conditions of labour and the relation between the employer and the employed.

The next chapter deals with the foreign trade of S. India in the Middle Ages. The evidence is based almost solely on that of foreign travellers and chroniclers. A brief sketch of the main features of this trade in the first half of the tenth century under the heads exports and

imports, rise and fall of ports, commercial communities, shipping, security and navigation is followed by a detailed description of the same through the successive centuries up to the 15th. The change in the contents and course of the foreign trade of India since the mediæval times is brought out clearly from a review of the same during the period.

The author disproves the statement that the early Arab settlements were the result of conquest and proves that they were peaceful mercantile establishments encouraged by the astonishing tolerance of the Zamorins who had their own economic motives for the pursuit of such a policy. The explanation of the author for the question why Malayalees did not take to trade seems to lie chiefly in the joint family system which reduced their personal credit. But the chief explanation is to be sought for in another direction. The Nairs, who were the most powerful community among the Malayalees and who alone in the Hindu fold were in an economic position to take to trade were a military class of landlords to whom the profession of the trader was a contemptible docile occupation. This can be seen even to-day in the northern parts of Travancore and Cochin where all Tamils are clubbed together as Chettis and considered inferior in social status.

The author traces the rise and fall of successive commercial communities and centres of trade in the southern portion of the peninsula. The course of navigation and the methods of ship-building are described in detail. Having assumed that it is incorrect to identify Kaucammali with Cochin, the author identifies it with Quilon. "Leaving Kaucammali on the west coast of S. India, ships made directly for Kalah in the Malay peninsula, which was reached in a month from Kulam." Here is a contradiction by the author. If Kaucammali was intended to refer only to Quilon, there is no meaning in using another word to indicate the same place in one and the same sentence.

It is interesting to learn that S. India not only exported, but also imported, cloth of certain fabrics. In tracing the causes of the decline of the Chinese trade, the author draws an interesting parallel from English Economic History to the mercantilist policy that was predominant in the mediæval age. Such parallel observations are found here and there in the book and they are of no mean value for a comparative study of economic conditions. It is pleasing to note that the commercial morality of the Hindus was high, although we learn that piracy was encouraged on the west coast by certain kings for the sake of possessing a better cavalry.

Much industry has been devoted by the author to the section on currency and prices. An attempt is made to trace the development of

the money medium from the 11th to the 15th century. He tells us that gold formed the predominant coinage of S. India and silver had very little role to play. That this has been so even as late as 1835 when the rupee was established as the legal medium is corroborated by recent researches on the subject.

The question of taxation takes up a separate section. The author is undecided as to whether taxation was light or heavy. Here, as elsewhere, the author, with the astuteness of the scholar, is thoroughly unbiassed. The tradition of taking one-sixth of the produce of land which had been honoured in the breach rather in the observance and the methods resorted to by successive kings to evade the Shastric maxim are referred to. Finally, the standard of life of the people, the crux of all economic problems, is reviewed in detail and the traditional notion of the ascetic self-sufficiency of the villages is exploded.

A word regarding the sources. Of the nine sources availed of by the author, only three stand prominent, these being inscriptions, travellers' accounts and works of jurists. The value of inscriptions is well understood by him and it is no exaggeration to say that he makes the best possible use of them. The silent stones are pressed into service and made to speak on the controversial question of land tenures and the system of taxation in mediæval S. India. On the question of industries, trade, etc., however, the author has chiefly to rely on the accounts of foreign travellers. Both Barbosa and Marco Polo are freely but critically made to render aid on these points. But where, however, the author has overdone is in the importance he has given to the theoretical jurists like Vignaneswara and Madhavacharya. No doubt the author is cautious and careful in his statements as to how far those theories would have been carried out in actual practice; but still the repeated reference to them almost at every stage leaves the reader with the impression that these sources have been given excessive prominence. For one thing, as the author himself admits, these theories were not applicable to all the Hindu princes of S. India.

Dr. Appadorai is throughout lucid and has mostly avoided the temptation to infer the coming of a whole summer from the flight of a single sparrow, which largely arises where there is paucity of materials. There are many useful appendices on land values, currency, weights and measures and rates of interest with a bibliography which will aid future and further research on the subject. The two volumes cover 892 pages of boldly printed type. It looks as if a favourable star has risen on the firmament of the economic history of S. India. To-day Dr. Appadorai has come out with a learned treatise on the subject covering the 4 centuries

from the eleventh to the fifteenth. It is true that Dr. Appadorai's task is arduous from the nature of the materials he has to handle. Hence it is that as Prof. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri says the picture is by no means complete. But it is certainly a bold venture on the part of Dr. Appadorai to have attempted even an outline. His work will form a monumental basis for future scholars and with the bridging of the intervening gulf, we will have a continuous account of the economic history of S. India from early to modern times.

Dr. Appadorai's book is a very comprehensive treatise on the subject which is well written and highly interesting and valuable.. The author displays a remarkable capacity for intelligent research and sound judgment. His book will greatly help and stimulate scholarship in this branch of study. It is a book that few Economic History students can afford to be without.

The University of Madras may well congratulate itself on the publication of such a work.

B. V. NARAYANASWAMY.

*Some Aspects of Economic Planning*—By N. S. Subba Rao—Being Sir William Meyer Lectures, 1932-33. (The Bangalore Press). Price Rs. 3.

This is a book of outstanding interest for it enables us to see how another Mysore economist looks at planning. The whole controversy over economic planning has suffered greatly from a widespread lack of understanding of the fundamental issues at stake. To what is 'planning' an alternative? Planning is really an alternative to pricing, that is to say, to the operation of free price system, and the two, planning and pricing are alternating methods of distributing economic resources in such a way as to satisfy various demands. Under the price system this is achieved through the influence of free consumer's choice on prices on the one hand and the willingness of producers to work or save for a certain wage or salary or dividend on the other. It is ultimately the individual choices of the persons, determined by their individual desires which decide the direction of production and consumption.

How is it to be decided under planning? This is a very much more difficult problem. It is now coming to be believed that the community can and must deliberately plan, direct, and control, not in detail, but in broad outline the economic development to which innumerable individual activities contribute. We cannot in future be content to rely for such economic direction entirely upon the uncoordinated decisions of individuals or groups which cannot, in the nature of things, see the national problem as a whole. The nation will require of its government not a

merely passive policy of giving relief to the victims of a defective economy, but a positive energetic leadership in constructing a new organisation for collective planning and direction of its economic life.

Of the 6 chapters of the book, the first introductory chapter deals with the meaning and scope of planning. Planning, it is said, has a three-fold objective, utilisation of all available resources, adjustment of production and consumption and maximum satisfaction of the needs of the people and this is to be achieved by the co-ordination of economic activities under a unifying centre. Briefly stated, what is sought to be achieved by the new methods and machinery is efficiency of production stability of economic life and equity of distribution. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 deal with these three central ideas and chapter 5 dealing with the most interesting aspect of the subject, namely, planning in India, is admittedly sketchy. The whole book prompts the conclusion that whether or not national planning is desirable, some intelligent regulation of the economic relations of different nations is an urgent necessity. The conviction is growing that the solution of the economic problem must come from some sort of blending of free competition with deliberate planning.

V. G. RAMAKRISHNA AYYAR.

*A Survey of Motor-Bus Transportation in Six Districts of the Bombay Presidency*—By D. R. Gadgil and L. V. Gogate. Pages 174. Price Rs. 2/8.

This is a timely publication setting forth the results of the fourth of the series of field investigations carried out under the auspices of the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics. The subject is very topical and the authors have collected considerable data of a very valuable nature. The Condition of the bus transport industry in the part of the Bombay Presidency under review is dealt with at length with the aid of statistics collected. But the authors however are greatly handicapped by the lack of adequate statistics on many vital points which would have thrown more light on the problem. The refusal of the railway authorities to furnish figures and facts, even of a non-confidential nature, is to be deplored by all students of the problem, as this has prevented the investigators from turning their attention to one of the most important aspects of the subject, viz., the question of rail-road competition. One important fact that emerges out of the study is the urgent necessity to carry out traffic surveys, as are done in countries like the U.S.A. and Great Britain. Such surveys, whether for purposes of the road engineers and road authorities, for purposes of allocating the fiscal burden, or for purposes of gauging the changes brought about in the peasant economy due to the advent of motor transport, are extremely helpful. The authors



have very interesting data, though not qualitative, regarding the competition of bullock carts with motor-buses in the sphere of goods traffic. They conclude that while it is clear that the motor-bus will continue to make inroads in the province of the bullock cart the process of displacement will be necessarily slow. The effect of this on the peasant economy is incidentally touched upon.

Dealing with the earning and profits of the bus transport industry, they are of opinion that it is a heavily overcrowded and considerably depressed one in which even the better organised units find it difficult to earn a profit and in which consequently the number of those who are forced to leave it after a few years' losses is very large. The root trouble with the industry, according to them, as it is run to-day is that all the relevant costs of the business are not brought home to the average owner. The authorities, however, make a strong plea for compulsory insurance of buses against risks, for "non-profitability could be a strong argument against increased taxation but never against proper steps for passenger safety." The chapter on "Road Finance and Motor Taxation" examines the defects that are inherent in the present system and some of the estimates of Mitchell and Kirkness are questioned. Interesting chapters follow, dealing with the organisation, co-ordination and control of transport illustrated by the regulations that are prevalent in other countries. A select bibliography closes this valuable study.

Though the study is not confined to a particular part of the Bombay District, it has interesting conclusions which are of a general application to the rest of India. We heartily recommend the monograph not only to all students of road finance, but to every transport organisation and every bus owner.

B. V. NARAYANASWAMY.

*Conflicting Tendencies in Indian Economic Thought*—By S. C. Dutt, M.A., B.L. Pages 225. Price Rs. 5.

The author discovers two trends, running opposite to each other, in the development of economic thought in India. One is a desire to return to mediæval economy and the other a passion for emulating the industrialised West. The author takes Mahatma Gandhi as the representative of the former school and Prof. Benoy Kumar Sarkar as the protagonist of the latter. The reason for the choice of the two people is set forth by the author as follows: "Gandhi does not profess to be an economist. But he has certain clear-cut and definite economic conceptions. And he has been trying his utmost with the whole weight of his personality to reconstruct the economic life of the country after his own heart..... The

other side has its spokesmen too. Of the many Indian economists in the country to-day who are trying to offer a guidance to the economic activities of this kind one of the most prominent is Benoy Kumar Sarkar." The views of Gandhi as expressed in *Young India* and some of his books and speeches are first set forth and then follows an examination of Prof. Sarkar's writings in English, Bengali, French, German and Italian. The chapter on "Thirty-five years of Indian economic thought" is in the main a valuable bibliography of all publications in Economics from 1898 to 1932 and the author makes some critical observations. "Up till now the books bearing on Indian Economics as a whole or on some of its particular branches . . . have been mainly in the nature of convenient summaries of Government Reports. . . . Perhaps this methodology is on the verge of exhaustion . . . ." There are some interesting passages which have a special application to Bengalee students. The subject is very lucidly dealt with.

B. V. NARAYANASWAMY.

*The Indian Sugar Industry ; Its Past, Present and Future*—By M. P. Gandhi, M.A. Pages 286. Price Rs. 5/8.

The sugar industry in India has assumed an importance that has far-reaching national and international consequences. A scientific monograph on the subject is a welcome thing. Mr. Gandhi has considered in detail the arguments for and against such vital questions as the fixation of the price of cane, allocation of zones and licensing of factories and his conclusions are throughout unbiassed. The study of utilisation of the by-products, molasses and bagasse takes up a good part of the treatise and the possibility of manufacture of power, alcohol and paper on a commercial scale with State help is discussed at length. The defects in our present system of cane cultivation are examined at length and suitable remedies are suggested. The need for the cane growers to organise themselves on co-operative lines and the importance of carrying on technological and chemical research are emphasised. The welfare of the sugar industry in relation to problems of transport is separately dealt with and there is a general review of the world trade and manufacture of sugar up to the year 1932-33. Mr. Gandhi has utilized all the available material on the subject and has produced an able work. We have no doubt it will be useful to all those interested in the industrial development of India.

B. V. NARAYANASWAMY.

*Decay of Indian Industries*—By Mr. P. R. Ramachandra Rao. Taraporevala Sons and Co., Bombay. Price Rs. 2.

This is a monograph dealing mainly with the causes that made for the decay of Indian industries. A historical retrospect of some of the principal Indian industries in Ancient India like cotton, wool, carpet-weaving, sericulture, iron and steel, enamelling and glass-making, sugar manufacturing and ship-building, based mainly on the well-known writings of authors like R. C. Dutt and Major Basu is followed by an account of the causes that led to the decay of these industries. We may not be able to see eye to eye with the author in the relative importance he assigns to the series of circumstances that deepened the gloom which fell on our industries even as early as the Mughal days. For example, is it not true that the Industrial Revolution was a factor that contributed towards this end and that it has never been over-emphasised? That it was the prime cause for the decay in the textile industry may be seen when it is remembered that the competition of machine-made cloths in the nineteenth century began first in the export markets of India. Nor should the vexatious treatment of the weavers by the Company blind us to the fact that it was a huge employer with an annual investment mounting to several lakhs in the Presidency of Madras alone, and that when the Charter Act of 1813 broke its monopoly resulting in the gradual cessation of investment, particularly in the south of India, there followed a fell slump and heavy unemployment. Four-fifths of the monograph is devoted mainly to these two aspects of the question. The rest is given to "Prospects," or a theoretical plea for a Gandhian structure of economic society. This part is topical, but we wonder what conviction it is going to carry with people, when even leaders of Congress are divided as to the permanent utility of the *Charka*. The book is of much value to those engaged in propaganda work.

B. V. NARAYANASWAMY.

*Tāṇḍava Lakṣaṇam or The Fundamentals of Ancient Hindu Dancing.*

—By B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu, M.A., PH.D., B.COM., BAR-AT-LAW. 1936. 10" × 7½". Pages 178. Plates 50. Figures 252. G. S. Press, Madras. Rs. 12.

This work is a fine attempt to illustrate Hindu dancing with the aid of the sculptured dance poses in the temple of the Lord of Dance in Chidambaram. In a short introductory chapter, Dr. Narayanaswami and his collaborators, Messrs. Srinivasalu and Venkata Rangayya, discuss the age of Bharata and the genesis of Nāṭya, describe the temple of Naṭarāja and the sculptured panels in it, and offer some preliminary remarks on

Abhinaya. Chapter II is a translation of the fourth Adhyāya of Bharata, bearing on the sculptured poses in the temple ; the Sanskrit text of this chapter is printed in Appendix A. Chapter III is a glossary of the technical terms employed by Bharata in this difficult adhyāya of his work. Appendix B reproduces the section of the now rare Madras Epigraphical Report for 1914 where the sculptures of the Naṭarāja temple were first noticed in some detail. Six other Appendices follow among which those on Bharata's Theatre and on some ancient authors and treatises on Dancing call for special mention. The book concludes with a short but useful bibliography, an index of the poses and a brief general Index.

The authors who have undertaken and completed this labour of love deserve to be congratulated warmly on their achievement. They have earned the gratitude of all lovers and students of South Indian Art, who will find this work invaluable as a book for constant reference and a basis for further studies on this difficult and interesting branch of aesthetics. The printers, Messrs. G. S. Press, deserve great praise for the excellent technique of production which is fully adequate to the nature of the subject.

K. A. N.

*Daśopaniṣads*—with the commentary of Śrī Upaniṣad-Brahma-Yogin, Vol. II. Edited by the Pandits of the Adyar Library under the supervision of Prof. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D.PHIL.(OXON). Published in 1936, for the Theosophical Society, at the Vasanta Press, Adyar.

This handy volume, comprising the Chāndogya and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads, with the commentary of Śrī Upaniṣad-Brahma-Yogin of South India, completes the series of the Adyar Theosophical Society publications of the 'One hundred and eight Upaniṣads', together with the commentary of *Upaniṣad-Brahma-Yogin*. Several years ago, Dr. Schrader proposed to bring out critical editions of the 108 Upaniṣads on up-to-date lines. Though it has not been possible for the Adyar Library to follow Dr. Schrader's plan and fulfil his object, for want of funds, it is gratifying to note that the manuscript material in the Adyar Library, contained in the commentaries of *Upaniṣad-Brahma-Yogin*, has been made available to the world of Sanskrit scholars in handy volumes printed in Devanāgarī script. These volumes, together with the carefully compiled indexes and tables of contents, are expected to afford ample facilities for scholars who may undertake to carry on research in the sphere of Upaniṣadic literature. The commentator—Śrī Upaniṣad-Brahma-Yogin—was a *Sannyāsin* of South India, who flourished in recent times and who devoted his life completely to the study and exposition of the 108 Upaniṣads ; and the significance of his appellation is borne out by his

works. His commentaries are direct, simple and free from polemical digressions and they are of great value in understanding the meaning of the text of the 108 Upaniṣads. The get-up and typographical execution of the volume under review are worthy of the reputation of the Vasanta Press.

S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI.

*Prolegomena to the New Reforms* by S. K. Dutta, B.A. (CAL.), B.Sc.ECON. (LOND.), BAR-AT-LAW. Pages 134. Price Rs. 3. Foreign 4s. 6d.

In this small book the author gives a clear exposition of the Government of India Act, 1935. The Act taken by itself constitutes perhaps the most complicated piece of constitutional legislation so far known, and the general reader, as well as the college student, will be thankful to a trustworthy guide who offers to tell him succinctly what the main provisions of the Act are, and how we may expect them to function, and the author of this booklet supplies a real want with remarkable success. His mood is one of quiet optimism. He is not unaware of the many defects and shortcomings of the measure, or of the extent to which it falls short of Dominion Status, and he is no uncritical admirer of the Reforms of 1919 or of 1935. His comments, always brief, are often shrewd and far-reaching, as for instance on the constitutional position of the States (p. 15), the working of Dyarchy (p. 22), Indianisation of the Army (p. 23), Safeguards (p. 43), Privileges of the Legislature (p. 69), Rule of Law (p. 115), Declaration of Rights (p. 118) and so on. Education of the masses, high character and sagacity among the political leaders, and a well-disciplined party system calculated to resist the growing multiplication of parties are, according to the author, the chief desiderata for our getting the best even out of these reforms. The book is very well printed and remarkably free from printing mistakes.

K. A. N.

# JOURNAL

## OF THE

# ANNAMALAI UNIVERSITY

---

VOL. VI.

JANUARY, 1937

NO. 2.

---

### The Horme in Purposivistic Psychology and Karma in the Gita—A Comparative Study

By

P. S. NAIDU

(*Annamalai University*)

In his paper on 'Indian Philosophy in relation to Contemporary Italian Thought' Professor Surendaranath Das Gupta says, 'My contention is that most of the elements of contemporary European thought are found anticipated in Indian Philosophy. I do not maintain for a moment that Indian systems of thought are identical with modern ones or *vice versa*, but I wish to maintain that the important elements are all there in more or less varying modifications. Much of what passes as modern philosophical discovery is like old wine in new bottles.' These words are pregnant with meaning. The object of this paper is to extend Professor Das Gupta's significant remarks to the realm of Western Theoretical Psychology. It is contended here that the most important element in the theoretical basis for, what is perhaps, the most influential school of modern psychological thought has been anticipated in Indian Philosophy.

Professor McDougall's hormic psychology bids fair to conquer and assimilate all its rival schools. The outstanding contribution of the Hormic school is the discovery that the horme is the very essence of the structure of the mind. This discovery, we hold, was made long ago (in the fifth century B.C. if we accept Professor Radhakrishnan's conclusion regarding the date of the Gita) by the Master of the Gita.

The Hormic school is one of the oldest of the contemporary schools of psychology. It was in 1908 that it took shape as the result of a protest against the lop-sided intellectualism of the then reigning schools of psychology. As against the rationalising tendency of psychology, Professor McDougall, the founder of the school, stressed the life of emotion, and the importance of the play of motives in human action. Human conduct depends upon impulses, and these impulses are non-rational, just because they are ultimate.

'It is the mental forces, the sources of energy, which set the ends and sustain the course of all human activity—of which forces the intellectual processes are but the servants, instruments or means.'<sup>2</sup> Professor McDougall does not neglect the intellect. His theory of the mind is not a partial theory. Unlike the other schools, the Hormic school takes the whole mind into account, and gives intellect its proper place in its scheme. The hormic theory asserts that the behaviour of every organism is purposive, though the purpose might be vague in many cases. That which urges the organism on to action is the *Horme*, the vital impulse called variously as the *elan vital* by Bergson, the *libido* by Jung and the *will-to-live* by Schopenhauer. Professor McDougall's work, 'An Outline of Psychology,' is one long argument in support of the hormic thesis.

'The instincts are prime movers of all human activity ; by the co-native or impulsive force of some instinct, every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained.'<sup>3</sup> Professor McDougall himself asserts that the hormic theory of action is not new, but very old. But his emphasis, or over-emphasis as his opponents term it, is but the natural corollary of the general theory of the structure of the mind which he has propounded. His brilliant analysis of instinctive propensities, and his equally brilliant attempt to trace the complex sentiments of adult life to their instinctive sources, should not blind us to the origin from which all these subsidiary doctrines take their rise.

It is possible to pick holes in Professor McDougall's hormic theory, if one confined oneself to its partial manifestations in the discussions about instincts, intelligence, belief and reasoning, attention, etc.

The doctrine of instincts propounded by Professor McDougall has been most vigorously attacked by those engaged in laying a psycholo-

2. McDougall, W. Introduction to Social Psychology, p. 3.

3. *Ibid.* p. 44.

gical foundation for sociology. Mr. Bernard's treatise on 'Instinct' is typical of the one-sided criticism urged against the hormic theory. Professor McDougall's analysis of instincts, and particularly his classification of instincts, his account of the relationship between emotions and instincts, have all been argued against with great show of reason. But in the heat of the controversy the critics have lost sight of the fundamentals of hormic psychology. But 'now, happily, all is changed; the animal psychologists have begun to realise that any description of animal behaviour which ignores its goal-seeking nature is futile; . . . . . they are busy with the study of 'drives,' 'sets,' and 'incentives'. . . Much the same state of affairs prevails in current American writings on human psychology. . . . . Motivation after being almost ignored, has become a problem of central interest. We are in a transition period; and all this recognition of the purposive nature of human activity is partial and grudging.'<sup>4</sup>

Human activity, then, is hormic activity involving 'the liberation of energy potential or latent in the tissues.' Hormic psychology asserts that active striving towards a goal is a fundamental category of psychology.<sup>5</sup>

Three basic principles of supreme importance emerge from a careful examination of the foundations of hormic psychology. (1) The mind is fundamentally a unity. (2) The Horme or the primeval urge is of the very essence of the mind, as it lives and moves in this phenomenal world. (3) This Horme differentiates itself into the impulses of the instincts (or propensities), which have been clearly analysed by Professor McDougall.

This hormic theory was clearly present before the mind of the Great Teacher of the Bhagavad Gita when he propounded his doctrine of 'Desireless Action.' The author of the Gita had profound insight into human nature; he had a very thorough knowledge of the psychology of the human mind.<sup>6</sup> We have no hesitation in affirming that the exposition of the doctrine of action (especially in Adhyayas 2, 3 and 6) is based on the second hormic principle enunciated above.

4. Psychologies of 1930, p. 3.

5. Had Prof. McDougall confined the term 'desire' to the desire for the goal or 'fruit of action,' and used the expression 'horme' to indicate the primal urge to action a great deal of confusion could have been avoided.

6. The mind referred to here is the mind in the midst of the phenomenal environment.



Mr. A. S. Wadia, in the opening chapter of his book, 'The Message of Sri Krishna,' says, 'By habit and thought, temperament and character, the East has long been associated with Passivity and Inaction as the West with Effort and Activity. . . . . And yet, strange to say, the guiding star of the East wrote Effort large and luminous on his own incomparable life and proclaimed Action repeatedly and triumphantly in his own peerless Song Celestial.' The call to action rings persistently through every line of the Gita.

The author of the Gita is intensely interested in man, and the Song Celestial, therefore, definitely concerns itself with the problem of conduct. The solution which the Gita offers to the ethical problems is based upon the psychological analysis of the *Gunas* of the mind. The Gita definitely discountenances inaction (III, 27 and 32). In chapter III verses 4 and 20, and in chapter IV verse 41, Sri Krishna preaches renunciation, and yet, immediately after, he insists upon practical performance of duty. Such an attitude tantalises Arjuna, who asks, 'If the method of discernment or knowledge without action be held by Thee more excellent than work, why dost thou urge me to work?' This question elicits a long answer (III, 3 to 35) which weighs the respective merits and demerits of the teaching of the Veda, Samkhya and Yoga regarding work. 'Activity is natural to man and no view of life which overlooks that feature or minimises its importance can be right.' Men must work and work is inevitable, nay more, it is right! In the remarkable utterance in III, 20-22 Sri Krishna points out that even the liberated (*jivanmuktas*) should work so long as they are in the world. A little farther on (III, 27) it is asserted that this work is done entirely by the *gunas* of nature. And Sri Krishna urges Arjuna to work. This precept is no empty precept. That the urge to work (the *horme*) is natural to the mind is fully recognised. This primal urge is present even in the minds of those who have secured liberation. It is a clear proof of the fact that the *horme* is of the very essence of the structure of the mind.

We gain further support for our view when we analyse the exposition of renunciation. Sri Krishna preaches not renunciation of action, but renunciation *in* action. He does not recommend the rooting out of all desires, but only the rooting out of the desire for the fruit of action, and the desire for selfish gain. In chapter V we are told that true renunciation and true performance of work are not opposed. 'Who is the true renouncer? Not he who attempts to remain completely inactive, but he whose work is done in a spirit of detachment.' The Samkhya method of inaction is condemned in unmistakable terms in this chapter. The opening verses of chapter VI emphasise once again

the oneness of renunciation and performance of work. Sri Aurobindo Ghose writes, 'No, he (Sri Krishna) says, 'such renunciation far from being indispensable, is not even possible. 'For none stands even for a moment not doing work ; every one is made to do action helplessly by the modes of Prakriti.' The strong perception of the great cosmic action and the eternal activity and power of the cosmic energy which was so much emphasised afterwards by the teaching of the Tantric Shaktas who even made Prakriti or Shakti superior to Purusha is a very remarkable feature of the Gita. Although here in an undertone, it is still strong enough, coupled with, what we might call the theistic and devotional elements of its thought to bring in that activism which so strongly modifies in its scheme of Yoga the quietistic tendencies of the old metaphysical Vedanta. Man embodied in the natural world cannot cease from action, not for a moment, not for a second ; his very existence here is an action.'

No more authentic pronouncement is needed to establish our contention than these weighty words of the great sage. The author of the Gita was perfectly conscious of the hormic theory of human action.

The following verses bear out our contention :<sup>8</sup>

### III, 1-8

If, O Janardana ! devotion is deemed by you to be superior to action, then why, O Kesava ! do you prompt me to this fearful action ? You seem, indeed, to confuse my mind by equivocal words. Therefore, declare one thing determinately, by which I may attain the highest good.

The Deity said,

O sinless one ! I have already declared that in this world there is a two-fold path—that of the Samkhyas by devotion in the shape of (true) knowledge ; and that of the Yogins in the shape of action. A man does not attain freedom from action merely by not engaging in action ; nor does he attain perfection by mere renunciation. For nobody ever remains for an instant without performing some action ; since the qualities of nature constrain everybody to some action.

7. Ghose : Essays on the Gita, I series, p. 154.

8. Telang : Bhagavad Gita, S. B. E., Vol. 8.

## III, 33

Even a man of knowledge acts consonantly to his own nature. All beings follow nature.

## IV, 16-20.

The truth regarding action is abstruse. He is wise among men, he is possessed of devotion, and performs all action, who sees inaction in action and action in inaction. The wise call him learned, whose acts are all free from desires and fancies, and whose actions are burnt down by the fire of knowledge. Forsaking all attachment to the fruit of action always contented, dependent on none, he does nothing at all, though he engages in action.

## V, 1-3.

O Krishna ! you praise renunciation of actions and also the pursuit (of them). Tell me determinately which one of these two is superior.

The Deity said,

Renunciation and pursuit of action are both instruments of happiness. But of the two, pursuit of action is superior to renunciation of action. He should be understood to be always an ascetic who has no aversion and no desires.

## VI, 1-3.

He who, regardless of the fruit of action, performs the actions which ought to be performed, is the devotee and renouncer, not he who discards the (sacred) fires ; not he who performs no acts. Know, O son Pandu ! that what is called renunciation is devotion, for nobody becomes a devotee who has not renounced (all) fancies. To the sage who wishes to rise to devotion, action is said to be a means.

These verses, and others with similar import, in the later chapters stress the need for action, and prescribe action as the means for deliverance. This action should be desireless action (that is action performed without desire for the fruit). But such action is not purposeless action.<sup>9</sup> It has a vivid and intense purpose. 'On me place your mind, sacrifice to me, reverence me, and you will certainly come to me,' says Krishna.

9. The difference between the urge to action (horme) and the desire for the enjoyment of the fruit of action is brought out, in a striking manner, in the Gita.

When the Great Teacher made the demand for desireless action of his devotees he was not making a demand impossible or even difficult of fulfilment. He knew full well that he was prescribing a course of conduct which did not cut athwart the pain of mental structure. In short, he knew the hormic structure of the human mind.<sup>10</sup>

10. Further support for our position is gained from Lokamanya Tilak's 'Gita Rahasya.' The following lines have been taken from Mr. Bhide's paper on 'The Gist of the Gita Rahasya,' Kalyana Kalpataru, Gita Number, 1935:

Now let us turn to the mandatory portion of verse 48 (II). But before that it is necessary to ascertain the significance of verse 47, because in this verse it is stated 'Thou hast a right to action alone.' The term right (Adhikari) is clearly intended to show that according to 'Buddhiyoga' 'Karma' (action) is not something unauthorised but that which *necessarily and naturally devolves upon man*.

"The word 'kama' in Samskrit means passion. A passion for devotion to the Supreme Deity is also known as 'kama' and actions done with this motive are also called 'Sakama' or interested actions. But it is wrong to believe that all passions or desires lead to sinful results. Passions or desires which are not contrary to the Divine laws are virtuous and not sinful. Not only this, such passions lie at the root of 'Paramartha' of spiritual progress. Therefore all actions done with a pious motive are disinterested actions. This definition is fully acceptable to the *srutis* and *smritis* alike."

# A Brief History of English Scholarship

By

M. S. SUNDARAM

(Continued from page 25, Vol. VI No. 1.)

## II. BEGINNINGS OF ANGLO-SAXON SCHOLARSHIP

English scholarship, in the strict sense of the term, may be said to begin with the study of Anglo-Saxon literature. Even before the conquest of England by the Norman kings, Anglo-Saxon, as a literary language, was slowly dying and passing into some other form. For some two hundred years Anglo-Saxon had ceased to produce any great poetry or literary prose. The language itself showed signs of a complete break ; its inflections were becoming loose and its dialects were thrown into a confused mixture. With the coming of the Normans, French became the established court language. Literature, in a language which had been banished from the court and had been losing its distinctive features, was obviously impossible. Anglo-Saxon had succeeded in producing works of intrinsic merit both in prose and verse and had established its claim to being the ancestor of one of the greatest literatures of Europe, and one of the oldest, with the exception of Icelandic. For nearly two hundred years after the Norman conquest we have no Anglo-Saxon literature except the last sections of the Worcester and Peterborough chronicles, the last of which extends to the year 1155. The bulk of literary work between the fifth and twelfth centuries known as Anglo-Saxon was mostly preserved in the monasteries where the effects of the Norman Conquest were not felt very much. Some of the very valuable manuscripts were preserved intact in the monastery of Tevistock.

To a scholar of the fifteenth century in England, any of the Anglo-Saxon manuscripts preserved in the monasteries would have appeared almost as a foreign language. By the fifteenth century English had undergone such vast changes both in form and vocabulary, and scholars were concerned more with Latin learning and the classics than with Anglo-Saxon. The earliest references to Anglo-Saxon literature in the period of the Renaissance are found in the works of that most incomparable of compilers and editors—Richard Hakluyt. In his *Principal Navigations* which has been called “ the prose epic of the modern English nation,” Hakluyt refers to the voyages of Othere mentioned in Alfred’s

*Orosius*. This might be interpreted as proof that the Elizabethan scholars and researchers were acquainted with Anglo-Saxon literature. The study of Anglo-Saxon was not at any time allowed to decay completely, but it was not until the beginning of the English Reformation that a real attempt was made by English scholars to do research in Anglo-Saxon literature and to print the ancient texts of Anglo-Saxon buried in the monastic shelves.

Almost the first name connected with the revival of the study of Anglo-Saxon is that of Matthew Parker, (1504-1575) Archbishop of Canterbury in the reign of Queen Elizabeth. He held various appointments both in the State and in the Church and was for a time Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cambridge. He identified himself with the party which sought to establish a *via media* between Romanism and Puritanism, known later as the Anglican party. In his untiring researches carried out among church tracts, he came to know of the sermon of Aelfric, and it seemed to him to have a bearing on the debated question of the sacrament as maintained by the Anglican church. Since the time of Aelfric there had grown up customs and rituals for which no warrant could be found. Parker immediately ordered this work of Aelfric to be published. The motive was purely ecclesiastical but the work turned out to be of immense value to Anglo-Saxon learning. Matthew Parker was a great lover of books and he knew the value of old manuscripts. The dissolution of the monasteries had done irreparable harm to the manuscript collections preserved in them, and a great many Anglo-Saxon treasures happened to be scattered all over the country, and some, secreted abroad by foreigners. Parker spared no pains in collecting these scattered treasures and instructed Bale, the antiquary, to use all his efforts to secure such manuscripts as were still to be found. He had several other agents both at home and abroad whom he employed in this business of collecting books. He bequeathed all his valuable collection to the Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, of which he was a student. These manuscripts are called by Fuller "the sun of English antiquity." One of Parker's great objects was to revive and stimulate the study of the Saxon language, and he employed John Day, the printer, to cut the first Saxon types. He was the earliest among English scholars to perceive the necessity for an Anglo-Saxon dictionary and had actually planned this work which he had no leisure to pursue.

Matthew Parker had the rare gift of selecting able men to assist him in his research. Parker's secretary was a certain John Josselyn (1529-1603) who was a great Anglo-Saxon scholar. He was a student of Queen's College, Cambridge, and in his twentieth year was elected

fellow of Queen's. When Parker became Archbishop, he chose this scholar as his Latin secretary, and he rendered Parker invaluable assistance in his literary undertakings. Parker has sometimes been accused of taking the credit of Josselyn's work by giving his name to Josselyn's writings.

Josselyn's name is closely associated with Anglo-Saxon learning. Under Parker's guidance he made collections from Anglo-Saxon documents, and many of his notes and collections are found among the Cottonian and Harleian sections in the British Museum. He was the earliest to prepare an Anglo-Saxon and Latin dictionary and also an Anglo-Saxon grammar. Josselyn published Parker's *Testimonie of Antiquity shewing the ancient Fayth in the Church of England, touching the Sacrament of the Body and Bloude of the Lord* which was an edition of Aelfric's *Homily* discovered about 1567. William Lisle re-edited this volume in 1623.

Lawrence Nowell (?—1576) Dean of Lichfield, has been acclaimed as the founder of Anglo-Saxon studies. Camden gives him very high praise and calls him the restorer of Anglo-Saxon learning. He was a member of both the Universities (Oxford and Cambridge) and a diligent antiquary. He learned Anglo-Saxon "being among the first to revive the study of that language in England." (Camden's *Brittania*). He left in manuscript an Anglo-Saxon dictionary entitled *Vocabularium Saxonicum* which passed into the hands of several scholars of Anglo-Saxon, and is now in the Bodleian Library. He edited no work under his own name.

Nowell's pupil, William Lambarde, (1536-1601) imbibed his master's enthusiasm for Anglo-Saxon studies, and at the suggestion of Nowell he undertook a collection and paraphrase of the Anglo-Saxon Laws (1568).

One of the early foreign scholars who showed a special interest in the study of Anglo-Saxon was Richard Verstegen (1565-1620) a Dutchman, who took the English name of Rowlands and joined Christ Church, Oxford. Being a zealous Catholic he left the University without a degree declining the religious tests. On his return to Amsterdam he set up a printing press and cut special types to print Anglo-Saxon words. The principal work is entitled *Restitution of Decayed Intelligence concerning the Most Learned and Renowned English nation*, 1605. He dedicated the book fittingly to the learned King of England, James I. In this book he gives a summary of all the invasions of Britain, the formation of its languages, surnames, and exhibits his knowledge and appreciation of Anglo-Saxon. His collection of Anglo-Saxon words printed in this book is our earliest printed vocabulary in Old English. This foreigner is again the

first to point out the distinctions between the three principal Anglo-Saxon dialects—the southern, the midland and the northern. Thus the study of dialects is not so very modern as some of us are inclined to think. Verstegen also refers to Chaucer as the first illuminator of the English tongue, but he complains of Chaucer's mixing English and French words indiscriminately.

By the year 1600 the Anglo-Saxon language was accessible and well-known to the continent. In 1597 there appeared a book called *De Literas et Lingua Getarum* (the writing and language of the Goths) in which we find ten pages (between 70-80) devoted to "specimens of the old Saxon language which the English made use of 1,000 years ago." The author, by name Wulcanius Brugensis, gives quotations from Asser's *Life of Alfred* with modern translations.

With the beginning of the seventeenth century a new era in Anglo-Saxon scholarship begins. For nearly fifty years Cambridge becomes the real centre of Anglo-Saxon studies. It was mainly due to the energy and enthusiasm of one man that a great revival of interest in Anglo-Saxon began. Our knowledge of Anglo-Saxon is largely due to the researches carried out by Sir Henry Spelman, (1564-1641) Church historian and antiquary. He was pronounced to be a dull boy at school and the "curst schoolmaster" under whom he was educated used to say, "as very a dunce as Henry Spelman" (Aubrey's *Lives*). Spelman graduated from Cambridge in 1581 and settled near London determined to devote all his spare time to research. His scholarly abilities combined with his knowledge of affairs commended him to King James I, by whom he was appointed Commissioner to determine unsettled titles to lands and manors in Ireland. Nothing was a more pleasing task to this antiquary.

Spelman was greatly interested in English law and desired to trace them back to their sources and original records. He experienced great difficulties in finding out the proper meanings of Anglo-Saxon terms used in early legal records, and he determined to compile a glossary of law terms. In 1626 the first volume of the glossary extending to the letter "L" was published. The concluding volume for which he gathered materials was not published till after his death in 1664. His researches in collecting material for the Anglo-Saxon glossary induced him to found an Anglo-Saxon lectureship at Cambridge. He wrote to Abraham Wheelocke touching this subject, "We must not launch out into the deep before we know the points of our compass." Finally, he experimented boldly by establishing a lectureship and endowing it with a stipend. Wheelocke was appointed the first lecturer and he proved to be also the last in this post. The stipend attached to this office was on the death of



Wheelocke, paid to William Somner towards enabling him to complete a Saxon Dictionary.

Spelman was master of the art of editing, and in some respects he could be said to have anticipated the modern ways of editing books. He collected various manuscripts and recognised the importance of variant readings. (We had to wait nearly a hundred years to get the variant readings of Shakespeare's plays).

It was at the instance of Spelman that another Cambridge scholar devoted his time and energy to the study of Anglo-Saxon. This was Abraham Wheelocke (1593-1653) a great student of oriental languages at a time when comparatively no interest was evinced in oriental learning. He was the University Librarian at Cambridge and also Professor of Arabic and Persian. But his name is best remembered in connection with the work he did as Anglo-Saxon reader. In 1643 he published the *Anglo-Saxon Translation of Bede* ascribed to Alfred and also an edition and translation of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*. For the latter, he used two manuscripts, one of which belonging to the Cottonian collection was destroyed by fire. His edition is the only authority now on which modern editors depend for the authentic text. Wheelocke admits having derived his knowledge of Anglo-Saxon mainly from the letters and writings of Sir Henry Spelman. Spelman suggested to him, among other tasks, the compilation of a comprehensive dictionary of Anglo-Saxon which Wheelocke commenced but left unfinished. This project was completed by William Somner (1598-1669) the first Oxford scholar of Anglo-Saxon in 1659.

In Anglo-Saxon scholarship Cambridge had the lead by nearly half a century, but after the death of Wheelocke interest in Anglo-Saxon almost died out in Cambridge and began a new life in Oxford.

The greatest name associated with Anglo-Saxon scholarship in the seventeenth century is that of a foreigner, Du Jon Francois, a Dutchman, who took the English name of Francis Junius (1589-1677). In 1621 he came to England where he became librarian in the household of the Earl of Arundel. For thirty years he lived with this family, and during this period paid several visits to the Bodleian Library at Oxford. He devoted himself to the study of Anglo-Saxon in connection with his comparative study of Teutonic and Northern languages. He was the discoverer of *Caedmon* and it was at Amsterdam that the text of *Caedmon* was first printed (1655). There are references to *Caedmon* in *Bede's* works, but the text of *Caedmon* was unknown for a long time. Milton shows a knowledge of *Caedmon*, but he could not have seen the edition brought

out by Junius, for Milton was blind by 1652 and Caedmon was printed only in 1655. Archbishop Usher (1581-1656) had a copy of Caedmon in his collections which he had presented to Junius.

After several visits to Holland, Junius finally returned to England and retired to his favourite town of Oxford where he at first lodged opposite Lincoln College of which the Rector, Dr. Marshall, was his intimate friend and collaborator. Together with Marshall (1621-1685) he edited the Anglo-Saxon gospels and the Gothic gospels of Ulfilas with a Gothic glossary, Junius editing the Gothic and Marshall, the Anglo-Saxon.

Before his death on November 19, 1677, Junius made a magnanimous gift to Oxford by bequeathing in his will all his manuscript collections to the Bodleian and also the Saxon types which he had specially designed for printing Caedmon. The manuscripts which he bequeathed contained both "Caedmon" and the "Ormulum." Junius's own book on philology *Etymologicum Anglicanum* was of immense value to later students of the language, and Dr. Johnson referred to it for his etymologies when he compiled the English Dictionary.

The friendship of Junius and Marshall and the bequests of the former to the Bodleian gave a great impetus to Anglo-Saxon learning in Oxford. For the next hundred years the home of Anglo-Saxon studies was Oxford. Gothic and Icelandic studies were also revived in Oxford. The University Press co-operated with the scholars in furthering this enthusiasm for Anglo-Saxon. The Sheldonian theatre which is to-day used for holding the Convocation of the University was originally used as the University Printing Press. (The Clarendon Press came into existence only in the eighteenth century) Many of the early books printed at Oxford mention the Sheldonian on the title-page, and in some, there is even a wood-cut of the Sheldonian as it is to-day. In some of the books we find "Tipis Junianus" printed on the title page, meaning that the books were issued with the use of the types presented by Junius to the University.

Anglo-Saxon in course of time became the fashionable study for clever young men at Oxford, and Queen's College produced some of the exceptional scholars who continued the enthusiasm for the revival of the oldest literature of England. In the year 1803 there was created a Professorship of Anglo-Saxon in the University of Oxford and the first to hold the chair was Professor James Ingram. In 1807 he published his Inaugural lecture (as Rawlinson Professor of Anglo-Saxon) on the utility of Anglo-Saxon literature to which is added the geography of Europe by King Alfred.

From the time of Junius up to the inauguration of the chair of Anglo-Saxon at Oxford, a great many scholars devoted their attention to the revival and study of all the available materials in the language. The name of George Hickes (1642-1715) is only next in importance to that of Junius among the seventeenth century scholars of Anglo-Saxon. He was a non-juror and member of St. John's College, Oxford, and after graduation, he became Fellow of Lincoln's and was tutor there for seven years. At Worcester he began the study of the northern languages, and after a year's indefatigable work compiled his Anglo-Saxon and Maero-Gothic grammar printed in Oxford in 1689. Between 1703-05 appeared his best-known work printed in the University Press, Oxford, *the Lingarum veterum septentionalium thesarus grammatico-criticus et archæologicus* which was acclaimed by all contemporaries as a stupendous monument of learning and industry. It contained a comprehensive survey of the Anglo-Saxon, Gothic and Icelandic grammars. The entire work was dedicated to Prince George of Denmark and was priced at three guineas.

Among the scholars of Anglo-Saxon at Queen's College at this time, may be mentioned William Nicholson, Edward Gibson and Edward Thwaites, who, each made a distinct contribution to the advancement of old English studies. William Nicholson (1655-1727) graduated from Queen's in 1675 and travelled abroad learning German and the northern languages. Hearne says that Nicholson "had ye reputation (and not undeservedly) of a drinking fellow and boon companion; but his industry must always have been great, for at Oxford, in addition to the labours already specified, he transcribed for Bishop Fell, the large lexicon of Junius, and compiled a "Glossarium Brigantinum."

Of the many young scholars inspired by the work of George Hickes, Edmund Gibson (1669-1748) was the most noteworthy considering the services rendered to the advancement of Anglo-Saxon studies. He was attracted to the study of old English which was then the rage at Oxford. He was Fellow of Queen's and in 1692 he brought out an edition of the "Saxon Chronicle" with a Latin translation and notes. He based his text of the chronicle on the manuscript which was a gift of Archbishop Laud to the University Library, but he also compared it with a few others. Plummer in his edition of the *Two Saxon-Chronicles* bestows great praise on Gibson's edition; but Gibson treated the Anglo-Saxon chronicle as though it was the work of one author. Gibson never formed any clear view of the relative value of the authorities which he employed, and taking sometimes one and sometimes another version, he managed to produce a composite text. But he was an honest editor and mentioned the sources from where he obtained his text.

Edward Thwaites (1667-1711) was a batler at Queen's College and came early in his college days under the spell of George Hickes. Among the Anglo-Saxon scholars at Queen's, Thwaites took the lead. He edited Alfred's Anglo-Saxon version of the 'Universal History' of Orosius. He was elected Lecturer in Anglo-Saxon and he next laboured in bringing out a revised edition of Somner's Anglo-Saxon dictionary, and in this he was helped by another scholar, by name, Thomas Benson. Thwaites also wrote an up-to-date grammar of Anglo-Saxon for the benefit of his pupils, to one of whom, by name, Christopher Rawlinson, it was dedicated by the author.

The reign of William III was an important period in the history of English scholarship and English antiquarian research. It was a period which witnessed the renaissance of Anglo-Saxon, and the full effects of this period were known only in later years. The spirit of research was animated by a sense of the continuity of the English language. The aim of the scholars was to recover old material, to know and understand it and then publish it. The same cannot be said of the research of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when phonology was viewed with greater importance than subject matter. The year 1705 may be taken as a great landmark in the history of Anglo-Saxon scholarship. That year witnessed the publication of Hickes's *Thesaurus*. All that Hickes knew of the northern languages was collected in the three volumes of this book, and there were many beautiful reproductions of old manuscripts in them. These volumes may be called a summing up of the studies in the older languages made so far.

Of the many who assisted Hickes in his monumental task, no one is more noteworthy than Humphrey Wanley. He was engaged for George Hickes in searching through various parts of England for Anglo-Saxon manuscripts. Wanley was a simple modest man whose value was not recognised until our century. He was assistant to a linendraper and remained with him till he was twenty-three, "but spent every vacant hour in studying old books and documents and in copying the various styles of handwriting." His studies are said to have begun with a transcript of Somner's Anglo-Saxon dictionary. He came to Oxford in 1695 and became an assistant in the Bodleian Library on a salary of £12 per annum. As he had no university degree he could not be appointed Librarian. He became secretary to the S.P.C.K. (Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge) and his talents as a scholar were discovered by Robert Harley who appointed him his private Librarian. Harley was a famous collector of books and Wanley advised him in the matter of choosing books. He was also a keen bargainer and often bought for his patron many valuable books. The library was inherited by Harley's son, and later it was scattered owing

to the poverty of Harley's descendants. But fortunately the manuscripts were kept together and were added to the Cottonian collection to form the nucleus of the British Museum. Wanley has the right to rank as one of the great scholars and cataloguers of all times.

The history of Anglo-Saxon scholarship may be concluded with a brief survey of the work of a very remarkable woman, Elizabeth Elstob, grand-daughter of George Hickes on her mother's side. Scholarship among women was rather rare at this time, and particularly Anglo-Saxon scholarship. Elizabeth Elstob (1683-1756) was a precocious child and at the age of eight she learnt accidence and grammar. Her brother, William Elstob, was a student at Queen's College, Oxford, and Elizabeth went to Oxford to attend upon her brother in his illness. William Elstob (1673-1715) was an Anglo-Saxon scholar, and under his guidance Elizabeth applied herself to further study and mastered eight European languages including Latin and Anglo-Saxon. In 1709 Elizabeth Elstob published the *English-Saxon Homily on the Nativity of St. Gregory* with an English translation and a preface. The book was dedicated to Queen Anne. The book contains a long chatty preface in which she explains the purpose of the work and how she came to write it. The story of St. Gregory exclaiming on seeing the Angles sold at the Slave market, "Ah! they have the face of Angels" is found in this preface. She proposed to edit Aelfric's Homilies and advocated her scheme in a letter, "Some testimonials of learned men in favour of the intended version of the Saxon homilies." This publication was not completed, and a fragment of the first few pages is found in the British Museum.

In 1715 Elizabeth Elstob published her *Rudiments of Grammar for the English-Saxon tongue, first given in English; with an apology for the study of Northern Antiquities*.

In the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Anglo-Saxon literature was revived in the two older universities. When Queen Anne ascended the throne Oxford made a special effort to display its loyalty by celebrating the accession with an address in every language; one of the poems was in Anglo-Saxon composed by William Elstob. This was an indication that Oxford at this time had accepted Anglo-Saxon as one of the humane languages like Latin and Greek. Almost all the prose and verse in Anglo-Saxon had been unearthed and reprinted by this time. Only the *Beowulf* among the major works remained unknown, and it was not before 1815 that the first edition of this great masterpiece of Anglo-Saxon literature came to be published.

(To be continued)

# The Tariff and the Handloom—Some Aspects

By

M. K. MUNISWAMI  
(*Annamalai University*)

## INTRODUCTORY

[In this article, though an attempt has been made to offer some cut-and-dry suggestions towards a conclusion, the main aim of the author has merely been to provoke some discussion. He feels the imperative need of co-ordination in textile production: otherwise the benefits of the tariff would be confined to one section of the textile industry, and other interests prejudicially affected.]

Recently, the Madras Spinning Mills, that gave evidence before the Murray Board, contended that their interests were more seriously affected by foreign imports of yarn than those of the combined spinning and weaving mills, which are in a position to convert the bulk of their yarn into cloth, or to regulate sales of surplus yarn, according to market conditions. The agitation on behalf of the handloom weaver has been equally continuous, especially after the passing of the Cotton Yarn Duty Act of 1927, though with no fruitful results. The Murray Board, however, took the view that the protection of either the interests of the handloom weaver or the spinning section of the industry, did not fall within their terms of reference, but contented themselves with enhancing the duties on imported piecegoods.

The protection to spinning, the Indian mills contend, has, to a certain extent, been neutralised by the levy of a duty on imported cotton ( $\frac{1}{2}$  anna per lb. or Rs. 12-8-0 per bale). This duty was justified on the ground that it would protect the grower of cotton in India and that it would incidentally permit the entry of foreign yarn of finer counts, on which the living of handloom weavers depends in some parts of India. But the Indian Central Cotton Committee itself (vide evidence before the Tariff Board on cotton, 1932) has recommended the confining of this duty to cotton between  $\frac{7}{8}$ " to 1"; for weaving finer counts of yarn, Egyptian or Uganda cotton is required by Indian mills at present. Mr. Kasturbhai Lalubhai pointed out (evidence before the Tariff Board : 1932) that there is really no competition between indigenous and imported cotton, and

that the only effect of the duty has been to handicap particularly the Ahmedabad mills, in the weaving of finer yarn.

The ultimate interest of the spinning industry would seem to require this duty. In recent years, (e.g. in 1921-22, 1926-27, 1931-32), Indian growers of short stapled cotton, who ordinarily do not feel the competition of foreign imports, suffered from the fall in the price of American cotton. There has also been a tendency for the quality of American cotton to deteriorate. If this should continue, in the absence of this import duty, the position of the Indian grower may become more precarious. Further, the growing of high quality cottons, having a staple of  $1\frac{1}{8}$ " or even  $1\frac{1}{4}$ " and capable of spinning up to 60 counts warp, is likely to become a commercial proposition, in certain areas of Sind. If our ideal is the weaving of fine counts of yarn, from out of Indian cotton itself, the duty on imported cotton ought to continue. (Ordinarily, there is a difference of only Rs. 0-1-6 per lb. between the price of imported cotton and Broach cotton.)

Sir George Rainy, in 1927, frankly admitted that the specific duty on cotton yarn, would enhance the price of cotton yarn consumed by the handlooms, but justified it, on the ground that it was an emergent measure, dictated by the dumping of Chinese yarn. Others, however, in the Legislative Assembly, argued that (1) as  $\frac{5}{6}$ th of the yarns used by the handlooms is of mill origin, its price would be determined by competition amongst Indian mills and not by the price of imported yarn, and that (2) particularly the price of yarns over 40 counts, largely used by the handlooms, would not be affected. (The majority of the Tariff Board in 1926, it need hardly be stated, were against the levy of such a duty on yarn "in view of the effect it would have on the handloom industry, which in 1925-26, supplied about 26% of the total consumption of cloth in India.")

Even at present, according to the Murray Report, "The spinning mills assert that the protection granted is inadequate and that no less than 10% of the purely spinning mills, have gone over to weaving. We are also told that in the case of coarse yarn and coarse piecegoods where economies of the power loom do not count, the handloom, partly protected by the Railway freight, is able to hold its own. (Vide, however, the evidence of the Government of the U. P. before the Tariff Board in 1932, for a contrary view).

In the case of medium counts, even the 1932 Tariff Board had to admit that the handloom is losing ground. Unlike the handloom weaver, the power loom does not pay any freight or commission charges. For

counts of yarn below 30s, the handlooms are almost entirely dependent on mills—their principal competitors—and if the existing duty, which also applies to finer counts of yarn, continues, the situation will be the same with reference to higher counts also. It may be argued that the handloom weaver has taken to Indian mill yarn not because the price of foreign yarn has been raised but largely because he has come to realise that, if he should use foreign yarn, his products would not command a market. At present, if the handloom weaver is killed, the market for mill-made yarn will disappear. As a result of this duty, many mills, which were merely weaving sheds, have begun to spin their yarn. Mr. Kasturbhai suggested that the duty be continued on all counts of yarn and that the assistance be provided to the handloom weaver in other ways. But it must be remembered that Indian mills at present account for only 3% of the total quantity of fine yarn used in India, and often, the “attempt of the handloom weaver, to take to lines of production in which there is not mill competition has been unsuccessful because of the high price of the finer counts of yarn (beyond 30s).” I am free to admit that other facts have also been at work ; the prejudice against goods woven from foreign yarn, the decline in the purchasing power of the rural classes in recent years, and the competition of cheap priced artificial silk goods will also explain the deterioration in the position of the handloom weaver. A way out of this difficulty is the substitution of subsidies in place of the import duty on fine yarn, following the recommendations of the majority of the Tariff Board in 1926. The specific duty on yarn ought to be levied on counts 40 and below and should be supplemented by bounties on the weaving of finer counts of yarns. When the specific duty is continued, the problem of how best to help the handloom persists. A cess of 3 pies per lb. on the production of Indian mill-made yarn has sometimes been suggested, the proceeds of which being distributed to the handloom weaver, to improve particularly his technical efficiency. If a cess be levied equivalent to the specific duty on imported yarn, the mill-owners might reasonably ask for a higher scale of duties on imported piecegoods, as such a cess would increase their cost of production. Unless the Government of India is willing to raise still further the tariff on woven goods, a cess is out of the question : there would arise also the inevitable question of Imperial Preference. Measures may be devised which would, in effect, limit the spheres of production of the power and handlooms.

Mr. Kasturbhai indicated in 1932 (evidence before the Tariff Board) that he was willing to surrender the right of weaving cloths below 18 counts, entirely in favour of the handloom : possibly Bombay may not be willing to surrender, such a large part of her coarse cotton cloth pro-



duction, but may be willing not to weave cloths of less than 12 counts (even then, there would be a few lines, such as tent-cloth, open to power looms). Now, if the mills consent to weave only cloths made out of medium counts, the handloom weaver, would have, as his province cloths woven out of counts below 12 and (2) cloths woven out of fine yarn, say about 60 counts. The establishment of a Federal Government, ought to enable us to enforce such agreements, in the Indian States. In view of provincial differences, in marketing conditions, such co-ordination of production may in the first instance, be on a provincial basis. Co-ordination in the production of textile goods is imperative: otherwise the position of the handloom weaver, would deteriorate. The interests of the spinning section of the Indian Mill Industry and of the handloom weaver, are not necessarily opposed, and ought to be reconciled like Road and Rail Interests. To revert: The duty on finer counts of yarn should be removed and Indian production of finer counts of yarn, stimulated directly by the grant of subsidies. (Taking Madras, only 2 per cent. of the Madras Mill's production is in counts of above 90's—Murray Report). If the price of very fine yarns, is not reduced, their use by the handloom would altogether cease. It is at this point, we have to notice, the competition of artificial silk yarn and piecegoods. They compete with dyed and fancy piecegoods made by the handloom and the power loom. (The Revenue duty on these yarns, was raised to 18¾ per cent in 1931 and was changed to 25 per cent or a minimum specific duty of 3 as. per pound in May 1934). In spite of duties, the imports increase. The interests of the Indian Mill, handloom and sericulture industries, with singular unanimity, demand that they must still further be raised. If the price of indigenous silk yarn should go still further, probably Indian mills will go in for them, alongside the handloom weaver. But, if its price is to be lowered, it must be produced on a larger scale and this would be possible, only if indigenous sericulture is given effective protection. In the long run when the Swadeshi spirit is developed, the handloom weaver, would find it to his advantage, to use indigenous cotton and silk yarn.

### CONCLUSION

What would seem to be called for immediately is (1) the removal of the duty on finer counts of yarn, and the grant of subsidies, for a certain percentage of fine yarn production in Indian mills; (2) the devising of some kind of quota system, under which the respective spheres of the power and the handloom, would come to be defined and (3) the raising of the duty on artificial silk yarn and piecegoods, still further.

# Optical Scattering by Colloidal Suspensions and Emulsions

By

S. RAMACHANDRA RAO AND N. MUTHUSWAMI  
(*Annamalai University*)

## 1. INTRODUCTION

It was Lord Rayleigh<sup>1</sup> who developed the theory of light scattering in the case when light falls on minute particles of dimensions several times smaller than the wavelength of light. Rayleigh's theory has been considerably extended by Sir C. V. Raman<sup>2</sup> and the theoretical deductions have been amply confirmed in Calcutta and elsewhere. Studies on light scattering by molecules have thrown much light on the shape and structure of many organic and inorganic molecules.

When the scattering particles have diameters comparable with the wavelength of light, the scattering becomes unsymmetrical about the plane perpendicular to the incident ray. Mie<sup>3</sup> studied the distribution of scattered energy of light around a radiating particle of a turbid medium for different dimensions. According to him the definite asymmetry of dispersion of particles having nearly the same diameter as the wavelength of light, increases as the particles become larger. Shouleykin<sup>4</sup> worked the theory of Mie in a comprehensive manner and considered typical cases of spherical particles having the ideal properties of a dielectric. B. B. Ray<sup>5</sup> studied the gradual changes of the light transmitted through colloidal solutions as the size of the particles increased. Krishnan<sup>6</sup> discussed the scattering of light for the case of air bubbles suspended in a liquid medium. The same writer detected the presence of molecular clusters in fluids of size comparable with the wavelength of light by the method of the anomalous depolarisation of scattered light. Such molecular clustering was obtained in mixtures of carbon disulphide and methyl alcohol in the ratio 3 : 1 at the critical solution temperature and also to a smaller extent at temperatures in this neighbourhood. Scattering methods have now given us a powerful

1. Scientific papers, 1, 104 ; 1, 518 ; 4, 397.
2. See innumerable papers from the Ind. Assn. Cult. Sc., Calcutta, 1922-29.
3. Ann. d. Phys., 1908, 25, 377.
4. Phil. Mag., 1924, 48, 307.
5. Proc. Ind. Assn. Cult. Sc., 1923, 8, 221.
6. Proc. Ind. Acad. Sc., 1934, 1, 147.

tool for the study of the size and shape of colloidal particles. In the following pages an outline is given of the attempts made to study the particle size and stability of colloidal suspensions and emulsions.

## 2. EXPERIMENT

The box used for studying the polarisation of the scattered light in different directions is shown in fig. 1. A and B are made of sheet metal and have openings at C, D, E and F for the incident and transmitted beams of light. At O is placed a round-bottomed flask of diameter 6 cm. The solution or emulsion studied is taken inside the flask. To enable us to study the light scattered in different directions suitable windows are cut on the sides of A and B. The sides of the box are blackened with Japan enamel. The flask is also blackened on the outside leaving a small slit running symmetrically round the flask in a horizontal plane. The width of the slit was 2 mm.


The source of light is a mercury arc lamp which is placed inside a closed wooden box. The light emerging from a small slit in the box is rendered parallel by a convex lens placed at the proper distance. The parallel beam is focussed at the centre of the flask with the help of a lens of long focal length (about 10 inches).

To render the light monochromatic, a Zeiss monochromatic filter (B) transmitting 80% of the 5461 radiation was placed in the path of the incident beam.

The scattered light was observed through a horizontal window 5 mm.  $\times$  1 mm. The depolarisation factor was measured with a double-image prism and nicol in the usual manner. The double-image prism was adjusted so that the images appeared one over the other. The angle between the two positions of the nicol for which there was equality of intensity between the two images was determined. If this angle is denoted by  $2\theta$ , the depolarisation factor or the ratio of the intensity of the weaker to that of the stronger component is given by  $\tan^2\theta$ .

To render the incident beam polarised in any desired plane, a second nicol was placed in the path of the incident beam. In many of the following measurements, the depolarisation factor has been determined with the incident light (a) unpolarised, (b) vertically polarised and (c) horizontally polarised.

Because of the feeble intensity of the scattered beam, the experiments were conducted in a perfectly dark room. All extraneous light in the direction of observation was cut off by suitable screens with slits cut through them.



Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 cms.

Fig. 1.




Fig. 2.

In this investigation colloids of sulphur and arsenious trisulphide and emulsions of benzene, toluene, aniline and nitrobenzene with water have been studied. The sulphur colloids were prepared by acidifying a dilute solution of sodium thiosulphate with a few drops of dilute sulphuric acid. On shaking the flask, sulphur colloid is obtained having a characteristic colour which changes with the mode of preparation and time. Arsenious trisulphide colloid was prepared by boiling some pure arsenious trioxide dissolved in a beaker of double distilled water. Dust-free hydrogen sulphide was next passed into the diluted solution. To eliminate excess of this gas remaining in solution, a stream of hydrogen gas (dust-free) was passed through the liquid. A fine colloidal solution of arsenious trisulphide now appears in the beaker.

The organic liquids used in the preparation of the emulsions were taken from freshly opened bottles and distilled before use. Double distilled water was taken in a flask and a few drops of benzene were added. When the mixture is shaken well for some time we obtain an emulsion of benzene in water. If on the other hand a few drops of water are added to benzene in excess and the mixture shaken well, we obtain an emulsion of water in benzene. An emulsion was also prepared by leading dust-free benzene vapour into double distilled water. The condensed benzene is dispersed through the water medium as a fine emulsion, more stable than those obtained by the previous method. The other emulsions studied were also prepared by one of these methods. Steam was also passed through dust-free aniline and nitrobenzene and fairly stable emulsions were obtained in these cases.

### 3. RESULTS

Shoulejkin<sup>4</sup> derived several important conclusions from his adaptation of Mie's theory to the special case of the scattering of light by very big colloidal particles. When the particles are very small of the Rayleigh type, the maximum of polarisation corresponds to an angle of  $90^\circ$  and a definite symmetry of scattering can be observed. With particles of diameter about a third of the wavelength of light, a definite asymmetry appears, the forward scattering being larger than the backward scattering. In the case of particles whose diameters are approximately equal to the wavelength of light, the curve of radiation is sharply deformed in the direction of the incident beam. The maximum of polarisation is more displaced from  $90^\circ$  than in the previous case. With the biggest possible particles, we have reflection taking place at the surface of the spheres and also refraction of the light through the particles. These considerations lead Shoulejkin to the result that as the particle size increases, the maximum of polarisation tends to reach the direction

for which the angle is equal to  $2 \tan^{-1} m$  where  $m$  is the ratio of the refractive indices of the particles and of the surrounding medium. A smooth continuous change was thus observed from scattering to reflection and refraction.

Similar calculations have been carried out by Krishnan<sup>6</sup> in the case of optical scattering by particles suspended in a medium of higher refractive index. The conclusions are quite similar to those obtained by Shoulejkin. In another direction however, Krishnan<sup>7</sup> has carried the subject to a field of great interest. His reciprocity theorem in colloid optics shows that if

$q_u$  be the depolarisation factor with the incident light unpolarised,

$q_v$  be the depolarisation factor with the incident light polarised with the electric vector in the vertical direction,

and

$q_h$  be the depolarisation factor with the incident light polarised with the electric vector in a horizontal direction,

then

$$q_u = - \frac{1 + \frac{1}{q_h}}{1 + \frac{1}{q_v}}$$

Krishnan has verified this relation from the results of Subbaramaiya<sup>8</sup> and his own measurements on colloidal solutions, emulsions, suspensions and protein solutions. The depolarisation factors studied give us useful information regarding the size and anisotropy of the colloidal particles.

The results obtained with sulphur colloids are tabulated below. Subbaramaiya prepared sulphur suspensions by adding 8 to 10 drops of a very weak solution of sodium thiosulphate to a large quantity of double distilled water. 3 or 4 drops of very dilute sulphuric acid were then added and the mixture was stirred. A fine suspension of sulphur

7. Proc. Ind. Acad. Sc., 1935, 1, 782. See also *ibid.*, 1935, 1, 717.

8. *Ibid.*, 1935, 1, 709.

was formed. In this investigation the same method has been adopted except that definite concentrations of the acid were employed to study the effect on the scattering of light.

TABLE 1—SULPHUR SUSPENSIONS\*

Test No.	Concentration of acid used.		Soon after mixing.	After 3 hrs.	After 6 hrs.	After 12 hrs.
1.	N/20	$Q_v$	8.0	9.0	10.1	11.2
		$Q_h$	12.8	13.6	14.1	14.4
		$Q_u$ (obs.)	73.0	75.0	77	82
		$Q_u$ (cal.)	65.3	69.0	74.2	79.8
2.	N/20	$Q_v$	10.7	11.2		11.4
		$Q_h$	15.0	15.1		15.2
		$Q_u$ (obs.)	74.0	77.2		78
		$Q_u$ (cal.)	74.1	76.8		77.6
3.	N/10	$Q_v$	10.7	11.3	14.2	14.9
		$Q_h$	13.1	14.2	14.8	15.2
		$Q_u$ (obs.)	88	92	97	98
		$Q_u$ (cal.)	83.5	81.7	96.5	98.3
4.	N	$Q_v$	10.8	12.6		15.2
		$Q_h$	13.2	14.3		15.6
		$Q_u$ (obs.)	86	95		97
		$Q_u$ (cal.)	83.6	89.5		97.8

\* All depolarisation measurements in this paper are given in per cent.

The results for arsenic trisulphide are given in table II below :

TABLE II—ARSENIC TRISULPHIDE

No.	Sample.		Fresh.	After 3 hrs.	After 12 hrs.
1.	Hydrogen sulphide driven off from colloidal solution	$Q_v$	15.2	15.4	16.0
		$Q_h$	37.0	37.2	39.0
		$Q_u$ (obs.)	56.0	56.0	53.0
		$Q_u$ (cal.)	48.9	48.3	49.2
2.	Hydrogen sulphide in solution	$Q_v$	14.3	14.4	15.0
		$Q_h$	45.0	45.0	45.5
		$Q_u$ (obs.)	48.0	48.0	49.0
		$Q_u$ (cal.)	40.3	40.6	41.7

A study was next made of the depolarisation factor in different directions in the plane of scattering. The angles ( $\varphi$ ) given are those between the direction of observation and direction of incidence.

TABLE III—ARSENIC TRISULPHIDE

$\varphi =$	30°	45°	50°	75°	90°	105°	120°	135°	150°
$\varrho_v$	10.0	10.0	9.0	11.1	15.3	15.8	12.0	6.0	3.2
$\varrho_h$	41	46	29	16	24	21	18	10	5
$\varrho_u$	-37	-37	-12	32	48	38	22	11	5.5

The depolarisation factor is plotted against the angle of observation in figure 2. The curve is of special interest. It will be noticed that for incident unpolarised light, the maximum of depolarisation occurs in the neighbourhood of 90°.  $\varrho_v$  is maximum at 100° while  $\varrho_h$  is largest at 45°.

### EMULSIONS

The methods of preparing emulsions have already been outlined. It is a curious fact that the value of  $\varrho_v$  is very high for the emulsions studied indicating that the minute liquid particles were highly anisotropic. This is remarkable in view of the fact that one would expect the liquid droplets to gather up into perfect spherical shapes. The effect of time upon the depolarisation factors was also investigated showing astonishingly large variations. These results lead one to expect that conditions inside the emulsions are characterised by large variations in size and shape of the minute liquid droplets.

*Benzene-water.* The emulsions were not stable when prepared by mixing and shaking. But those obtained by passing benzene vapour in double distilled water were more stable. The depolarisation factors observed for three specimens are given below.

TABLE IV—BENZENE WATER

	Specimen I.	Specimen II.	Specimen III.
$\varrho_h$	95	93	95
$\varrho_v$	29	26	25
$\varrho_u$ (obs.)	93	94	93
$\varrho_u$ (cal.)	49	43	41

A reference to the above table indicates that the formula of Krishnan does not hold good in this case. But a little consideration will show that this need cause no surprise. Krishnan's relation obviously cannot



hold good in this case since it postulates scattering by the matter but does not contemplate reflection—surface or internal. In the case of benzene in water, the refractive index of benzene is greater than that of water and hence it is likely that part of the incident light gets transmitted into the droplets and suffers internal reflection (one or more) at the droplet boundary. This would account for a large amount of unpolarised light in the lateral beam.

*Toluene-water.* As in the case of benzene, emulsions of toluene in water were more stable. It should however be confessed that the measurements were far from being consistent and emulsions produced by the same methods under apparently identical conditions gave considerably divergent values. Since however a verification of the relation of Krishnan was one of the objects of this work, such fluctuations were disregarded.

To investigate the problem of any influence likely to be exercised by the container on the depolarisation measurements, readings were taken with emulsions in a rectangular cell and in the spherical vessel as outlined earlier. No difference was found to exist. Further, in the case of emulsions, the filter did not influence the depolarisation factors.

TABLE V—TOLUENE IN WATER

	Rectangular cell.		Spherical bulb.	
	With filter.	Without filter.	With filter.	Without filter.
$Q_v$	26	26	25	25
$Q_h$	44	44	43	43
$Q_u$ (obs.)	66	65	64	64
$Q_u$ (cal.)	68	68	66	66

In the following table are given the depolarisation factors at different time intervals.

TABLE VI—TOLUENE IN WATER

	Fresh.	½ hr.	1 hr.	12 hrs.	1 day.	2 days.
$Q_v$	64	31	44	76	10	32
$Q_h$	88	88	21	21	22	36
$Q_u$ (obs.)	50	43	79	86	7	11
$Q_u$ (cal.)	83	49	55	41	49	91

It will be noticed that there is no systematic variation of the depolarisation factors with time. A result of much greater regularity was

obtained when the emulsion was prepared by passing steam through a bottle containing dust-free toluene and stabilising the emulsion by adding a few drops of very dilute soap solution.

TABLE VII—WATER IN TOLUENE

	Fresh.	1 hour.	12 hours.	1 day.	2 days.
$Q_v$	28	40	42	45	57
$Q_h$	69	83	84	86	93
$Q_u$ (obs.)	39	42	45	47	50
$Q_u$ (cal.)	54	63	65	69	76

This table shows that the depolarisation factors change gradually with time and there are no irregular variations. The relations however do not appear to be verified here, obviously because of internal reflection of light in the minute droplets.

Measurements made on another sample prepared in a similar manner are given below. It will be noted that there is a close agreement between these results and those given in the above table.

TABLE VIII—WATER IN TOLUENE

	Fresh.	1 hour.	1 day.	2 days.
$Q_v$	31	43	51	70
$Q_h$	65	78	84	92
$Q_u$ (obs.)	39	42	44	52
$Q_u$ (cal.)	60	68	73	86

The disagreement between the observed and calculated values may, as in the previous cases, be attributed to reflections of the incident beam.

The depolarisation factors were next measured for the above emulsion in different directions in the plane of scattering. The values obtained are given in the following table :

TABLE IX—WATER IN TOLUENE

$\varphi =$	30°	45°	60°	90°	105°	120°	135°
$Q_v$	17	16	9	35	51	65	63
$Q_h$	52	82	82	75	39	29	52
$Q_u$	-26	-12	39	69	78	75	51

The nature of the variation of any one of these factors is similar to what was obtained in the case of arsenic trisulphide except for the fact that the values of  $Q_u$  are greater.

*Aniline-water.* The results obtained with emulsions prepared by shaking dust-free aniline vigorously with water show that reflections play a large part in the intensity of the observed illumination in a transverse direction.

TABLE X—ANILINE-WATER

	Fresh.	After 12 hours.
$Q_v$	81	73
$Q_h$	86	54
$Q_u$ (obs.)	83	84
$Q_u$ (cal.)	96	83

The depolarisation factors for the polarised incident beams decrease with time indicating that the liquid droplets become less asymmetric.

*Nitrobenzene-water.* The emulsions were prepared by shaking water to which was added a small quantity of nitrobenzene. The results obtained are similar to those of aniline-water emulsions.

TABLE XI—NITROBENZENE-WATER

	Specimen I.		Specimen II.		
	Fresh.	After 1 hr.	Fresh.	After 1 hr.	After 1 day.
$Q_v$	84	84	80	84	84
$Q_h$	63	63	60	63	63
$Q_u$ (obs.)	85	85	90	85	85
$Q_u$ (cal.)	85	85	84	85	85

The depolarisation factors were then measured in different directions in the plane of scattering. The values obtained are given in table XII.

TABLE XII—NITROBENZENE-WATER

$\varphi =$	45°	60°	90°	120°	135°
$Q_v$	70	62	84	78	67
$Q_h$	61	52	63	79	86
$Q_u$	93	69	85	98	71

An examination of the above table shows that the unpolarised incident light gives rise to a maximum depolarisation at about 120°. For incident light polarised with the electric vector vertical, we observe maximum depolarisation at some angle between 90° and 120°. When

the incident light is polarised with the electric vector horizontal, the maximum of depolarisation occurs at about  $120^\circ$ . Thus in all the three cases the maximum of depolarisation occurs at some angle above  $90^\circ$  and on the theory of Mie as developed by Shoulejkin, this would indicate that the emulsion droplets have dimensions a little larger than the wavelength of the light used. The matter will be discussed at length in the next section.

#### 4. DISCUSSION

Before undertaking a discussion on the measurements, a word may be mentioned about the convergence correction. The convergence correction is usually given as  $\Omega^2/2$  where  $\Omega$  is the semi-angle of convergence at the focal spot of the condensing lens. In the present investigation, this angle was  $0.15$  and hence the convergence correction works to  $1.1\%$ . This value has to be *subtracted* from the values given in the foregoing tables. Since our aim however is to study comparatively the depolarisation factors under various conditions, this small correction is not of great significance.

From the theory outlined in the first section, it is well known that as the scattering particles grow in size from molecular dimensions, a striking change takes place in the distribution of intensity of the scattered light in different directions. A variation of the depolarisation factor in any direction of scattering also takes place. The following table is adapted from a paper of Krishnan. The values of the depolarisation factor with the incident light vector horizontal are given here as the ratios of the *weaker* vertical to the *stronger* horizontal components in the scattered light.

TABLE XIII

Case.	Nature of particle.	$q_u$	$q_v$	$q_h$
1.	Small spherical particles.	.. 0	0	0
2.	Spherical particles of finite size	.. <1	0	0
3.	Small ellipsoidal particles	.. <1	<1	1
4.	Ellipsoidal particles of finite size	.. <1	<1	<1

It is clear from a reference to the above table that measurements made in this investigation will yield a good picture of the size and shape of the colloidal particles or emulsions. A finite value of  $q_u$  indicates that the particles are not small. The values of  $q_v$  on the other hand give more useful information regarding the asymmetry of shape of the particles, the larger the value of  $q_v$  (always less than 1), the more ellip-

soidal the shape. The values of  $q_h$  are equally useful and supplement the information from the other measurements.

These methods have been applied to the case of colloidal solutions, emulsions and protein suspensions by Subbaramaiya and Krishnan. The latter worker also investigated a few binary liquid mixtures, some pure liquids and optical glasses. He claims to have shown the presence of large clusters of particles of dimensions equal to the wavelength of light even in pure liquids like formic and acetic acids. While this special inference needs confirmation from other well-known properties of liquids, there is no doubt that the method is a powerful one and is bound to throw much light on the size and shape of the scattering elements.

Our results for sulphur suspensions are in general accord with those of Subbaramaiya although our values of  $q_u$  are much smaller. A reference to the above table will indicate that here we are dealing with ellipsoidal particles of finite size. The particles are small and definitely asymmetric. Further the size and shape alter very little with time, showing however a tendency on the part of particles to become larger and more asymmetric. The changes are not large even after 12 hours. The large variation obtained by Subbaramaiya has not been noticed in this case.

The depolarisation factors observed with suspensions of arsenic trisulphide are of great interest. The results of Subbaramaiya are given in the following table :

TABLE XIV—ARSENIC TRISULPHIDE

	Fresh.	After 5½ hrs.	After 18½ hrs.
$q_u$ Blue	13·4	23·5	27·1
Red	4·7	11·5	16
$q_v$	2·1	4·9	6·9
$q_h$	90	70	55

Our values for  $q_u$  are larger while those of  $q_h$  are smaller than those of Subbaramaiya. These may indicate that the suspensions prepared in the present work were larger and less asymmetric than those of this investigator. It should however be remembered that he used white light and gets two different values using blue and red filters. This indicates that the wavelength of the incident light modifies the measurements considerably. We think that since the depolarisation factors have different values in the different parts of the spectrum, no direct

comparison of the relations would be possible if white light is used. Subbaramaiya has himself drawn attention to the difficulty of comparing the two components of the scattered light which are different in colour. It is essential to use monochromatic light for a detailed study and any broad differences between our results and those of Subbaramaiya should be attributed to this cause.

It is found in the present work that both  $\rho_u$  and  $\rho_h$  tend to increase with time while  $\rho_h$  is either constant or shows a small decrease. The observed values of  $\rho_u$  are greater than those calculated by assuming Krishnan's relation. The depolarisation values suggest that the particles become slightly larger and perhaps a little more asymmetric. The effect of removing hydrogen sulphide is to increase the value of  $\rho_h$  effectively. The particles become smaller without suffering any change in the asymmetry. This may be due to a layer of hydrogen sulphide molecules around the colloidal particles, some of which are perhaps driven off by leading a stream of hydrogen gas through the colloidal solution.

Taking into consideration the variation of the depolarisation factors with the direction of scattering, it will be noticed that the maximum values of these factors are obtained at scattering angles just greater than  $90^\circ$ . At the same time the values of  $\rho_u$  at small angles of scattering are negative indicating that at these inclinations, the vertical component is stronger than the horizontal component. A reference to Shoulejkin's paper indicates that for those particles whose diameter is approximately equal to the wavelength of light, such a reversal takes place at some angle between  $20^\circ$  and  $40^\circ$ . In the present investigation, the reversal occurs at about  $50^\circ$ . Since the depolarisation depends not merely on the angle of observation but also on the refractive index of the material of the particles in relation to that of the medium in which they are suspended and on the shape of the particles, a coincidence between the theoretical and experimental values in this account should not be expected. That a reversal of the sign takes place is in full accord with theory. This would indicate that the arsenic trisulphide particles prepared in this work possess dimensions of about  $0.5\mu$ .

The results obtained with emulsions show that generally speaking the depolarisation factors for incident polarised light have got relatively large values. This suggests that the suspended droplets should have dimensions of the order of the wavelength of light. A large anisotropy is also indicated. One would expect the droplets to be perfectly spherical but the large depolarisation values show that they are highly asymmetric. This is a surprising result and is in agreement with similar observations by Subbaramaiya.

Attention may be drawn to the large discrepancy between the calculated and observed values of the depolarisation factor, when the incident light is unpolarised. Some agreement is obtained in the case of toluene and water (see table V) but in all the other cases the departures are serious. It is noted that whenever the values of  $\rho_v$  and  $\rho_h$  are large, such discrepancies are in evidence. A straight inference from this observation is that the deviations are prominent only when the particles or droplets are large and highly asymmetric. Under such circumstances, the possibility of reflections taking place at the boundary between the droplet and the surrounding liquid would have to be considered. Krishnan's relation holds good when the particles scatter the incident beam and does not include cases where reflections occur in addition to scattering.

## 5. SUMMARY

The scattering of light (wavelength=5462Å) by colloids of sulphur and arsenic trisulphide and emulsions of benzene, toluene, aniline and nitrobenzene with water, has been investigated. The depolarisation factors were observed transversely and in differing angles of scattering for three cases (a) with the incident light unpolarised (b) with the incident light polarised with the electric vector vertical and (c) with the incident light polarised with the electric vector horizontal. For the colloidal suspensions studied, it is found that the particles possess dimensions of about the wavelength of light. Their asymmetry is also striking. More surprising is the strong asymmetry noticed with the emulsions. Krishnan's relation connecting the three depolarisation factors is found to be valid for the colloidal suspensions, particularly when the depolarisation is small. In the case however of emulsions, serious discrepancies have been observed and these are attributed to reflections of the incident light occurring at the boundary between the droplet and the surrounding medium.

Our thanks are due to the authorities of the Annamalai University for the award of a studentship to one of us which has rendered this work possible.

# The Age of Tholkappiam

By

S. S. BHARATI

(*Annamalai University*)

Tholkāppiam is the classic grammar in the Tamil language. This is held to be the oldest extant book in the Tamil literature. Pandits of the old school claim for this book an antiquity of some eight to ten thousand years. There are others who contend that this is perhaps the latest of the early literature and is not earlier than the ninth or eighth century A.D. To find out the truth between these two extreme views is no easy task. In my thesis "Tamil classics and Tamilaham" written over 20 years ago, I tried to discuss some of the salient arguments of these extremists, and as a result of my investigation on the materials then available to me, I suggested that this great Tamil grammar may be assigned to about 500 B.C. Many others have since gone into this question and have written learned disquisitions about this controversy, and recently in a Madras University publication known as the "The Chronology of the early Tamils," a definite stand is taken by its writer, and the Pro-modernist view is advocated in a highly provocative challenging manner. It is time, in my opinion, that the whole question is reviewed in a dispassionate scientific spirit in the interest of truth : and I propose to prepare the ground for such a final decisive verdict in the world of Letters by an attempted approach to the truth in a twofold manner. Let me first try to test the worth and value of and valid warrant for the modernist arguments advanced in the chronology ; and thereafter I shall marshal out and summarise the salient historic and literary evidences which would affirmatively indicate the real truth about this matter. As many problems relating to the history of the Tamil literature depend on the place and position of Tholkāppiam in that literature, and are sure to be coloured by one's outlook on this question of the Age of Tholkāppiam, its importance warrants an earnest inquiry into its truth. And I shall presently deal with the first part of this inquiry, viz., an assessment of the value and validity of the specific data given in the Chronology to refute Tholkāppiam's claims for antiquity.

Dewan Bahadur S. E. Runganadan drew my attention to a review of the Chronology of the Early Tamils in the "Hindu." The reviewer's remarks interested me deeply : particularly the hearty approval he ac-



corded to the conclusions of the learned author of the Chronology recording the Age of Tholkāppiam aroused my curiosity. Directly I secured a copy of the Chronology and read it through with all the attention and care which such an University publication as the Chronology and the startling new theories expounded therein would demand. It struck me that the general remark of the Professor in his review that the book reveals some settled bias is really more warranted than the approval of the reviewer regarding the Age of Tholkāppiam.. It is obvious that both the author and the reviewer of the Chronology have some instinctive bias against the great antiquity which traditions and Tamil scholarship agree in according to the classical Tamil Vyakaranam. It is my purpose here briefly to canvass the reasons given in Appendix XV of the Chronology to prove that Tholkāppiam should be assigned rather to 600 A.D. or a later time than to 600 B.C. or an earlier age. Five particular points are emphasised by the learned author of the Chronology in the Appendix in support of his conclusions. Let me deal with them seriatim.

1. As the “Venkatam” hills are mentioned in the preface or ‘Payiram’ to Tholkāppiam as the northern limit of Tamilakam, and as the name ‘Venkatam’ itself is not mentioned in any Tamil literary works earlier than that of ‘Kalladanar’ of the 7th generation of the Chronology, its author argues that Tholkāppiam should be of a later age. For the first time, according to this author, Karikalan II extended the Tamil rule as far as the “Venkatam” hills. If the author’s premise is an established fact, there may be some force in his argument. But the very basis for this argument is an unproved and unwarranted assumption, and will be found to be founded on an error in fact. In the first place Tholkāppiam makes no reference to “Venkatam” at all; and the “Payiram” which mentions Venkatam is not the work of the author of Tholkāppiam. Again it is a cardinal canon for all research workers that no valid argument can be based on mere absence of reference in any books to the points at issue in a discussion. No Sangam poet set himself to write any geographical treatises as such. He need not have mentioned anything on earth unless it had some necessary bearing on or relation to the subjects he was poetising upon. There are innumerable rivers, hills, valleys and villages in the Tamil Nad, that no poet ever referred to; and no one will seriously argue against their existence from the absence of any reference to any of them in the works of the literary writers. Thus the first point for the argument against the antiquity of Tholkāppiam is found to be a bubble that stands no pricking.

But this is not all. The very hypothesis for this whole argument is untenable. That the “Venkatam” is not mentioned in any early Sangam

work and cannot receive any such mention, because till Karikalan II extended his kingdom in the 6th century for the first time the “Venkatam” hills lay far far north of the limits of Tamilakam, are statements which are as incorrect as they are unwarranted. The author of the Chronology has yet to establish this opinion he hazards about Karikalan II being the first warrior that extended his conquests to the foot of the “Venkatam” hills. He only throws out these suggestions as arising out of his surmises from the absence of any earlier references to the Chola conquest of Aruvanadu before Karikalan II. But he knows as well as any Tamil scholar that Aruvanadu was always part and parcel of the Tamil Nad; and as a matter of fact from the early times the Vadugas called the Tamils and their language by the name of this northern-most Tamil province, which bordered the Andhradesa. “Aravam” and “Aravars” are the Vadugu appellations for the Tamils and their language, famously familiarised by the author of “Parani” by his felicitous reference to the cries of the fleeing Vaduga warriors when vanquished by the great Chola general Karunakara Thondaiman in his conquest of “Kalinga.”

The author of the Chronology admits in his book after an elaborate discussion that Purananuru, Agananuru, Narrinai and Kuruntokai (should) form the main basis and supply us with the primary evidence for the early history of the “Tamils”, and that “Padirrupattu and Pattupattu are by their style and subject matter not far removed from them.” Almost all these old classics refer to the “Venkatam” hills, and reinforce the tradition that not only these hills formed the northern bourn of the old Tamilakam, but that they were part of Tamilakam being ruled over by Tamil chieftains. Verses 381, 385, 389 and 391 of Purananuru will make this fact abundantly clear. “ஒலிவெள்ளருவி வேங்கடநாடன்”

(381) “கல்விழி யருவி வேங்கடங்கிழவோன்” (389)

Nothing can give more definite evidence than these references to the Tamilian proprietorship and sovereignty of the Venkatam hills. And “Purananuru” is the oldest extant Tamil classic and Agananuru comes next to that according to the author of the Chronology. Let us therefore see if any and what evidence we may find in the Agananuru collection as regards this unchanging hill boundary of the old Tamilakam. Again verses numbers, 61, 211, 27, 213, 85, and some others as well speak of the “Venkatam” as being in the territory of the Tamil chieftains.

“மழபுலம் நணக்கிய மாவண்புல்லி விழவுடை விழுச்சீர் வேங்கடம் பெறினும்”

(61). Stanza 14 of “Narrinai” says the same story. In the face of this overwhelming evidence in all the oldest Tamil classics for treating the ‘Venkatam’ hills as in and of the old Tamil Nad, it is difficult to

appreciate the argument of the author of the Chronology against the antiquity of Tholkāppiam on the score that the preface or 'Payiram of Panamparanar affixed to Tholkappiam refers to the "Venkatam" as the northern boundary of Tamilakam.

2. The second point of attack against the antiquity of Tholkappiam is founded on a presumption that the rulers in the Tamil country of the Sangam Age were all petty tribal chiefs, and none of them was a crowned king. Because Tholkappiam refers to the three crowned kings in the Tamilakam, therefore it should be of a very late period when some chieftains had established kingdoms and came to wear crowns also. It may well be that in the pre-historic remotest past, some warrior chiefs may have founded the thrones that acquired renown as the three great kingdoms in the Tamilakam. But what is the warrant for this author's dictum that in the Age of the now extant Sangam poetry, there was not and could not be any crowned monarch in the whole Tamil Nad. He hazards an opinion that the founder and first ruler of the Chola dynasty was Veliyan Thithan and he was only a Vēnmān or crownless petty chieftain of Veerai, a coastal town in the estuary of the Kaveri river, or that he and his son ruled their people in the Chola territory without wearing a crown. That Thithan conquered and planted himself in Uranthai may or may not be confirmed by further research. But even were it true, this would not conclude that there were no crowned kings in Uranthai. On the other hand Thithan himself may have usurped the crown with the throne of Uranthai kingdom. A chieftain may well conquer and establish his dynasty over a kingdom. Far from confirming the suggestion in the Chronicle, the very poets he quotes in this connection lend support to the fact, that Uranthai was not a mere manorial or baronial town. but was the famous capital of the Chola line of kings even at the time of Thithan.

“ வென்றி முரசின் விதற்போர்ச் சோழன்  
இன்குடங் கள்ளின் உறந்தை யாங்கண் ”

(Agam. 137).

“ வெல்போர்ச் சோழர் அழியும் பெருங்காட்டு ”

(Narrinai 87).

“ மறங்கெழு சோழ ருறந்தையவையத்  
தறநின் று நிலையிற்றூதலின் ”

(Puram. 39).

There is no specific proof that Venman Veliyan was the lineal ancestor or the prepositus of the Chola house of Karikalan, or even that

the Veerai chieftain permanently established his dynasty over the Urañthai throne. The very rule laid down by the author in his chronology appears to rule out this surmise of his. He says "Three generations is the utmost limit to which a person could be assigned, and that too in very exceptional circumstances only. But beyond it, neither facts of history nor demands of logic would permit us to go." In his chronological tables (1) Veliyam Thithan, the Veerai chieftain, is shown as the prepositus of the Chola dynasty. (2) Thithan Veliyan, his son, is shown as the successor in second generation on the Urañthai throne. (3) Mudithalaikko-Perunarkilli is mentioned as the son and successor of this latter Thithan (No. 2), in the third generation. (4) Velpahradakkai Perunarkilli as succeeding (No. 3) in the fourth generation. (5) Uruvappahrār Ilancēcenni succeeds (No. 4) in the fifth generation. And the poet, Paraṇar, is assigned in this table to be the eulogist of all except the second Thithan of these five Chola kings of Urañthai in unbroken succession. This offends the above peremptory postulate which the author has himself approvingly emphasised in his book. Paraṇar could not possibly have adorned the courts of five successive generations of the Urañthai kings besides being in courts of Nedumceraladan, Chenguttuvan and others, as well as a number of Velir chiefs such as Pehan and Neduman Anji. The only acceptable position would be that these several heroes Paraṇar belauds in his poems should be more or less contemporaries, and are not to be reckoned as successors surviving each other to five generations.

It is perhaps to explain away this patent and fatal objection, it is just insinuated in the Chronology and its schedule that poet Paraṇar only addressed the Chola kings from the third generation as a contemporary of those kings, while his verses about the earlier Chola rulers in Urañthai were only posthumous eulogiums by Paraṇar based on hearsay reports of their exploits. The language and nature of these poems do not afford warrant for any such differentiation. Paraṇar's verses about Thithan the Ist and Mudithalai-ko, *alias* Karikalan I of the Chronology, and particularly Stanza No. 6 in Aham series could suggest contemporaneity of the poet with the hero-kings as consistently as those about the later Cholas do. Of course Puram verses may be addressed to kings directly; whereas the poems of the Aham series by their very nature can only be indirect references to the kings. For, all direct personal references are tabooed in Aham poetry. But tenses, moods and other circumstantial indications in the Aham verses of Paraṇar about Thithan and his alleged grandson in the schedule to the Chronology, far from militating against the poet's contemporaneity, almost suggest it to such an extent that one may well infer that there were more than one poet by the name of Paraṇar in the Sangam Age. The

real point is that the verses in the name of Parānar cited and relied on for the chronological pedigree do not warrant, and much less prove the author's assumptions. Even if Parānar's references to Tithan of Uraṇthai and to Mudithalai-ko-Perunkilli were to be brushed aside as mere posthumous eulogies based on hearsay reports, nevertheless, according to the Chronology the astounding fact still stares us in the face, *viz.*, Parānar belauds personally Pahradaikai Perunarkilli in the fourth and Ilamchetchenni in the fifth generation in the Chronology, as much as he does in Pattirrupattu the King Cheran Chenguttuvan, whom the author of the Chronology takes to be the grandson of Karikalan, who was son to Ilamchetchenni. This would make Parānar a contemporary of five generations of kings, a longevity out of the range of credibility. On these facts, the theory that all the five Chola rulers of Uraṇthai in the first five generations in the chronological table, were uncrowned petty chiefs, and that only Karikalan in the sixth generation for the first time assumed the royal role, fails.

Moreover in the absence of their distinctive dynastic appellations such as Valavan or Killi for the Cholas, Cheliyan or Maran for Pandyas, and Cheral or Vanavan for the Cheras, the adjunct Ko is added to the names of kingly rulers to indicate that they are crowned monarchs of these three immemorial Tamil kingdoms, as distinct from mere ruling chiefs and feudatories who go by the names of Vels and Venmans. The names of almost all the rulers of Uraṇthai are spoken of in the Sangam literature, and even in the table of chronological pedigree under review, either with their respective dynastic titles or with the royal appellation of Ko. This fact also would militate against the conjecture that all the Uraṇthai rulers prior to Karikalan were only Velir chiefs without crowns.

Again, the schedule to the Chronology mentions two Karikalans, the first in the third, and the second in the sixth generation; and in support thereof some verses (Puram 65 and 66) are cited. Obviously these citations reveal that there must be much confusion in the ordering and grouping of kings of the Chola dynasty in the schedule to the Chronology. Puram stanzas 65 and 66 specifically refer to and praise the exploits of Karikalan in the famous battle of "Venni." The poem "Porunar Arrupadai" of Mudathama Kanniyaṛ, cited for Karikalan II in this schedule, narrates just these very exploits in Venni-battle which on the authority of Puram verses 65 and 66 the author of the Chronology attributes to his Karikalan I. It is not suggested that there were two battles in Venni, and in each the victory went to the Chola king having the same name of Karikala. The Puram verses only give the name of the Venni-victor as Karikalan; but they do not say whose son he was.

“Porunar Arrupadai” expressly says that the conqueror of the other two contemporary rival crowned kings at Venni was the son of Uruva Pahrer Ilamchetchenni. The hero of Pattina Palai is neither the son of Ilamchetchenni, nor the victor of Venni battle; he is not even known as Karikalan. His real name is Perumavalavan; and he is the son of Karikalan. (*Vide* Pazhamozhi verse No. 105.) This stanza leaves no doubt as to the respective identities of and relationship between the Venni-victor Karikalcholan, and the hero king immortalised in Pattina Palai. Karikalan means “he who had the burnt-foot.” Karikalan earned that name because he had his foot burnt in his child-hood, *vide* the following venbas :—

1. முச்சக் கரமு மளப்பதற்கு நீட்டியகால்  
இச்சக் கரமே யளந்ததால்—செய்ச்செய்  
அரிகான்மேற் தேன்றெடுக்கும் ஆய்புண்ணீர் நாடன்  
கரிகாலன் கானெருப் புற்று  
(பத்துப்பாட்டு-பொருநராற்றுப்படை முடிவிலுள்ளது)
2. சுடப்பட்ட ஓயிருயந்த சோழன் மகனும்  
பிடர்த்தலைப்பேரானைப்பெற்றுக்—கடைக்காற்  
செயிரறு செங்கோல் செலீஇயினு னில்லை  
உயிருடையா ரெய்தா வினை.  
(பழமொழி 105)

This Chola king Karikalan's son was kept out of his birthright in his boyhood; and this adventurous Chola scion escaped from his captivity eluding his prisoners, and won back his ancestral Chola crown by his daring military *coup-de-main* with the aid of loyal allies. This story and happy denouncement, exquisitely eulogised in Pattina Palai, are succinctly summarised in this Pazhamozhi venba. In later times, this martial son of Karikalan was confused with his father; and their respective exploits have been indifferently mixed up by indiscriminate writers. That Pattina Palai neither names its hero as Karikalan, nor alludes to any exploits of the famous battles of Venni and Vahai which are exclusive laurels only of Karikalan—the son of Ilamchetchenni, is eloquently significant: Also the incidents of the youthful life of the victor in Venni and Vahai as given in Porunar Arrupadai are irreconcilably at variance with those of the early life of the hero of Pattina Palai. These facts were first noticed by and elaborated in a research thesis of Mahavidwan R. Raghava Iyengar of this University: and when he drew my attention to them, I suggested to him the venba from Pazhamozhi as not only confirming his thesis *viz.*, the Pattina Palai hero was different from Karikalan of Venni and Vahai fame, but as also affording further

proof of the real relationship between these two great Chola kings as father and son.

There is yet another confusion in the Chronology between Tithan, the Chola king of Uranthai, and a Venman or chieftain of Veerai. All the citations in the Chronology in support of the identity of these different personalities except one verse from Narrinai, make no reference whatever to Veerai or Venman in relation to Tithan of Uranthai. Puram stanzas 6, 122, 352 and 395 all speak simply of "Thithan's Uranthai," without any other adjunct. Even the Aham verse No. 226 refers only to Tithan Velian's Uranthai, and gives no warrant to connect this Tithan of Uranthai with any Venmanship of Veerai. All these poems further emphasise that Uranthai was ever the abiding capital of Tithan under his aegis, and would not admit even remotely any possible hint of his conquest or usurpation of Uranthai. Thithan is the personal name of this Chola king of Uranthai. Velian was one of his titles or surnames suggesting his conquest of "Veliam" a chera citadel. Aham verse 359 expressly names this place as belonging to the Chera ruler.

"வானவரம்பன் வெளியத்தன்ன" Aham 208 also speaks of this 'Veliam' as being under the Chera Venman general, Aay Yeyinan 'வெளியன் லண்மான் ஆய்ளயினன்" And if the Chola king Thithan conquered this Chera citadel 'Veliam,' nothing is more natural than for him to add the title 'Velian,' suggesting his martial victory over the place. Thus, Tithan or Tithan Velian were both one and the same Chola-king that ruled over Uranthai, the time-old Chola metropolis in the classic age. The Narrinai line relied on in the Chronology to identify this Chola king with a petty Velir chief of Veerai seems to read into it a totally different story altogether. The relevant lines of this verse run as follows :—

" .....

வீரவேண்மான் வெளியன் துத்தன்

முரசுமுதற்கொளீஇய மாலை விளக்கின்,

வெண்கோடியம்ப நுண்பனியரும்பக்

கையறவந்த பொழுதொடு .....”(நற்றிணை 58)

The first line is read to mean that it is all one reference to Veerai Venman being or having become the Velian Tithan of Uranthai. That the language of this verse cannot bear this suggestion is patent on its very face. If all the words 'Veerai Venman Veliam Tithan' in this line go to name a single person, then the following lines are left bald and bereft of all meaning. These lines speak of some military exploit as worthy of praise. The plain and intelligible meaning of the second line here, is and could only be this. "Like unto the vespertine rows of lamps

lighted in commemoration of the capture of the Drum, etc., etc., etc., etc.” Such a statement would be unmeaning, unless it were completed in sense by mentioning the victor and the vanquished in this connection. i.e., the winner and the loser of the drum, etc. mentioned in this second line here. If the entire first line were taken as referring only to one person, he may be the winner or the loser of the drum and other things. The poet would give no information whatever, by leaving his lines so vaguely indefinite as to make no sense out of his lines. The first line therefore must be read to furnish all the particulars necessary to render it in accord with the second line an intelligent and intelligible allusion to some laudable event of military exploit. The words in the first line just appear to answer to this end. Veerai Venman was the chief that perhaps vanquished another Velir chief of Veliam by name ‘Tithan.’ Veerai and Veliam are two seats of Velir chiefs, situated in the Chola and Chera regions respectively (*Vide* Aham 206 and 208.) A Velir chief of Veerai perhaps won a victory over another Velir chief of Veliam, and seized his War-Drum, etc. in the battle. These lines of the Narrinai verse here refer only to this incident. The War-Drum, etc. etc. referred to in the second line were those of Thithan of Veliam seized by the Venman of Veerai. Thus read, the Narrinai verse makes cogent sense; and also shows that this Tithan who lost his Drum to the Venman chief of Veerai, a Chola feudatory, was a Chera lieutenant in charge of Veliam, and had nothing whatever to do with the Chola king Tithan of Uranthai; who also once conquered Veliam perhaps, and therefore assumed the honorific surname ‘Velian’ to signify that victory of his. This seems to be not only more probable in the light of the many verses cited above, but also the only way to reconcile them all into harmony and accord, as well as to give sense and cogent meaning to the Narrinai stanza No. 58 cited in the Chronology.

Finally, one would like to be shown some clear authority or definite reference in any Sangam classic before being asked to accept the suggestion that the “Veerai Venman Veliyan Thithan” is to be identified with the Thithan referred to in the line “தித்தனுமந்தை” by Paranar in Agam 22. The mere fact that an Uranthai ruler’s name was Thithan will be no warrant to conclude that he must be the Venman Thithan of Veerai praised by ‘Mudukurranar’ in Agam. There is not only no evidence for identifying these namesakes; but there is also not the faintest hint in the whole Sangam literature even to suggest that the Veerai chief ever invaded or conquered Uranthai. That very fact that Veerai chieftain is specifically spoken of as Veerai Venman, while this distinctive appellation is dropped in the case of the Uranthai Thithan should preclude any suggestion of identity between them. They



are not even spoken of by the same poet. Paranar the earliest poet sings of Uranthai Thithan, while Mudukurranar speaks of Veerai Venman. These two poets have to be reckoned as contemporaries only because the heroes they belaud are assumed to be one and the same person. This is reversing all rules of research. If the identity of their heroes is otherwise established, it may then suggest contemporaneity for the two poets who eulogise that common hero. But when neither the identity of the heroes, nor the contemporaneity of the eulogising poets is proved, it is unthinkable to build any argument for one from the other of the two unproved and probably unprovable statements.

Thus the whole argument of the Chronologist on this head against the antiquity of Tholkappiam is found to have no feet to stand on. Venman Thithan is not proved to be the first Chola victor of Uranthai ; and even if Veerai Venman were really the conqueror of Uranthai, that in itself cannot prove that there was no crown for the Uranthai rulers in those times.

There is just one more point that calls for consideration in this connection. That Uranthai was a mere Baronial seat of some electorate or petty principality, and not the capital of a kingdom before Karikalan is again an obiter, if not an ipse dixit of the author of the Chronology, and rests on no higher authority than his own surmise. On the contrary all the references in the earliest Sangam poems point to Uranthai as the Chola metropolis (*Vide* Puram Stanzas 39, 58, 69, 352, 395), and the Cholanad as one of those three famous kingdoms of Yore. (*Vide* Puram stanzas 13, 35, 38, 40, 61, 67, 174, 212, 382).

This writer facetiously concludes that the reference in Tholkappiam to the three Tamil kings (வண்புகழ் மூவார்) itself disproves its antiquity, because he presumes that the "general phrase" 'three kings' cannot refer particularly to the Tamil kings at a time "when there were seven or eleven kings and a host of them besides on a proper counting." It is difficult to divine what this author really means by this sentence. He cannot mean seriously to argue that passages in poems like "எழுவரும் வீழ்" "சேழார் குடிக்குரியோர் ஒன்பதின்மர்" refer to as many independent kings. Even in later times after the three monarchies were firmly established in Tamilakam according to this writer, eulogists praise the prowess of victors in war as having vanquished five, seven or nine rulers. Here at least these numbers must mean only as many ruling chiefs, under the suzerainty real or nominal of one or the other of the three crowned kings of Tamilakam. Not only Tholkappiam, but even Purananuru (the oldest according to the author of the Chronology) refers to three monarchs almost in language identical with that of Tholkappiam he is here animadverting upon.

The parallel passages may here be compared with advantage in this connection.

## Tholkappiam.

## Purananuru.

வண்புகழ் மூவர் தண்பொழில் வரைப்  
பின்  
நாற்பெயரெல்லை யகத்தவர் வழங்கும்  
(தொல். செய். சூ. 391)

மண்டிணிகிடக்கைத் தண்டமிழ்க்கிழவர்  
மூரசு முழங்குதானே மூவருள்ளும்  
அரசெனப்படுவது நினதேபெரும,  
(புறம். 39)

Vide also stanza 367 of Puram to the same effect.

The author of the Chronology takes the second line of his quotation from Tholkappiam “நாற்பெயரெல்லை” as referring to the four mandalams or kingdoms of the later Tamilian history, i.e. Chera, Chola, Pandya and the later born Thiraya or Thondai. On this assumption he concludes that Tholkappiam must have been composed only after the latest Thondai or Thiraya kingdom came into existence. In support of this argument he seems to rely on statements of Ilampuranar under this Sutram. He writes as follows:—

“The political division to which the third extract refers is not at all applicable to the period of the synchronistic tables. The commentator rightly expounds that it comprised the four major political provinces of the Tamilakam of Tholkappianar’s days, *viz.*, Pandya mandalam, Malai (Chera) mandalam, Cholamandalam and Thondaimandalam. What we have to note in this connection is that the fourfold political division to which Tholkappianar alludes in his Sutrams is the picture of a later Tamilakam which we have no right to project into the times of the dynastic kings appearing in the synchronistic tables. Tholkappiyar’s reference must be strictly construed as mirroring the conditions of a much later period in the political history of the Tamils.” Perasiriyar’s is acknowledged on all hands to be the standard commentary higher in authority than the Ilampuranar’s for Cheyyuliyal of Tholkappiam; and Perasiriyar rightly repudiates Ilampuranar’s gloss here, and interprets the Sutram in strict and logical conformity with its language which runs as follows:—

“வண்புகழ் மூவர் தண்பொழில் வரைப்பின் நாற்பெயரெல்லை யகத்து”

Perasiriyar’s commentary for this is as follows:—

“நாற்பெயரெல்லை யகமென்பது தமிழ்நாடென்றவாறு. வடவேங்கடர் தென்முரியன்றிக் கிழக்கும் மேற்கும் கடலெல்லை கூறினரோ எனின்—அறியாதுகடாயினாய்; வரையறையிலவென்று கூறுதனவெல்லாம் களைந்து கொள்ளப்படுவன வல்ல; வகை கூறாமையும் தமிழ் கூறப்படுங்கண்டாய்; அவர் வழங்கும் யாப்பின் வழியதென்பது, அந்நாட்டார் வழங்கும் யாப்புப்பகுதி அவை, என்றவாறு.”

This is the only meaning that will square with the explicit words in the Sutram. When Tholkappiar expressly says that the entire Tamilakam was ruled by “the only three” monarchs in the whole country, the adjectival phrase “நாற்பெயரெல்லை” can never mean four kingdoms. For, ex-hypothese there were only three kingdoms. Besides the words “எல்லை” is unmistakably significant. It can only mean boundary and never a province at all. The Sutram is self-luminous. Tholkappiar here says only that the rules of prosody and poetics, he expounds in this section, strictly conform to the conventions and practices in vogue within the four boundaries of the entire Tamil country under the aegis of the three dynastic monarchs in Tamilakam. The learned author of the Chronology himself says that “one cannot immediately jump to the conclusion that there was a political province under the name Tondaimandalam in those days, for this name itself was brought into vogue at a much later date.” After stating as much, he is not fair to himself to stretch the plain and explicit words of Tholkappianar “மூவர் வரைப்பின் நாற்பெயரெல்லை” so as not to refer to their natural import, viz., within the four boundaries of the entire country, belonging to the three Tamil monarchs, but to suggest something else at once unnatural and inconsistent with the language in the Sutram. Ilampuranar’s reference is perfectly innocent of its historic implications. Perhaps he meant merely to say that Tholkappianar here referred to the whole Tamil Nad comprising the four provinces known in his times. He never adverted to the chronological sequence at all. He simply stated the only important fact in this connection, viz., Tholkappianar here spoke of the practices extant in the entire Tamilakam under the three monarchs. He thought he might best put it by including all the four major provinces or mandalams known to his times to emphasise the entirety. If not, he would be stultifying himself beyond redemption. For, he believed in the great antiquity of Tholkappiam and so could not have said anything to discredit that faith of his. Here the Chronologist who chooses to torpedo Tholkappiam with an innocently inadvertant reference from Ilampuranar, ignores his express statement that what may be meant was the entire Tamilakam between Venkatam and the Kumari.’ This explicit statement explains Ilampuranar’s intention: and his innocently inadvertent word cannot subvert the import of the expressly definite words in the Sutram. It is unnecessary to labour this point at any further length. It is clear that there is absolutely nothing in the Sutrams cited in this connection that is not in perfect harmony with the traditional antiquity of Tholkappiam.

3. The third objection to the great antiquity of Tholkappiam is founded on some Sutrams found in Marapiyal which purport to sanc-

tion and accentuate the privileges of caste by birth. The convincing answer to this objection is what appears on the very face of these fugitive Sutrams. Their contents as well as their context bear unimpeachable testimony to their fabrication and foisting at some later period. The 15 Sutrams which purport to speak of the four castes and their brithrights are sandwiched between sutrams 69 and 86 in Marapiyal. This highly incongruous and inappropriate situation is self-suggestive. Tholkappiam scrupulously follows the most perfectly scientific method and system of treatment throughout. But in this instance, if these Sutrams were genuine, Tholkappiar must be deemed guilty of a strange and inexcusable lapse. For, all the Sutrams up to 69 speak of conventions regarding animal life, and all from 85th and after refer to the vegetable kingdom. What is the appropriateness in wedging between them these 15 Sutrams about the places and privileges of the four castes of men based on birth? These might well have preceded the Sutrams relating to the beasts, or followed those dealing with the plants. In fact, if ever Tholkappiyanar intended to incorporate these in his great grammar, he could have placed them immediately after Sutram No. 33 which refers to mankind as standing at the top of the scale of all living things. That Sutram comes in the regular course of climax in gamut of life.

Again, if there were four castes in Tamilakam in Tholkappiyanar's times, surely they should have been referred to with other classifications of the Tamil people detailed in the Agattinaiyiyal and Purattainaiyiyal. None but the Brahmans are there spoken of, and they are treated as of a different race and culture. But the Tamil people are always mentioned only in their regional or vocational divisions. Not a single reference to Kshatriyas, to Vaisyas or even to Vellalas as a caste appears anywhere in Tholkappiam except in this ramshackle context in Marapiyal. The names Kshatriya and Sudra are carefully left over in these 15 Sutrams. This scrupulous avoidance of the word "Sudra", the name of the fourth caste of the Aryan social system is eloquently significant. Vellalas in Tamilakam were a respected sect in the post-Tholkappiyam age. They formed the highest rank among the Tamil people. The interpolators, whoever they may be, of these 15 Sutrams, dared not speak of any Tamil class as the ignoble Sudras. They therefore slyly referred to the fourth class as "Vellalas". As this was a respected name, the Tamils would raise no serious protest at the time. Another difficulty also was smoothed over by the authors of these interpolated Sutrams. The fourth caste among the Aryans formed the servile class. But the Vellalas in Tamilakam were of the proudest rank. So, in stating the pursuits and vocations of the four Varnas in these 15 Sutrams, their author takes care to confuse them between the last

two—Vanigars and Vellalas. The fact of the matter is that in the Tamil country at no time were any castes, Vaisyas or Kshatriyas. The Arasars are actual rulers, and the Brahmans claim to be of non-Tamil Aryan extraction. Tholkappiyam repeatedly proclaims that it deals exclusively with the actual conditions of the Tamils alone as were in vogue in the Tamilakam of that age or epoch. And if ever any Aryan institution or usage is referred to for parallel illustration, the Sutram says as much, and never leaves it in doubt as to whether it was Aryan or Tamil. In the face of these facts, these 15 fugitive Sutrams can only be spurious interpolations by some later writers to make it appear that this oldest classical grammar gives sanction and countenance to the four Varnas of the Aryan sociology in Tamilakam. It is thus clear that these 15 Sutrams, on whose incongruity the Chronologist hangs an objection to the antiquity of Tholkappiyam, are irrelevant interpolations of a later date. The very fact that Tholkappiyam does not refer to any existence of the four Varnas or castes by birth among the Tamils in the Agam and Puram chapters, is a proof that it was composed at a very early epoch in the history of Tamil Literature when the caste-system was unknown and unfamiliar to the Tamil society.

Moreover, it is clear that these Sutrams in the “Marapiyal”, assigning pursuits and privileges to the four castes, do not offer any irreconcilable opposition to the antiquity of Tholkappiyam even if they were genuine. The four-fold caste-system is a very old institution in the Brahman or Vedic or Aryan culture. The four classes mentioned in these Sutrams really existed—though not by birth,—and exercised their useful function in the social economy of the Tamils as much in the pre-Purananuru as in the post-Purananuru times. Vellalas or agriculturists, Vanigars or traders, Arasars or rulers, and Andanars or priestly Brahmans were all well-known social units in the Tamilakam of yore. The author of the Chronology himself admits that “the few Aryans who first came into the Tamil country were of the religious order. There was a small sprinkling of secular Brahmans also (in the Tamil country of the Purananuru age) who pursued some handicraft work or other.” Tholkappiyam does frequently refer to both these sections. It speaks of the higher order of the priestly Brahmans as “Andanars”, and of the secular Brahmans as “Pārpārs”. The very fact that the rulers and noblemen in Tamilakam invited these priestly Brahmans to perform Yagams for them and heaped honours and estates on them, as is admitted in the several verses in the old Puram or Aham collections, proves that these religious and social notions of the Aryans were not only known, but were not even averse to the Tamils of the Puram and Aham epochs. To aspire for the benefits of Yagams and to actually resort to their costly performances—a

fact observed not only on the part of the Tamil monarchs, but also among noblemen in the country—would reveal not a mere acquaintance with, but also a considerable assimilation of the Aryan practices and culture by the Tamils in the times of the Puram and Aham verses to which the Chronology assigns the oldest age. This in its turn should indicate that Brahmans must have lived long enough in Tamilakam from prior to this classic age to familiarise and persuade the civilised Tamils to acquiesce in and partially adopt these Aryan notions. Books like *Purananuru* and *Ahananuru*, *Padirruppattu* and *Pattupāṭṭu*, which the Chronology assigns to an earlier pre-Tholkappiyam era, all of them bear testimony to the performance of Yagam by the rulers and citizens in Tamilakam; whereas Tholkappiyam has not a single reference to the practice of Yagam by any non-Brahman Tamil. In this view Tholkappiyam should imply, if anything, an earlier age when the Tamils might have been merely hospitable witnesses to the practices of the Brahman settlers in their midst, quietly observing and good-naturedly not objecting to these Aryans having their own ways which were not the ways of the Tamils in those days. And as clearly the extant Sangam literature which familiarly refers to the performance of Yagams as a common practice among the Tamil rulers and the rich and aspiring nobles in Tamilakam, it should bespeak of a much later post-Tholkappiyam age. It may well be that Tholkappiyam in these Marapiyal Sutrams is just drawing a parallel from the Aryan culture to the four classes of people in Tamilakam without any implication whatever that the Aryan Varnas existed in the Tamil country. This tendency to draw comparisons with the parallel Aryan practices and precepts is quite a common feature in Tholkappiyam. The reference to the Gandharva union as a close parallel to “Kalavu” practice of the Tamils in Kalaviyal, and the mention of the Brahmanic Siksha rules and standards of phonetic measures and sound sources of the alphabetic letters in contrast to those of the Tamil grammar in Pirappiyal are instances in point. These will only point to a fair acquaintance with the Aryan culture and learning on the part of the Tamil scholars and nothing more. This contact and acquaintance of the Tamils with the Aryans is just discernible in Tholkappiyam; but it is the Sangam poetry, for which the Chronology fondly claims pristine purity and priority, that breathes not a mere acquaintance with, but also a considerable assimilation and adoption of Aryan notions and practices by the Tamil people of that age, and thus affords unimpeachable internal evidence of that poetry being later and post-Tholkappiyam works. The Sutram cited for the third objection is simply permissive. It only says that to rule over lands is not taboo to the Andanars or spiritually evolved Brahmans. It does not even speak of Brahmans in the Tamilakam being rulers. This may be a mere reference to the parallel

social standard in the Aryan system to show the position and privileges of the Brahmans in that system to which there need not have been any bar in Tamilakam also.

4. The fourth objection to the antiquity of Tholkappiyam is based on Sutram 5, Agattinai iyal. This Sutram need not frighten or distress any Tamilian at all. The same explanations which harmonise the Marappiyal Sutrams discussed above in dealing with objection No. (3) will reconcile this Sutram as well with the early age of Tholkappiyam. The author of the Chronology has no real objection to any reference to the gods mentioned in this Sutram. For, he admits that all the collections of his own choice contain verses relating to most of these deities. His only objection is to the regional distribution of these deities in Tholkappiyam and particularly to the position assigned to "Varuna" in this Sutram. If once the Gods were admitted to be familiar deities in the old Tamilakam, there can be no objection to their correlation with the regional topography. Muruga, Māyōn, Indra, and Varuṇa are the favourites or Adidevatas in the hills, pasture lands, urban and maritime areas respectively as much in the Aryavārtha as in the Tamilakam. This Sutram, if anything, would be even a more unexceptionable parallel reference than those in the Pirappiyal and Kalaviyal of Tholkappiyam. The point as to whether these four were ancient Aryan gods domiciled in Tamilakam, or were indigenous Dravidian deities incorporated in the Aryan pantheon is yet an open question. The recent theses of Western scholars suggest that even Vishnu and Varuna and Indra are of Dravidian origin. We need not go so far to harmonise this Sutram with its great age in Tamil literary history. There is nothing on record in the works admitted to the claim of antiquity in the Chronology to militate against Tholkappiar's reference in this connection; but there is everything to support the reference to these deities in this Sutram in Tholkappiyam. Verses in the Agam and Puram collections, Pattupattu and other Tamil poems do refer to one and all of these deities, and always in special reference to their favourite regional locations. Tholkappiyam simply reflects the myths and the faith current in Tamilakam.

5. The final and fifth shaft in the Chronology is the familiar old stock-in trade argument founded on the word (தொரை) Orai in Tholkappiyam. The late lamented and learned Mr. Swamikannu Pillay almost canonized this fetish. But no one tackled this gorgon scare-crow seriously so far. We generally accept the argument as axiomatic truth; and naturally on that footing we find no answer to this objection. The whole history of this argument is a fine instance of the power of auto-suggestive self-stultifying hypnotism. We are often overpowered by mere

sound similarity ; and we then flounder helplessly in irretrievable errors. What is the proved philological connection between the Greek 'hora' and the Tamil 'Orai' (ஓரை) So far as I know no one has given any convincing answer to this obvious elementary question. Until this connection is first conclusively established, it is idle to speculate on the origin or the fancied kinship of this Tamil word. It is unprofitable and even dangerous to enter upon endless and hair-splitting controversies.

In the first place it is said by competent Greek savants that the original import of "Hora" in Greek had nothing to do with the divisions of a day's time at all ; only in its later and secondary stage this Greek word was adopted to mean a part of a day. In Sanskrit there is no word corresponding to this Tamil word (ஓரை) in sense as well as sound. "Ahōrāthram" in Sanskrit can have no connection whatever to "orai" in Tamil. Were it necessary to dogmatise a foreign origin to this word "orai" in Tamil, it may as well have come directly into Tamilakam from Greece, and need not require a Sanskrit transporting agency for its transmission. For, it is a well-known fact of history that there was direct intercourse between Tamilakam and the Grecian and Roman countries from pre-historic times. But why this superstition that the Tamils could have had no indigenous culture of any kind, and every Tamil word for even elementary notions of time and space divisions should be of foreign origin ? To argue that borrowing was always the lot of Tamil, and to lend words and notions is ever the monopoly of the Aryan dialects is the order of the day. Dr. Caldwell has pricked this bubble decades ago and has laid the ghost to rest, it is to be hoped. Even the proud Sanskrit is now proved not to have disdained loans and even gifts from Tamil. "Orai" may well be an indigenous Tamil word from the beginning of time. As Sanskrit has no word to correspond to the Tamil "orai" in sense and sound, it is all the more reason why it should be a pure Tamil word. Kizhamai (கிழமை) Nāl (நாள்) Thingal (திங்கள்) Andu (ஆண்டு) are all pure Tamil words, and there is no insuperable impediment in believing that "orai" (ஓரை) also may be of Tamil origin. The contention is that the Tamils could not have evolved for themselves any advanced astronomical knowledge and should therefore have only borrowed the words with the notions of astronomical science. Even if this extraordinary and perverse proposition were conceded for argument's sake, it need not entail the foreign origin of the word (ஓரை). For it involves no advanced or technical astronomical notion whatever. If "orai" meant merely some part of a day's time set apart as suitable for certain rites and rituals, this requires no great astronomical attainments for anyone to entertain this idea, or to frame



a word to express it. "Orai" may thus be a Tamil word; and the endless speculation about its origin will have no solution; for, it needs none at all.

Secondly, apart from all this, this meaning of "orai" in the Tholkappiyam is not conclusively established. It is a fundamental canon that the meaning of a word must be first ascertained definitely before any controversy is raised about its origin. The Sutram reads as follows :

“மறைந்த வொழுக்கத் தோரையும் நாளும்  
துறந்த வொழுக்கம் கிழவோற்கில்லை”

(தொல். களவி. 44)

It is the commentators of the modern age that first interpreted the word "orai" here as meaning a muhurtham or auspicious part of a day. There is nothing in the whole of Tholkappiyam to hold that this word is employed only in this astronomical or astrological sense here in this Sutram. The Sutram proceeds to emphasise only this simple truth viz., while men may not forsake all other attractions and diverse distractions even in their love, women unlike men would crave for nothing but their love. Neither the nature and normal functions of the day, nor the fondest amusements and sports would distract women from their all-absorbing love. The plain meaning of this Sutram is that men in love do not forsake all other attractions of the day as well as their wonted sports and plays. The implication is that women in love do so, because love to them is their very existence, while to men love is merely a thing of joy. The language of the Sutram is plain as a pike staff. The word "orai" meaning pastime or play is as old as the Tamil literature. At first it simply signified sport or play in common. But as after childhood and youth, men ordinarily cease to interest themselves in amusements as civilization advances, while women ever revel in them throughout their life, the word "orai" by selective principle came to be applied in later times to the pastimes and amusements of women-folk. Tholkappiyam in the earliest unsophisticated Tamilian Era uses this word to express sports or plays, which men in their amphibious, attenuated and moderated love do not give up even for their love. The later day commentator who came nearly fifteen hundred years after this classic grammar, imported into this Sutram the astrological meaning of this word. While the original text gives no countenance to this view and while it admits of a fairly uncontroversial meaning, it will be doing violence first to give a new import and then to build a load of argument against the age of the book itself all based on unproved one-sided assumption. It is an instance of giving the dog a bad name to hang him.

# தொல்காப்பிய ஆராய்ச்சி

By

S. S. BHARATI  
(Annamalai University)

(முன்தொடர்ச்சி)

## களவியல் சூத்திரம் 2.

ஒன்றே, வேறே, என்றிருபால்வயின்  
ஒன்றியுயர்ந்த பாலதாணையின்  
ஒத்தகிழவனுங் கிழத்தியுங்காண்ப ;  
மிக்கோனாயினுங் கடிவரை இன்றே.

இதற்கு இளம்பூரணருரைவருமாறு :— “ஒருவனும் ஒருத்தியுமாக இல்லறஞ் செய்துழி, அவ்விருவரையும் மறுபிறப்பினும் ஒன்றுவித்தலும் வேறுக்குதலுமாகிய இருவகை ஊழினும், இருவருள்ளமும் பிறப்புத்தோறும் ஒன்றி நல்வினைக் கண்ணே நிகழ்ந்த ஊழினது ஆணையின், பிறப்பு முதலிய பத்துவகையினும் ஒத்த கிழவனும் (தலைவனும்) கிழத்தியும் (தலைவியும்) எதிர்ப்படும். இக்குணங்களால் தலைமகன் மிக்கானாயினும் கடியப்படாது” என்றவாறு.

நச்சினுர்க்கினியரும் ஈண்டு, “பால்வரைதெய்வத்தின் ஆணையாலே, பிறப்பு முதலியன பத்தும் ஒத்த தலைவனும் தலைவியும் எதிர்ப்படுபு,” என்றே கூறுகின்றார். இவ்வாறு பொருள் கொள்ளின், களவுக் காதலியலுக்கே முரணாகும். தமிழர் கற்பு மணத்துக்குக் களவுமுறைக் காதற் கூட்டம் இன்றியமையாதது எனக்கொண்டார். மெய்க்காதலின்றிக் கற்பறம் சிறவாது ; இருவயினொத்த மெய்க்காதலுண்மையும், பிறர்கூட்டுந்துணையின்றிக் தலைவனும் தலைவியும் தாமே கண்டுழிக்காதலித்துக் கூடுவராயின் மட்டும் துணியத்தகும். அன்றியும் பிறர் துணைகூட்டக் கூடும் கூட்டம் குறிக்கோள் கொண்டதாமாகவே, ஆண்டுப்பிறிது குறிப்பின்றி உள்ளுறையுமன்போன்றே உழுவலர் தம்மிற் கூடக்காரணமென்று துணிதற்கில்லை. பிறிது குறிப்பெதுவுமின்றி, முன்கண்டறியாத இருவர் தமிழராய்க் கண்டாங்கே ஒருவரை ஒருவரின்றியமையா உணர்ச்சி தரும் மெய்க்காதல் உள்ளத்தூறக் கூடநேரின், அவர் காதலின் தூய்மையும் துப்பும் துணியப்பெறும். நாளும் பல பெண்களைக் கண்டுவரும் ஒருவனுக்கும், அவ்வாறே நாள்தோறும் பிற ஆடவரைக் காணும் ஒருத்திக்கும் காணப்பட்டார் யார் மாட்டும் அவரின்றிக் தாமமையாத்தாபம் பிறப்பதில்லை. ஒரோவழி ஏதேனுமேதுப்பற்றிச் சிறிது காமவிகார மெழுவதாயினும், அது நிலையாது மாறியழியும்.

பணம், பதவி, இளமை, அழகு முதலிய காரணத்தொடு தோன்றும்பும், உழுவலன் பல்லாததால், நிலையாது. ஒருவரை யொருவர் முன்னறிவராயின், பிறகுறிக்கோள் உளத்துருவெடுத்து ஒருவரை நிலைநிறு அன்புக்கிடனாகலாம். அதுபற்றியே முன்னறியாரிருவரிடமும் காரணமின்றிக் கண்டுழியலைக்குங் காதலொன்றே, அன்றுபோலென்றும் நின்று, மணந்து கற்புறவு கொள்ளுமுன் எவ்வாறே அவ்வாறே கரணமொடு மணந்துவாழும் பிற்காலத்தும் நிலைத்து, அழகு இளமைமுதலிய இங்கிதத் துணைகளிறந்தாலும் தான் நாளும் வளரும் பெற்றியதாகும். இதனற்றான் “அதுவே,

தானே அவளே தமிழர் காணக்  
காமப்புணர்ச்சி யிருவயினொத்தல்”

என்றிறையனார் அகப்பொருட் சூத்திரம் வற்புறுத்திற்று.

அன்றியும் திருக்கோவையார் 7-ம் பாசுரத்தின் கீழ்ப்பேராசிரியர் தரும் விசேட வுரைக்குறிப்பும் இத்தமிழ்க்காதற்ன்மையை வலியுறுத்துகின்றது. “இவனோடிவளிடை உண்டாய அன்பிற்குக்காரணம் விதியல்லாமை ஈண்பேற்றும்” எனக்கூறி அக்கூற்றுக்கு எற்ற பலரியாயங்களும் எடுத்துக்காட்டி நிறுவியுள்ள பேராசிரியர் தமிழ் வழக்கறிந்து தெளித்து வடித்துக்கொடுத்த வாய்மையைமறந்து, பழையதமிழ் எழில் வழக்கொன்றையே தான் கூறுவதாக விதந்துரைத்துச் சூத்திரிக்கும் தொல்காப்பிய விதியில், “ஊழ்வினையின் விதியால் காதலர் கூடுவர்” எனப் பொருள் காணுவது தமிழ் வழக்கழித்துத் தொல்காப்பியர் கருத்தை மறுப்பதாகும். ஆகையாலிங்குப் “பாலதானை” எனும் தொடருக்கு உரிய உண்மைப்பொருளைத் தெளிய முயல்வோம்; எளிதிலறிவோம். ஈண்டுக் காதல், பால்பற்றியெழும் பான்மையது. யாருக்கும் யார்மாட்டும் நிகழத்தகும் அன்பல்ல. ஆண்—பெண்—என்ற இயற்கை வேறுபாட்டின் மூலம், அவ்வேற்றுமையிடை ஒளிந்தொளிரும் உயிர் ஒற்றுமைச் செவ்வி வெளிப்படுத்த கேதுவாக ஒத்த இருவருள்ளத்தும் ஒருங்கே விளையும் தூயகாதலாகையால், இக்காதலரின் காமக்கூட்டம் பிறிதுகாரணமின்றி, அவர் தம் ‘பாலியல்பே’ காரணமாக வுடைத்து. அதனால் அத்தகவுடைக்கூட்டத்தை ஆசிரியர் ‘பாலதானையிற்’கூடும் கூட்டம் என்றுள்ளவாறுரைக்கலானார். இனிச் சூத்திரத்திற்குப் பொருள்காண முயல்வோம்.

“ஒன்றே, வேறே, என்றிருபால்வயின்”—“குறிஞ்சி முதலிய நிலங்களில், ஒரு நிலத்திற்கே இருவரும் உரியராயினும், அன்றி இருவரும் இருவேறு நிலத்தினராயினும்,”

“ஒன்றியுயர்ந்த பாலதானையின்”—“நாள்தோறும் காணுபவர்போலன்றி, முன்காணாருவர் முதலிற்கண்டாங்கே அவரிடை உள்ளுறையும் இருவயினொத்த காதல் முனை கிளைத்துத் தழையத்தக்கவாறு தம்முள் ஆண்பெண் வேறுபாட்டிடை உயிரொன்றி யுயர்ந்த அவர் தம் பால்விளியால் (sex urge).”

“ஒத்தகிழவனுங் கிழத்தியுங்காண்ப” — “பிறப்புமுதலிய எல்லாவகையினும் உள்ளமும் உயிரும் கள்ளமின்றி ஒத்துயரு முழுவலன்புக்குரியாரிருவரும் எதிர்ப்படிவ், ஆங்கே தாமுன்னறியாக் காதற் காட்சியராவர்.”

“மிக்கோனாயினுங் கடிவரை இன்றே” — “அறவே தம்முள் எல்லாவகையினும் காதலரிருவர் ஒவ்வாமல் இருவருளொருவர் சிறிதளவுமிக்காராக நேரின, அது தலைவன் கண்ணதாயின் காதற்கூட்டம் கடிதற்கில்லை.”

இங்குநாம் உய்த்துணர்ந்து ஒம்பற்குரியன ஒன்றிரண்டுண்டு. பாலதானே யாண்டு நிகழும்? ஆணும் பெண்ணும் பால் வேறுபாட்டால் யாரும் யாரையும் காணக் காதலிப்பது இயல்பில்லை. தம்மிடை உள்ளுறையும் உழுவலுடையாரே காணுங்கால் உயிரொன்றி யுயர்த்தற்குரியர். அதனாலேதான் பால்வேறுபட்டார் யாருக்கும் ‘பால்’ ஆணைதராது. பெருந்திணைக் காமம் ஒருகால் சிலரை அலைத்தல் கூடும். அன்றார் கூடில் தம்முள் உளம் ஒன்றியுயர்தல் இயலாது. உள்ளமும் உயிரும் இரண்டற்று ஒன்றாய்க்கலந்து உயர்த்தற்கேற்ற உழுவலன்பு மறைத்துறையு முள்ளமுடையார் இருவர் காணுங்கால்தான் மெய்க்காதல் முனை கூர்த்து வெளிப்பட்டுத் தழையும். உதவி, உறவுமுதலிய பிறகாரணம்பற்றி எழுந்து இடையழியுமன்புபோலாது இருவாயி னொத்து என்றும் நின்றுதழையும் காதலால் மட்டுமே இருவர் ஒன்றியுயர்வர். அன்றாரையே தம்முட் காதலித்தொன்றியுயருமாறு “பால்” விளிக்கும்.

இனி “மிக்கோனாயினும் கடிவரையின்றே” என்பதும் ஆராயத்தக்கது. மிகுதி இருவருள் யார் மாட்டும் நன்றன்று. செவ்வொப்பே சாலச்சிறந்தது. ஒரோ வழிச் சிறிதளவு தரமுயரினும், அது தலைவிமாட்டாமேல் தலைவனுக்கு நிலை குலையும். வாழ்க்கைத்துணையான மனைவி, மிகத்தாழ்த்தலும் நலம்தராது; ஒப்பது மனைமாட்சி தரும்; உயர்வது தலைவினைப் பெண்வழிச்சேறும் பழிக்கிழிக்கும் வழியாகும். ஆகவே, இருவரும் ஒத்தலே வேண்டப்படும். ஒருவர் சிறிதளவு மிகநேரில், அது தலைவன் மாட்டேயமைதல் காதலர் மாட்டேதம் குறைக்கு மென்று கடியாது தழுவப்படும்.

இனி, இவ்வாறே சூத்திரங்களுக்கெல்லாம் பழைய உரைகாரர் உரைகளைச் சொல்லி மறுத்துப்போவது அவசியமில்லையென நினைக்கின்றேன். இன்றியமையா இடத்துமட்டும் பழைய உரைகளைக் குறிப்பதன்றி, நிரலே சூத்திரங்களுக்குரிய நேரியபொருளை நான் கண்டவாறே தரமுயலுவேன்.

### களவியல் சூத்திரம் 3.

“சிறந்துழி, ஐயம் சிறந்த தென்ப; இழிந்துழி இழிபே சுட்ட லான.” என்பது சூத்திரம்.

இதன்பொருள்: — “சிறந்துழி, ஐயம் சிறந்ததென்ப” — ஐயம் முன்னறியாதார் இருவர் தலைப்பட்டு ஒருவரை ஒருவர் காதலித்துக் கண்டபோது ஒருவருள்ளத்து மற்றவரையாரோ என்றையம் எழுவது இயல்பு. எனில், அவ்வாறையப்

படுபவர் மற்றவரை அவருக்குரியதனினும் சிறந்ததொரு தகுதியுடையாராக ஐயுறு மாறமைதல் வேண்டும். அத்தகைய ஐயப்பாடே சிறப்புடைத்தாம்.

“இழிந்துழி, இழிபே சுட்டலான” —அவ்வாறு உயர்ந்தவழிப்படாது, உண்மைநிலையினும் தாழ்ந்தாராக ஐயம் நிகழின், அது இழிபுணர்ச்சியையே சுட்டுமன்றி மனத்தூறும் காதலேக்காட்டாது.

எனவே, புலவர் காதலரிருவரின் முதற்காட்சியில் அவரிடை ஐயம் கூறுங் கால், இழிவுணர்ச்சியைக் காட்டும் இழிதகவையத்தைக்கடிந்து சிறப்பினைச்சுட்டிக் காதலைவளர்க்கும் சீரியமுறையில் செய்யுள்செய்வதே புலனெறிவழக்கம், என்பதை இயற்றமிழ்ப்புலவர்க்கு இலக்கணங் கூறுமாசிரியர் ஈண்டுத்தெளிக்கலானார். இப் பொருளே இளம்பூரணருக்கு முடம்பாடாதல், “ஐயமிகுதலாவது-மக்களுள் உள் ளாள் அல்லள், தெய்வமோ எனமேலாயினாரோடே ஐயுறுதல்” எனுபவர் உரைக் குறிப்பால் தேறப்படும். இதற்கு மாறாக நச்சினர்க்கினியர் இச்சூத்திரத்துக் கூறும் புத்துரை, ஆடவரில் பெண்டிர் அறிவாற்றாழ்ந்தவரெனும் தமிழர்கடந்த பிழை யைப்பேணிப் பீழைபடும்.

### களவியல் சூத்திரம் 31.

“முந்நா எல்லது துணையின்று கழியாது;  
அந்நா எகத்தும் அதுவரை வின்றே.”

இதன் பொருள் :—“முந்நாளெல்லது துணையின்று கழியாது” —களவுக்கா லத்துத் தலைவி பூப்பால் புறம்பெயராமல் மனையகத்தடங்கி யொழுகும் மூன்றுநாட் களைத்தவிரப் பிறிதெந்நாளும் தலைவனும் தலைவியும் கூடாது கழிவதில்லை.

“அந்நாளகத்தும் அதுவரைவின்றே” —பூத்தகாலத்தும் கூட்டம் களவிற் கடியப்படுவதில்லை.

இதுவே இச்சூத்திரச்சொற்றொடர் சுட்டும் செம்பொருளாகும். தொல்காப் பியர் கருத்தும் அதுவேயாதலால், அக்கருத்துக்கேற்ற சொற்கள் இச்சூத்திரத்தில் பெய்தமையானும், பின்கற்பியலில் “களவினுள் நிகழ்ந்த அருமையைப்புவம்பி, அல மரலுள்ள மொடளவியவிடத்தும், அந்தரத்தெழுதிய எழுத்தின்மான, வந்தகுற்றம் வழிகெட வொழுகலும்” என்று இவ்வாறு களவுக்காலத்தே காதல் மிகுதியால் நிகழ்ந்த தவறுகளை நீக்குதல் குறித்தமையானும், தெற்றெனவிளங்கும். இதற்குமா றாக உரைகாரர் கூறுவவினைத்தும் பொருந்தாமையை அவருரைக்குச் சூத்திரச்சொ ள்கள் இடந்தராமையொன்றே தெளிவிக்கும்.

### களவியல் சூத்திரம் 44.

“மறைந்த வொழுக்கத் தோரையு நாளும்  
துறந்த வொழுக்கங் கிழவோற் கில்லை.”

இதன்பொருள் :—மறைந்தவொழுக்கத்து—களவொழுக்கத்திலே, ஓரையும் நாளும் துறந்தவொழுக்கம்—தனக்கியல்பான வினையாட்டுக்களையும் நாள்வேலைக

னையும் துறந்து அனவரதம் கா தலிலேயே அழுந்திக்கிடக்கும் வழக்கம், கிழவோற் றில்லை—தலைவன் மாட்டுக்காணப்படுவ தொன்றன்று.

எனவே களவில் தலைவிக்குத் தன் காதலன்றிப் பிறிதெதிலும் உளங்கொள் ளாமல் முழுதும் தன்னைக்காதலுக்கே கொடுத்துப் பிறவெல்லாவற்றையும் மறந் தொழுதலியல்பா மென்பதும், தலைவன் அவ்வாறன்றித்தன் தகுதிக்கேற்ற விளை யாட்டுக்களை ஒழித்துவிடாமல் ஆடியும் நாள்தோறும் தனக்குரிய தொழிலாற்றி யும் வருவதுடன் ஏற்றபெற்றியால் காலமிடங்கருதிக் காதலின்பத்தையும் துய்ப பாளுவான் என்பதும், உலகியல் கருதி இச்சூத்திரம் கூறுகின்றது.

ஓரை—விளையாட்டென்பது, சங்க இலக்கியமுழுதும் அச்சொல்லுக்கு அப் பொருளாட்சி யுண்மையால் விளங்கும். ஓரைக்கு இராசி அல்லது முகூர்த்தம் எனும் பொருளுண்மைக்குத் தொல்காப்பியத்திலேனும் சங்க இலக்கியம் எதனிலே னும் சான்று காணுதலரிது. மிகவகன்ற பிற்காலப்புலவர் சிலர் முகூர்த்தம் (அதாவது ஒருநாளினுள் நன்மை தீமைகளுக்குரியதாகப் பிரித்துக்கொள்ளப்படும் உட் பிரிவு) என்றபொருளில் இச்சொல்லைப், பிரயோகிக்கலானார். அக்கொள்கைக்கே சான்றில்லாத சங்க இலக்கியத்தில், “ஓரை”யென்னும் தனித்தமிழ்ச்சொல்லுக்கு, அக்காலத்திலக்கியங்களால் அதற்குரிய பொருளாகக் காணப்பெறும் விளையாட்டை யே அச்சொல் குறிப்பதாகக்கொள்ளுவதே முறையாகும். அதைவிட்டுப்பிற்கால ஆசிரியர் கொள்கையான இராசி அல்லது முகூர்த்தம் எனும்பொருளை இத்தமிழ்ச்சொ ல்லுக்கு ஏற்றுவதே தவறாகும். அதற்குமேல் அச்சொல்லைக்கொண்டு தொல்காப்பி யம் அடையப் பிற்காலத்து நூலென்று வாதிப்பது அறிவுக்கும் ஆராய்ச்சி யறத்திற் கும் பொருந்தாது. அடையின்றி ‘ஓரை’ என்பதற்கு முகூர்த்தமென்று பொருள் கொண்டால், நல்ல நேரத்தைக் குறிப்பதன்றித் தீய இராசியைக் குறிப்பதாகக் கொள்ளுதல் பொருந்தாது, ஒழுக்கமென்னுஞ் சொல்லைப்போலவே முகூர்த்தமும் தன்னளவில் நல்லதையே குறிக்கும் ஆகலான்.

### கற்பியல் சூத்திரம் 31.

“பின்முறை யாகிய பெரும்பொருள் வதுவைத்  
தொன்முறை மனைவி எதிர்ப்பா டாயினு  
மின்னிழைப் புதல்வனை வாயில்கொண்டு புகினும்  
இறந்த துணைய கிழவோ னுங்கட்  
கலங்கலு முரிய நென்மனார் புலவர்”

இதன்பொருள் :— பின்முறையாகிய பெரும்பொருள் = வரைவிற்குப் பின் தலைவியைத் தணக்கப்போதிய பெருமையுடைத்தாகத் தலைவன் கருதிச்செய்தபொ ருளை. (148) வதுவைத் தொன்முறைமனைவி எதிர்ப்பாடாயினும் = மணந்து கற் புங்காமமும் நற்பாலொழுக்கமுமாய தொன்முறையுடைய மனைவிக்கெதிர்கொ ண்டு புகுங்காலும்,

## அல்லது

அன்னநன்மனையாள் தன்னிற் பொருளைப் பெரிதாக்கித் தற்பிரிந்து தேடிய பொருளொடு மீளும் தலைவினைச் சினவாது (பிரிதற்கு முன் நடந்தபடியே நடந்து) தொல்லைக் கற்புறுகாம நற்பாலொழுக்க முறையில் எதிர்ப்படுவாளாயினும் எனலுமாம்.

மின்னிழைப் புதல்வினை வாயில்கொண்டு புகினும் = பரத்தைமையால் பிரிந்த தலைவன் தன் தவறஞ்சி மகனை வாயிலாகக் கொண்டுபுகினும், இறந்த துணைய கிழவோன் = தன் பிரிவுக்காலத்துத் தலைவிக்குத்தான் காதலறங்கடந்த அளவினரூய தலைவன். அதாவது, தவறிழைத்த வாழ்க்கைத்துணையாய்தலைவன்.

ஆங்கண் கலங்கலுமுரியன் = அவ்வாறு பிரிந்து மீண்டு தலைவியை எதிர்ப்படுமிடத்து அவட்குத்தானிழைத்த தவறு நினைத்துக் கலங்கலுமுரியன்.

உம்மையால் கலக்கங்காட்டாமல் தன் காதல் நிறைவுகூறித் தலைவியைத் தேற்றவும் ஊடல்தீர்க்கவும் முயலுவதே தலைவனின் பெரும் இயல்பென்பது விளங்கும்.

இசுத்திரத்திற்கு இதுவே ஆசிரியர் கருத்தாம் என்பது, முன் கற்பியல் 9-ம் சூத்திரத்துப் ‘பெரும்பொருள்’ எனும் தொடரை இப்பொருளிலேயே தொல்காப்பியர் பெய்தமைத்தபெற்றி வலியுறுத்தும்.

“பெறலரும் பெரும்பொருள் முடிந்தபின்வந்த” என்ற சூத்திரமுதலடிக்கு இளம்பூரணர் இவ்வரையே கூறுவதும் கருதற்பாலது. அவர் ஆங்குத்தரும்பொருளாவது :—“பெறுதற்கரிய பெரும்பொருளை முடித்தபின்னர்த் தோன்றிய தெறுதற்கரிய மரபு காரணத்தால் தலைவினைச் சிறப்பித்துக் கூறுமிடத்தும் தோழி கூற்று நிகழும், என்றவாறு.” இவ்வாறு உரியபொருள் கூறியதோடமையாது, “பெரும்பொருள், ஈண்டு, வரைவிற்கேற்றது; தெறுதல், சுழலநோக்குதல்” என விசேடவுரையும் கூறி, “பெரும்பொருள்” என்னும் தொல்காப்பியத் தொடருக்கு அத்தொடர்ச் சொற்கள் சுட்டும் நேரியபொருளைத் தெள்ளத்தெளித்துப் போந்தார்.

அதே சூத்திரத்தில், பின் “சீருடைப் பெரும்பொருள் வைத்த வழி, மறப்பினும்” எனவருமடியும் கவனிக்கத்தக்கது. ஆண்டும், வரைந்துகொண்டு வாழும் தலைவன் இவ்வாழ்க்கை இனிது நடத்தற்குவேண்டிப் பெரும்பொருள் தேடுவதைப் பெரிதாகத் தன் மனதில் கொண்டபொழுது, அது காரணமாகத் தலைவியுடனுறையும் காதற்கடனைத் தலைவன்மறந்து பிரிவுக்குறிப்பைத் தோற்றுவிப்பினும் தோழி கூற்று நிகழும், என்பதே இவ்வடிக்கு இனிது பொருந்தும் செவ்வியபொருளாகும். முதலடிக்குச் செம்பொருள் கூறிய இளம்பூரணர் இப்பின்னடிக்கு அதைமறந்து, “பெரும்பொருள்” என்பதற்குரிய செம்பொருளை விட்டு, இத்தொடரை இலக்கணையாக “இற்கிழமை”யைக் குறிக்கும் என்றெழுதலானார். அதைக் கொழுசொம்பாக்கி, முதலடியில் வரும் இத்தொடரையும் ஆகுபெயராக்கிப் “பெரும்பொருள்” என்பதற்கு “வதுவை” எனப்பொருள் கூறுவர் நச்சினர்க்கினியர். அவரே, பிற்கிய

அடிக்குத் “தலையாய இல்லறத்தைத் தலைவிமாட்டு வைத்த காலத்துத் தலைவன் அறஞ்செய்தற்கும் பொருள் செய்தற்கும் இசையும் கூத்துமாகிய இன்பம் நுகர்தற்கும் தலைவியைமறந்து ஒழுகினும்” என வுரைகூற்றினார். இலக்கணநூலில் ஒரு சொல்லையோ தொடரையோ பலவிடங்களில் பலவேறு பொருளில் பெய்துபோவது இலக்கணநூலார் முறையன்று. அது அறிவுக்கும் ஆட்சிமரபுக்கும் மாறான தவறாகும். சூத்திரம், மற்றைப்பாட்டுப்போலாது, திரிசொல் முதலிய மயக்கச் சொற்களைவிலக்கி, எளிய இயற்சொற்களால் சொற்சூட்டும் செம்பொருள் கற்பார்க்குக்கண்டளவே தோன்றுமாறு அமைதலே முறை. தொல்காப்பியரே

“அவற்றுட், சூத்திரந்தானே,  
ஆடி நிழலி னறியத் தோன்றி  
நாதே லின்றிப் பொருணனி விளங்க  
யாப்பினுட் டோன்ற யாத்தமைப் பதுவே”

எனச் சூத்திர இலக்கணம் கூறுபவர், அவ்விலக்கணத்துக்கு மாறாகத்தானே பல சூத்திரங்களில் ஒரேதொடரைப் பல வேறுபொருளிற் பெய்து மயங்கவைப்பாரா? ஒருகாலுமில்லை. பிறிது கருத்தைச் சுட்டாவிடத்தெல்லாம் சூத்திரச்சொற் றொடர் சுட்டும் செம்பொருளே ஆசிரியர் கருத்தாகக்கொள்ளுதல் கற்போர்கடண், ஆகையால் கற்பியல் 9-ம் சூத்திரத்தி லீரிடத்தும், 31-ம் சூத்திரத்திலோரிடத்தும் வரும் “பெரும் பொருள்” எனும் சொற்றொடர் அம்மூவிடத்தும் “பெரிதாகியபொருள்” என்பதேயே குறித்தல் வேண்டும். முன்னையதான 9-ம் சூத்திரத்தில், முதலடியில், வரைவிற்பொருட்டு வரைவுக்கு முன்பொருள்செய்யச்சென்ற தலைவன், பொருளைச் செய்துமுடித்து, வரைதற்கு வந்தபொழுது, அப்பொருட். பொருட்டுச் சிறு காலையவன் தலைவியைப்பிரிந்ததற்கு நெகுண்டுதெறாமல், வரைதற்கு வந்த மகிழ்ச்சிமலிந்து தோழிக்குக்கூற்றுநிகழுமென்பது, கூறப்பட்டது, அதேசூத்திரத்தில் பிந்திய அடியில், வரைந்துவாழும் தலைவன் வரைந்தபின் இல்லறமினிது நடத்தற்பொருட்டுப் பொருள்தேட நினைத்துத் தலைவிக்குரிய தன் காதற்கடனை மற்பாறாகக்கண்டதோழிக்குக் கூற்று நிகழ்வதை ஆசிரியர் சுட்டுகின்றார். இவ்விருவகைப்பொருட்பிரிவையு மிதிந்கூறிய ஆசிரியர், இவற்றுள் முன்னதான வரைவுக்கு முன்பொருளாக்கியதை விலக்கி, வரைந்தொழுகும் தலைவன் கற்பொழுக்க முடைய தலைவியை மறந்து பிரியுந்குறிப்புக்காட்டிய பொழுது தோழி கூறுவதையு மிங்குக்கூறி, பின் 31-ம் சூத்திரத்தில் அவ்வாறு இல்லறத்திற்கு வேண்டியபொருட்குப் பிரிந்த கணவன், பொருளொடு மீளுபவன், தான் தணந்துவைத்த தலைவியை அப்பொருளொடு எதிர்ப்படுங்கால் தன் நெஞ்சில் கலக்கங்கொள்ளுமிடத்தை விளக்குகின்றார். இதனால், ஈண்டு, “பின்முறை ஆக்கியபெரும்பொருள்” என்பது, வரைந்தபின் தலைவன்செய்யும் பொருளென்பதைத் தெளிக்கவந்த தொடரெனத் தெளிதலெளிதாம்.

இனி, இச்சூத்திரத்தில் நச்சினூர்க்கினியர் சில பாடபேதங்கொள்ளுகிறார். அவர் பாடமும் சூத்திரப்பொருளை மாற்றற்குரியதன்று. முதலடியில் “ஆகிய” என்ற இளம்பூரணர் பாடத்தை “ஆக்கிய” என மாற்றிக்கொள்ளுவர் நச்சினூர்க்கினியர்.



எதுபாடமாயினும், வரைவுக்குப்பின் முறையாகத் தலைவன்செய்த பெரும்பொருளையே சுட்டுவதாகும். நச்சினூர்க்கினியர் பாடத்தில், இச்சுத்திரத்தின் 4-வது அடியிற் பெரியதொரு மாறுதல் காணப்படுகிறது.

“இறந்த துணையகிழவோளுங்கண்” என்ற இளம்பூரணர் பாடத்தை அறவேமாற்றி, “கிழவோன் இறந்தது நினைஇ ஆங்கண்” எனப் புதிதொரு பாடங்கொண்டனர் நச்சினூர்க்கினியர். தமக்கு முந்திய உரையாசிரியர் பாடத்தைச் சுட்டக்மேலே புறக்கணித்துத் தாம் புதுப்பாடங் கொண்டதற்கேற்ற ஆதாரத்தையும் விளக்கினரில்லை. அதன் முறையை ஈண்டாராய்தற்கவசியமில்லை யாதலால், அதை விட்டு, நச்சினூர்க்கினியர் பாடத்தால் சூத்திரக்கருத்து வேறுபட்டதா என்பதை மட்டும் நோக்குவோம். இவர் பாடமும், “பிரிந்து மீண்டதலைவன், கழிந்த தன்தவறு நினைந்து, அம்மீட்சிக் காலத்துக் கலங்குவதுமுண்டு என்பதையே கூறுதலால், இச்சுத்திரத்திற்கு ஆசிரியர் கொண்ட கருத்து மேலே நாம் தெளித்துக் கூறியதே யாகுமென்பது வலியுறுகின்றது.”

# The Semantic Principle of Expansion

By

A. C. CHETTIAR

(*Annamalai University*)

Semantics or the Science of meaning is only a more recent development in linguistics than phonology and morphology.<sup>1</sup> No systematic and scientific treatment of this branch appears to have been made before Breal, Professor of Comparative Grammar at the College de France, published his book on Semantics in 1897. But Whitney as Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology in Yale College seems to have taken an interest in this study as early as 1867.<sup>2</sup> Professor A. H. Sayce would even say that August F. Pott took an interest in this pursuit at about the same time.<sup>3</sup> Postgate, Professor of Comparative Philology at University College, London, in 1900, claims that just before Breal published his book in French he had bestowed some thought to the subject himself. If Breal published his book in July 1897, Postgate had delivered an elaborate lecture on the science of meaning at his college in October 1896. The latter had to take great pains then to exhort his audience to devote some attention to the subject. He is reported to have said, "We see a subject of almost limitless extent, but of workers not a score."<sup>4</sup> Still, of all departments of philology, Semantics is certainly the one most likely to be of great interest to the general public.

What is this science about? It deals with the principles regulating changes of meaning in a language.<sup>5</sup> That its contributions to comparative philology are inestimable is the opinion of Postgate. All linguists know that there have been changes from time to time in the meaning of certain words in a spoken language. Some of these changes are capable of explanation. And interesting observations can be made of certain tendencies but it may not be possible to go beyond this. The reason is that 'laws' of change in meaning have not yet been discovered and are

1. Taraporewala: Elements of the Science of Language, p. 191.

2. His "Language and Study of Language," p. 106.

3. "The Science of Language," p. 339.

4. *The Fortnightly Review*, September 1897.

5. Peile: Philology, p. 23.

probably undiscoverable, according to Tucker.<sup>6</sup> These tendencies then are generally classified under three heads : Expansion, Restriction and Transference. It is by means of transference or shifting that expansion and restriction sometimes take place. Hence these tendencies will ultimately resolve themselves into two, namely, Expansion or widening and Restriction or specialisation.

The process of expansion consists in the application of the name of a particular species to a genus in general. It is a normal phenomenon, which finds a place in languages that are spoken by people whose life is intense and whose thought is active. Children, for example, are prone to call any river they may see by the name of the river that runs through their own village or town. A child coming from Kumbakonam, on looking at the stream Pālamān in Chidambaram actually cried out to its mother, "Here is Kāvēri." Vendryes tells us that the child of Paris generally says, "I see a Seine before me," when as a matter of fact it does not see the River Seine but any stream before it.<sup>7</sup> And Damodhar Gune states that in Poona and Sangli women generally talk of *Gaṅga* even when they have before them only the Krishna or what is worse, any little stream.<sup>8</sup> From these instances it may be noticed that the name of a particular river has come to be applied to any other river in a general way.

This tendency is found not only among children and women. Even great men have not escaped it. That this is true may be evident from certain examples collected below from various languages. The French word *temps* originally meant only temperature or heat. Later on, it came to mean weather, good or bad. But now it corresponds to the English word 'time'<sup>9</sup> and indicates the abstract idea of duration in general. In the Southern Slavonic group of languages the name of the particular flower 'rose' has been used to indicate flowers in general. The Italian dialects of Friuli are said to have been contaminated by this usage.<sup>10</sup> They not only use the word *rose* in respect of any flower in general but they have given the flower rose itself a new name 'rosar' in order to distinguish it from all other flowers. The English word *place*, we understand, is a borrowing from Latin 'platea' which itself was derived from Greek 'platys'. And the English word is said to have kept

6. Natural History of Language, p. 373.

7. Language—A Linguistic Introduction, p. 202.

8. Introduction to Comparative Philology, p. 71.

9. Breal's Semantics, p. 117.

10. Vendryes, p. 202.

intact the meaning of 'broad' of the Greek word for sometime.<sup>11</sup> That word was originally employed to indicate 'a broad street'. But now it is employed even when one talks of a standing or sitting room. One would even say "this is a small place for me". Here it is doubtless that the idea of breadth is out of joint. The tendency to use this word in a larger and expanded sense is thus found to be at work here.

This tendency is more frequent in the use of compound words. The Sanskrit word 'gōshtha'<sup>12</sup> means a cow-pen. But it expands in its meaning when it is used in conjunction with asva as 'asva-gōshtha'. In gōshtha there is gō which means cow. And when *asva-gōshtha* is uttered, one does not mean that it is a stable for horses and cows, but only a stable for horses. Here gōshtha broadens into the meaning of a mere stable without any restriction made as to which animal is to be accommodated in it.

The word *taṇṇīr* illustrates this tendency in Tamil. It is a compound of two words, *taṇmai* and *nīr* according to native grammarians<sup>13</sup> though foreign grammarians like Dr. Caldwell<sup>14</sup> would regard it as a compound of *taṇ* and *nīr* or *taḷ* and *nīr*. That the latter may be justified in so doing is evident from such groups of words as *taṇḍalai* (grove), *taṇṇam* (chill), *taṇṇavan* (moon), and *taḷam* (green leaf), *taḷavam* (*Jasminum sambac*), *taḷi* (rain-drop), *taḷir* (sprout) and *taḷpam* or *taṭpam* (coldness), where we see that *taṇ* or *taḷ* is the real element which conveys the significance of the cold atmosphere of the things mentioned. At any rate, there is no gainsaying the fact that the word *taṇṇīr* originally meant cold water. The following instances from Tamil literature show that this word was used in this sense formerly :

- i. *antīn taṇṇīr amuthoḍu koṇargēm*  
(*Maṇimēkhalai*, X. 37.)
- ii. *taṇṇīr malarāṇindu*  
(*Chintāmaṇi*, I. 75.)
- iii. *taṇṇīr koḍu pōy aḷittu*  
(*Kambarāmāyaṇam—Nagarnīṅgu*, 81.)

11. Tucker, p. 380.

12. Breal, p. 120.

13. Vide Nannūl, § 135 and 136.

14. Cf. Caldwell's suggestion that 'nallan' has been formed from 'nal' and 'an' rather than from 'nanmai—mai+an.' (Vide his Comparative Grammar. 3rd edition, p. 316).

These passages from the epics of Tamil literature of different periods, namely, of the 2nd, 9th, and 12th centuries A.D., leave no doubt as to the cold nature of the water expressed in these places. And that water in general did not go by the name of taṇṇīr but only of 'nīr' is evident from the following passages :

- i. karuṇ kuḷal kaḷīya kalavai nīrum  
(*Maṇimēkhalai*, XXVIII. 6.)
- ii. nīr nirandu vandu iḍidara  
(*Chintāmaṇi*, I. 142.)
- iii. kaṇṇum nīrāy oḷuga  
(*Kambarāmāyaṇam—Nagarnīngu*, 56.)

If we peep still further back we see that the word nīr is used in a general manner there too. Stanza 186 of *Puṛaṇānūṟu*<sup>15</sup> and stanza 20 of *Tirukkural*, which surely are of an age anterior to *Maṇimēkhalai*, bear testimony to this. Expressions such as āṟṟunīr (river-water), ūṟṟunīr (fountain-water) and maḷainīr (rain-water) also show that only nīr was used in the sense of water.<sup>16</sup>

But if we turn to *Kalingattupparaṇi*, a laudatory poem of about the eleventh century A.D., we come across a passage where 'taṇṇīr' is used in a sense not compatible with cold water.<sup>17</sup> Here the poet talks of a water that is hot and has to be cooled. Still, the word used is taṇṇīr and not nīr. Does this not show then that the poet has employed the word in the general sense of water ? This cannot be ascribed to the individual fancy of the writer, for there is behind this usage the tendency of expansion in meaning. We too nowadays say cuḍutaṇṇīr for hot water. If taṇṇīr is cold water, cuḍutaṇṇīr should be hot-cold water. But it is not. We further say sometimes kāpitaṇṇīr, tētaṇṇīr or kaṇḷitaṇṇīr, even though the coffee, tea or gruel we are speaking of is hot. We simply mean thereby the liquid coffee, tea or gruel. Here also nothing but the principle of expansion is at work. That this is so is further augmented by the fact that when we want to speak of cold water we very often say 'pachai taṇṇīr' or 'kuḷirnta taṇṇīr'. Poet *Jayaṅkoṇḍār* also has used the latter expression in his *Kalingattupparaṇi*.<sup>18</sup> If taṇṇīr is cold water,

15. 1. 1.

16. Cf. Telugu nīru (singular) ; Kan. nīru ; Mal. (lity.) nīr.

17. Vide stanza 543.

18. Stanza 569.

kulirnta taṇṇir ought to be cooled cold water or cold-cold water. If we remember that we employ this expression not in respect of water boiled and cooled nor even of water that is very cold, we shall have no difficulty in accepting that 'taṇṇir' used here only discloses the process of generalisation that has been the cause of change of meaning from the particular to the general. It has more or less taken the place of 'nīr' which was used in earlier days in the sense of water in general. To prove this only one more usage will be cited here. We say very often "kaṇṇil-taṇṇir varugiradu" when we simply mean by taṇṇir 'water' without any reference to its temperature.

There is another word in Tamil that affords an excellent example of the same process. It is *eṇṇey*. In this compound there are two words *eḷ* and *ney*. *Eḷ* means sesamum. 'Ney'<sup>19</sup> appears to have been employed indifferently to any gleamy semi-liquid or liquid in olden times. This word with a formative 'pu' appears to have been employed in the sense of gleam<sup>20</sup> by Nachchinārkkiniyar, a commentator of about the 9th century A.D.<sup>21</sup> That it was used in the sense of coldness is evident from the commentary of the same person to Tirumurugāṛruppaḍai.<sup>22</sup> And it looks as though that since some oil of a fish corresponding to the modern cod-liver oil was a gleamy liquid it was styled 'ney' in the 2nd century A.D.<sup>23</sup> And honey too, because of the same reason, was called a *ney*, as is evident from Porunar āṛruppaḍai (l. 214) and Chintāmaṇi (stanzas 1198, 1051, 2747, etc.). The web-like substance found at the bottom of palmyra or cocoanut leaves which in Tamil is called 'paṇṇāḍai' is otherwise called 'ney(y)ari'. And the latter expression simply denotes that it is a thing which filtrates 'ney' or honey.<sup>24</sup>

That the word 'ney' was employed to indicate the perfume civet also may be understood from such passages as the following:

- i. *ney(m) māṇ civiṇiyar* (Paripāḍal, 6. l. 34.)
- ii. *kūntal ney(y) aṇi maṇappa* (Chilappu, IV. 56.)
- iii. *ney(t) talai(k) karuṅkuḷal* (Chintāmaṇi, IV. 251.)

19. Cf. Telugu 'neyyi'; Malayalam 'ney.'

20. Chintāmaṇi—Commentary—I. 170.

21. V. C. Chengalvararya's History of Tamil Prose Literature, p. 29.

22. l. 20.

23. Vide Porunar āṛruppaḍai, l. 213.

24. See Dr. V. Swaminatha Ayyar's footnote on p. 124 of Pattupāṭṭu (3rd edn.).

It was further used for signifying unclarified as well as clarified butter in the ages preceding the third Sangam period (2nd century A.D. circa). We have an indubitable reference to the unclarified substance in *Paripāḍal*.<sup>25</sup> There the expression used is simple 'ney'. Citations are not absolutely necessary to show that this word was employed in the sense of clarified butter also.<sup>26</sup> Then it looks as though that since butter and ghee were fluids in one sense or another, the same word was considered for some time enough to signify either of these two according to context. But this state of things could not continue long. A line of distinction had to be drawn. And that is why we see *Nalluruthiranār*, a poet of the third Sangam period, using 'veṇṇey' for indicating butter.<sup>27</sup> Thus it is evident that the necessity to make some distinction or other in the form of the word itself was felt even in his days. And now too we use 'ney' only when we talk of ghee, and 'veṇṇey' when of butter, pure and simple.

But what may look strange to us to-day is that our very remote ancestors once used 'ney' to indicate oil of sesamum too. Even if doubts may be entertained as to the clear import of the word occurring in such passages as "ney umi! curaiyar"<sup>28</sup> and "ney umi! cūḍar",<sup>29</sup> which perhaps admit either of the two meanings, the expression occurring in an important passage in *Tolkāppiyam*,<sup>30</sup> the earliest extant Tamil grammar, takes us to a surer ground. Even if we dismiss the two former citations as capable of indicating ghee too, since the torch of a king in the first instance, and the lighting of a city on a festive occasion in the second are spoken of, we cannot so easily dispense with the phrase "ney aṇi mayakkam" which occurs in *Tolkāppiyam*. In this last instance, the oil-bath a lady has after her confinement is spoken of. The commentator of *Aganānūru* who is concerned with the second instance does not throw any light as to the exact nature of the thing used. *Nachchinārkkiniyar*, the commentator of *Mullaippāṭṭu*, in which the first instance is found and of *Tolkāppiyam* in which we have the last, seems to give us a clue however that the expression used in *Mullaippāṭṭu* did not perhaps indicate the

25. St. 16, l. 3.

26. Those that need will, however, refer to *Puranānūru*, st. 44 and *Perumpār āṇruppāḍai*, l. 394.

27. *Kalittogai*, st. 108.

28. *Mullaippāṭṭu*, l. 48.

29. *Aganānūru*, st. 17.

30. *Poruḷadikāram—Karpīyal*, §. 5.

oil of sesamum, for whereas he clearly interprets *ney* of *Tolkāppiyam* by using the expression *eṇṇey*, he slurs over the passage of *Mullaippāṭṭu* by interpreting 'ney' as 'ney'.

To *Nachchinārkkiniyar*, a person living in about the 9th century A.D. and well-versed in the literature of the Sangam Age, the word *eṇṇey* should have been an expression conveying the distinctive nature of the oil used. That he is found to use 'eṇṇey' in the commentary of *Tolkāppiyam* as also in that of *Kuriñchippāṭṭu*, where *eṇṇey* itself occurs in the text<sup>31</sup> commented upon, is proof positive to show that he might have used this word if he had thought that oil of sesamum was spoken of in *Mullaippāṭṭu*.<sup>32</sup>

But when we turn to *Jayaṅkoṇḍār* of the 11th century A.D., we see that this word *eṇṇey* has expanded in its meaning. We notice that this poet uses this word when he speaks of the ruddy juice of the male elephant.<sup>33</sup> He might have been more justified if he had used 'ney' instead of 'eṇṇey', for the former originally indicated, as was shown above, any fluid that was gleamy. But finding that he uses only the latter, are we to put it down as a peculiar usage permissible only in poets? No. This usage is only a result of the process of expansion in meaning, for even to-day we talk of *tēnkāy eṇṇey* or *āmaṇakku eṇṇey*<sup>34</sup> when we mean only oil extracted from cocoanuts or from the plant *Ricinus communis*. But the expressions literally mean cocoanut-sesamum-oil and castor-sesamum-oil. When we realise that there is not even a bit of sesamum in these oils, how strange should it appear that they are called *eṇṇey*s unless they are explained by the semantic principle of Expansion? So then, we see that 'eṇṇey', which was used in early times as the name of a specific oil, came to be used even as early as the 11th century A.D. to denote any oil and that it keeps its expanded sense even to-day. That is why we call also 'kerosene' 'maṇ-eṇṇey.' That 'eṇṇey' has lost its original significance is rendered very clear by the way in which we call sesamum-oil itself by another name, namely, 'nalla eṇṇey' or the sesamum-oil proper. In this respect we have already seen an analogy in the use of 'rosar' for 'rose' in the Italian dialects of Friuli.<sup>35</sup>

31. l. 107.

32. In *Puṇanānūru* st. 50 and *Paripāḍal* st. 10 also there is the expression 'eṇṇey' in the sense of sesamum-oil.

33. *Kalingattupparaṇi*: st. 494.

34. Vide V. G. Surianarayana Sastriar's *Tamiḻ moḻi varalāru*, p. 88.

35. Vide p. 148 *supra*.



Thus we see that the semantic principle of expansion explains a few changes in the meaning of words in several languages, which otherwise would appear to us strange and whimsical.

---

n—	न
ñ—	नि
ñ—	ने
ñ—	नो
ñ—	नो
l—	ल
l—	ल
l—	ल
r—	र
r—	र

# Action of Sulphuric Acid on Glucose and Sucrose

By

K. ASWATH NARAIN RAO AND P. L. NARASIMHA RAO  
(*Annamalai University.*)

In reviewing E. J. Holmyard's "Outlines of Organic Chemistry", K. V. (*Current Science*, 1936, 5, 313) writes, "the statement (p. 340) that sucrose differs from glucose in charring with hot sulphuric acid is incorrect as glucose also chars." Such statements are to be found in other text-books also, *e.g.*, Perkin and Kipping's Organic Chemistry, where it is stated (p. 285) it (glucose) is not carbonised when it is gently warmed with sulphuric acid (distinction from sucrose).

Such expressions as "*hot*" and "*gently warmed*" do not convey any precise idea of the temperature at which the carbonisation takes place and may be interpreted by different workers differently. Since the behaviour of these two sugars with sulphuric acid can be very conveniently used (and is being used by students of chemistry) as a test to distinguish between them, it is useful to know as to how best the test could be carried out.

When glucose or sucrose is mixed with concentrated sulphuric acid, heat is evolved and sucrose carbonises very rapidly, while glucose takes a much longer time to darken, so that although a distinction can be made, it is not very satisfactory. If, however, cold sulphuric acid is added to glucose and the temperature is not allowed to rise above 25° C., there is no change; it is only when it is slowly warmed to about 50-60° C., that charring takes place. This is true of both the anhydrous (m.p. 146° C.) and the hydrated (m.p. 86° C.) forms of glucose. Sucrose, on the other hand, on addition of the cold acid, darkens and carbonises very rapidly, the liquid becoming deep brown within three to four minutes. This happens even when the liquid is kept at 25° C.

The difference is more marked still, with dilute sulphuric acid (1:1). Both glucose and sucrose do not carbonise with acid of this strength at the ordinary temperature. When warmed to about 50° C. sucrose begins to darken, carbonisation taking place by about 70-80° C. Under these conditions *i.e.*, even at 80° C., glucose is only pale yellow, darkening rapidly above this temperature.

Therefore, sulphuric acid (both concentrated and dilute, 1:1) can be conveniently employed to differentiate between glucose and sucrose, if these facts are borne in mind.

Chemistry Department,

29th January, 1937.

# **A Note on the Spirit and Pharmaceutical Industry of India**

**By**

**K. ASWATH NARAIN RAO, D.Sc. (LOND.), D.I.C., F.I.C.,**  
*(Annamalai University)*

We heartily support the appeal made by Rajyaratna B. D. Amin, Managing Director and Agent, Messrs. Alembic Chemical Works, Ltd., Baroda, to His Excellency the Marquis of Linlithgow, on behalf of the Spirit and Pharmaceutical Industry of India. It cannot be said with any seriousness that the Government of India and the Provincial Governments are not aware of the disabilities under which the manufacturer of pharmaceuticals in India labours and their continued indifference in this respect can only be taken to mean that they are not particularly keen on fostering the growth of this industry in our country.

“It is ridiculous and absurd that imports from Germany and Japan should get better treatment in India than India's own manufactures” and unfortunately it is so; spirituous preparations imported from foreign countries enjoy unrestricted movement all over India once the tariff duty has been paid at the port of entry, while products manufactured in India are subjected to all sorts of petty annoyances and restrictions.

Nobody—not even the Member for Education, Health and Lands—has seriously questioned the urgency of legislation to prevent the sale of adulterated drugs. At least three recognised systems of medicine—Ayurveda, Unani and Allopathy—are widely practised in India and almost anything can be sold as a panacea for all ills, without the least fear of prosecution. The series of prosecutions in Bombay recently, of people who were engaged in the practice of filling patent medicine bottles of reputable firms with adulterated products and passing them off as genuine must have brought the seriousness of the situation to the notice of all people who are interested in the welfare of the nation.

We are glad to notice, however, that the Government of India have recently taken up this matter and are arranging for the assay of medicines in the School of Tropical Medicine at Calcutta. It is some satisfaction to see that an attempt is being made to attack the problem of drug adulteration, although it is some years after the Drugs Enquiry Committee submitted their report.

Mr. Amin wants the excise rules and procedure to be revised throughout India before Provincial Autonomy is duly inaugurated, because he is afraid that under Provincial Autonomy, the Provincial Governments will be less sympathetic. He is very unfair, we consider, in suggesting that the future Provincial Governments manned by Indians, will not do what is good for India as a whole, purely on provincial considerations. He is certainly optimistic in expecting the Government of India to do in the next few months what they have failed to do all these years: The adroit way in which the whole question was shelved when it was brought up at the All-India Industries Conference held at Lucknow recently indicates the correct position of how matters stand.

May we conclude by appealing to the future Provincial governments, whatever their political complexion, to help this suffering Indian Industry, which is essential for the welfare of the Nation ?



# SIDDHITRAYA

By

YAMUNĀCĀRYA

*Edited with English Translation and Notes*

By

R. RAMANUJACHARI

AND

K. SRINIVASACHARI



रागद्वेषादयस्तु चैतन्यस्यैवावस्थाविशेषास्तद्वदेव प्रत्यक्षीभवन्तीति, न तन्निदर्शने-  
नानुमानोदयः । सुखप्रयुक्तविषयीकारचैतन्यं रागः । तद्विरोधप्रयुक्तविषयीकारं तदेव  
द्वेषः । भूतदुःखज्ञानेन चेतश्चलनं \* शोकः । आगामितज्ज्ञानेन चेतश्चलनं भयम्,  
इत्यादि लक्षणग्रन्थादेवावगन्तव्यमित्यलं प्रविस्तरेण ॥

एकस्य चात्मनो निरंशस्य† न स्वापेक्षया ग्राह्यग्राहकभावः, विरोधादित्यप्युक्तमेव ।  
अंशभेदांश्रयणे तत्सिद्धये चांशान्तरमाश्रयितव्यम्; तथा तत्र तत्रेत्यनवस्था । सङ्घातत्व-  
च्चात्मनः ।

ननु च ग्राहकावभासश्रुत्या स्वसिद्धान्तश्रद्धाविप्रलब्धबुद्धिभिरभिहित इन्द्रियादि-

Being, in fact, only different states of consciousness, desire, aversion and the like must be perceptible, even as consciousness is; hence, with these as illustrative examples, you cannot advance your argument. Desire is consciousness which is directed towards objects, with a view to obtaining pleasure. The same (consciousness), when directed towards objects with a view to obtaining the opposite of pleasure, is aversion. Sorrow is mental agitation caused by consciousness of past pains. Fear is mental excitement produced by the awareness of pains to come. Since these (i.e., terms, namely, desire, aversion, sorrow and fear) and others like them may be understood even from treatises dealing with definitions, it is needless to discuss them (here) at length.

It has already been shown that, as it involves a contradiction, one and the same self which is partless, cannot possess, in respect of itself, the quality of being at once the perceiver and the perceived. If the distinction of parts (within the self) be admitted, to establish the same, (for each of these parts) other parts would have to be admitted; similarly, for these latter, other parts, and so on *ad infinitum*. Besides, the quality of being a collocation would have to be attributed to the soul.

(Here is yet another attempt to show that the self is open to mental perception). A consciousness, like the following: 'I perceive the pot' posited to exist on the strength of scriptural references to the awareness of the perceiver,<sup>145</sup> by those whose intellect has been blinded by excessive faith in their own system, must be said to exist on some

\* The reading *taccalanam* found in the Chowkamba and Telugu editions is manifestly wrong; it has been altered into *cetaścalanam*. If, however, the original reading must stand, the sentence "bhūtaḍuḥkhaññānena taccalanam śokaḥ" must come after and not precede the sentence "āgāmitajñānena cetaścalanam bhayaṃ."

† *Nirāṃkuśasya* is a variant reading. In the context, it makes no sense.

145. cf. *tadātmānamevāvet ahaṃ Brahmāsmi*, *Bṛh. up.* I. iv. 10.



प्रत्यासन्नतत्तत्पदार्थमात्रस्फुरणात् तादृशोऽपि कचिदस्तु नाम प्रत्ययः । स त्वागन्तुका-  
त्मप्रतियोगिकप्राकट्यप्रकाशादिपदाभिधेयार्थधर्मानुमितज्ञानविशिष्टमानसप्रत्यक्षसिद्धात्मनिब-  
न्धनः ।

उच्यते—अहो खलु स्वानुभव एव विभ्रमः परोक्षकाणाम्, यद्विषयानुभवसमये  
पूर्वावस्थातो न किञ्चिद्विशेषमयमात्मनोऽवबुध्यत इति । उक्तं ह्येतत्—‘ ईदृश एवा-  
यमर्थः, ज्ञायते न वेति न विद्मः, मम वा प्रतिभासते परस्य वेत्यपि न विद्मः ’ इति न  
जातुचिदेव प्रतीतिरस्ति ; ज्ञानज्ञात्रोनवभासे तादृश्यपि प्रतीतिरापद्येतेति । सोऽयं  
परसञ्चेतितात्त्वसञ्चेतितस्यातिशयस्सर्वत्र परिस्फुरन् असति ग्राहकावभासे नोपपद्येत । अनु-  
मितज्ञानावलम्बनत्वे चाज्ञासिषमित्येव प्रतिभासः स्यात् ; न जानामीति । ज्ञानजन्या-

occasions (at least) ; for, (often) only the several objects which are near the senses are apprehended (and not the self). Such a consciousness pertains to the self which is established by mental perception, and which is associated with a knowledge, whose existence is inferred from the quality found in the object (known)—a quality which is occasional, which is related to the soul, such as, *prākāṭya* and *prakāśa*.<sup>146</sup>

To this it is replied—“ It is, indeed, surprising that the confusion—namely, that, in respect of their own experience the self does not notice any difference at the time objects are apprehended—should occur to eminent investigators. It has already been stated (vide p. 30) that the following experience—“ This object is really such and such ; we do not know whether it is known or not ; nor do we know whether it appears to me or to others ”—does not exist at any time, and that, when there is no apprehension of knowledge and the knower, such an experience would also have to occur. If there is no apprehension of the knower, the special feature observed everywhere in what is perceived by us rather than in what is perceived by others, cannot be appropriately explained. If the consciousness ‘ I perceive the pot ’ has for its object a knowledge which is inferred, then, the experience would only take the form ‘ I knew ’ and not ‘ I know ’ ; for, when there is the observation of the special feature (*prākāṭya*) produced in the object by

146. Briefly stated, this view maintains that on some occasions, at least, we get a consciousness like ‘ I perceive the pot ’ ; it involves three factors—the ‘ I,’ knowledge and the pot. Of these, the second is inferred from the illumination (*prākāṭya*) found in the object known ; and the third is directly perceived by the outer senses. Regarding the ‘ I,’ as it is beyond the reach of the external senses, and as it has already been shown that it is not open to inference, it must, by a process of elimination, be concluded that it is open to mental perception.

श्रुतिशयदर्शनतद्व्याप्यनुसन्धानानुमानोदयसमयेऽनुमितितत्त्वज्ञानस्यातिवृत्तत्वात् । ज्ञानानुमानासम्भवः पूर्वमेवोक्तः । मानसप्रत्यक्षत्वञ्चात्मग्राह्यधीनिरस्तम् । तथा सति हि स्वपरवेद्ययोरनतिशयः स्यात् ।

ननु कथमिव ग्राहकानवभासे स्वपरवेद्ययोरनतिशयप्रसङ्गः ? न हि ग्राहकसिद्धिनिबन्धनः स्वपरवेद्यविशेषः । स्वसमवेतविषयबोधजन्मना परसमवेतबोधजन्मना च तद्विशेषोपपत्तेः । स्वपरसम्बन्धिबोधविशेषोदयव्यवस्थापि स्वीयपरकीयेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षादिज्ञानहेतुसामग्रीभेदनिबन्धना । न चात्मसिद्धिरपि तत्सामग्र्यनुप्रवेशमर्हति ; इन्द्रियादे-

knowledge, and when its (i.e., of *prākāṭya*) invariable concomitance with knowledge is brought to mind, and when the inference originates, the knowledge which is sought to be inferred must have already disappeared. The impossibility of inferring knowledge has already been pointed out. Besides, the view that the soul is open to mental perception is refuted by the very fact that knowledge (which is said to be inferred) is grasped by the self as belonging to itself. If it be said that knowledge is inferred without any reference to the self, then, between what is known by oneself and what is apprehended by others there would have to be no distinction.<sup>147</sup>

How, it may be asked, could the indistinguishability of what is known by oneself from what is known by others be said to result when there is non-apprehension of the knower ? Indeed, the distinction of what is known by oneself from what is known by others is not dependent on the apprehension of the knower. Their distinction can be rendered intelligible by the fact that the knowledge of objects takes birth as being inherent in oneself or as being inherent in others. This demarcation, too, in the birth of the several items of knowledge of objects which belong to oneself and to others is explainable on the basis of the distinction of the means namely the causes of knowledge, such as, the contact of the senses, belonging to oneself or others, with objects. It cannot be said that the manifestation of the self too deserves to be included among the causes of knowledge ; for, in the manner of the senses and the like, it (i.e., the self) may act as the cause (of know-

147. Every one of the statements made by the opponent is refuted. First, it is shown that the knowledge of 'I' as perceiver cannot be occasional, and that, in fact, all cognitions of objects involve, in addition, the apprehension of the self and knowledge. Next, it is pointed out that knowledge cannot be inferred with the aid of *prākāṭya*. Lastly, the attention of the opponent is drawn to an inconsistency in his argument. He must admit that when knowledge is inferred, it is necessarily inferred as related to the self. Hence, in the very act of inferring knowledge, the self also is apprehended ; and it is futile to talk of the self being open to mental perception.

रिवानवभासमानस्यैव हेतुत्वसम्भवात् । न च विषयबोध एवात्मबोध इति साम्प्रतम् । न ह्यर्थान्तरसिद्धिरर्थान्तरस्य सिद्धिर्भवति ; अतिप्रसङ्गात् । अपि च यदधीना भावानां रूपभेदव्यवस्था तदपि हि संवेदनं तदानीं निलीनरूपमेव इन्द्रियादिवत् ; कुतस्तु पुनस्तदाश्रयस्यात्मनः प्रतिभासप्रसक्तिः ? यदाहुः—इदमहं जानामीति त्रितयावभासः सार्वत्रिक इति, तदप्यनुभवानारूढमेवानन्तरमेव प्रतिक्षिप्तमिति ।

अस्तु तर्हि ग्राहकतयैव सर्वार्थिग्रहणसमयेष्वात्मसिद्धिः । अभ्युपगन्तव्या हि संविदः स्वतःसिद्धिः, सर्वप्रकारसाधनान्तरनिराकरणात् सत्याश्च तस्याः कदाचिदनवभासादर्शनाच्च । यथा च संविदः प्रकाशाव्यभिचारस्तथा प्रपञ्चितं प्रथमाधिकरण इति

ledge) without itself being manifest. It is not right to maintain that the manifestation of the object is itself the manifestation of the self. Indeed, the manifestation of one object cannot be the manifestation of another ; for, otherwise, an unwarranted extension of this principle would become possible. Further, at the time objects are presented, even knowledge itself, one on which the very distinction of the respective shapes of objects depends, is altogether hidden from view, even as the senses and the like (remain hidden). (When that is so) where is the possibility for the manifestation of its substrate, the self.<sup>148</sup> Even the contention of some that the threefold manifestation occurs everywhere taking the form 'I know this' does not fit in with experience ; and is forthwith refuted.

If that be so<sup>149</sup>, let it be granted that the self is manifested as the knower at the time every object is apprehended. The self-luminosity of knowledge has necessarily to be admitted, because, the refutation of the view that knowledge depends for its manifestation on some means other than itself has been effected, in every possible manner ; and because when knowledge does exist, it is never noticed to be unmanifest. How knowledge never fails to be manifest has been

148. When objects are known, knowledge which is responsible for bringing to light the respective shapes of objects is not itself revealed ; just as when things are perceived, the senses which are the instruments of perception are themselves not cognised. While knowledge itself remains unmanifested, there is absolutely no room for the presentation of its substrate, the self.

149. If the consciousness of the self as the perceiver in every cognition of objects is not necessary for accounting for the distinction between objects known by oneself and those known by others, at any rate, on the ground that knowledge which is self-luminous has the quality of revealing everything, it should be admitted that, when it reveals objects, it manifests the self also.

नात्रोपक्षिप्य प्रतिक्षेप्तव्यम् । सतोऽपि प्रमेयजातस्य स्वापादिसमयेऽनुपलब्धेरभ्युपगतं तावत्संविदस्तत्साधकत्वम् । अतः कृतार्थान्तरसाधनभावया तथैवात्मनोऽपि सिद्धिरभ्युपगन्तुं न्याय्या ।

यत्तु विषयवित्त्युपरमेऽपि स्वापसमयेऽयमात्मा प्रकाशत इति, तदुपपत्तिभिरुपपद्यमानमपि यथाप्रतीति व्यवहरतां न चित्तमनुरञ्जयति ।

अपवृक्तस्य तु ज्ञानं हेत्वभावात् सम्भवि ।

नित्यत्वे नित्यमुक्तिस्स्यादर्शवादास्तथोक्तयः ॥

निर्धूतनिखिलकरणकलेवरज्ञानकर्मवासनानुबन्धस्यापवृक्तस्य न खलु स्वपरसंवेद-  
elaborately dealt with in the *Prathamādhikaraṇa*.<sup>150</sup> Hence, it is need-  
less here to refer to the view (that knowledge depends upon something  
else for its manifestation) and refute the same. For the reason that  
during states, such as sleep, even though collections of objects of  
knowledge exist, there is non-apprehension of the same, it has to be  
admitted that the capacity to reveal the same belongs to knowledge.  
Therefore, it is but proper to admit that the manifestation of the self  
also is effected by knowledge itself, which has definitely been proved to  
possess the quality of revealing other objects.

(If it be said that the self need not depend on knowledge for its  
manifestation, for the reason that even in the absence of the latter, the  
self shines forth, it is thus replied to). The view that even  
when knowledge of objects is absent in deep sleep the self  
is revealed may be rendered intelligible by arguments, but  
(it) does not satisfy the mind of those who think and act  
in the light of experience. Again, to the released soul know-  
ledge cannot arise, as its causes do not prevail (in that state).  
If it be contended that the knowledge which obtains in the state of re-  
lease is eternal, being independent of causal conditions, then, there must  
be perpetual release; and those scriptural passages (which teach the  
existence of jñāna in this state) must be considered to be *arthavādas*.<sup>151</sup>

There is no possibility of the occurrence of any cause which could  
account for the birth of knowledge concerning himself and others to  
the released soul, who is devoid of all senses, body and contact with

150. The elaborate treatment of the nature of jñāna set forth in *Prathamādhikaraṇa* of Nāthamuni's *Nyāya-tattva-śāstra* is, unfortunately, not available. But there are some extracts from this work in Vedānta Deśika's *Nyāya-Siddhāntajana*. cf. 'Nyāyatattvetu Prathamādhikaraṇe lakṣaṇāntarāṇi bahūni dūṣayitvā "atyantavegitātyanta saūkṣmyam nirbharatā tathā svasattākāla bhāvyaṁ jñāne lakṣma catuṣtayaṁ" iti svoktalakṣaṇopasamhāraḥ kṛtaḥ' *Buddhipariccheda*, p. 249.

151. *Arthavādas* are those scriptural passages which do not directly convey positive or negative injunctions; but which, by extolling prescribed or censuring forbidden acts, aim at infusing in the mind of the listener a keen desire to engage in his sacred duties at the earliest opportunity.

नोदयनिबन्धनं किञ्चित्सम्भाव्यते । न च मनसो नित्येन्द्रियत्वेन तत्संयोगादेव तदा ज्ञानं जन्यत इति युक्तम् ; स्वरूपतो गगनवन्नित्यस्यापि सतस्तस्येन्द्रियभावेन ज्ञानोत्पादकत्वस्य धर्माधर्मावरोधनिबन्धनत्वात् ।

धर्माधर्मावरुद्धं सन्मनो ज्ञानस्य साधनम् ।

सति नित्येन्द्रियत्वेऽपि श्रोत्रवत्करणत्वतः ॥

ननु योगजधर्मानुगृहीततत्संयोगस्य साधनत्वम्, ‘क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि’ ‘तदा विद्वान्पुण्यपापे विधूय निरञ्जनः’ इत्यादिशुक्लेतरसकलकर्मप्रक्षयश्रुतिविरोधात् । धर्मफलत्वे चापवर्गस्य पुनरावृत्तिप्रसङ्गः, ‘नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन,’ ‘तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते’ इत्यादिश्रवणाच्च ।

impressions of knowledge and actions. And, it is not right to maintain that, as the mind (manas) is an eternal organ, through its conjunction itself knowledge is caused in that state ; for, although, like ether, mind is, in its essential nature, eternal, its being the originator of jñāna by acting as an organ is dependent on its association with merit and demerit.<sup>152</sup> Being associated with merit and demerit, manas acts as the means of knowledge ; for, although it is an eternal sense organ, the mind, like the mechanism of hearing, acts as an instrument of knowledge.

Nor is the view tenable—namely, that contact with manas, which is assisted by the merit resulting from concentration, is itself the instrument of knowledge ; for, it contradicts scriptural passages which declare that all good and bad deeds perish ; for example : “The deeds of this person (i.e., the released soul) perish” ;<sup>153</sup> “Then, he who knows (Brahman), shaking off good and evil deeds, leaving the spotless. . .”.<sup>154</sup> If final release were the result of good deeds, there would be a further return (to the state of bondage). Besides, in view of the following scriptural passages (it is evident that release does not result from deeds). “The uncreated (Puruṣa) cannot be attained by what is created (i.e. deeds).<sup>155</sup> “Hence, just as here the world won by deeds perishes, even so after bodily death, the world won by good deeds perishes.”<sup>156</sup>

152. Even though the organ of hearing is nothing but ether (*ākāśa*) it is only the ether which is limited by the winding walls of the auditory apparatus (*karnaśaṣkuli*) that can function as a sense-organ and possess the capacity to appreciate sounds. In the same way, though manas is eternal, it can act as the originator of knowledge not always, but only when associated with merit and demerit.

153. *Muṇḍa. up.* II. ii. 8

154. *Muṇḍa. up.* III. i. 3.

155. *Muṇḍa. up.* I. ii. 12.

156. *Chānd. up.* VIII. i. 6.

न चात्मा सत्तयैव तदानीं तज्ज्ञाननिमित्तमिति वाच्यम् ; क्लृप्त्यागाकृतकल्पन-  
प्रसक्तेः । तन्मात्रनिमित्तत्वे च सर्वदा आत्मनि स्वरूपवत् \* तदपि विद्यत  
इति संसारानवतारप्रसङ्गात्, बन्धमोक्षावस्थयोरविशेषापत्तेश्च । न च देहेन्द्रियादिप्रतिबद्धतये-  
दानीं तदभाव इति वाच्यम् । तत्खलु प्रतिबन्धकम्, यत्सति पुष्कलकारणे कार्योदयं निरुणद्धि ।  
न चाद्याप्यात्मनस्तत्पुष्कलकारणत्वं सिद्धम् । शरीरेन्द्रियवतामेव ज्ञानदर्शनात्, क्लृप्तज्ञान-  
कारणभावस्य तस्यैव तद्वन्धकत्ववचनमुन्मुक्तवचः । अतो नास्त्यपवर्गदशायां ज्ञानम् ।  
तात्कालिकज्ञानमुखादिवादास्तु आत्मज्ञानविधिशेषतया गुणवादेन नेतव्याः । अतो

Nor can it be contended that in the state of release, the self, by its very existence, acts as the cause of knowledge concerning itself ; for, that would involve the rejection of what is well-established and the positing of something unproved. If the very existence of the soul were itself the cause of knowledge, knowledge also would, like the existence of the soul, persist therein at all times ; and, as a consequence, the stream of births and deaths would not arise at all ; hence, there would be no distinction between the states of bondage and release. It is not helpful to suggest that as knowledge is obstructed by the body, senses and other impediments, it comes to be absent in the state of bondage. Indeed, that must be the obstructing factor which prevents the origin of the effect, even when the entire set of causal conditions is present. So far it has not been proved that the self is the entire cause of jñāna. While the body and senses are well established to be the cause of knowledge, for the reason that the latter is found to arise only to those possessing them, to speak of the very body and senses as constituting an impediment to jñāna is a mad man's assertion. Therefore, jñāna must be said to be absent in the state of release ; and the scriptural passages speaking of the existence of jñāna, pleasure and the like as prevailing in that state, must be taken as being auxiliary to the injunction prescribing knowledge of the self,<sup>157</sup> and interpreted in accordance with *gauṇī vṛttī*.<sup>158</sup> Therefore, since there is

\* *Ātmasvarūpavat* is a variant reading.

157. cf. *ātmā vā* are *draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ mantavyaḥ nididhyāsitavyaḥ*. *Bṛh up.* VI. v. 6.

158. In the proposition 'Devadatta is a lion,' the term 'lion' cannot, obviously, be understood in a literal sense. The judgment only signifies that Devadatta possesses a strength, ferocity, cruelty and the like which are similar to the corresponding qualities owned by the lion. This interpretation of the word *lion* is in accordance with what is known as *gauṇī vṛttī*. *Gauṇī vṛttī* has been defined by Khaṇḍa-deva in his famous *Bhaṭṭadīpikā* and *Kaustubha* thus : 'Svaśakyasamavetavattā gauṇī vṛttih | samavetavatvaṇca kvacit āropitatvasambandhena kvacit svasamāna jātyagunaṇavattāsambandhena iti bhedah.' Jaimini's *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra*, I. iv. 23 mentions six varieties of *gauṇī vṛttī* : 'tatsiddhi jāti sārūpya praśamsā bhūma liṅga-samavāyā iti guṇāśrayāḥ.'

विषयवित्तिसमय एवात्मसिद्धिनियमाद्यथोक्तनीत्या अर्थवित्तिषु वेदितृतयैवात्मसिद्धिरिति ।

इदमप्यात्मतत्त्वापरिज्ञानोल्लासितपरिमितमतिविकल्पजल्पितमिति न रोचयन्ते त्रय्यन्तविदः । विषयवित्तिर्हि विषयवित्तिरेव, न हि तथा आत्मवित्तिः स्वरूपं वा सेद्धुमर्हति ; अतद्विषयत्वात् । यो हि यत्संविद्विषयो न भवति नासौ तथा सिद्धयति, रूपसंविदेव रसः । अविषयो च विषयवित्तेर्बुद्धिबोद्धाराविति तावपि न तथा सिद्धयंतः ।

ननु वेद्यस्वभावोऽयं यत्स्वविषयसंविदा सिद्धयतीति । वित्तिस्तु वित्तिरेव, वेदिता च वेदितैवेति कुतस्तयोर्वेद्यस्वभावानुप्रवेशः । उक्तं हि तयोर्मानसप्रत्यक्षागोचर-त्वमनुमेयत्वासम्भवश्च । कुतस्तर्हि वित्तिसिद्धिः ? । स्वतन्त्रैव स्वयंप्रकाशा हि संवित् ।

भैवम् ; सापि हि विषयवदेवान्यस्यैव प्रकाशमानतया न स्वतः सिद्धयति,

invariable presentation of the self at the very time when the knowledge of objects arises, it must be concluded that, in the manner indicated already, the self presents itself as the knower in all knowledge of objects.

Those who have understood the (true import of the) Vedānta do not countenance this view either, as it is the prattle of that form of narrow mind which is the result of ignorance of the true nature of the self. Indeed, the knowledge of objects is no other than the presentation of objects; and with its aid neither the self, nor its knowledge is capable of being presented; for, neither of these is the object of the cognition of objects (*viṣaya-jñāna*). That which is not the object of a given consciousness cannot be presented by that consciousness; just as taste could not be revealed by the consciousness of colour. Knowledge and knower are not the object of *viṣaya-jñāna*; hence, they too are not manifested by it.

(The opponent may say) the quality, namely, that of being manifested by knowledge concerning itself is the character of objects known; (and may ask) how can the character of objects known be thrust on knowledge and knower, when knowledge is only knowledge and the knower is only the knower? It has already been shown that they are not open to mental perception; and the impossibility of inferring them has also been proved. (It may be asked) If so, how is knowledge manifested? (The opponent's reply is) it does not depend on anything else; because consciousness is self-luminous.

(The reply to the above is:) it is not so; for, consciousness too cannot shine forth by its own aid, since, like objects, it is revealed for

स्वतः सिद्धयन्ती च सा किमिति कश्चिदेव प्रति चकास्ति? न सर्वान्प्रति? तत्समवायादिति चेत्—यत्समवायिनी हि या संवित् तस्यैव सा चकास्ति नेतरस्य तदसमवायादिति—यद्येवम् आश्रितस्तर्हि आत्मसम्बन्धनिबन्धन एव संविदः प्रकाशः, तद्भावाभावानुविधानात् ।

यदुच्यते प्रकाशस्वभावाया एव सत्याः प्रतियोगिविशेषावच्छेदायैव तदपेक्षा, न स्वरूपसिद्धये इति ; कुतः खल्वयं निश्चयः? यदि हि प्रतियोगिनिरपेक्षैव कदाचिदात्मस्वरूपमिव संवित्प्रकाशेत, तत एवमध्यवस्येमापि । न च तथास्ति ; आश्रयप्रतियोगिसापेक्षैव संयोगपुत्रत्वादेरिव तस्याः स्वरूपसत्तेति न पृथक्सिद्धयुत्प्रेक्षावकाशः ।

सत्यास्संविदः प्रकाशव्यभिचाराभावात् स्वरूपप्रयुक्तः प्रकाश इति चेत् ; सत्याः किं तस्याः आत्मसम्बन्धव्यभिचारोऽस्ति? अपि चैवं सुखदुःखादयोऽपि त्वन्मते स्वतः सिद्धाः स्युः । न हि तेऽपि सन्तो न प्रकाशन्ते ।

some one other than itself. How can self-consciousness, which, on your view is self-luminous, shine forth to some one person only and not to all? It may be argued that because of its inherence in that particular self, (it shines forth to that self only). In other words, that consciousness which is inherent in a given self can manifest itself only to that self and not to others ; for, it is not inherent in the latter. If so, (we reply) it amounts to admitting that the manifestation of consciousness is dependent upon the relation of consciousness to the self ; for, the presence or absence of this manifestation is dependent respectively upon the presence or absence of this relation.

If it be said that while consciousness is, in its essential nature, self-luminous, it still stands in need of this relation for being associated with the different correlates (*pratiyogin*) and not for its own manifestation ; (we ask) how did you arrive at this conclusion? If at any time consciousness, like the soul, presents itself without depending upon the correlatives, then, we may come to this conclusion ; but such a presentation is not met with. The very existence of consciousness, like that of the quality of being son or conjunction, presupposes a substrate and a correlative ; hence, there is no room for thinking of the manifestation of knowledge apart from these.

If it be maintained that the manifestation of *jñāna* is dependent upon its very being, for the reason that, as long as it exists, it never fails to present itself ; (we ask) when it exists is its relation with the self absent? Further, if this were so, even pleasure, pain and the like would, on your view, be self-dependent ; for when they exist, they never fail to be manifested.



अथ अर्थान्तरसाधकतया सर्ववादिसम्मतयाः संविद एव परं स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमाश्रितम्, तयैव तथाभूतया तदितरबाह्याभ्यन्तरसकलपदार्थसिद्धशुपपत्तेः किमनेकस्वयंप्रकाशभावाभ्युपगमेनेति भावः ; तथा सति,

सर्वस्यार्थस्य तद्वित्तेः साक्षी सर्वत्र सम्मतः ।

आत्मैवास्तु स्वतःसिद्धः किमनेकैस्तथाविधैः ॥

यो यस्य साक्षी तेनैव तस्य सिद्धिर्न लौकिकी ।

अर्थस्येवार्थवित्तेरप्यात्मा साक्षी हि लक्ष्यते ॥

सन्तु नामार्थवित्तयः स्वतःसिद्धाः, तथापि न ताभिरयमात्मा प्रत्यक्षीभवति ; तत्साक्षित्वात् । यत्साक्षी खल्वयं पुरुषः न तेनासौ प्रत्यक्षः ; घटसाक्षात्कारीव घटेन । अर्थसंविदां च साक्षात्कारी चेतन इति सोऽपि न ताभिरपरोक्षीभवति ।

सजातीयस्वसाध्यार्थनिरपेक्षात्मसिद्धयः ।

सर्वे पदार्थास्तेनात्मा निरपेक्षस्वसिद्धिकः ॥

If it is your intention to say that the quality of being self-luminous has been admitted to belong only to consciousness, which is accepted by all disputants as being the means for the manifestation of all things other than itself, and if you were to ask where the need is for positing self-luminous entities, when with the aid of such a consciousness alone, the manifestation of all other objects, internal and external, becomes intelligible, (we may as well reply :) Let the self alone which is admitted on all hands to be the witness (sākṣin) of all objects and their cognitions, be considered self-luminous ; (and ask you in turn) where is the need for several entities of that description ?

Moreover, the view that the revelation of what stands witness to a given entity is effected by that given entity itself is not supported by everyday experience. The soul is, indeed, found to be the witness of the knowledge of objects, even as it is the witness of objects. Let all items of knowledge concerning objects be admitted to be self-established ; even then, with their aid, the soul cannot be directly apprehended ; for, it is their witness. Indeed, the self cannot be revealed by that for which he stands witness ; just as he who witnesses the pot cannot be revealed by the pot. As the conscious entity is the witness of all object-cognitions, it cannot be directly revealed by them.

All objects possess a manifestation concerning themselves, a manifestation which is not dependent on something similar to them or on something manifested by themselves. Hence, the soul owns a manifestation concerning itself—a manifestation which is not dependent

न हि कश्चित्पदार्थः स्वप्रकाशाय स्वसाध्यसाधारणजातीयार्थान्तरापेक्षो दृष्टः । न खलु घटः स्वसिद्धये घटान्तरमपेक्षते, अपेक्षते तु विजातीयमालोकादि । एवमालोकोऽपि प्रकाशमानो नालोकान्तरमपेक्षते ; नापि स्वापेक्षप्रकाशं घटादिकमपेक्षते ; अपेक्षते तु विजातीयमिन्द्रियम् । एवमिन्द्रियमपि नेन्द्रियान्तरम्, स्वापेक्षप्रकाशं आलोकादि घटं वापेक्षते ; अपेक्षते तु विजातीयं संवेदनम् । एवं संवेदनमपि संविदन्तरं स्वाधीनसिद्धिकमिन्द्रियादिकं वा नापेक्षते स्वसिद्धौ, अपेक्षते तु विजातीयं स्वाश्रयभूतं स्वतन्त्रमात्मानम्, एवमात्माप्यात्मान्तरं स्वाधीनसिद्धिं संविदिन्द्रियादिकमपि स्वापरोक्षे नापेक्षते इत्यनन्यापेक्षा ह्यात्मस्वरूपसिद्धिः ।

तदेवं चित्स्वभावस्य पुंसः स्वाभाविकी चित्तिः ।

नानापदार्थसंसर्गात्तत्त्वित्त्व\*मश्नुते ॥

(upon something similar to it or on anything revealed by itself). No object is found to depend for its manifestation on some other entity which is similar to itself, or on something which is manifested by that object itself. In fact, the pot does not require for its manifestation some other pot ; but it stands in need of light and so on. Likewise, light also, when it shines forth, does not require some other light ; nor does it need pot and the like, which depend for their manifestation on light itself ; but it stands in need of the sense-organ, an entity which is dissimilar to it. Similarly, the sense-organ also does not require (for its manifestation) light and the like, or the pot, which alike depend on the sense-organ for their manifestation ; but it requires consciousness, which is an altogether different type of entity. Similarly, consciousness, in its turn, does not depend (for its manifestation) on some other consciousness ; nor on the sense-organ and the like, whose manifestation is dependent on itself ; but it requires the self-dependent soul, which is its substrate and which is a different type of entity. In the same manner, the self, in its turn, does not require for its direct presentation some other self ; nor does it require consciousness, sense-organ, and the like, whose presentation is dependent upon it. That is why the presentation of the essential nature of the self is not dependent upon anything other than itself.

To the soul which has thus been shown to have consciousness as its essential nature, consciousness must indeed be an invariable attribute. On account of its conjunction with manifold objects, conscious-

‡ The reading *asādhāranasajātīyārthāntarāpekṣaḥ* found in the mss. and printed copies makes no sense. Hence the following emendation *svasādhyaśādhāraṇa-jātīyārthāntarāpekṣaḥ* has been suggested.

\**tattadvittitvam* is the reading found in some manuscripts. It is preferable to *tattaccittatvam* found in the Cowkamba and Telugu editions.

यथैव खलु सूर्यालोकस्तेन तेनार्थभेदेन संसर्गात्तत्प्रकाशो भवति घटप्रकाशः पट-  
प्रकाश इति, एवमात्मनः प्रकारभूतं चैतन्यं अर्थविशेषसंसर्गात् घटसंवित्पटसंविदित्यादि-  
प्रख्योपाख्ये प्रतिपद्यते । ते च चैतन्यस्य दशाविशेषाश्चेतयितुरात्मनो धर्मविशेषत्वादेव  
तस्यापरोक्षा भवन्ति, कादाचित्कबोधवादिनामिव बोधस्य विषयभेदावच्छेदादयः ।

ननु आत्मनश्चैतन्यमागन्तुकमिति न्यायवैशेषिकास्तन्मतोपजीविनश्चाभिनवमीमां-  
सकाः; अर्थेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाद्यन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानात्, गच्छामि, अगच्छमित्यादिवज्जानामि,  
अज्ञासिषमित्यादिकालावच्छेदप्रतीतेः, स्वापतुरीयादिदशासु च बोधाधारत्वे सुप्तप्रबुद्धबद्ध-

ness comes to be such and such a knowledge (e.g. knowledge of the pot, knowledge of the cow, and so on). Just as the rays of the sun, by virtue of their contact with several different objects, come to be treated as different illuminations, such as the illumination of the pot, the illumination of the cloth and so on; even so, consciousness which is an attribute of the soul, on account of its contact with diverse objects, acquires different names and comes to be spoken of as being distinct, such as the cognition of the pot, the cognition of the cloth, and so on. And these (different cognitions) are merely the several states of consciousness. As they are, thus, the different attributes of the self, which is a conscious entity, they become perceptible to the self; even as, on the view of those who maintain that consciousness is an occasional attribute of the self, the delimitation of knowledge by the different objects is perceptible to the self.

Those who know the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika darśanas and the Neo-Mīmāṃsakas who follow their doctrines declare that consciousness is an occasional quality of the soul; because consciousness depends (for its presence or absence) on the presence or absence of such factors, as the contact of the senses with the objects; and because experiences, such as, 'I know,' 'I knew,' are known to be limited by time; and because the distinction between the sleeping person and the person awake, and that between the soul in bondage and the soul released, would disappear, if the soul were regarded as the substrate of consciousness even in states such as, sleep and *turiya*<sup>159</sup>. Further, in respect of con-

---

159. The psychology of the Upaniṣads mentions four states of the soul—*jāgrat* (waking), *svapna* (dreaming), *suṣupti* (deep sleep) and *turiya*. During the waking state, manas and the outer senses are active. In the dream state, the outer senses are in abeyance, but manas continues to function. In deep sleep, even manas is quiescent. *Turiya* is a transcendental state not to be grasped by the experience of the ordinary man. While it resembles dreamless sleep in so far as there is complete withdrawal of normal consciousness, and the absence of desires, it differs from it in so far as in this state the self reveals itself fully.

मुक्तादिव्यवस्थाभावप्रसङ्गाच्च । नित्यस्य च ज्ञानस्यात्मसमवायिनः प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थापि दुरुपपादैव । तदा हि प्रकाशनशीलतया तस्या एकस्यां संविदि सर्वमेव प्रकाशेत ; न वा किञ्चिदविशेषात् । अन्यदा तु यदर्थसन्निकर्षजुषा इन्द्रियलिङ्गादिना या धीर्जन्यते तदीयैव सेति व्यवस्था युक्तिमती ।

स्यान्मतम्—इन्द्रियादिप्रणाडिकया चैतन्यमेव तेन तेनार्थेनानुरज्यमानं तत्प्रकाशतया तदीयत्वेन व्यवतिष्ठते; अनुरागस्य चागन्तुकतया इन्द्रियाद्यनुविधानं कालावच्छेदस्वापादिव्यवस्था चोपपद्यत इति—तदसत् । अर्थान्तरसन्निकर्षेऽर्थान्तरस्यानुरागासम्भवात् । चैतन्यमपि तथा निष्क्रम्य सन्निकृष्यत इति चेन्न; अमूर्तस्याकाशस्येव निष्क्रमणप्रवेशाद्यनुपपत्तेः । गुणश्च चैतन्यं गुणिनमपहाय कथमन्यतो यास्यति । न चार्थोऽन्तः

consciousness which is eternal and which is inherent in the soul, all distinctions based on each object known become unintelligible. Indeed, then (i.e. if consciousness is eternal), as it possesses the nature of manifesting (objects), either all objects will shine forth in one and the same knowledge or none at all, there being no distinguishing feature (favouring one object rather than another). When it is admitted to have a different character (i.e. when it is occasional), the distinction of knowledge (into, knowledge of the pot or knowledge of the cloth) based on this principle, namely, that knowledge which arises from the sense-organ or probans or something similar, coming into contact with a particular object, pertains to that object only—becomes reasonable.

It may be contended that consciousness itself, through the medium of the senses and the like, becomes coloured by different objects. and (thereby) comes to be distinguished into such and such a knowledge pertaining to such and such an object ; and that, as this process of being coloured is accidental, the dependence on the senses, the limitation by time into the past, present, etc., and the distinction of states, such as, sleep and the like become intelligible. This (contention) is erroneous. When one object is near, another (which is not near by) cannot be coloured (by it). If it be said that consciousness itself proceeding outward gets so close a contact (with the object as to be coloured by it), (the reply is :—) not so ; for, in the case of a formless object, such as ether, proceeding outward, entering and the like are impossible. How can consciousness, which is an attribute, depart from the substance wherein it inheres and proceed elsewhere ? Nor does the object enter into (consciousness) ; for the object is perceived by everybody as being

प्रविशति । स हि बहिर्देशसम्बद्धः सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः । जात्यादिषु चानुपपत्तिस्तुल्यैव ।

अथोच्येत द्वेधा खल्वयं प्रत्यगर्थोऽवतिष्ठते—बहलो विरलश्च । तत्र बहलः प्रत्यक्चेतनक्षेत्रज्ञादिपदपर्याय आत्मा; विरलस्तु चैतन्यज्ञानादिपदाभिधेयः प्रत्यगर्थ-तन्त्रतया गुण इत्युपचर्यते तेजोवत्, यथा बहलस्तेजः प्रदीपोऽग्निरिति, विरलं तु प्रभा ज्योतिरिति । अतो विरलात्मप्रदेशतया चैतन्यस्यालोकस्येव गमनं संयोगादिकमुप-पद्यत इति ।

इदमनुपपन्नम् । निरवयवस्यामूर्तस्यासङ्गस्यात्मनो बहलविरलादिधर्मानुपपत्तेः । यदि सावयवत्वमूर्तत्वानित्यत्वसंसर्गित्वादिकमपि धर्मजातमात्मन्यनुमन्वीमहि, तत एव-मङ्गीकुर्वमिहि । न च तदनुमन्तुमुचितम्, अचेतनत्वापातादित्यलमनेनार्हतमतानुकारदूषिते-नात्मवादेन ।

located in the space outside. Besides, in the case of (formless) entities, such as, generality, the same difficulty (i.e. the impossibility of proceeding outward or coming in) holds good.

It may be said that the inward entity, like the luminous substance, exists in two forms, viz., in a dense and in a sparse form; of these the entity in the dense form is the self; and it has the words *pratyak*, *cetana*, *kṣetrajña* and the like as its synonyms; but the entity in the sparse form, referred to by the terms *caitanya*, *jñāna* and the like, is called, by courtesy, a quality, for the reason that it is dependent on the *pratyagartha* (the inward entity in the dense form); even as the luminous entity in the dense form is termed flame, fire and the like; while the same entity in its sparse form is referred to as *prabhā* (radiance) and *jyotiḥ* (light); proceeding outward and coming into contact would be appropriate in the case of consciousness, as in that of light (*āloka*); for, consciousness is only the sparse region of the self.

But this view is untenable: For, qualities, such as, those of existing in a dense and in a sparse form cannot be attributed to the self, which is without parts, and without forms and which has no contact (with anything else). We could admit the self to exist in such a manner, if we were prepared to admit the following set of qualities, viz., the character of possessing parts, of having forms, of being non-eternal, and of having relations, as belonging to the self. But it is unreasonable to make such an admission; for it would result in reducing the self to a non-intelligent entity. This peculiar theory of the self, which stands condemned for the very reason of its imitating the Ārhatta (Jaina) doctrine, need not detain us any further.

अथ मतमात्मा अयमनवयवेन सर्वतः सर्वार्थावभाससमर्थचैतन्यानुबन्धः सर्वव्यापी अथ च न सर्वमस्य परिस्फुरति, तमोगुणप्रतिबन्धात् । सत्त्वोत्कटैस्तु करणैः स्वकस्व-कपाटवानुसारेण पाटिते तु तमसि, ते तेऽर्थाः प्रतिभासन्ते । अतोऽन्तरेणापि ज्ञानार्थ-योर्निष्क्रमणप्रवेशानुपपद्यत एवार्थविशेषोपरागः संविद इति ।

एवमप्यर्थातिशयमात्रहेतुत्वादिन्द्रियलिङ्गादेर्ज्ञानस्येव ज्ञापकत्वं न स्यात्, ज्ञान-हेतुत्वाभावात् । न चार्थप्रकाशस्य ज्ञानत्वम् ; प्रकाशमानतयार्थस्यापि ज्ञानृत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

यदाहुः—आत्मधर्मस्य चैतन्यस्य विषयेण संयोगो ज्ञानमित्युच्यत इति ; तत्रापि संयोगस्योभयनिष्ठतया स एव प्रसङ्गोऽनुभवविरोधश्च ; अहमिदमिदानीं जानामि, नेदानी-मित्यात्मसमवायिनोरेव ज्ञानभावाभावयोरनुभवात् ।

It may be contended that the self is, in its entirety, related to consciousness, which is capable of illuminating all objects and in all ways ; that it is all-pervasive, and that although it is of this nature, all objects do not present themselves to it, since there is the obstruction proceeding from the quality of darkness (*tamas*) ; and that when, with the aid of the sense-organs, wherein the *sattva* quality predominates, this darkness (*tamas*) is dispelled in accordance with their different capacities, the respective objects shine forth ; and that, thus, without there being any proceeding outward or coming in on the part of consciousness and objects, all reference to knowledge as pertaining to particular objects becomes intelligible.

Even if this were so, the senses and probans (*hetu*), like *jñāna*, could not be considered the cause of knowledge, for, they are responsible only for helping objects to be illumined (by removing the enveloping *tamas*), and not for originating knowledge. (It is no escape to say that) the illumination of objects is itself knowledge ; since (in that case) the objects also, for the reason of their being illumined would have to be considered the knower.

Even on the view advanced by some that the conjunction of consciousness, which is a quality of the self, with the object is spoken of as knowledge, the same difficulty (the unwelcome result, viz., that the object would have to be considered as the knower) persists, since conjunction exists in both (the self and the object) ; and, in addition, there is contradiction with experience, since the presence or absence of knowledge is experienced to inhere in the self only (and not in the object), as is evident from the experience 'I know this now,' 'I do not know this now.'

अविकृतप्रकाशहेतुकिरणसंहतावप्यहिममहसि प्रकाशकत्वप्रख्योपाख्यानवदुपपद्यते इति मा बोचः । तत्र हि गभस्तीनां द्रव्यतया अकुञ्चनप्रसारणद्रव्यान्तरसंयोगविभागादे-  
स्सम्भवादुपपद्यते व्यवस्थोपलब्धिः; चैतन्यं तु गुण इति न तथा व्यवस्थामर्हति ।

अथोच्येत—द्विधा हि ज्ञानमात्मनः स्वस्मिन्नन्यत्र च । तत्रायमुदयास्तमयरहित-  
मात्मस्वरूपप्रयुक्तमनवरतमनुवर्तते, इतरत्तु तत्तदर्थसम्बन्धीन्द्रियाद्यागन्तुकहेतुभेदायत्तात्म-  
लाभं तद्भावाभावानुविधायि तत्तदर्थप्रकाशतयोदीयते लीयते च । तदपेक्षयैव स्वापजागरा-  
द्यवस्थान्वयवस्थापि सङ्गस्यत इति । उच्यते—अभ्युपगच्छेमाप्येवं यदि नित्यमात्मनि  
ज्ञानमस्तीत्यत्र किमपि साधनमुपलभेमहि ।

ननु अङ्गीकृतस्तावज्जाग्रदवस्थायां सर्वदात्मानुभवः स्वापादिषु चानुमीयते ;

Do not say that, just as in the case of the sun which is unchanging and which possesses hosts of rays which are responsible for manifesting objects, it is the sun, and not the object, that is considered to be the manifester and called like that, (here also, the reference to the self, and not the object, as the possessor of knowledge becomes intelligible). For, in the case of the sun, since the rays are substances, contraction and expansion, contact with objects and separation therefrom, are possible ; and hence, the consideration (of the sun rather than the object) as the manifester is quite intelligible. Consciousness, on the other hand, is a quality ; hence, in this case, there is no adequate basis for the consideration of the self, rather than the object, as the knower.

It may be said that the knowledge belonging to the self is twofold—one relating to itself, the other to everything else ; and of these, the former is without a beginning and an end, is dependent on the very existence of the self and persists at all times ; while the latter, whose very existence is dependent on several occasional factors, such as, the senses which are in contact with the various objects, originates and perishes as the knowledge of such and such an object—a knowledge whose presence or absence is based respectively on the presence or absence of the causal factors. And it is on this basis that even the distinction of states into those of sleeping, waking and the like would be rendered intelligible. To this it is said in reply that we may accept this if we notice any proof for the assertion that knowledge exists in the self eternally.

(One may ask : Does not the following argument prove that consciousness is an eternal and not an occasional property of the soul ?) It is admitted on all hands that in the state of waking the consciousness

तात्कालिकस्वविषयज्ञानाभावस्योत्तरोत्तरकालं परामृश्यमानत्वात् । यत्कालीनोऽभावः परामृश्यते तत्कालीनेन तदाश्रयस्वरूपज्ञानेनापि हि भाव्यम्, मध्याह्नकालपरामृश्यमान इव प्रातस्समयपरिदृष्टतटाकतीरादिवर्तिनि कुञ्जराद्यभावे । यत्कालीनाभावाश्रयतया यः परामृश्यते सः तत्कालीनस्वरूपानुभववान्, यथा प्रातरनुभूततटाकतीरादि । स्वापादि कालिकार्थानुभवाभावाश्रयतया चायमात्मा परामृश्यते; अतस्तात्कालिकस्वरूपानुभववानिति ।

मैवम् । अनैकान्त्यात्, प्रातस्तत्र नाहमासमिति स्वाभावभूमितया प्रतीतेन

of self always exists ; but its existence in states of sleep and the like is inferred, for the non-existence of knowledge of objects in those states is remembered on subsequent occasions. Whenever the non-existence of a thing is remembered as having existed at a given time, there must necessarily have existed at that time a knowledge of its locus, as in the case of the non-existence of the elephant remembered at noon-day as having prevailed in the morning on the bank of a tank or thereabouts witnessed then. That which is known as the locus of the non-existence obtaining at a given time involves knowledge concerning itself at that time ; for instance, the bank of the tank or thereabouts perceived in the morning.<sup>160</sup> The self is remembered as the locus of the non-existence of the consciousness of objects—a non-existence which prevailed in the states of deep sleep and the like ; hence, at that time (also) it must have possessed knowledge concerning itself.

The reply is 'not so'. For, in the light of instances such as, the hill, tank and the like which were not noticed in the morning by a person, and which are known to be the substrate of his non-existence as

160. It is well known that in the walking state consciousness always exists. If it could be shown that it exists in sleep and other kindred states also, it would follow that consciousness is an eternal quality of the soul. For this purpose, the following analogy is employed. Just as when a person remembers at noon-day that there was no elephant at the tank in the morning, he must have noticed in the morning the tank which is the locus of the non-existence of the elephant. Even so when a person remembers on waking that he had no cognition of objects at the time of sleep, he must necessarily have known, in the state of sleep, the self which is the locus of the non-existence of the cognition of objects. Thus, it is to be concluded that even in the states of sleep, swoon and the like, there is consciousness. In other words, consciousness is an eternal property of the soul.



प्रातरनवगतगिरितटाकादिना । अभावप्रतिपत्तिसमये प्रतिपित्सिताभावसमकालवर्तिनस्तदा-  
श्रयस्वरूपस्यावगत्या, विद्यमानत्वे तत्कालतयावगमप्राप्तस्य प्रतियोगिनोऽनवगत्या च भवि-  
तव्यमभावज्ञानस्येत्येतावत् । अन्तरेणापि स्वापकालीनमात्मानुभवमिह तदुभयमुपपद्यते ;  
प्रत्यभिज्ञयैव प्रबोधे स्वरूपसिद्धेः, जाग्रदनुभवस्येव पटीयसः स्वापेऽपि सतोऽनुभवस्य स्मर्त-  
व्यस्य सतस्तदानीमस्मरणाच्च ।

‘सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्’ इत्यादिवृत्तयश्च तात्कालिकदेहेन्द्रियलाघवपाटवादिपर्यालोचन-  
पूर्विकाः न स्मृतयः जातिवेषसंस्थानादिष्विव । तेऽपि हि परामृश्यन्ते, ‘एवंजाती-

is evident from his experience ‘I was not present there in the morning,’ it is clear that your reason is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa*. For the cognition of non-existence two conditions would suffice, namely, (i) at the time of the cognition of non-existence, there must be knowledge of its locus—a locus which exists simultaneously with the non-existence which is sought to be apprehended, and (ii) the absence of the knowledge of the pratiyogin (counter-correlative)—which, had it existed, must surely have been grasped as having existed at that time. Here, even without there being any self-consciousness at the time of sleep, those two conditions may possibly exist ; for, at the time of waking, there is the knowledge of the locus (i.e., the self), as is evident from remembrance ; and in the waking state, there is no remembrance of the experience existing at the time of sleep also—an experience, which is as clear and distinct as waking experience and which is capable of being remembered (if only it existed).<sup>161</sup>

It cannot be said that experiences, such as ‘I slept well,’ prove the presence of the cognition of ‘I’, in the state of sleep ; for, experiences such as ‘I slept well’ (found in the waking state) are based on the consideration of the then existing brightness and briskness of the body and senses ; and are not remembrances (of what took place in sleep) ; even as knowledge of caste, dress, configuration and the like is not remembrance. (It cannot be maintained that caste and the like are not experienced, while the ‘I’ is experienced). They too are cer-

161. The foregoing analogy is shown to be unsound. To be able to say at noon-day that there was no elephant in the morning at the tank, a person need not have noticed the tank in the morning. It is enough if he has a knowledge of the tank at noon-day, and if there is no knowledge of the elephant, which, if it had existed, would surely have been known. Similarly, in order to state that there was no consciousness during sleep, it is enough if the person has a knowledge of the self at the time of waking, and if there is the absence of the cognition of objects.

योऽहमीदृशेन वेषेणानेन संस्थानेनात्र इयन्तं कालमस्वाप्सम्' इति ।

अपि च स्मृतित्वेऽपि जाग्रदवस्थायामिव निद्रालक्षणया प्रमाणविपर्ययादिवृत्त्य-  
भावकारणतमोगुणालम्बनया प्रतीत्या तत्कालप्रसिद्धस्यात्मनः स्मरणम् ; न तु सहजसंवेदन-  
सिद्धस्य स्वप्रकाशस्य वा, प्रमाणाभावात् । निद्रापि प्रमाणविपर्ययादिवत् वृत्तिविशेष इति  
तत्रभवान् पतञ्जलिः । यदाह—‘ अभावप्रत्ययालम्बना वृत्तिर्निद्रा ’ इति ।

प्रयोगश्च—विमत्याक्रान्तात्मस्वरूपसिद्धिः विषयानुभवनिवन्धना, आत्मस्वरू-

tainly experienced thus : “ I belonging to this caste, slept here so long, in such and such a dress, in such and such a form.”<sup>162</sup>

Moreover, even if the cognition ‘ I slept well ’ were admitted to be a recollection, the remembrance of ‘ I ’ pertains only to the self which is known at the time of sleep to be in association with the *vṛtti*, known as *nidrā*—a *vṛtti* based on the quality of *tamas* (darkness) which makes for the absence of other *vṛttis*, like *pramāṇa* and *viparyaya*—even as it is known in the waking state to be in association with some *vṛtti* or other ; it does not pertain to either the self which manifests itself (*svapṛakāśa*) or to that which shines forth with the aid of a knowledge which is its innate quality ; as there is no warrant (for stating that it refers to either of these). The revered Patañjali thinks that *nidrā* (sleep) also, like *pramāṇa* *viparyaya* and so on, is a form of *vṛtti*.<sup>163</sup> He says, “ *Nidrā* (sleep) is the *vṛtti* which has for its object *tamas*, which is the cause of the non-existence of other *vṛttis*, (like waking and dreaming.”)<sup>164</sup>

The same may be expressed in syllogistic form.—The knowledge of the self—the matter under dispute—is dependent upon the cognition of objects, because it is knowledge of the self, like the knowledge of self

162. Even those who think that the self is cognised in deep sleep admit that its caste, dress and the like are not cognised then, but are apprehended from a consideration of the state of the person on waking. Similarly, it could be said that the cognition ‘ I slept soundly ’ does not point to a knowledge existing at the time of sleep, but is based on a consideration of the condition of the body, senses, etc., at the time of waking.

163. *Vyāsa Bhāṣya* on *Yoga-Sūtra* I. 10 and *Vācaspati Mīśra's* *ṭikā* thereon deal with the question whether *nidrā* must rank as a *vṛtti* alongside of *pramāṇa* and *viparyaya*.

164. *Pātañjala Yoga-Sūtra* I. 10. The translation of this sūtra is based on *Vācaspati Mīśra's* *ṭikā*. See also *Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa's* *Yoga-Sūtra-Vṛtti*.

पसिद्धित्वात्, जाग्रतस्तत्सिद्धिवत् इति । तथा आगन्तुकं ज्ञानं, आत्मविशेषगुणत्वात्, सुखादिवत् । न च सुखदुःखादयो नात्मगुणाः; अपसिद्धाश्रयान्तरत्वे सति अहम्प्रत्यय-सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रकाशमानत्वात्, ज्ञानवदिति ।

अत्राहुरात्मतत्त्वज्ञाः स्वतश्चैतन्यमात्मनः ।

स्वरूपोपाधिधर्मत्वात्प्रकाश इव तेजसः ॥

चैतन्याश्रयतां मुक्त्वा स्वरूपं नान्यदात्मनः ।

यद्धि चैतन्यरहितं न तदात्मा घटादिवत् ॥

चितिशक्त्या न चात्मत्वं मुक्तौ नाशप्रसङ्गतः ।

बुद्धिसुखदुःखादिनिश्शेषवैशेषिकात्मगुणात्यन्तिकोपरमलक्षणो हि मोक्षः कणभक्षा-क्षचरणमते । न चात्यन्तलुप्तकार्यं वस्तु तत्कार्यजननशक्तमित्यत्र किञ्चित्प्रमाणं क्रमते ।

found in one who is awake.<sup>165</sup> Knowledge is an occasional quality ; for it is a specific quality of the self, like pleasure and so on. It cannot be maintained that pleasure, pain and the like are not the qualities of the self ; for, while they are not known to have any other basis, they shine forth as residing in the same substrate wherein self-consciousness resides ; as knowledge and the like (which are not known to have any other substrate than the self and which are known to dwell in the self (e.g., we may say 'I am happy').

Those who have understood the true nature of the soul declare that consciousness is an innate quality of the soul ; for, it is a quality dependent on the soul itself ; just as illumination is an innate quality of light. Apart from being the substrate of consciousness, the self has no other form. That which is devoid of consciousness cannot be the soul, as in the case of the pot and the like. It cannot be said that the soul becomes a soul by virtue of its capacity to know ; for, (if that were so) in the state of release, it would have to perish. For in the systems of Kaṇāda and Gautama release consists in the total annihilation of all special qualities of the soul, such as, intelligence, pleasure and pain. There is no warrant to declare that a substance, which altogether fails to produce its effect, possesses the capacity of producing it.

165. Just as the consciousness of the self found in waking is dependent upon the cognition of objects, even so, in sleep also the consciousness of self must depend on the cognition of objects. But as there is no knowledge of objects then, there cannot be consciousness of the self.

# NYAYAKULISA

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

By

R. RAMANUJACHARI

AND

K. SRINIVASACHARI



## ॥ स्वयंप्रकाशवादश्चतुर्थः ॥

ख्यातिस्त्वतः किमन्यस्मात्सिद्धयेदित्यत्र संशये ।

निर्णयन्ति यतीन्द्रोक्ति(स्थ)(क्त)भारतीभाविताशयाः ॥

अत्र केचिदाहुः—ख्यातिर्नप्रकाशेति(स्वप्रकाशेति) । तथाहि— सर्वमेव वस्तुजात-  
मुत्पत्तितः प्रभृत्यावसानमनवच्छेदेन सत्तामनुभवति । कदाचिदेव तु प्रकाशते । तत्क-  
स्य हेतोः यदि सत्तातिरेकी प्रकाशो न स्यात् ? अन्यदापि सत्ता कथं सिद्धयतीति  
चेत् ; केयं सिद्धिः ? । किं ज्ञप्तिः, उत वस्तुस्वरूपमात्रम् ? । आद्ये मा भूत्सिद्धिः ।  
अस्तु वा इदानीन्तनज्ञानगोचरत्वेन कथञ्चित् । नैतावता सा निवर्तते । इदानी-  
न्तन्या ज्ञेयेव तत्र प्रमाणत्वात् । इतरथा वर्तमानावभासत्वेऽप्यनाश्वासप्रसङ्गात् ।  
अपरोक्षप्रकाशेषु ह्यर्थस्य हेतुत्वात् । पूर्वभावस्सामान्यतः<sup>1</sup> परोक्षज्ञानेषु चेति केचित् ।  
इतरथा ह्यनालम्बनत्वप्रसङ्गात् । वस्तुपक्षस्तु प्रतिक्षिप्तोऽन्यत्र । अतो विरुद्धधर्मा-  
ध्यासेन सत्ताप्रकाशयोर्भेदसिद्धौ कः खलु ब्रूयात् संविदां सत्तैव ज्ञप्तिरिति ? । न च  
सर्वभावानुगतमनौपाधिकं रूपमेकोऽतिवर्तितुमर्हति । सर्वस्य हि सतस्त्वगोचरज्ञाना-  
धीनः प्रकाशः, संविदामपि तथैवाभ्युपगन्तुमुचितः ।

ननु ज्ञानमेव प्रकाशस्सर्वभावानाम् । तत्कादाचित्कत्वमेव प्रकाशकोदाचित्क-  
त्वमपि । अतो न ज्ञानस्यापि (अतो ज्ञानस्यापि) स्वात्मैव स इत्यनन्यापेक्षत्वमिति  
चेत्, यद्येवं यत्नलभ्यं (न यत्नलभ्यं) भवतां सार्वज्ञ्यम् । तथापि खलु मदुक्तमपि न  
जानन्ति भवन्तः । यदि हि ज्ञानसत्तैव विषयविषयिभावलक्षणप्रत्यासत्तिनिरपेक्षा वस्तुनः प्रकाश-  
स्यादेकज्ञ एव सर्वज्ञस्स्यात् । अथ प्रत्यासत्तिविशेषसापेक्षा, कथमियं स्वात्मनि घटते ? ।

1. सामान्यत इत्यादि—अतीतवस्तुषु परोक्षज्ञानगोचरेषु पूर्वभावमात्रमिदं ।  
अविषयः अविषयकत्वेऽपि तद्व्यक्तेर्भाविस्त्वेऽपि तज्जातीयस्य पूर्वभाविस्त्वमस्येव ।

कर्मकर्त्रादेरपि<sup>१</sup> द्विरूपत्त्वमंशभेदादेवेत्यविरोधः । इह तु कर्मक्रियाभावो निरंशस्य विरुद्ध एव । न च ज्ञाने विषयविषयित्वलक्षणप्रत्यासत्त्यनपेक्षा । तथा सत्येकस्यैव ज्ञानस्य सर्वज्ञानगोचरत्वप्रसङ्गात् । ज्ञानभेदै(देऽ)स्तु प्रत्यासत्त्यपेक्षा । सा तु स्वात्मनि नास्तीति चेत्, सत्यम् ; तत्तु अयोग्यत्वादेव । तत एव प्रत्यासत्तिलक्षणः प्रकाशोऽपि निवृत्त इति दृश्यताम् । ज्ञानस्वरूपमात्रे च तत्प्रकाशे ख्यात्याख्यधर्मिणि स्वप्रकाशत्वविप्रतिपत्तिर्न स्यात् । <sup>२</sup>संप्रतिपत्तिविप्रतिपत्त्योरेकत्रायोगात् ।

एतेन ज्ञानं स्वप्रकाशमित्युक्तिरेवानुपपन्नेति व्याख्यातम् ; अन्यपदार्थासिद्धेः<sup>३</sup> । तत्पुरुषे हि लिङ्गानुपपत्तिः । असामानाधिकरण्यादनन्वयश्च । व्यतिरेकविभक्तिर्हि सामानाधिकरण्यं प्रतिबध्नाति ।

यदि च ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वम्, अनुव्यवसायव्यवसाययोरवैलक्षण्यं स्यात् । ज्ञान-  
भेदादेव वैलक्षण्यमिति चेन्न ; भेदकधर्मानवभासे तदनवभासात् । न च स्वप्रकाश-  
सिद्धेः प्रकाशान्तरेण<sup>४</sup> ज्ञानान्तरं प्रकाशयतीति (प्रकाशयत इति) युक्तम् । प्रमाण-  
भेदस्य प्रमेयाकारभेदापादकत्वायोगात् । बौद्धा हि ग्राहकभेदाद्वाह्याकारभेदमातिष्ठन्ते ।  
स्वरूपभेदस्त्वकिञ्चित्कर एव । इतरथा धारावाहिबुद्धिष्वपि भेदावसादप्रसङ्गात् ।

यदि च पटप्रकाशो ज्ञानं स्वप्रकाशोऽपि, तदा कथं ज्ञानपटयोर्भेदस्सिद्धयेत् । संविनिष्ठा  
हि नो वस्तुव्यवस्थितयः । संविदेव चेन्न भिद्यते कथं वस्तुभेदः । यथैकस्यां संविदि घट-  
पटयोर्विषयोभूतयोर्भेदस्सिद्धयति, तथा विषयविषयिणोरपीति चेन्न; विषयत्वलक्षणप्रकाशभेदादेव

१. कर्मकर्त्रादेरिति—श्लोकवार्तिके च शून्यवादे “ नन्वात्मा ग्राहको ग्राह्यो भवताभ्युप-  
गम्यते ” इत्याशङ्क्य “ कथञ्चिद्धर्मरूपेण भिन्नत्वात्प्रत्ययस्य तत् । ग्राहकत्वं भवेत्तत्र ग्राह्यं द्रव्यादि  
चात्मनः ” इति परिहृतम् ।

२. सम्प्रतिपत्तिरिति—ज्ञानमत्र सम्प्रतिपन्नं, स्वयंप्रकाशश्च विप्रतिपन्नः ।

३. अनेकमन्यपदार्थे इति ह्यनुशासनम् । न च स्वपदप्रकाशपदयोरर्थादन्वयो ज्ञानपदार्थः ।

४. ज्ञानभेदादिति—किं व्यवसायानुव्यवसायप्रकाशज्ञानभेदो विवक्षितः, उत तत्स्वरूप-  
भेदः । आद्ये आह—भेदकेति । अन्येत्वाह—स्वरूपभेद इति ।

५. सिद्धेः प्रकाशान्तरेणेति—स्वप्रकाशसिद्धिविषयकानुव्यवसायेनेत्यर्थः ।

घटपटयोर्भेदोपपत्तेः। अत्र तु प्रकाशभेदो नास्तीति त्वयैवोपपादितम् । विषयविषयित्वेनात्राप्य-  
स्तीति चेत्, तर्हि स्वात्मनि दुर्लभमेवेत्युक्तम् । विषयित्वावच्छिन्नस्य प्रकाशान्तरविषयिकर्म-  
कत्वेन स्वात्मत्वेन सम्पादयितुमशक्यत्वात् । तथा च ज्ञानपरिशेषप्रसङ्गः। अर्थमात्रस्य ह्य-  
प्रकाशमानस्य सत्तायां प्रमाणाभावादभावस्स्यात् । अयमेव हि ज्ञानादर्थस्य भेदः यद-  
प्रकाशमानमप्यस्ति । तदापि स्वयंप्रकाशमानत्वे त्वर्थशब्द एव ज्ञाने प्रयुक्तो भवति । तथा  
च जितं योगाचारैः । सहोपलम्भनियमादथोऽपि तदा सिद्धयेयुः । <sup>1</sup>अतस्संविदा-  
यत्तो विषयगतः कश्चित्प्रकाशज्ञाततादिपदवेदनीयो धर्मः कल्पयति संविदम्। अतस्तत्करण-  
क<sup>2</sup>ज्ञानांतरगोचरतया तत्सिद्धिः ।

अथवा<sup>3</sup> कृतमर्थगतेन प्रकाशेन । ज्ञानमेवार्थस्य प्रकाशोऽस्तु । न च  
सर्वसाधारण्यम् ; विषयासाधारण्यात् , तत्तत्सामग्र्यधीनत्वाच्च तत्तद्विषयभावस्य ।  
संयुक्तसमवायस्य साधारण्येऽपि कथं रूपमेव चाक्षुषज्ञानगोचर इति चेत्, तव वा  
कथं तत्रैव प्रकाशोदयः ? चक्षुश्शक्तिविशेषाज्ज्ञानविशेषसिद्धेरिति चेत्, समानमिदं  
तद्विषयत्वस्वभावेऽपि । चाक्षुषं हि ज्ञानं स्वभावादेव रूपप्रकाशः, न स्पर्शादिप्रकाशः ।  
रूप एव वा प्रकाशं जनयति, न स्पर्शादावित्यत्र चक्षुश्शक्तिरेव नियमवति शरणं (यति  
करणं) (वती शरणम्) । सा च नावयोर्विशिष्यते । तत्कल्पने तु व्यवहारविशेषः  
प्रत्यासत्तिविशेषं ज्ञानं .... [चापेक्षमाणो हेतुः । स च सन्निकर्षस्य साधारण्ये(त्वे)-  
प्यावयोरविशिष्ट इति कृतं प्रकारान्तरकल्पनग्रहणेन । अतस्सामग्रीसम्पादितस्वभाव-  
प्रत्यासत्तिविशेषं ज्ञानमेव प्रकाशोऽस्य । सा च प्रत्यासत्तिः प्रतियोगिविशेषापेक्षैव । तथा  
हि—स्वपरनिर्वाहिकेति चेत्, तर्किं विषयप्रतियोगिकयैव तया स्वात्मप्रकाशतानिर्वाहः, (किं  
वा) इतर(प्रतियोगिकेव) स्वात्मप्रतियोगिकापि सा, किं वा प्रत्यासत्त्यनपेक्ष एव प्रकाशः ?  
न प्रथमः ; अतिप्रसङ्गात् । प्रत्यासत्तिकृतश्चेत्प्रकाशभावः, सा यत्प्रतियोगिका तदपेक्ष

1. भाट्टमतेनोपसंहरति—अत इति.

2. ज्ञानान्तरेति—ज्ञातताहेतुकानुमितीत्यर्थः ।

3. मुरारिमिश्रनैयायिकादिमतमाह—अथवेति.



एव हि सोऽभ्युपगन्तुमुचितः । इतरथा तत्कल्पनैव निष्फला स्यात् । न द्वितीयः ; अनभ्युपगमात् । न हि स्वप्रकाशवादिनापि स्वात्मा विज्ञानस्य कर्मेत्युपेयते । तथात्वे च स्वात्मप्रकाशस्यानुमानादौ पारोक्ष्यप्रसङ्गः । प्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि स्वजन्यत्वं<sup>१</sup> स्वात्मनि भ्रान्तत्वं वा स्यात् । एवं क्रियाकारकभावेऽपि प्रत्यासत्तावात्मगोचरता पराकार्या । न हि कस्याश्चिदपि क्रियायाः स्वात्मैव कारकतामनुभवति, कर्मकारकतां वा । तथा च सति कारकाणां व्यभिचारादकारकत्वप्रसङ्गः । न हि कारकान्तरे सत्यपि स्वात्मापि कारकं भवति । बहिर्विकल्प(बहुविकल्प)दर्शनात् । कर्मणि तु समुच्चय इति चेन्न ; कर्मकारकरूपस्याभेदात् । इन्द्रियादिकरणसम्बन्धा (द्धा) नां हि बहूनामप्येकज्ञानक्रियावशीकृतानां कर्मत्वमेकमेव । तर्हि तत्रैवात्मा विज्ञानस्यान्तर्भाव्यतामिति चेन्न ; तदन्तर्भावे क्रियाया एवासिद्धेः । तदपेक्षस्य कारकत्वस्याप्यप्रसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । न हि भङ्गस्यै(?)कस्यैव क्रियात्वं कारकत्वञ्चेति द्रष्टव्यम् । प्रत्यक्षे तु पौर्वापर्ययोगेन व्याघातो भ्रान्तत्वप्रसङ्गो वेत्युक्तम् । तत्स(अतस्)म्पयोगजं हि प्रत्यक्षं भ्रान्तमिति सर्वसम्मतम् । न च तृतीयः ; अतिप्रसङ्गादेव । बहिरतिप्रसङ्गपरिहाराय प्रत्यासत्त्यपेक्षा । अत्र तु नेति सर्वस्य च तत्तदसाधारणं रूपमन्वेष्टुं शक्यमेव । यदुपाधिकोऽनपेक्षाकल्पः (इति चेत्) तर्हि तस्य यावत्समस्तं प्रकाशस्स्यात् । अतज्ज्ञानावि(व)च्छेदादिति चेत्, तत एव तत्रानपेक्षा निवर्तताम् । ज्ञाने तु नैवमनिष्ठापात इति चेत्, अस्ति तु अव्यवहारदशायामपि प्रकाशही(मा)नत्वकल्पनागौरवम् । अनिष्टान्तरश्च पूर्वमेवोक्तम् । न च प्रचुरविषयपरिदृष्टानिष्टप्रकल्पितसामान्योपाधिकोधि (क्रोडी) करणाय सर्वत्रानिष्टमन्वेषणीयम् । तथाहि सति विद्युदादिषु संवित्कर्मता न कल्प्येत । अस्ति हि तस्यैकस्य क्षणिकेषु सम्भवः, यस्य ज्ञानं यस्यैव सत्तेति । यदि च सर्वमेव विज्ञानं सत्तामात्रेण प्रकाशत इति स्फुटा संवित्, ततोऽनपेक्षापि कल्प्यताम् । प्रत्यक्षे चैवमेव युक्तम् । न च तथा दृश्यते, किं कल्पनामूलम् ? अतश्च सर्वभावानुगतस्वभावपरित्यागेन ज्ञानान्तरमेव ज्ञानस्य प्रकाश इति गम्यताम् । इच्छादीनामपि तदानीं कर्मेवेष्टादि-

1. स्वजन्यत्वमिति—प्रत्यक्षे विषयस्य कारणत्वात्स्वप्रत्यक्षे स्वजन्यत्वस्यावश्यकत्वादिति भावः । सन्निकर्षानधीनप्रत्यक्षत्वे शुक्तौ रजतशुद्धिवत्स्वांशो भ्रमत्वम् ।

भावमनुभवति, न स्वरूपमिति विषयिधर्मस्वभावन्यायेनापि तथाभ्युपगन्तुमुचितम् । एतेनानुभूतिरन्याधीनस्वधर्मव्यवहारा, स्वसम्बन्धादर्थान्तरे तद्धर्मव्यवहारहेतुत्वादिति प्रत्युक्तम् ।

यत्त्वेकदेशिनामनुभूतित्वादित्यासिहेतुः, तस्यानुभूतिरिति धर्मनिर्देशेनापि बाधः । तद्धि पदं स्वजन्यानुभूत्यालम्बनतामापादयति । \* अथ नापादयति, निरर्थकमेव स्यात् ; न वाननुभूतिव्यवच्छेदकत्वमात्रम् ; निरधिष्ठानव्यवच्छेदानुपपत्तेः । अथाज्ञानविशेष-निरासकवृत्तिभेदजननादर्थवत्तेति मतम्, तन्न ; अन्योन्याश्रयत्वात् । तत्प्रक्रियासिद्धौ हि तत्सिद्धिः । न हि दृश्यस्य कस्यचित्सत्यत्व(त्वे) विश्वाध्यासादिसिद्धिः । न च सिद्धान्तिनोऽयं प्रयोगः ; केवलव्यतिरेकिप्रामाण्यानभ्युपगमात् । आभाससमानयोगक्षे-मता च दूषणम् । एवं हि स्वप्रकाशत्वं न सिद्धयेत् । एवं वकानुमानानामपि निरा-सोऽनुसन्धातव्यः । न च जानामीति वर्तमानावभासात्स्वेनैव प्रकाशत इति वाच्यम् ; गच्छामीति वर्तमानावभासाद्गमनस्यापि स्वयंप्रकाशत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न च वर्तमाने ज्ञाने ज्ञाना-न्तरानुदयात्तथा ग्रहणानुपपत्तिः ; बाध्यबाधकयोरेकक्षणे सामानाधिकरण्यात् । तन्मात्रेण (वर्तमानावभासोपपत्तेः । न च) 'जिज्ञासितग्राह्यजिज्ञासाव्यवधानादिन्द्रियसम्बन्धानुप-पत्तिः । तस्यास्तदविरोधित्वात् । विरोधोऽ(धेऽ)पि जिज्ञासानन्तरभाविनो ज्ञानस्ये-न्द्रियेण ग्रहणात् । पूर्वभाविनश्च विषयस्मरणानुमानोपपत्तेः । न च इदमहं जानामीति त्रैरूप्यदर्शनात्स्वप्रकाशत्वसिद्धिः ; अनुव्यवसायस्यैव तद्रूपत्वात् । सविषयस्य हि ज्ञानस्यानुव्यवसायेन ग्रहणात्तद्रूपत्वोपपत्तिः । तस्माज्ज्ञानान्तरेणैव ज्ञानसिद्धिः । तत्कारण-ञ्चान्तःकरणमेवासन्नत्वादिन्द्रियाशक्तिसिद्धेश्च कल्प्यत इति न सङ्कटं किञ्चित् ।

नन्विदं बुभुत्सितं (अबुभुत्सितं) वाऽन्तःकरणेन गृह्यते ? (न) प्रथमः । अनवस्थाप्रस-ङ्गात् । तद्ग्रहणपरम्पराया अवश्यवेदनात् ततश्च विषयान्तरसञ्चाराभावः । द्वितीयेऽपि इच्छा ज्ञानपूर्विकेति पूर्वज्ञानापेक्षया मूलक्षयकरी सैवानवस्था स्यात् । तत्रोत्तरं बुभुत्सितवेद्यमे-

वेति । न चानवस्था । न हीच्छायाः कारणं ज्ञानं विशेषगोचरमेवेति सार्वत्रिकम् । तथाहि बुभुत्सैव न स्यात् । अनुपरमो वा तस्याः । अतस्सामान्यतो ज्ञाते विशेषे बुभुत्सा भवति । सा च तज्ज्ञानहेतुरिति युक्तम् । ज्ञानञ्च सामान्यतस्सर्वैरेव पूर्वं ज्ञातु(त)-मेव संसारिणां प्रवाहानादित्वात् ज्ञानतज्ज्ञानसंसारि(रा)णाम् । अतो बुभुत्सितं ज्ञानं मानसप्रत्यक्षवेद्यमेवेति न स्वप्रकाशत्वमिति ।

अत्रोच्यते—

सत्ताघटत्वयोर्भेदो यथा ..... [वो युक्त्य]पाश्रयः ।

अप्रकाशेषु तद्वत्स्याद्भेदस्सत्ताप्रकाशयोः ॥

प्रकाशस्य तु सत्तैव प्रकाशपदगोचरः ।

यथा घटादिभावानां सत्ता तत्तत्पदास्पदम् ॥

प्रकाशस्सर्वभावानां सम्बन्धो (द्धो) व्यवहारकृत् ।

नैष स्वात्मनि तत्कर्तुं प्रकाशान्तरमीक्षते ॥

स्वरूपमेव हि भावानां सत्पदार्थः । जातिस्संस्थानमात्रमिति स्थितमन्यत्र । तदेव च कादाचित्कात्प्रकाशाद्भेदेन तद्गोचरतया भवताप्युपवर्णितम् । सा सत्ता भावान्तरेषु प्रकाशाद्विन्नापि प्रकाशे(न) भिद्यत इति स्थिते चिन्त्यते, प्रकाशः कथमर्थेषूपकरोतीति । व्यवहारं जनयतीति दृश्यते । हानादिलक्षणश्च व्यवहारः । तत्र वस्त्वन्तरेषु सम्बन्धपुरस्सरं तत्तद्व्यवहारसहकारिमध्यमधिशयानस्तत्र व्यवहारहेतुर्भवति । सम्बन्धश्च वर्तमानेषु संयोगद्वारको योग्यतालक्षणः कार्यकल्प्यः । स एव प्रामाण्यस्वभावादिशब्दैरप्यभिधीयते । स च चक्षुरादिकरणसम्बन्धानुसारेण भवतीति सर्वसम्मतम् । अवर्तमानेषु वर्तमानावस्थद्रव्यसंयोगद्वारको योग्यतालक्षण एव ।.....[तत्र च] कार्यमेव प्रमाणं व्यवहारश्च कार्यमित्युक्तमेव । संयोगस्तु प्रसरणवैभवादिप्रतिपादकशास्त्रबलादाश्रयते ।

“वालाग्रशतभागस्य शतधा कल्पितस्य च ।

भागो जीवस्स विज्ञेयस्स चानन्त्याय कल्पते ॥”

इति ज्ञानरूपस्य जीवस्याणुपरिमाणत्वं तद्धर्मभूतस्य ज्ञानस्य च वैभवमाह । आराग्रमात्रो ह्य-  
वरोऽपि दृष्ट इति चात्मनोऽणुत्वमाह ।

“ यया क्षेत्रज्ञशक्तिस्सा वेष्टिता नृपसर्वगा ।  
तया तिरोहितत्वाच्च शक्तिः क्षेत्रज्ञसंज्ञिता ।  
सर्वभूतेषु भूपाल तारतम्येन वर्तते ॥ ”

इति धर्मभूतज्ञानं स्वतस्सर्वगतं कर्मणा सङ्कुचितं तारतम्येन वर्तत इति विज्ञायते । एतेन  
द्रव्यत्वमप्यात्म(वत्) विज्ञानस्यापि सिद्धयतीत्यन्यदेतत् । एवञ्च येन रूपेण परस्मि-  
न्व्यवहारजनने ज्ञानमुपकरोति आत्मविषयव्यवहारजनने तथाविधमुपकारं कर्तुमन्यं प्रकाशं  
नापेक्षत इति स्वप्रकाशमुच्यते । यथा ह्यग्न्यादीनामन्धकारस्य निरसनेन सहकारितया वा  
परत्रोपकुर्वतां तदुपकारजननायात्मन्यग्न्यन्तरापेक्षा न विद्यते ॥ तथा चोक्तम्—

“ <sup>1</sup>अग्न्यादयो घटादीनां प्रसिद्धा ये प्रकाशकाः ।  
न ते प्रकाश्यरूपा हि प्रकाशस्यानपेक्षणात् ॥ इति ” ॥

तत्र ह्यवयवानां मिथः प्रकाशकत्वकथने सम्भवत्यपि गौरवभयान्नाश्रीयते । त(अ)त्र  
तु ज्ञानान्तरमेव मृग्यमिति विशेषः । एतेन धर्मिसिद्धावपि स्वप्रकाशत्वविप्रति-  
पत्तेस्स्वरूपातिरिक्तप्रकाशसद्भावः प्रत्युक्तः ; प्रकाशान्तरभावाभावयोर्विप्रतिपत्त्युपपत्तेः ।  
प्रकाशान्तरस्य स्वस्य च स्वप्रकाशत्वेऽपि तयोर्भेदकधर्मानवधारणाद्वेदाभेदविप्रतिपत्तिर्युक्तैव ।  
अत एव च प्रतिज्ञोपपत्तिः । स्वस्य प्रकाशस्स्वयमेवेति—स्वयमेव स्वव्यवहारहेतुः प्रकाश  
इति यावत् । आत्मेश्वर इत्यादिवदन्यपदार्थोऽपि द्रष्टव्यः ।

अपि च सर्वभावानामेव हि सजातीयापेक्षा नास्तीति दृष्टम् । यथोक्तम्—

“ सजातीयस्वसाध्यार्थनिरपेक्षात्मसिद्धयः ।  
सर्वे पदार्थास्तेनात्मा निरपेक्षस्वसिद्धिकः ॥ ” इति ॥<sup>2</sup>

1. श्लो. घा. शून्यवादे श्लो. 65.

2. आत्मसिद्धौ अयं श्लोकः ।

अत्र सजातीयापेक्षाभावव्याप्तज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वसिद्धिः । स्वापेक्षा अस्तु वा मा वा । स्वसाध्यापेक्षाभावादात्मनस्त्वप्रकाशत्वम् ।

यत्तु प्रत्यासत्त्यपेक्षत्वमुक्तम् । तदयुक्तम् । यथा हि संयोगिन्यन्धकारन्निर-  
स्यतस्तेजसस्त्वात्मनि तन्निरासे स्वसंयोगापेक्षा नास्ति ; एवमितरत्र व्यवहारे साध्ये  
सम्बन्धापेक्षस्य स्वात्मनि तं साधयितुं न सम्बन्धाभ्यर्थनम् । अत्र तु हेतुभावमात्रं  
न तमोनिरास इति चेत्, ज्ञानेऽपि सामान्यविशेषाभ्यां सहकारित्वेन कर्मत्वेन च व्यवहारं  
प्रति हेतुत्वमेवेति तुल्यम् । सहकारित्वमेव तेजसि न कल्पनीयमिति चेत्, ज्ञानेऽपि  
तुल्यम् । प्रकाशव्यवहारेऽपि हि प्रकाशापेक्षा नास्ति ; विषयापेक्षामात्रमेवेत्यपि सुव-  
चत्वात् । तस्माद्विषयव्यवहारे सम्बन्धापेक्षा, स्वात्मव्यवहारे न तदपेक्षेति स्थितम् ।  
तत्र चायं विशेषः । विशिष्टसामग्रीसम्बन्धं कृत्वा तत्तत्प्रावण्यलक्षणस्य सम्बन्धस्य तत्त-  
त्सामग्रीभेदेन <sup>१</sup>प्रावण्यस्य तारतम्यदर्शनाद्विषये पारोक्ष्यापरोक्ष्यादिभेदः । स्वात्मनि तु  
तन्निरपेक्षस्यैव सर्वदा व्यवहारहेतुत्वादपरोक्षरूपतैव । वैशद्यं ह्यापरोक्ष्यम् । नन्वेवं  
स्वव्यवहारे प्रकाशान्तरानपेक्षत्वे परेणापि व्यवह्रियेत । तेन तज्ज्ञानमेव व्यवहर्तव्यञ्चेत्, अन-  
पेक्षत्वव्याघातः । नैवम् ; विषयवदुपपत्तेः । विषयोऽपि ह्यनेन व्यवहर्तव्यस्त्वयश्च तत्र  
विषयः यथा अनेन ज्ञानेनास्यैव ज्ञातुर्व्यवहारार्हो न सर्वस्य ; एवं ज्ञानमपीति न दोषः ।  
एवञ्चात्र प्रयोगः—ज्ञानमनन्याधीनप्रकाशं, अर्थप्रकाशकत्वाद्दीपवत् ; सजातीयानपेक्षप्र-  
काशं वस्तुत्वाद्धटवदिति । प्रकाशश्च साक्षाद्वा परम्परया वा जायमानं ज्ञानफलं व्यवहा-  
रानुगुण्यमभिधीयते । आनुगुण्यन्नाम व्यवहारसामग्र्या ज्ञानेन सम्पूर्तिः । ज्ञानस्य  
व्यवहारकारणान्तरसम्बन्ध<sup>३</sup> इत्यर्थः ।

नन्वेवं व्यवहारानुगुण्यापादकस्य तदापादकान्तरेण न भवितव्यमित्युक्ते दीपस्य  
ज्ञानानपेक्षव्यवहारत्वप्रसङ्गः । तदपेक्षव्यवहारत्वेऽनैकान्तिकत्वं वेति चेत्, नैवम् ; यदा-

1. तत्तदिति—सामग्रीप्रावण्य इत्यर्थः ।
2. ज्ञानप्रावण्यस्येति भावः ।
3. व्यवहारेति—व्यवजिहीर्षाजनकत्वमिति यावत् ।

कारेण यस्य व्यवहारानुगुण्यापादकत्वं तस्य तदाकारोपपादकानपेक्षत्वस्य <sup>१</sup>विवक्षितत्वात् । कचिदनुमानादावनुमानाद्यन्तरा<sup>२</sup>द्यपेक्षायामप्यनुमान<sup>३</sup>त्वप्रयुक्तापेक्षाभावादनैकान्तिकत्वपरिहारो द्रष्टव्यः । विशेषप्रयुक्ता त्वपेक्षा न वार्यते ; ज्ञानेऽपि परसमवेतेऽतीतादौ च ज्ञानान्तरापेक्षादर्शनात् । (स्व)प्रकाशे परानपेक्षेति वचनात् । उपकारकमात्रस्य तदुपकारजनने परापेक्षादर्शनात् । (अत एव) इच्छादिष्वनैकान्त्यमपि पूर्वोक्तं परिहृतम्<sup>४</sup> । <sup>५</sup>एतेन स्वसम्बन्धादर्थान्तरे तद्धर्मव्यवहारहेतुत्वादिति पूर्वोक्तः प्रयोग-स्सम्भावनामात्रपरः नानुमानाभिप्रायेण प्रयुज्यत इति वेदितव्यम् । अत एव हि भगवद्भाष्यकारपादैरपि संवेदनवद्रूपादिवच्च परत्र व्यवहारविशेषहेतोस्स्वस्मिन्नपि तद्व्यवहारहेतुत्वं युष्माभिरभ्युपेतं भेदस्यापि सम्भवत्येवेति पराभ्युपेतस्य स्वपक्षे सम्भावनामात्रमभिधीयते । एवञ्च नातिप्रसङ्गो न चात्मकर्मकत्वम् । तथाप्यनन्यापेक्ष-प्रकाशत्वं ज्ञानस्येति न कश्चिद्विरोधः ।

किञ्च—

अन्वयव्यतिरेकित्वेऽप्यन्यथासिद्धियोगिनः ।

हेतुत्वेन न गण्यन्ते किं पुनस्तदसम्भवे ॥

वैशेषिका ह्यवयवरूपाद्यन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानेऽप्यवयविगन्धादेः, अन्यथासिद्धेरतत्कारणता-

१. विवक्षितत्वादिति—तिमिरनिरासकत्वाकारेण दीपस्योपयोगो न तेनाकारेणान्यापेक्षेति भावः ।

२. अभावनुमेयत्वापादकस्य धूमस्यानुमेयत्वं हि स्थलमलिनताद्यधीनमिति ।

३. अनुमानत्वाकारेण परामर्शविषयत्वाकारेण धूमस्यानुमेयतावहत्वं, न हि तेनाकारेण तस्य मालिन्याद्यपेक्षेति ।

४. ज्ञानस्य स्वतो ज्ञातत्वानङ्गीकारात् इतरनिरपेक्षस्वव्यवहारकारणत्वमेव ह्यङ्गीक्रियते तदिच्छादावपि तुल्यम् ।

५. एतेनेति—स्वसम्बन्धादर्थान्तरे ज्ञातत्वव्यवहाराद्यापादकेन स्वस्मिन् ज्ञातत्वव्यवहा-  
राद्यनापादनेन ।

मातिष्ठन्ते । वयञ्च प्रतिबन्धकाभावस्याकारणत्वं ब्रूमः । ज्ञानविषये व्यवहारे जायमाने ज्ञानान्तरमन्वयव्यतिरेकवत्तया नोपलब्धम् । अनुपलम्भेऽपि केन कारणेन कारणमित्युप-  
 कल्प्येत ; येन कल्पनागौरवप्रसङ्गान्मुच्येत । ननृक्तं वस्तुत्वानुमानम् । सत्यम् ।  
 तत्तु विशेषविरुद्धमिति भावि(वयि)तव्यम् । यद्वि ज्ञानगोचरतयैव प्रकाशते, तज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तेः  
 प्राक्सदप्यप्रकाशितमिति दृष्टम् । ततस्साध्यं ज्ञानान्तरगोचरत्वनियमं साधयद्गस्तुत्वं  
 तद्व्यापकं तदुत्पत्तेः प्रागप्रकाशमपि साधयेदिति विशेषविरोधः । नेदमनिष्टमिति चेन्न ;  
 अप्रामाणिकत्वात् । न हि ज्ञानं सदप्येतावन्तं कालमनुपलब्धमिति दृष्टम् । आशुत-  
 रविनाशित्वात् (न) तदितरवद्विवेचितमिति चेन्न ; कथितस्य पश्चादनुमितस्यापि  
 पूर्वाप्रतिज्ञात (पूर्वाज्ञातत्वं) परामर्शोपपत्तेः । न चाभावप्रमाणवादिनो ज्ञाततानुमेयस्य ज्ञान-  
 स्यातीतत्वस्य योग्यानुपलब्ध्यभावादभावो दुरपहव (दुरवधर) इति वाच्यम् । स्मरणा-  
 भावादपि अनुभवाभावानुमानोपपत्तेः । इतरथा ह्यज्ञानव्यवहारः कापि न स्यात् ।  
 विषयस्मरणादनुमिते ज्ञाने विषयवत्स्मर्यतेऽनुमीयते वेति सन्देहात्स्मरणाभावो दुरवधर इति  
 चेन्न ; अनुव्यवसायमालायामपि तथात्वात्सन्देहापातप्रसङ्गात् । न च कार्यस्मरणा-  
 भावात्कारणाभावो दुरवधरः, व्याप्याभावाद्यापकाभाव(वा)सिद्धेरिति युक्तम् ;  
 घटादावपि पूर्वाज्ञातत्व(त्वा)परामर्शप्रसङ्गात् । पतितविशीर्णञ्च फलमुपलभ्य सुदूरपत-  
 नादिदं पुरा विशीर्णं तदानीन्नोपलब्धमिति स्फुटमनुसन्धीयते । एवं ज्ञानप्रवाहसमनन्तरञ्च  
 पूर्वाज्ञातं ज्ञानं पाश्चात्यार्थस्मृतिव्यापाराद्यनुमितं पूर्वाज्ञातमित्येवानुसन्दधीरन् । न च  
 जिज्ञासितस्य स्मर....[णाद]ज्ञानापरामर्शः ; अवश्यजिज्ञासानुपपत्तेः । व्यासङ्गाद-  
 ज्ञातस्यापि तथा प्रतिसन्धानात् । न च विषयप्रकाशाद्विप्रलब्धो ज्ञानाप्रकाशकं नानुसन्द-  
 ध्यात् ; अर्थान्तरप्रकाशेनार्थान्तराप्रकाशस्यातिरोधानात् । यदि च कार्योन्नेयमेव विज्ञानम्,  
 अन्तःकरणयोगसंस्कारादिवदखिलजनप्रसिद्धिगोचरो न स्यात् । सर्व एव हि जाना-  
 मीति स्फुटतरमनुसन्दधते । ज्ञानाभावञ्च सहसा प्रतिक्षिपन्ति । यच्चाज्ञातं तदज्ञात-  
 मित्येवानुसन्दधते । न च सन्दिहते । आत्मावस्थाविशेषैः प्रकाशमाने सर्वदैव हि ज्ञाना-  
 ज्ञानसंशयो नास्ति । न चायं ज्ञाननिर्णयो ज्ञानस्यानुमेयत्वेनावकल्पते । अस्मरण-

नियमस्यानुभवाभावेन व्याप्त्युपलम्भोऽप्यप्रत्यक्षज्ञानाभावस्य नावकल्पत एव । अर्थ-  
प्रकाशेन ज्ञानानुमा<sup>१</sup>नम(मानेऽ)शेषजनप्रसिद्धिदौस्थ्यमेव । आत्मान्तःकरणसंयोगातिरेकश्च  
तदानीं ज्ञानस्य <sup>३</sup>न स्यात् । ततश्च मनश्चैतन्यप्रसङ्गोऽप्यर्थान्तरविवक्षया तैराशङ्कितस्ता-  
नेवास्कन्दति । अतस्सतोऽपि ज्ञानस्याज्ञानापरामर्शानुमेयज्ञानवादः ।

. मानसप्रत्यक्षतायामप्यज्ञानापरामर्शो न घटते । तथाहि—न तावत्सुखादिवदबुभु-  
सितवेद्यतया ; सर्वदाज्ञातत्वात् । तथा सत्यनवस्थाप्रसङ्गाच्च । न चावश्यजिज्ञा-  
सितत्वात् ; तत एव । न च सुखादीनां ज्ञानान्तरवेद्यत्वम् ; ज्ञानत्वेन स्वयं-  
प्रकाशत्वात् । तस्य च ज्ञानत्वं मोक्षसिद्धौ द्रष्टव्यम् । न च जिज्ञासितस्य सहसैव  
ग्रहणेऽप्यजिज्ञासितस्य चिरातिवृत्तस्याज्ञानानुसन्धानानुपपत्तिः । न च जिज्ञासासमनन्तर-  
मेव सर्वदा गृह्यते । वर्तमाने ज्ञाने जिज्ञासमानस्यैव ह्यन्तःकरणसंयोगेन ग्रहणोपपत्तिः ।  
अतीते ज्ञाने जिज्ञासितेऽपि मनस्संयोगाभावेन स्मृत्यादिकार्योन्नेयत्वात्तस्य पूर्वाज्ञानं  
सुग्रहमेव ।

स्मरणानुमेयस्य स्मर्यमाणत्वारोपादग्रहणाभिमानाभावः प्रत्युक्तः । यदा हि  
स्मर्यते ज्ञानमित्यारोपस्तदा स्मृतिहेतुरनुव्यवसायोऽप्यनुमातव्यः । तस्यापि विषयज्ञानवत्स्मर्य-  
माणत्वारोपः केन वार्यते । अथ विषयज्ञानादनुव्यवसायस्य कर्मक्रियालक्षणवैलक्षण्योप-  
लब्धियोग्यस्य तथाऽनवसाया<sup>४</sup>त्स्मरणाभिमानो दुरारोप इति मतम् ; तन्न । व्यवसाय-

1. व्याप्तीति—ज्ञानाभावस्यास्मरणनियमस्य चायोग्यतयाऽनुपलम्भे तद्वत्तव्याप्तेरप्युप-  
लम्भासम्भवात् घटाद्यस्मरणनियमेन घटाद्यनुभवाभावानुमानमेव न स्यादिति भावः ।

2. ज्ञानानुमान इति—नान्यथाऽर्थसङ्गावो दृष्टस्सन्नुपपद्यते ।

ज्ञानं चेन्नेत्यतः पश्चात्प्रमाणमुपजायते ॥ श्लो. वा. 5 सू.— 182. श्लो. इत्युक्तप्राक-  
व्यानुमेयत्वपक्ष इत्यर्थः

3. न स्यादिति—तद्धेतोरेवास्य तद्धेतुत्वे मध्ये किन्तेनेति न्यायादिति भावः । यथोक्तं  
श्रीमति न्यायसिद्धाञ्जने कल्पयैव धीश्चेत्कल्पयेत तस्मात्तत्र लाघवात् । प्रत्यक्षायास्ततोऽन्यत्व-  
बलसौ नैवं प्रसज्यते ॥ इति बुद्धि. परि. पृ. 250

4. विषयज्ञानविषयकत्वेनानुव्यवसायाननुभवात् ।



स्मरणानुमितानुव्यवसायगोचरज्ञाने सति तथा अनुव्यवसाया(ऽनवसाया)सिद्धेः । अनुव्यवसायोत्पत्तिवैलयां तथा व्यवसायो न प्रतीयत इति चेन्न ; अनुव्यवसायगोचरानुमानगोचरज्ञेयज्ञानाकारस्यैव<sup>१</sup> तत्राप्यारोपात् । ननु पूर्वाप्रसिद्धपरामर्शात् दुरारोप इति चेत्, एवन्तर्हि व्यवसायेऽप्यर्थज्ञानयोः कर्मक्रियालक्षणस्य वैलक्षण्यस्य पूर्वाप्रसिद्धेः(द्वयस्य) परामर्शात्तदनुमाने स्मृत्यभिमानोऽपि नाशङ्क्येत ; अविशेषात् । अतो व्यवसाये स्मृत्यारोपशङ्कामनुव्यवसाये तदनर्हताच्च ब्रुवाणो यावदवगतं स्मर्यत इति, <sup>२</sup>अनन्यशरणत्वात्स्वप्रकाशतामेव व्यवसायस्यानक्षरमूरीकुरुते । तस्मात्सतोऽप्यज्ञानावभासाभावादपि स्वप्रकाशत्वसिद्धिः । एवं तर्हि सर्वदा प्रतीयमानं विषयान्तरवत्स्फुटतरमवसीयेत, येन स्वेन परेण वेति सन्देहो न स्यादिति चेत् ; सत्यम् । अनुव्यवसायो नास्तीति निश्चयेऽप्यज्ञानोपलम्भाभावात्स्वेनैवेति विविच्यत एव ; प्रकाशत इति च । तथापि न सर्वेण स्फुटम् ; निर्धर्मकत्वात् । विषयव्यतिरेकेण स्वगतविविधधर्मसद्भावे हि विवेकोपपत्तिः । सर्वज्ञानसाधारणज्ञानत्वादिभ्यतिरेकेण प्रतिनियतधर्मभेदाभावात्, बहुतरधर्मविशिष्टप्रतीतिलक्षणवैश्याभावात्, क्षणभेदानां दुर्विवेचत्वाच्च, स्वेन स्फुटतरमुपलब्धमिति सर्वेण न विकल्प्यते । निरूपकास्तु यथोक्तप्रकारेण विविञ्चत एवेति । अतो वस्तुत्वानुमाने विरोधः । विपक्षे बाधकाभावश्च । अपि च,

अस्ति नास्तीति सन्देहो यतो ज्ञाने न विद्यते ।

ततस्स्वयंप्रकाशत्वं ज्ञानस्येत्यवसीयते ॥

यस्य हि स्वरूपे विद्यमानेऽपि प्रकाशार्थमन्यापेक्षास्ति, तस्य तद्गोचरप्रकाशसामग्र्यसन्निधानात्, सन्निधाने वा दोषसम्भावनया कदाचित्संशयास्पदत्वमपि भवति । ज्ञाने तु संशयानर्हता दृश्यते । अतो व्यापकव्यावृत्त्या व्याप्यस्यान्याधीनप्रकाशत्वस्यापि व्यावृत्तिः । प्रस्मृते ज्ञाताज्ञातसन्देहो भवत्येवेति चेन्न ; वर्तमाने ज्ञाने तदभावात् । तस्यैव स्वयंप्रकाश-

1. अर्थगतस्मर्यमाणत्वस्य व्यवसाये आरोपव्यवसायगतस्मर्यमाणत्वस्यानुव्यवसाये आरोपसम्भवादिति भावः ।

2. इत्येतादृशाभिसन्ध्यन्यशरणत्वाभावात् ।

त्वाभ्युपगमात् । तस्य जिज्ञासितस्य मनसा सहा(सहसा) ग्रहणादसंशय इति चेत्, तथापि ज्ञानास्तमयसमनन्तरं तदेव जिज्ञासमानस्य सन्देहो भवेत् । विषयस्मरणात्सहसा अनुमानसिद्धौ तत्रापि न सन्देह इति चेन्न ; <sup>1</sup>अन्वयव्यतिरेकाग्रहणात् । स्वप्रकाशत्वे हि तदुपपत्तिः । <sup>2</sup>तथापिकारणानुमाने संस्कारानुमानापत्तेः । तथापि(हि) —

विषयस्मरणं साक्षात्संस्कारादुपजायते ।

अनिश्चये .... [च] तस्यैष कथं ज्ञानस्य निश्चयः ॥

न चानुभवस्य कदाचित्प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात्तस्यैवानुमानं सहसा भवतीति वाच्यम् ; यतः कदाचिदेव जिज्ञासितं ज्ञानं गृह्यत इत्युक्तं भवता । जिज्ञासानन्तरमपि तज्ज्ञानसामग्र्यनुवृत्तौ हि तद्गृहणोपपत्तिः । न....[च सर्व]दा असावनुभूते ज्ञाने तद्विषयमेवावश्यं स्मरति । तद्विषयमपि स्मरन्नन्यश्चा(ञ्चा)नुभूतमर्थं स्मरन्नेकः कश्चित्त(कदाचि)दनुभवमतीतं प्रति संशयीत ।

संशयोऽपि हि संस्कारे न स्यान्नित्यमदर्शनात्

कदाचिद्दर्शनाज्ज्ञाने संशयस्यैव सम्भवः ॥

कदाचिदन्वयमात्रमुपलभमानस्य (न) तत्कारणकत्वनिश्चयः । व्यतिरेकस्तु दुर्ग्रह इत्युक्तम् । अत्यन्तव्यवहिते चानुभवेऽर्थस्मरणमुपलभमानस्य तद्विनाभावात्तदकार्यता-ध्यवसायो वा भवेत् । अपि च —

विषयत्वेन सिद्धस्य विसंवादोऽपि सम्भवेत् ।

व्यवहारादिसंवादनियमस्तु स्वसिद्धितः ॥

1. अन्वयेति—अनुभवस्मरणयोरप्रत्यक्षत्वेनान्वयव्यतिरेकग्रहणस्यायोगाच्च तेन तदनुमानसम्भव इति ।

2. तथापीति—अनुभवत्वादिरूपेणाग्रहणेऽपि कार्याकारणानुमानमात्रमिति चेत्, संस्कार एव साक्षात्कारणभूतोऽनुमीयेतेति भावः ।

यस्य हि स्वव्यतिरिक्तज्ञानविषयत्वेन सिद्धिस्तस्य स्वज्ञान(स्य) कारणदोषाद्वि-  
शिष्टरूपग्रहणासामर्थ्ये स्वगोचरो व्यवहारो बाध्यत इति दृष्टम् ; यथा रजतादिषु ।  
ज्ञाने तु न कदाचिद्व्यवहारविसंवादो दृश्यते । अतोऽवगच्छामोऽत्र स्वव्यतिरिक्तज्ञाना-  
नालम्बनत्वेन सिद्धिरिति । न च स्वरूपप्रकाशत्वेन सामग्र्यधीनसम्बन्धापेक्षास्तीत्युक्तम् ।  
यतस्तद्दोषा<sup>१</sup>द्विवेकाग्रहाद्यवसरो भवेत् । न च स्वसमवेतधर्मान्तराभावाज्ज्ञानस्य स्वरूप-  
मात्रस्फुरणे भेदकधर्मान्तरग्रहणाग्रहणकृतव्यवहारबाधाबाधयोरनवसर इति वाच्यम् ; शङ्ख-  
पीतादिवदुपपत्तेः । अत एव ज्ञानान्तरविषयतया सिद्धयतस्तस्यैव ज्ञानस्य व्यवहार-  
बाधो दृष्टः, यथा ह्यज्ञातरि परस्मिन् जानातीति । स्वप्रकाशतायां तु न विपर्ययावकाशः ;  
स्वरूपसत्तामात्रेण साक्षादवभासे तदसम्भवात् । तत्रापि ज्ञानभेदाभेदयोरस्त्येवावसरः ;  
ज्ञानान्तरापेक्षत्वाद्भेदादिव्यवहारस्य, तस्य च स्वमात्राधीनत्वात् ।

प्रकाशनियमं धत्ते संशयादेरयोग्यता ।

स च स्वेनैव चेन्न स्यादनवस्था प्रयु(स)ज्यते ॥

सुखादिवत्संशयाद्यनर्हत्वादन्यभिचरितप्रकाशसत्ताकत्वं तावदनुमीयते । ततश्च  
सर्वज्ञानप्रकाशव्यवस्थायास्सजातीयापेक्षया अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गाद्विषयान्तरसञ्चाराभावप्रसङ्गाच्च  
स्वेनैवेति नियमः । अपि च विषयस्मरणकाले तद्वदेव निस्संशयानुभवस्मरणा(णम)-  
खिलजनगोचरो (र उ) पलभ्यमानं विषयवदनुभवस्यापि तदानीं स्वेनैवानुभवनियमं  
व्यवस्थापयति ।

यः पुनर्मानसाध्यक्षगोचरं ज्ञानमृ(मि)च्छति ।

मनसश्शक्तिमप्यत्र कल्पयेदिति गौरवम् ॥

विज्ञानस्यानपेक्षत्वं व्यवहारेष्व(षु) पश्यताम् ।

न कश्चित्कल्पनीयोऽर्थो येन प्राप्नोति गौरवम् ॥

अगत्या हीन्द्रियाणां प्राप्तिरसामान्येऽपि केषुचिच्छक्तिः केषुचिन्नेत्यनन्यथासिद्ध-  
कार्यदर्शनबलात्कल्प्यते । इह तु व्यवहारस्य स्वेनैव सिद्धत्वात्प्रकाशाख्यकार्यान्तरस्या-  
नुपलम्भात्केन हेतुना गुर्वीभिमां कल्पनामाद्रियेमहि । ज्ञानाभावो हि ज्ञानान्तराद्यात्मा  
केवलात्मस्वरूपो वा स्वप्रकाश एवेति न तदर्थमपि मनसश्शक्तिकल्पनागौरवम् ।

. यच्चोक्तं ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वे विषयज्ञानयोरेक एव प्रकाश इति भेदाभावप्रसङ्ग  
इति । तदतिस्थवीयः ; निराकारं ज्ञानं, साकारोऽर्थ इत्येव स्फुरणात् । एतदुक्तं  
भवति—ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ ज्ञानार्थयोः परस्परविलक्षणव्यवहारयोग्यर्थ(र्थः) सम्पद्यत इति । यदि  
चैकज्ञानाधीनप्रकाशत्वमात्रेणाभेदस्स्यात् , गुणगुणिनोर्घटपटादीनां वा न भेदस्सिद्धयेत् ;  
घटपटौ भिन्नौ शतं घटा इत्याद्येकप्रतीतिदर्शनात् । न चासङ्कीर्णव्यवहारयोग्यता-  
मन्तरेण स्फुरणभेदोऽपि प्राकट्यनिर्मुक्तं(क्तः) कैश्चिदिष्यते । तच्चानुपपन्नमित्युक्तमेव ।  
तस्मादाकारभेदस्फुरणादेव तत्तदर्थभेदसिद्धिः, न ज्ञानव्यक्तिभेदात् ।

सहोपलम्भनियमादभेद इति चेन्न; विरुद्धत्वात् । साहित्यस्यैव भेदमन्तरेणानु-  
पलब्धेः । पृथगनुपलम्भमात्रेणाभेदस्तु सोपाधिकत्वान्न सिध्यतीति भेदाभेदनिरासे  
विस्तरेण द्रष्टव्यम् । एतेन विषयावच्छिन्नज्ञानप्रकाशाविशेषाद्यवसायानुव्यवसाययोर-  
विलक्षणत्वप्रसङ्गः प्रत्युक्तः । विषयविषयिणोर्भेदेनैव प्रधानाद्विषयात्मन एव ज्ञाना-  
धिक्यन्यूनत्वाभ्याश्च भेदसिद्धेः । न च धारावाहिना(हने) बुद्धिभेदः ; <sup>1</sup>तद्वदव-  
भासत्वे तेषां मिथो विषयविषयिभावाभावात् । न च स्वानुभूतिसिद्धबुद्धिसंतानगोचर-  
चरमस्मरणविषयतया भेदसिद्धिः, <sup>2</sup>दीपसन्तानगोचरानुभवमालाजनितान्तिमस्मरणवत्त-  
स्यापि विवेकविषयसामर्थ्यायोगात् । न ह्यनुभूतादर्थत् मात्रयाप्यधिकं स्मृतिर्विषयीकरोति ।  
अनुभवाश्चोभयत्रापि प्रत्येकवस्तुगोचराः, न तु मिथो भेदगोचरा इति कुतो भेदप्रतीतिः ?

1. तद्वदिति—उत्तरस्य पूर्वतुल्यावभासत्वे सतीत्यर्थः ।

2. दीपेति—स्मरणं दीपसन्तानविषयकम् । एवं स्मरणेन विविक्ततया अग्रहणादेव हि  
प्रकारान्तरेण ज्वालाभेदानुमानमिति भावः ।

यतस्स्वरूपमेदे सिद्धेऽपि वैधर्म्याग्रहणे सति स्फुटमस्मादिदं भिन्नमिति बुद्धिर्न लभ्यते । एतेन विशिष्टापरोक्षादवगमेव विशेषणादिगोचरा विशिष्टप्रत्यक्षप्रतिपत्तिर्युक्ता (तिः प्रत्युक्ता); विषयस्य ज्ञानस्य च भासमानत्वेऽपि कदा किं भासत इति क्षणमेदानां दुरवधरत्वात् । न हि तत्रापि ज्ञानस्याप्रकाशमानस्य सत्ता तावताभ्युपगन्तव्येति कृतं प्रपञ्चेन ।

नन्वेवमस्तु ज्ञानस्य स्वतस्सिद्धिः । आत्मा तु मानसेनैव ग्राह्यः । न ह्युक्तीत्या तस्य स्वयंप्रकाशत्वसिद्धिः । आत्मान्तरानपेक्षत्वस्यैव तया सिद्धेः । आत्मनश्च ज्ञानत्वात्सजातीयानपेक्षत्वसिद्धौ तत्सिद्धिरिति चेन्न ; ज्ञानत्वस्यैवासिद्धेः । न ह्यात्मनः <sup>१</sup>कर्मविशेषप्रकाशात्मकत्वम् । न च तदन्तरेण ज्ञानत्वसिद्धिः । स्वप्रकाशत्वाज्ज्ञानत्वमिति चेन्न ; अन्योन्याश्रयत्वात् । श्रुत्या ज्ञानत्वस्वयंप्रकाशत्वयोस्सिद्धिरित्यपि नाश्वसनीयम् ; योग्यत्वापेक्षत्वात्तस्याः । अयोग्यत्वे हि 'आदित्योः' यूप इत्यादिवदर्थान्तरपरतया निर्वाहात् । ग्राह्यग्राहकज्ञानद्रव्याद्याकारवत्तया स्वप्रकाशवादः । ज्ञानगुणकत्वाज्ज्ञानत्वमिति हि केचित्प्रतिपद्यन्ते । 'मनसा तु विशुद्धेन' 'हृदा मनीषा मनसाभिकृष्ट' इत्यादिना मानसप्रत्यक्षत्वदर्शनाच्च ।

अत्रोच्यते—

यद्धर्मस्यापृथक्सिद्धिः (यस्य धर्मोऽपृथक्सिद्धः) प्रकाशः प्रतिलभ्यते ।

तस्य तन्निरपेक्षस्य प्रकाशस्यात्प्रदीपवत् ॥

यस्य हि साक्षात्परम्परया वा व्यवहारानुगुण्यापादनलक्षणः प्रकाशोऽपृथक्सिद्धविशेषणं भवति, तस्य धर्मिणस्तत्प्रकाशनिरपेक्षसिद्धित्वं दृष्टम् ; यथा दीपादौ । अतो धर्मभूतज्ञाननिरपेक्षसिद्धित्वादात्मनस्स्वयंप्रकाशत्वम् । <sup>२</sup>एतदेव च ज्ञानत्वम् ।

१. कर्मेति ; विषयेत्यर्थः ।

२. एतदेवेति—प्रकाशत्वमेवेत्यर्थः ।

नैतावता अहं जानामीति ज्ञानान्तरगोचरता सर्वथा निवर्तनीया ; उपहितस्य संस्कारोपनी-  
तस्य च रूपस्य तत्तत्प्रमाणगोचरत्वोपपत्तेः । ‘ मनसा तु विशुद्धेन ’ इत्यादीनि तु प्रमाण-  
ान्तरागोचरत्वमनोमात्रग्राह्यत्वप्रतिपादकानि परमात्मपराणि । यद्यपि जीवात्मापि योग-  
शास्त्रेषु ध्येयतयोपदिश्यते, तथापि न तावता मानसप्रत्यक्षवेदनीयो भवति ; प्रमाणान्तर-  
प्रतिपन्नरूपगोचरस्मृतिसन्तानरूपत्वाद्विज्ञानस्य । तस्य चादृष्टप्रकर्षवशादपरोक्षतापन्न-  
स्यापि न मनोमात्रनिबन्धनमानसप्रत्यक्षत्वमवकल्पते । तस्य च परिपाकदशायां सवि-  
भूतिकभगवद्गोचरतया विश्वमपि मानसप्रत्यक्षमापद्येत । इदञ्च प्रत्यगात्मनस्स्वप्रकाशत्वं  
सर्वविषयप्रकाशनिवृत्ताद(व)पि सुषुप्तौ भासमानत्वात्स्पष्टम् । सुप्तोत्थितो हि ‘ सुख-  
महमस्वाप्सम् ’ इति परामृशति । तेन परामर्शेन सुषुप्तिसमये सुखरूपस्याहमर्थस्यानुभ-  
वोऽस्तीति विज्ञायते । ननु नेदं प्रत्यभिज्ञानं स्मरणं वा, किन्तु प्रबुद्धस्य तदानीन्तन-  
मनुमानम् । अन्यथा स्वापस्यापि तदानीमनुभवप्रसङ्गादिति चेत्, यद्येवं कथं सुखस्य  
सतस्तदानीमनुभवः । न हि सुखमननुभूयमानमस्ति भवतामपि । स्वापे तु ज्ञानाभावा-  
त्मनि तदानीमनुभवाभावेऽपि पश्चादनुमानमेवाश्रीयताम् । तर्हि तद्विशेषणत्वं तु सुखस्य  
कथमुपपद्यतामिति चेन्न ; अविरोधात् । न ह्यनुमीयमान .... [स्य] स्मर्यमाणविशिष्टत्वे  
कश्चिद्विरोधः ; यथा गन्धाद्याश्रयस्य । अथवा स्वापोऽपि केवलात्मावस्थानलक्षण-  
स्वप्रकाश एवानुभूतः पश्चाद्विकल्प्यताम् । अभावो हि वस्तुस्वरूपात्मना पूर्वमनुभूतः ।  
पश्चात्प्रतियोगिज्ञानानुसारेण भावि(अभाव)तया विकल्प्यत इति किन्नोपपद्यते । येषा-  
मभावस्तत्त्वान्तरं तेऽपि प्रतियोगिना विशेषण(भूतेन विना) स्वरूपेण पूर्वमनुभूतस्या-  
भावस्य पश्चात्प्रतियोगिना ज्ञातेन विकल्पनं यदा वर्णयन्ति, तदा कल्याणमेवास्माकमिति ।  
अत एव नेदमपि शङ्कनीयम्—यथा इदानीं सुखं भवति तथा तदानीमस्वाप्समिति  
प्रत्येतीति ; क्रियाविशेषणत्वे बाधकाभावात् । प्रत्युत ‘ इयन्तं कालं सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्  
इदानीं प्रबुद्धो नितरां दुःख्यामि ’ इति प्रतीतेः । न च स्वापफलसुखालाभवचनमिति  
युक्तम् ; स्वापनैष्फल्ये तन्निन्दाप्रसङ्गात् । प्रशंसाभिप्रायत्वाद्वाक्यस्य । न च प्रति-  
षेधगोचरसुखानुवाद इति प्रतिपत्तिरस्ति, भाविसुखानुकीर्तनमिति वा । अतस्सुखत्व-  
प्रत्यक्त्वविशिष्ट आत्मा स्वप्रकाश एवास्थेय इति । एवं हि श्रुत्यनुसारोऽपि भव्यो भवति ।

अत एव विषयवेदनेषु त्रिपुटावभासोऽपि निरस्तः । विषयवृत्तिव्यतिरेकेऽपि सुषुप्त्याद्य-  
वस्थासु स्वप्रकाशत्वस्यात्मनि सिद्धौ तदधीनत्वकल्पनानुपपत्तेः । आत्मनस्त्वप्रकाशतया  
विषयवृत्तिवेळास्वपि प्रकाश(शा)व्यतिरेक एव तद्भ्रान्तेरपि निदानमिति ।

इति श्रीरामानुजमतधुरन्धरस्यात्रिगोत्रप्रदीपश्रीपद्म-  
नाभार्यनन्दनस्य वादिहंसाम्बुवाहस्य श्रीम-  
द्रामानुजार्यस्य कृतौ न्यायकुलिशे स्वयं-  
प्रकाशवादश्चतुर्थः ।

## ईश्वरानुमानभङ्गवादः पञ्चमः ।

ईश्वरस्यानुमानेन सिद्धिमिच्छन्ति केचन ।

शास्त्रप्रामाण्यसिद्धयर्थं तेषामत्र निराक्रिया ॥

ननु आनुमानिकेश्वरपक्षेऽपि शास्त्रस्य स्वतः प्रामाण्यमनपोदितमेव धर्मादिषु प्रसिद्धयेत् । तथा ईश्वरेऽपि शास्त्रस्यानुवादत्वमपि तत्रांशे नाशङ्कनीयमेव, यत्रानुमानाप्रवृत्तिः । न हि नित्यसूरिपरिषदि तन्निर्देशविशेषे (तस्मिन् देशविशेषे) निमित्तोपादानैक्ये वा अनुमानं प्रवर्तितुं शक्नोति । एवमादिसहस्रप्रकारविशिष्टेश्वरशस्त्रेण प्रतिपाद्यते । अनुवादांशेऽपि नायाथार्थ्यम् । तथाविधं वाक्यं कर्तव्यपरमपि बहुलमुपलभ्यते ; किमनेन निर्वन्धेन ? अत्रैके वदन्ति—अनुमानासामर्थ्यं (ध्यात्) तन्निरास इति । तन्न ; अतिप्रसङ्गात् । उच्यते—

एकदेशेऽनुवादत्वं बाधश्चांशान्तरे गिराम् ।

इत्येवं प्रत्यवस्थाने वक्तव्यं किञ्चिदुत्तरम् ॥

एवं हि केचिदाचक्षीरन्—सर्वथा तावदीश्वरे शब्दप्रामाण्यं न प्रतिष्ठां लभते । “ ईश्वरस्वरूपमात्रे तावत्कार्यत्वानुमानमेव समर्थम् । तस्य परिजनस्थानादीनि धर्मि-  
ग्राहकमानबाधितानि ; अनाधेयातिशयत्वात् अतिशयाधायकपरिजनाद्यन्वयायोगात् ।  
आधेयातिशयत्वे ईश्वरत्वायोगः । जगदुपादानत्वस्य च मूर्तत्वाचेतनत्वानेकत्वप्रेर्यत्वादिव्या-  
प्तस्य विभौ चेतने एकस्मिन्नित्यस्वतन्त्रेऽनुपपत्तिः । सशरीरस्य च संसारित्वप्रसङ्गाद-  
नित्यत्वम् । अशरीरस्य च तद्द्वारेणाप्युपादानत्वानवकाशः ” इत्याद्यनुमानजालेन  
बाधितास्सर्व एव वेदान्ताः कथमीश्वरे प्रमाणं भवेयुः ? न चैषामागमबाधो वाच्यः ;  
आगमस्यैवानुमानोपजीवने (विनो) बाध्यत्वात् । ननु व्युत्पत्तिकालेऽनुमानसापेक्षस्यापि  
वाक्यार्थप्रतिपादनकालेऽनपेक्षस्य शास्त्रस्यैव बलीयस्त्वम् । अत एव ज्योतिष्टोमादेरस्वर्ग



साधनत्वाद्यनुमानमागमेनैव बाध्यत इति चेन्न ; स्वर्गतत्साधनयोरेव शास्त्राधीनसिद्धित्वात् तदुपजीविनोऽनुमानस्य शास्त्रेण बाधात् । इह पुनरीश्वरे यद्यनुमानं निरङ्कुशप्रसरं भवेत् , तदेव कार्यदर्शनमात्रप्रभवमविलम्बितप्रवृत्तिकमिति तेनैव जघन्यस्य शास्त्रस्य बाध्यता व्यवतिष्ठेत । <sup>1</sup> ‘यतो वा इमानि’ इत्यादिवाक्यस्य चानुवादिता दृश्यते । अतः प्रमाणान्तरप्रसिद्धिपूर्वकत्वमेव युक्तमाश्रयितुम् , यदि लभ्यते । <sup>2</sup> नित्यानां हि भिन्नप्रकरणान्नातानाञ्च वाक्यानां परस्परापेक्षानिवन्धनस्वारसिकपौर्वापर्यायोगात् । न च स्वगोचरेऽपि शब्दस्यात्यन्ताय नैराकाङ्क्ष्यं वक्तुं शक्यम् ; योगा(योग्यता)पेक्षत्वात् । तस्यां चानुमानाधीनत्वादित्यादयो हि कस्यचित् समुल्लापास्सम्भवन्ति ।

न च वाच्यमानुमानिकेश्वरपक्षे तद्वचसामागमानामनुमानाधीनमेव प्रामाण्यं स्यादिति स्वतः प्रामाण्यभङ्गप्रसङ्गः इति ; आनुमानिकेऽपि तस्मिन् वेदनित्यताया अविरोधात् ; जगदादिपक्षेऽपि तदविरोधस्य ‘समानानामरूपत्वात्’ इत्यादिसूत्रेणैव<sup>3</sup> प्रतिपादितत्वात् । न चानुमानसिद्धत्वे कश्चिद्विशेषोऽस्ति । अतः पूर्वोक्त एव प्रसङ्गः ।

तत्र च प्रतिवचने कर्तव्ये द्वयी गतिः—सर्वनिषेधेन विरोधिनिषेधेन वेति । तत्र सर्वाप्रामाण्ये विरोधिनिषेधो न युक्तः ; विशेषनिषेधस्य विशेषानुज्ञानविषयत्वात् , उद्धटदृषणोपेक्षायोगाच्च । यत्र सामान्यतोऽनुमानमप्रमाणं तत्र तदेव वक्तव्यम् । न हि सन्निहितमतिक्रामितुं कारणमस्ति । न हि तदा विशेषदोषावकाशः । स च विवक्षितोऽपि<sup>4</sup> किञ्चिदुत्वेन व्युत्पाद्येत । सामान्यदोषेणैव तन्निरासे किं विशेषदोषव्युत्पादनत्वेनांशेन ? (नार्थेनांशेन) (न क्लेशेन) । एतदुक्तं भवति—अप्रतिषिद्धमनुमानं न प्रमाणान्तरवदुदास्ते, अपि तु प्रतिकूलमाचरेत् । अतस्तिन्निरासस्सामान्यद्वारक इति । न केवलमसामर्थ्यमेव निरासं प्रयुङ्क्ते, अपि तु विरुद्धस्यासामर्थ्यमिति । एतेनाभिप्रायेणानुमाननिषेधपरतया

1. एतावता ‘एवं हि केचिदाचक्षीरन्’ इति प्रक्रान्तं केषाञ्चिदाख्यानप्रकारमुपवर्ण्य तत्रोपेष्टभक्तमप्याह—यत इति ।

2. ननु श्रुत्यन्तरप्रसिद्धिपूर्वकत्वमेवास्तु, न प्रमाणान्तरप्रसिद्धिपूर्वकत्वमित्यत्राह—नित्यानामिति.

3. ब्र. सू. 1. 3. 29.

4. विपक्षिणोऽपीति. पा.

भाष्यकारमिश्रैस्सूत्रं व्याख्यातमिति । न चानुवादत्वेऽपि प्रामाण्यसिद्धिः । इति प्रयोजनवदेवे(देवमी)ध्वरानुमानदूषणम् ।

अत्राहुः—क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वादिति । नात्रासिद्धो हेतुः, प्रत्यक्षेण सावयवत्वादिना वा यथायथं कार्यत्वसिद्धेः । न च व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिः; निरूपाधिकसम्बन्धवत्वात् । शरीरजन्यत्वमुपाधिरिति चेन्न ; व्यर्थविशेषणत्वात् । न च पक्षव्यवच्छेदो विशेषणफलमिति युक्तम्; सर्वत्र हेतूनां सोपाधिकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । 'यद्यपि साध्याव्यापकेषु केषुचित्साधनेषु पक्षव्यवच्छेदकविशेषणविशिष्टस्य साध्यं प्रति अव्यापकतया केवलसाधनं<sup>२</sup> प्रति सो (नो)पाधित्वम् ; तथापि साध्यव्यापकहेतुप्रयोगे पक्षव्यवच्छेदकं विशेषणमुद्भाव्य तद्विशिष्टस्य तस्यैव केवलं प्रत्युपाधित्वेनोद्भावनं प्रसज्येत । अतः साध्यव्यापकः कृतकत्वादिरहेतुरेव स्यात् । न च शक्यक्रियत्वमुपाधिः; शक्तेः कार्यकल्प्यत्वेन त्वयैवं वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् । न च कृतजातीयत्वलक्षणं शक्यक्रियत्वमुपाधिः ; <sup>३</sup>सत्तयातिव्यापकत्वात् । अन्यस्य च क्रियमाणसमस्तव्यक्तिगोचरैकोपाधेर्जातिर्वाणुपलम्भात् दृष्टक्रियावान्तरजातीयत्वस्यासर्वज्ञैराकलयितुमशक्यत्वात् । अस्मदादयो हि कतिपयादर्शिनः कथमिदमेव क्रियते नेतरदिति विवेक्तुमुत्सहामहे । यच्च शरीरिणा क्रियते, तत्रापि हि न कर्तुः प्रत्यक्षोपलम्भः, अनुमाने तु समानोऽयं दोष इति सोऽपि न सिद्धयेत् ।

१. हेतुमति पक्षेऽपि प्रकारान्तरेण साध्यनिश्चये सति हेतौ साध्यव्याप्यत्वनिश्चये साध्याधिकदेशवृत्तिवृत्तिग्रहणासम्भवात्साध्याव्यापकत्वम् । तत्र पक्षेऽपि साध्यसत्त्वात्पक्षव्यवच्छेदकविशेषणविशिष्ट उपाधिस्साध्याव्यापक एव भवतीति नोपाधिः । यत्र तु पक्षे न साध्यनिश्चयः, तत्र हेतोस्तत्र ज्ञानेन साध्यव्यापको हेतुरिति तत्र पक्षव्यवच्छेदकविशेषणविशिष्टस्य साध्यव्यापकत्वं साधनाव्यापकत्वञ्च भवतीति तत्र तादृशस्योद्भावनं स्यादिति विशिष्टार्थ इति भाति ।

२. साधनस्यापि पक्षव्यवच्छेदकविशेषणविशिष्टत्वे स्वरूपासिद्धिरेव स्यात्, साधनाव्यापकत्वासम्भवेन उपाधित्वाप्रसक्तिश्चेति सूचयितुं केवलेति ।

४. कृतघटादिगतसत्ताजातिमत्त्वस्य पक्षेऽपि सत्त्वात्साधनव्यापकत्वादित्यर्थः ।

न च जीवानामेवादृष्टद्वारेण कर्तृत्वोपपत्तेस्सिद्धसाध्यता, उपदानादि साक्षाद्विश्वतो य...[स्य तस्यै] व कर्तृत्वात् ; जीवानां तथात्वाभावस्य प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धत्वात् ।

न चासौ विरुद्धो हेतुः ; विषयवृत्त्यभावात् । विशेषविरुद्ध इति चेत्, कथम् ? कार्यत्वस्य शरीर(रि)कर्तृकत्वव्याप्तेरिति चेत्, तत्किमस्त्यङ्कुरेऽपि शरीर(री) कर्ता ? नन्वसौ योग्यानुपलब्धिबाधित इति किं न जानासि ? अतोऽयमव्यापको(क)धर्मोत्कर्षः उत्कर्षसमा जातिरेव ।

अथ साध्यकर्तृव्यापकं शरीरमित्युत्कर्षः, सोऽप्युक्तनीत्या निरस्तः ; शरीरस्य प्रत्यक्ष-बाधात्, कर्तुरनुमानेन सिद्धेः । शरीराव्याप्तस्य कर्तुरनुमानात्सिद्धिः, सिद्धस्य चाव्या-प्तत्वमित्यन्योन्याश्रयतेति चेन्न ; कर्तुश्शरीरसम्बन्धस्य कर्मनिबन्धनत्वेनैवाव्याप्तिसिद्धेः ।

ननु कर्मापि व्यापकं स्वकार्येण ज्ञानेन शरीरेण च सहेति कथमुपाधिः ? अपि च कर्ता नाम ज्ञानचिकीर्षाप्रयत्नाधारः, ज्ञानादेश्च शरीरेन्द्रियादीनि कारणानीति कथं तेषामव्यापकत्वमिति चेत् ; इत्थम् । कार्यस्यैव ज्ञानादेः कारणापेक्षेति तस्यैव तद्व्याप्तिरिति । ज्ञानमकार्यं नाम न दृश्यत इति चेत्, तत् एवानुमीयते । संशये चानुमानं ; अत्र तु विपर्यय इति चेत्, स कथम् ? न तावद्विवक्षितज्ञानविशेषसिद्धौ तस्यानित्यत्वानुमानात् । धर्मिग्राहकं हि मानं बाधकम् । न चासिद्धावपि ; आश्रयासिद्धेरेव । क्रोडीकृतानित्य(त्व)मेव<sup>1</sup> सिद्धिमर्हतीति चेन्न ; ज्ञानत्वस्य विषयप्रावण्यविशेषनिरूप्यस्य नित्यत्वानित्यत्वानपेक्षणात् । अतः सकर्तृ-कत्वानुमाने सति शरीरादेरनुपलम्भान्निवृत्तौ सत्यां तदनुपजीवि नित्यमेव ज्ञानं कर्तृभू(ग)-तं सिद्धयति । विरोधश्च विरोधिनीरुभयोस्सिद्धयोर्वक्तव्यः । अन्यतरस्यासिद्धौ कस्य केन विरोधः ? सिद्धे च नैकस्य वा (व्या)वृत्तये प्रभवतीति किं विशेषविरोधः करिष्यति ? ।

विशेषविरोधः यदि हेतुव्यापकस्योत्कर्षः, किमायातं प्रकृतसाध्यस्य ? व्यापकान्तरे साध्यमानेऽपि प्रकृतस्य सिद्धयविरोधात् । व्यापकान्तरमनिच्छन्तं प्रति तत्साधनेऽपि

प्रकृतस्य तादवस्थयमेव । अव्यापकसाधने तूत्कर्षसमेत्युक्तम् । अथ साध्यव्यापकोत्कर्षः ; तथाप्यनुमितानुमान इव प्रथमसाध्यस्य स्थैर्यमेव । व्यापकधर्मोत्कर्षः तत्राप्युत्कर्षसम एव । अथ साध्यव्यापकस्य पक्षे व्यावृत्तिदर्शनेऽप्यापादनं विशेषविरोध इति मतम्, तत्राप्युत्तरीत्या आपादनांशस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वात् । व्यापकव्यावृत्ति<sup>१</sup>लक्षणप्रत्यनुमान(ने) बाधो विरोधो वा दूषणं तर्कबाधो वेति को विशेषविरोधावकाशः ।

अस्तु तर्हि ईश्वरः न कर्ता अशरीरत्वात्, अतीन्द्रियत्वादित्यादिप्रतिप्रयोग इति चेन्न ; आश्रयासिद्धत्वात् । सिद्धौ वा कालात्ययापदेशात् । तर्हि क्षित्यादिकमकर्तृकं शरीराजन्यत्वादित्यादिप्रयोगोऽस्तु ; सोऽपि न युक्तः । विशेषणवैयर्थ्य...[स्य पूर्व]मेवोक्तत्वात् । अनित्यस्य सर्वस्य पक्षसपक्षकोट्यन्तर्भावात् । नित्येषु चानित्यत्वव्याप्यस्य कार्यत्व...[स्यासत्त्वा]दनैकान्तिकत्वमपि नाशङ्कनीयमेव । एवं सर्वहेत्वाभासोद्धारसिद्धौ वा (चा)नुमानिक एवेश्वरस्सिद्ध्यति ।

तथापि कथमीश्वरसिद्धिः ? विप्रतिपन्नकतिपयकार्यकर्तृमात्रसिद्धेरिति चेन्न ; परमाण्वदृष्टादिगोचरसाक्षात्कारवति द्यणुकादिकर्तरि सिद्धे तावत्सार्वज्ञ्यसिद्धिः ; परमाण्वादिगोचर(स्य) कारणाभावादकारणाधीनस्य स्वाभाविकस्य विषयविषयिभावस्य सर्वगोचरत्वात् । सङ्कोचे कारणाभावात् । ज्ञानसमानगोचरयोरिच्छाप्रयत्नयोरपि तत एव सर्वगोचरत्वात्सर्वज्ञस्सर्वाधिष्ठानसमर्थस्सर्वकर्ता सिद्ध्यति । स एव चेश्वररूपो ख्यायत इति ।

अत्रोच्यते-

चेतनस्यास्ति हेतुत्वं सर्वकार्येषु(ष्व)संशयम्  
तच्चावश्यं क्रियाहेतुगुणद्वारेण वर्ण्यते ॥

स च यत्नः कचिद् दृष्टः कचिद्वर्मादिलक्षणः ।

तौ चेन्मिथश्च साकाङ्क्षौ भवेतामव्यवस्थितिः ॥

अत्रैवं प्रत्युत्तरारम्भः—कर्तृशब्देन किमात्ममात्रं विवक्षितम्, उत यत्नवानात्मा, किं वा ज्ञानादिपरिकरसहितयत्नवानसावेवेति । तत्र न प्रथमः कल्पः ; यत्नादिव्यापारनिरपेक्षकेवलात्मनः (कर्तृ)पदवाच्यकर्तृत्वायोगात् । कारणत्वमात्रमेव तस्य वक्तुं युक्तम् । किं पुनः कर्तृत्वम् ? सर्वस्यापि कारणस्य ह्यन्ततस्त्वव्यापारः कश्चिदस्ति । सत् (तु) कार्यसम्बन्धतदुपकारकत्वादिलक्षणः । स हि कार्यं कुर्वतोऽवान्तरव्यापारस्तु (र इति चेदस्तु) तत्रायं नियमः । अतः व्यापारनिरपेक्षात्मकारणत्वे साध्ये प्रतिज्ञा-विरोधः, हेतोः कालात्ययापदेशः, दृष्टान्तस्य साध्यविकलता, पक्षश्चाप्रसिद्धविशेषणः विवक्षितेश्वरासिद्धिश्च । अतो यत्नपूर्वकमिति साध्यमित्यास्थेयम् ।

तत्रापि विकल्पनीयम्—किं यत्नस्य क्रियाहेतुगुणत्वेनावान्तरव्यापारता, उत स्वरूपमात्रेणेति ? न तावच्चेष्टादिकार्येषु <sup>१</sup>स्वरूपमात्रेण यत्नस्यावान्तरव्यापारता निर्वहति; यत्ने सत्यपि क्रियोपजननाभावे कार्याभावदर्शनेन तस्य दृष्टान्ते तथात्वप्रसिद्धिवैकल्यात् । यदपि यत्किञ्चित्कार्यं तदानीमुपजायते, तदपि न तत्प्रयत्नसाध्यमिति कस्यचिदिष्टम् । न च ज्ञानेच्छागोचरस्य जायमानस्य यत्नेन साध्यत्वमिति वाच्यम्; फलस्यापि ज्ञानेच्छागोचरस्य तदुपायगोचरयत्ननिष्पाद्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । उपायज्ञानेच्छाव्यवधानान्न साक्षात्तद्गोचरत्वमिति चेन्न ; अन्योन्याश्रयणात्, व्यवधानादतज्जन्यत्वं, अतज्जन्यत्वाद्यवधानमिति । अनुवर्तते ह्युपायगोचरो यत्नः फलदशायामपि कचिद्दण्डादिना चक्रभ्रमणादौ । अतः पूर्ववद्वाधो विरोधोऽप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वञ्चेति दोषाः ।

यद्यपि चैतादृशं साध्यं पक्षे सिद्धयति ; तथापि नास्मदादिविलक्षणः, सर्वस्यापि तस्य कार्यस्य यत्किञ्चित्प्रयत्नपूर्वकत्वमात्रे लैङ्गिकबुद्धिपर्यवसानात् । तदा च किञ्चित्कुर्वा-

णस्सर्वं तत्कालीनं करोतीत्यपि स्यात् । न विशेषहेतुरस्ति, येन एकमेकः कुरुते, नेतर-  
दिति विवेकस्स्यात् ; यत्नाधिष्ठेयक्रियापेक्षाविरहात् । यत्नवदविच्छेदस्तु कार्यप्रमाणा-  
विच्छेदे सिद्धयेत् । किमेतावता ; ईश्वराभिद्धेस्तादवस्थ्यात् ।

अथ यत्नवतः पुरुषस्य यत्नाधिष्ठेयवस्तुक्रियाद्वारेण कर्तृत्वमिति मतम्, तदेव हि  
युक्तमाश्रयितुम् । अवयवकर्मद्वारणैव तत्संयोगावयवितद्गुणादीनां निष्पत्तेस्सम्भवात् ।  
सर्वोद्देशेनापि च तदधिष्ठानोपपत्तिरिति सर्वस्यापि सकर्तृकत्वमपि स्यात् इति ।

अत्रापि वदामः—एवमपि सर्वस्य यत्नपूर्वकत्वादग्न्याद्यूर्ध्वगमनादेरदृष्टकारणक-  
त्वकल्पनमन्याय्यं प्रसज्येत । एवं हि कल्पयन्ति, <sup>1</sup>‘अग्नेरूर्ध्वज्वलनं वायोस्तिर्यग्गमनमणु-  
मनसोश्चाद्यं कर्मेत्यदृष्टकारितानि’ इति । न हि तत्रादृष्टमन्तरेण क्रियाया अनिष्पत्तिः,  
यत्नमात्रेण सर्वोत्पत्तेरुपपत्तेः । न च तत्रादृष्टस्य कारणान्तरघटकतामात्रं विवक्षितम् ।  
सर्वकार्यसाधारणस्य तत्र विशेषतोऽवाच्यत्वात् । क्रियाहेतुगुणत्वमभिप्रेत्यैवादृष्टस्योपदेशः ।  
अथादृष्टाधिष्ठाने यत्नस्योपयोगः, तत्र ; तस्य निष्क्रियत्वात् । न च साक्षादग्न्यादेर-  
धिष्ठाने सम्भवति, अदृष्टद्वाराश्रयणं युक्तिम् । न च प्रागेवादृष्टे कल्पिते पश्चादीश्वरा-  
नुमानमिति वाच्यम् ; पश्चादपि बाधेन भ्रान्तित्वनिर्वाहात् । तथापि चेददृष्टं कल्प्यते,  
सर्वत्रैव किं न कल्प्यते ।

अथ अदृष्टस्य भोगार्थमेव कल्पनम् ; न हि जगद्वैचित्र्यं एकरूपेश्वरयत्नमात्रेण  
सिद्ध्यति ; तथात्वे तस्य वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यादिप्रसङ्गाश्च (च) । न च विश्ववृत्ति<sup>2</sup>-  
निष्फला भवितुमर्हति । तयोरुभयोः कार्यकारणभावश्चान्तरालिकप्रत्यात्मसमवेतभो-  
गव्यवस्थापकातीन्द्रियगुणविशेषमन्तरेण न घटत इत्येवादृष्टं कल्प्यते, न क्रियामात्रहेतुतया  
इति चेत् ; अस्तु चैवम् । तथाप्यग्न्यादिकर्मण्युक्तो दोषस्तदवस्थ एव । अपि च विधि-  
निषेधशास्त्रगोचरक्रियानिष्पत्तिसमनन्तरं तद्गोचरेश्वरज्ञानानुवृत्तौ विपाकाभिधानफलसिसृक्षा

1. वैशेषिकदर्शने 5-2-13

2. प्रवृत्तिरित्यर्थः “विफला विश्ववृत्तिर्नो” इति कुसुमाञ्जलिप्रथमस्तबके P. 34

सञ्जायेत । तदवच्छिन्नयत्ननिष्पाद्यं तत्फलमित्येव कल्प्यताम्, किमपरेणादृष्टेन ? । न च नित्यत्वादिच्छाप्रयत्नयोर्नित्येन फलेन भवितव्यम् ; कार्यान्तरवदुपपत्तेः । न च सर्वत्रादृष्टविशेषसदसद्भावकारित एव विपाकसिसृक्षादिभेद इति वाच्यम् ; कालावच्छेदक-परमाणुक्रियासन्तानमात्रेण सर्वोपाधिविभागोपपत्तेः । यस्य च प्रेषणात्मको विधिः, तस्य विशेषत एवमेव कल्पनं युक्तम् । शब्दव्यापारापूर्वादिविधिपक्षे कल्प्येतापि काममदृष्टान्तरम् । अतस्सर्वगोचरज्ञानेच्छायत्नाधिकरणेश्वराभ्युपगममात्रेण सर्वादृष्टकार्योपपत्तेः कृतमदृष्टान्तरकल्पनया । अथवा दृष्टमेवाश्रित्येश्वरः प्रतिक्षिप्यताम् । यथा ह्येकेनैव यत्नेन कारकक्रियानिष्पत्तौ न यत्नान्तरमाश्रयणीयम्, तथैकेनैव जीवात्मगुणेन क्रियानिष्पत्तौ विश्वसर्गोपपत्तेर्न विलक्षणात्मान्तरसमवेतगुणान्तरपरिकल्पनं युक्तमिति । अत्रायं प्रयोगः— विप्रतिपन्नं कार्यं न क्रियाहेतुगुणान्तरानुमापकं, एकेन क्रियाहेतुगुणेन निराकाङ्क्षत्वात्, सम्प्रतिपन्नैककर्तृकवत् । लोके च पवनपरिस्पन्दादेर्न यत्नापेक्षा वास्यादिकर्मणः परम्परया तदपेक्षा स्यन्दनपतनयोः द्रवत्वगुरुत्वापेक्षेति सुप्रसिद्धमेव । इत्थं नैराकाङ्क्ष्येऽपि यदि दर्शनमात्रादपरत्रापि यत्नानुमानं भवेत्, गुरुत्वद्रवत्वाद्यनुमानमपि किन्न स्यादिति । क्रियाजातिभेदात्तदसाधारण्यं यत्नेन समानम् । तत्तत्क्रियासामग्र्याः परापेक्षायां विलम्बश्च स्यात् ; तदभावाच्च नैराकाङ्क्ष्यं (इति) सर्वत्र समानम् । अपि च किमिति तर्हि कुलालकर्तृकमेव विश्वं न साध्येत ? न चात्र बाधः प्रगल्भते । तत्तत्कालेषु न कापि (कापि) वर्तमानशरीरेण यत्मानेन कुलालेन संयोगस्सर्वकार्यकारणानामप्यस्तीति पूर्वमेवोक्तम् । सर्वञ्च(श्च)(त्र) कालाहोरात्रभेदेनोपलभ्यते तत्तद्देशभेदेनेति न सङ्कटं किञ्चित् । तज्ज्ञानागोचरत्वादनित्यच्छाविषयत्वाच्च तेषां (न) तदधिष्ठानमिति चेन्न ; <sup>1</sup>अवान्तरव्यापारप्रकाराव्य...[व्यावृत्ते] रस्यापि विश्वस्याशरीरस्याधिष्ठाने चेष्टापेक्षाप्रसङ्गात् ; यत्नमात्रेणापि तदधिष्ठाने शरीराङ्ग-

1. अयं भावः—कुलालज्ञानागोचरत्वादिना कुलालाधिष्ठानं नास्तीति चेत्, चेष्टारूपद्वाराभावादशरीरेश्वराधिष्ठानमपि न स्यात् । चेष्टानपेक्षणे च कुलालोऽपि शरीरं विना सृदादिकमधितिष्ठेदिति ।

(रांश)वैयर्थ्यात् । न च जगदादिरनुमानमात्रात्सिद्धयति, ततो विपरीतस्यैव सिद्धेः ।  
अतस्सकर्तृकत्वे साध्ये सिद्धसाध्यता ।

पारम्पर्यादधिष्ठाने न साक्षात्तदपीष्यते ।

चेष्टमानतनुपेर्यवासीसन्दंशकादिवत् ॥

किं वा साक्षादधिष्ठाने पारम्पर्यानपेक्षणम् ।

तत्काङ्क्षा विनिहन्येव साक्षाद्यत्नार्थ(र्थि)तामपि ॥

तावतैव नैराकाङ्क्ष्यात् । तथाप्यपेक्षायां शरीरादावपि प्रसङ्गात् । तथाचाधिष्ठान-  
मात्रसाधने सिद्धसाध्यता । साक्षादधिष्ठानसाधने व्याप्यभाव इति । एतत्सर्वमभि-  
प्रेत्योक्तं मीमांसाचार्यपादैः—“ कर्मभिस्सर्वजीवानां तत्सिद्धेस्सिद्धसाध्यता ”<sup>१</sup> इति ।

किञ्च सर्वस्य साक्षादधिष्ठेयत्वे सर्वक्रियापि चेष्टा स्यात् ; प्रयत्नवदात्मसंयोगासमवायि-  
कारणिकायाः क्रियायाश्चेष्टात्वप्रसिद्धेः । असमवायिकारणत्वस्य च समवायिकारणप्रत्यासत्ति-  
लक्षणीयत्वात् । ततश्चेष्टाश्रयाणामन्त्यावयविनां तावच्छरीरत्वप्रसङ्गः । तथा सति तच्छरीर-  
कजीवकर्तृकमेव विश्वं प्रसज्येत । एवमपि परमाण्वाद्यधिष्ठानमशरीरस्यैवेति चेन्न ;  
तत्रापि पूर्वमारब्धान्त्यावयविकतया शरीरावयवत्वेन चेष्टाश्रयत्वोपपत्तेः । दृश्यते हि जाति-  
भेदेन केषाञ्चिच्छरीरावयवानां विभक्तानामेव चिरतरादिभावेन चेष्टाश्रयत्वम् ।

अथवा कथञ्चिदस्तु विश्वोपादानक्रियाहेतुप्रयत्नवान् कश्चित् ; न तस्य सार्वज्ञ्ये प्रमाणं  
पश्यामः । ज्ञानं विना कथं यत्नस्य विषयव्यवस्था भविष्यतीति चेत् , यथा सुषुप्ताविति ब्रूमः ।  
तथाह्यदृष्टविशेषादुपपद्यते । अतश्चेतनस्यैव यत्नो दृष्ट इति तस्य चैतन्यमात्रकल्पनैव हि लघो-  
यसी । कथञ्चिद्य(ञ्च य)त्नस्य विषयनियमे ज्ञानमुपयुज्यत इति चिन्त्यम् । न तावज्ज्ञा-  
नस्य विषयप्रावण्ये सति तत्सामानाधिकरण्यामात्रेण स्वतो निर्विषयस्यापि यत्नस्य विषयव्यप-  
देश इति वाच्यम् ; अतिप्रसङ्गात् । समकालत्वेन नियम इति चेन्न ; अस्मासु  
जन्यजनकभावेन तदसिद्धेः । जन्यजनकभावेन विशेषे नातिप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् , कथ-



मयमीश्वरे सङ्गच्छेत ? । अपि च यथा ज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वान्न सामग्रीकृता विषय-  
व्यवस्था, यथा च त्वया नित्ये ज्ञाने कारणगुणाभावेऽपि याथार्थ्यं प्रमात्वं चाश्रित्य  
“ते हि सर्वज्ञानानां न ज्ञानत्वप्रयुक्ते” इति महता प्रयासेन भवद्विरेवोपपाद्यते ;  
एवं नित्यस्य प्रयत्नस्यापि न ज्ञानापेक्षिणी विषयव्यवस्थेति किं न कल्पनीयम् ? । स्वतो  
विषयप्रावण्ये प्रयत्नोऽपि ज्ञानमेव स्यादिति चेन्न ; कार्यभेदादेव तद्भेदोपपत्तेः । निश्वास-  
प्रयत्नस्यापि तथाभावप्रसङ्गाच्च । अदृष्टाधीनत्वात्तत्रापि न स्वत इति चेन्न ; अदृष्टे  
ज्ञानत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न च भवत्पक्षे निश्वासहेतुप्रयत्नकल्पने प्रमाणमस्ति, ईश्वरयत्नमात्रेणापि  
तत्कार्यनिश्वासोपपत्तेः ।

एतदुक्तं भवति—सर्वाण्यवयविद्रव्याणि, यथायथं गुणाः, सर्वाणि  
कर्माणि चेति बहुप्रकारोऽशेषकार्यवर्गः स्वोचितकारणपरिस्पन्दमपेक्षमाणस्तदर्थं चेतन-  
गुणमपेक्षते, स चादृष्टं यत्नो वा, न ज्ञानादिकमपि ; तावतैव क्रियासिद्धेः तत्रैव कार्यार्था-  
पत्तिपरिक्षयादिति । न हि करणाकरणकालयोः कारणानां किञ्चित्सहकारिसम्बन्धा-  
सम्बन्धलक्षणं विशेषमुपलभमानास्तदतिरिक्तमनुपलब्धमपरमपि कारणं कल्पयितुमुत्सहा-  
महे । कल्पने वा बौद्धोक्तसामर्थ्यासामर्थ्ययोरुपालम्भः कथं कर्तव्यः ? तदपि हि  
स्वभावान्तरमन्यथानुपपत्तिपरिक्षयादेव नाद्रियामहे । तत्रापि—

विचित्रकर्मकर्तृणां विचित्रा भोगसिद्धयः ।

अदृष्टमन्तरङ्गत्वादात्मस्थं गमयन्ति हि ॥

कर्मफलसम्बन्धे च शास्त्रमेव प्रमाणमिति सिद्धम् ॥ यच्चाचेतनानां चेतनाधिष्ठितानामेव  
करणत्वमिति, तदप्यनेनैव प्रत्युक्तम् ; अधिष्ठानस्यादृष्टेन यत्नेन वेति स्थापनात् ।  
न हि तत्रापि साक्षादधिष्ठानानुमानमित्युक्तम् ।

एतेन ज्ञानादिपरिकरसहितयत्नवान् कर्ता साध्यत इति च प्रत्युक्तम् । ज्ञानादे-  
र्यत्नं प्रत्यनुपकारकत्वात् । साहित्यमात्रेण साधनेऽतिप्रसङ्गस्योक्तत्वात् । अपि च—

यदि यत्नेन साहित्यात् ज्ञानादिरपि साध्यते ।

देहादिरपि किं न स्यात् साहित्यस्याविशेषतः ॥

यत्तु कर्तुर्देहसम्बन्धे कर्मोपाधिकत्वमुक्तम् , तदयुक्तम् ; साधनव्यापकत्वात् । देहकर्मणोऽसमव्याप्तयोः कर्तृव्यापकत्वात् । ईश्वरसिद्धौ कथं व्यापकत्वमिति चेत्, असिद्धौ कथमव्यापकत्वमित्यत्रापि दीयतां दृष्टिः । तथापि शङ्कितोपाधिग्रस्तत्वान्न कर्तृव्यापकं शरीरमदृष्टं वेति चेत्, तत एवाव्यापकत्वनिष्कर्षोऽपि न शक्य इति विशेषविरोधस्य बाध-  
स्योपाधेर्वा शङ्कायां प्रकृतानुमानस्तम्भसिद्धौ प्रतिवादिन एव विजयः ।

अजसंयोगः प्रामाणिकोऽपि येन प्रतिक्षिप्यते, कथं तेन नित्यः प्रयत्नः प्रतिपादयितुं शक्येत । अप्राप्तयोः प्राप्तिः संयोग इति तल्लक्षणम् । इतरथा समवायत्वप्रसङ्गात् । अतो वर्जनीयं नित्यत्वमिति चेत्—न; एतेन सङ्केतमात्रेण नित्यविभूतां सम्बन्धस्य निराकर्तुमशक्यत्वात् । तेषाञ्चानाधाराधेयत्वात् संयोगसिद्धौ नाजसंयोगनिराससिद्धिः । न हि निरन्तरदेशानां द्रव्याणां तेनासम्बन्धो युक्तः । अत्रायं प्रयोगः—कालो विभुना संयुक्तः, तन्निरन्तरदेशस्येति सति द्रव्यत्वात् घटवदिति । इदन्तु प्रयत्नसाधकप्रमाणादन्यथासिद्धा-  
द्वलीयः । एवं प्रामाणिकमपि सम्बन्धमनिच्छता कथं(थम) प्रामाणिकः प्रयत्नोऽभ्यु-  
पेयते । किञ्च—

यत्नश्च यतमानस्य कर्तुर्व्यापार इष्यते ।

व्यापारस्सर्व एव स्यान्न नित्यः कारकाश्रयः ॥

यत्तु विशेषविरोधो नाम दूषणमस्तीति ; तदयुक्तम् । साध्यमात्रविपरीतसाधकवद्वि-  
शिष्टसाध्यविपरीतसाधकस्यापि विरुद्धत्वात् । यद्यप्यसौ हेतुस्तत्र तद्विपरीतेऽपि न समर्थः,  
तथापि तस्य साध्यस्य वादिविवक्षितविपरीतरूपव्याप्तत्वात्तत्साधकस्य सर्वस्य विवक्षित-  
विपरीतसाधकत्वेनैव नियमः । उभयत्र (त्रा)साधकस्यापि हेतोर्विवक्षितविपरीते पक्षपात-  
मात्रमस्तीति विरुद्धता वक्तव्या । अशरीरो हि कर्ता न साहित्यमात्रेणापि दृष्टः, सशरीरस्तु  
सहृदृष्ट इति विशेषात् । अतोऽयं विशेषविरोधस्साधयति चेत् , विपरीतमेव साधयेदित्येवो-

द्वाव्यम् । ननु यं तद्वि (नन्वयत्नत्व) (नन्वयं तत्त्व)चिन्तायां साध्या (साध्य) व्यापकाभावा-  
त्मेति प्रतिहेतुरुपाधिर्वा दूषणं स्यात् । न विशेषविरोधावकाश इति चेन्न ; समव्या-  
प्यपेक्षत्वादुपाधेः पक्षवृत्त्यपेक्षत्वात्प्रतिहेतोः । अस्य तु व्याप्तिमात्रनिरूप्यत्वेन शीघ्रभावि-  
त्वात् । इतरथा ह्युपाधेरेव दूषणत्वाद्विरुद्धानैकान्तिककालात्ययापदेशप्रकरणसमादेरदूषणत्व-  
प्रसङ्गात् । निरुपाधिकसम्बन्धे सति तेषामभावात् ।

यदि च भवदभिमतमेव दूषणं कार्यत्वहेतौ वक्तव्यमिति निर्बन्धः, तर्ह्यस्तुपाधिरेव  
शरीरजन्यत्वं प्रत्यनुमानं वा । न च व्यतिरेके विशेषवैयर्थ्यम् ; कर्तृजन्यत्वे साध्ये  
शरीरजन्यत्वमुपाधिरित्यत्रैव विशेषस्यैव हेतुत्वात् । जन्यत्वांशस्यानुवादमात्रत्वात् । न हि  
सकर्तृकमित्यस्यायमर्थः, कर्तृसम्बन्धमात्रवदिति ; सिद्धसाध्यताप्रसङ्गात् ; किन्तु कर्तृजन्य-  
मिति । अतो जीवकर्तृकत्वशरीरकर्तृकत्वयोरिव कर्तृपूर्वकत्वशरीरपूर्वकत्वयोर्व्याप्तिरिति  
न दोषः । न चात्र जन्यवा(त्वा)ननुवादेन तयोः क्षित्यादिधर्मता वर्णयितुं शक्यते ।  
शक्यते चेत्, किं त्वयापि न क्रियते ? त्वयापि हि कर्तृजन्यमित्येव प्रतिज्ञायते । न हि  
तज्जन्यत्वस्यापि साध्यत्वं विवक्षितम्, तस्यैव हेतुत्वेनाङ्गीकारात् । तथाचासिद्धत्वप्र-  
सङ्गात् । यथा च तव हेतुरेव किञ्चिद्विशिष्टो व्यापकोऽभिमतः, एवमस्माभिरपि सकर्तृकत्वं  
शरीरविशिष्टं तत्र व्यापकमिष्यते । तत्र शरीरबाधात्प्रथमव्याप्तिभङ्गो द्वितीयव्याप्तिभङ्गो  
वा । न्यायचिन्तायां प्रथमव्याप्तेरेव भङ्गो युक्तः । कार्यस्य कारणमात्रेणापि चरितार्थ-  
त्वात् । कर्तुस्तु देहादिपरिकरसापेक्षस्य दृष्टस्य तदभावेऽनुपपत्तेः । नित्यज्ञानादिकं  
ह्यत्यन्तादृष्टचरं सो(नो)त्प्रेक्षामप्यर्हतीति कस्तत्कल्पनयोत्तरव्याप्तिभङ्गायोत्तिष्ठेत् । तथा  
च सति चक्रकाश्रयत्वमुत्तरव्याप्तिभङ्गे पूर्वव्याप्तिजीव...[नं तज्जीवने नित्यज्ञानादिसिद्धिः  
तत्सिद्धौ उत्तरव्याप्तिभङ्गः इति । नचै] वविधोपाधिवचने सर्वानुमानोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः ।  
पक्षसपक्षत्वव्यवस्थापकधर्मोपजीवनेनोपाध्युद्भावने हि तथा स्यात् । न च शरीरादिना  
पक्षत्वादिसिद्धिः ।

ननु क्षित्यादिकमित्यादिशब्दस्य शरीराजन्यत्वोपाधि(रा)(कार्या)(धार्या)कारो  
विषयः, न हि तदन्तरेण सङ्ग्राहको दृश्यत इति चेन्न ; पक्षदर्शनात्प्रागेवोपाधिसर्वरूपस्य  
तद्व्याप्तेश्च सिद्धेः एवंविधेष्वतिप्रसङ्गाभावात् । पक्षसंस्पर्शमात्रेणानुपाधित्वे चाग्नीषोमी-

यादिहिंसानामधर्मत्वसाधने निषिद्धत्वमुपाधिर्न स्यात् । तत्रापि ह्यनिषिद्धानामेवादि-  
शब्दार्थत्वम् ।

अपि च (वा) पक्षव्यवच्छेदायैव विशेषणमस्तु; यथा धूमवत्त्वसाधनस्याग्निमत्त्वस्या-  
द्रैन्धनसम्बद्धाग्निमत्त्वोपाधिकत्वे, यथा वा ध्वंसानित्यत्वसाधने कृतकत्वस्य भावत्वे सति  
कृतकत्वोपाधित्वे च । अत्रापि हि व्यर्थविशेषणत्वं प्रत्युक्तम् । ननु तत्र पक्षे बाधक-  
प्रमाणं व्युत्पाद्य साध्यव्यावृत्तिसिद्धौ पश्चाद्विशेषणं सप्रयोजनमिति विशिष्टस्योपाधित्व-  
मुच्यते । अत्र तु तदलाभात् व्यर्थविशेषणत्वमिति चेन्न ; बाधानन्तरमुपाधेर्निष्प्रयो-  
जनत्वात्, बाधेनैव दूषणसिद्धेः । उपाधिरिति स्वतन्त्रदूषणं विवक्षितम् ।

अपि च माभूदुपाधिनिश्चयः । स हि साध्याभावग्राहिप्रमाणोदयानन्तरभावी ।  
तथापि तदुदयात्पूर्वं उपाधिशङ्का दुर्निवारा; सपक्षे निरुपाधिकानुगमदर्शनबलेन तस्यास्सु-  
दृढनिरूढत्वात् । तथा च नातिप्रसङ्ग इत्युक्तम् । यदि च नैवं, तस्यैवोपाधेः किञ्चि-  
त्प्रत्यनुपाधित्वमितरं प्रत्युपाधित्वमित्यव्यवस्थितमेव तद्रूपं स्यात् । न च बाधप्रतिरोध-  
योरिव एवमस्त्विति वाच्यम् ; प्रतिपक्षव्यवस्थितविशेषाभावे तदनुपपत्तेः । अत्र तु तत्रास्त्येव ।  
पक्षे बाधकप्रमाणेन विशेषेण सत्यु(षणेऽसत्यु)(षणसाफल्ये सत्यु)पाधेर्निर्णयः, बाधकालाभे  
विशेषणसाफल्यसंशये सत्युपाधिसंशय इत्येव स्थितेः । न चानेनैव प्रकृतहेतुना पक्षे साध्य-  
निर्णयाद्विशेषणवैफल्यनिर्णय इति वाच्यम् ; दर्शनबलेन परिप्लवमानस्योपाधेर्निरासमन्त-  
रेण साध्यनिर्णयायोगात् ; यत्र तु पक्षप्रतीक्षाना[तिज्ञाता?]र्थपूर्वं न किञ्चित्सपक्षानु-  
गतं व्यापकान्तरं दृश्यते, तत्र हेतोः पक्षधर्मत्वसिद्धिसमनन्तरमुत्प्रेक्षणीयादुपाधेः प्रागेव  
प्रकृतहेतुना साध्यसिद्धेरुपाधिशङ्कानवसर इति विवेकः ।

अपि च विशेषस्यैव विशेषं प्रति प्रयोजकत्वं युक्तम् । सामान्यञ्च कार्यत्वम् ।  
अतस्तत्कारणमात्रमेव प्रयोक्तुमुत्सहते । तद्विशेषस्तु कर्ता । नासौ कार्यमात्रेण प्रयोज्यो  
भवितुमर्हति । इतरथा कार्यत्वाच्छरीरजन्यत्वमित्यादेरपि दुर्निवारत्वप्रसङ्गात् । अवश्यञ्च  
कार्येऽपि कश्चिद्विशेषोऽनुसरणीयः, येन क्वचिच्छरीरस्य हेतुत्वं नेतरत्रेति व्यवस्था  
सिद्ध्येत् ।

ननु च शरीरसमवेतगुणादीनामपि शरीरजन्यत्वमस्ति, न तेषां सकर्तृकत्वं दृश्यते ; तदुपादानादिसाक्षात्कारवतस्सम्प्रतिपन्नस्यादृष्टेः । अतः कथं शरीरस्य कर्तृश्च समान-जातीयहेतुत्वं मिथस्समव्याप्तिर्वा वक्तुं शक्यत इति चेन्न ; शरीरसमवेतगुणानां शरीरा-जन्यत्वात् । न हि शरीरं शरीरात्मना तां जनयति, अपि तु द्रव्यात्मना । शरीरत्वञ्च सिद्ध्यति प्रथममन्तरेण भोगाश्रयत्वादिना । तस्य फलं प्रथमं चेष्टा च (दिश्च) साक्षात्प्रयत्ना-धिष्ठेयत्वेन । अतश्चेष्टैव साक्षाच्छरीरजन्य(न्या) तत्कार्याणि तामवान्तरव्यापारीकृत्य यथायथं शरीरेण जायन्ते, नेतराणि । तत्रोभयत्रापि सकर्तृकत्वमपि तथाविधमेव ।

ननु च चेष्टाया अपि शरीरलक्षणान्तर्भावाद्भोगादिवच्छरीरजन्यत्वासिद्धिरिति चेन्न ; आत्मगुणायत्तत्वमात्रेण शरीरत्वसिद्धेस्तदुत्तीर्णस्य तज्जन्यत्वोपपत्तेः । अतः कर्तृशरीरयोस्स-मव्याप्त्यादिसिद्धिः । एतेन शरीराधिष्ठाने व्यभिचारः प्रत्युक्तः । अधिष्ठानं हि यदि संयोगः नासौ सकर्तृकः । यत्नहेतोस्तस्य यत्नादिपूर्वकत्वासिद्धेः । अथ यत्नवदात्म-संयोगः, नायमपि सकर्तृकः, यत्नसमानकालस्य संयोगस्य तत्साध्यत्वानुपपत्तेः । अतश्चे-ष्टैव प्रथमं सकर्तृका, तत्कार्यं त्वनन्तरमिति व्यवस्थेति ।

किञ्च सकर्तृकत्वे साध्ये कार्यत्वं हेतुं वदता सकर्तृकत्वव्यावृत्तिः कार्यत्वव्यावृत्तिव्या-प्ता वक्तव्या । साध्याभावस्य साधनाभावव्याप्तिमन्तरेण हेतोर्विपक्षव्यावृत्त्यसिद्धेः । तत्र च यदकर्तृकं तदकार्यमित्यत्र व्याप्तावकारणत्वमुपाधिः । न चात्र साधनव्यापकत्वम्, सामान्यस्य विशेषव्याप्त्ययोगेन विशेषाभावस्यापि सामान्याभावेन व्याप्त्यसिद्धेः । विशेष-ान्तरेणापि सामान्यस्थितेरविरोधात् ।

ननु कोऽयं विशेषः? यदि कारणानामन्यतममात्रम्, तदयुक्तम् ; दिक्कालयोर्व्यभि-चारात् । तयोस्सर्वकार्यहेतुत्वेन तदभावस्य कारणमात्राभावव्याप्त्यभ्युपगमात् । अथ

1. कारणविशेषाभावः कारणसामान्याभावव्याप्त्यो न भवतीत्यत्र कारणविशेषः कः? न तावदन्यतममात्रम्, दिक्कालयोरप्यन्यतमत्वात् । तयोश्च सर्वकार्यकारणत्वेन तदभावस्य कारण-

सर्वकार्यानिनूततत्त्वम्, तदसिद्धम् । अनुमानेनैव विश्वकर्तृस्साधनादिति चेन्न ; अन्यतम-  
मात्रस्य सर्वहेतुत्वासिद्धेः । अतः विशेषस्य हि सर्वहेतुत्वम् । कर्तुश्च सर्वहेतुत्वं  
नाद्यापि सिद्धयति । तावन्मात्रेणोपाधेः स्थितत्वात् । सर्वकार्यहेतु(त्व)निर्णयोत्तरकालं  
हि साधनव्यापकत्वम् । इतरथा पूर्ववत्कार्यमात्रत्वाच्छरीरजन्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न च  
शरीरस्य योग्यानुपलम्भान्निरासः । अयोग्यानामपि शरीराणां सम्भवात् । न च निषि-  
डावयवशिलामध्यवर्तिभेकोत्पादके शरीरप्रवेशानुपपत्तिः, तत्रत्यानामेवा आप्यादिशरीराणां  
संभवात् । तेषाञ्च शिलारम्भकाल एवारम्भोपपत्तिः । दृश्यमानशरीरस्वभावत्वानति-  
क्रमाय तत्कारणत्वव्यावृत्तौ दृश्यमानकर्तृस्वभावानतिक्रमाय तत्कारणत्वव्यावृत्तिरप्यवश्याभ्यु-  
पेतव्या ।

एतेन विपक्षे बाधकाभावश्चानुसन्धेयः । यद्यकर्तृकं अकार्यमेव स्यादिति तु  
व्याप्यन्तराभावादेवासिद्धेः<sup>२</sup> । यः (यदि) अकारणमेव स्यादिति, <sup>३</sup>उक्तनीत्या व्याप्य-  
सिद्धेः । सहदर्शनमात्रेण तूक्तौ पूर्वोक्तोऽतिप्रसङ्गः । ननु च कारकचक्रस्य  
स्वतन्त्रकारकविशेषानधिष्ठाने तत्त्वमेव दुर्निरूपम् । नच स्वतन्त्रानधिष्ठा(ष्ठाने  
कारणा)(ष्ठिता)नां <sup>४</sup>कदाचिदेव सहकारिसम्बन्धः कार्यत्वे उपपद्यत इति चेत्,  
सत्यम् । तत्तु न साक्षादिति दृष्टम् । परम्परया तु चेतनोऽदृष्टादिद्वाराधितिष्ठतीति पूर्वमे-  
वोक्तम् ।

प्रतितर्काश्च भवन्ति—यदि क्षित्यादि सकर्तृकं, शरीरकर्तृकमेव स्यात्, अनित्यज्ञान-  
कर्तृकमस्मदादिकर्तृकमसर्वज्ञकर्तृकञ्च स्यादित्यादयः । व्याप्तिश्च तर्काणां प्रागेव निरू-  
पिता । एतत्सर्वमभिप्रेत्योक्तं भगवता मैत्रेयेणापि—

सामान्याभावव्याप्यत्वात् । नापि सर्वकार्यसाधारणातिरिक्तकारणमेव विशेषः । कर्तृस्सर्वकार्य-  
कारणत्वस्येदानीं साधनेन तस्य तादृशविशेषत्वासिद्धेरिति शङ्कार्थः ।

२. बाधकासिद्धेरित्यर्थः

३. अकार्यत्वेऽकारणकत्वमेव प्रयोजकं न त्वकर्तृकत्वमित्युक्तनीत्येत्यर्थः

४. कदाचिदपीत्यर्थः

“ निर्गुणस्याप्रमेयस्य शुद्धस्याप्यमलात्मनः ।

कथं सर्गादिकर्तृत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽभ्युपगम्यते ॥ ”<sup>१</sup> इति

अत्र प्रतिविहितं भगवता पराशरेणापि—

“ शक्तयस्सर्वभावानामचिन्त्यज्ञानगोचराः ।

यतोऽतो ब्रह्मणस्तास्तु 'सर्गाद्या भावशक्तयः ॥

भवन्ति तपतां श्रेष्ठ पावकस्य यथोष्णता ”<sup>२</sup> । इति ।

अयमर्थः—एते प्रतितर्कादयो दोषा व्याप्तिपूर्वकेऽनुमान एव बाधकाः, न तु तन्निरपेक्षे शास्त्रे ; तत्र धर्मिग्राहकप्रमाणबाधितत्वादिति । यद्यपि शास्त्रस्यापि योग्यत्वापेक्षस्य कथञ्चित् नमूलत्वमस्ति, तथापि तत्सम्भावनामात्रेण, सा च नाविनाभावापेक्षिणीति नानुमानवद् दृष्टजातीयविषयत्वम् । सर्वथा चाप्रामाण्ये निरस्ते विषयविशेषपर्यवसानमात्रचिन्तायां यत्र विश्ववैजात्यादिना सर्वप्रमाणाविरोधसिद्धिस्तत्र मुख्य एवोर्थे प्रामाण्यम् । यत्र तथापि न सम्भवति, तत्र वृत्त्यन्तराश्रयणम् ; यथा—‘आदित्यो यूयः’ इत्यादिषु । निखिलेतरविजातीयतया तु विश्वकर्तारं शास्त्रमुपदिशतांति कथं तस्य दृष्टसजातीयतागोचरेणानुमानेन समानयोगक्षेमता । “ अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते ” इत्यादौ हि सकलेतरवैजात्योपपादनपूर्वकं भूतयोन्यक्षरमभिधीयत इति न सङ्कटं किञ्चिदिति ।

ननु कथं न सङ्कटं ? यदा योग्यतापेक्षोऽन्वयस्तदनन्तरञ्च वैजात्यं, वाक्यार्थगोचरत्वात्तस्य । अतो वैजात्याद्योग्यत्वमयोग्यत्वाभावं वा वदतामन्योन्याश्रयत्वम् । तथा हि—

ज्ञानं सर्वान्वयायोग्यं सर्वं ज्ञानान्वये तथा<sup>३</sup> ।

वैजात्यादुपपत्तिश्चेन्न तत्सिद्धिरनन्वये ॥

1. वि. पु. 1. 2. 1

2. वि. पु. 1. 2. 2—3

3. अयोग्यमित्यर्थः ।

उच्यते—

उक्तमेतत्प्रमाणत्वमस्ति सर्वात्मना श्रुतेः ।

अतः पदार्थसन्न्यासाद्व्याप्तिनाशो हि युज्यते ॥

• प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिशक्तिप्रतिपन्नपदार्थवर्गस्य क्रियाकारकादि(देः) सामान्यतोदृष्टयोग्यतया निस्संशयत्वे, स्वरूपसंसर्गविरोधप्रतिपादकप्रमाणे च सर्वथानुपपत्त्ये, यदि परं पदार्थसहचारिधर्मान्तरव्याप्तिमङ्गीकृत्य तत्तत्पदार्थव्यापकाभिमतवस्त्वन्तरविरोधापादनेनान्वयायोग्यत्वात्केचित्पदार्था उद्धार्यन्ते, लाक्षणिकान्तरपरिग्रहेण च वाक्यार्थनिर्वाहः, ततः पदार्थधर्मव्याप्त्यनुसारेण पदार्थत्याग इति स्यात् । तच्चायुक्तम् <sup>1</sup> ।  
<sup>2</sup> 'अङ्गगुणविरोधे च तादर्थ्यात्' इति न्यायात् । अथ एकपदार्थधर्मव्याप्त्यनुसारेण पदार्थान्तरत्यागः, तत्रापि श्रुतिलिङ्गाधिकरणन्यायविरोधापत्तिः । अतो यत्र पदार्थस्वरूपगतो विरोधो दृश्यते, तत्र तत्त्यागेनान्वयाविरुद्धार्थान्तरलक्षणा, यथा यूपादित्ययोः । यत्र तु स्वरूपेण विरोधो नास्ति, व्याप्त्य(प्त्या) विरोधापादनं, तत्र विरोधापादकपदार्थगुणभूतव्याप्तित्यागेन पदार्थरक्षणमिति विवेकादर्थोत्पदार्थस्यापि वैजात्यसिद्धिः । तत्रापि न व्युत्पत्तिभङ्गः ; महासामान्यस्यैकत्वात् । तच्च रू(?).....दयनेनैव क्वचिदुपवर्णितं ज्ञातिषु ॥

इति भगवद्रामानुजमुनिवरमतधुरन्धरस्यात्रिगोत्रप्रदीपश्रीपद्मनाभार्यनन्दनस्य

वादिहंसांभुदार्थस्य श्रीमद्रामानुजार्यस्य कृतिषु न्यायकुलिशे

ईश्वरानुमोदनादभङ्गः पञ्चमः ॥

1. तच्च युक्तम् इति क्वचित् पाठः ।

2 पृ. मी. (12-2-9)





॥ श्रीगुरुभ्यो नमः ॥

## ॥ लक्षणाविमर्शः प्रथमो भागः ॥

पूर्वतोऽनुवृत्तः

॥ वे. सुब्रह्मण्य शास्त्री ॥

॥ अण्णामलैविश्वविद्यालयः ॥

अथवा अपभ्रंशाद्वादिरूपार्थबोधेऽपि गावीशब्दाद्बोधो भवतु बोधविषयो गौर्भवत्वित्याकारक एवेश्वरसंकेतः तावतैव तस्य सर्वविषयकत्वनिर्वाहात् । तथा च गवांशे गावीशब्दजन्यबोधविषयत्वस्य बोधविषयतात्वेन प्रकारत्वेऽपि मानाभावेन गावीशब्दजन्यबोधविषयतात्वेनाप्रकारत्वात् ईश्वरसंकेतीयगावीशब्दजन्यबोधविषयतात्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यत्वस्य गवि अभावेन तत्र तदवगाहिज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वम् । एवञ्च गङ्गापदस्य तीरशक्तत्वे गङ्गापदजन्यबोधविषयस्तीरं भवत्वित्याकारिका भगवदिच्छा वाच्येति गङ्गापदजन्यबोधविषयतात्वे ईश्वरसंकेतीयतीरादिनानापदार्थनिष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपितप्रकारतावच्छेदकत्वं, तत्प्रयोज्यतीराद्युपस्थितेः शाब्दबोधानुकूलत्वञ्च कल्पनीयम् । गङ्गापदस्य तीरलक्षकत्वे तु गङ्गापदाद्बोधो भवतु बोधविषयस्तीरं भवतु इत्याकारिकैव ईश्वरेच्छा कल्प्यते । तावतापि तस्याः सर्वविषयकत्वोपपत्तेः । एवञ्च गङ्गापदजन्यबोधविषयतात्वे न नानापदार्थनिष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपितप्रकारतावच्छेदकत्वं कल्प्यते । अपि तु क्लृप्तशक्यसंबन्धप्रयोज्यतीराद्युपस्थितेः शाब्दबोधानुकूलत्वमात्रं कल्प्यते इति लाघवम् । तस्माल्लक्षणा स्वीकरणीया । इत्थञ्च लक्षणासिद्धौ तन्निबन्धनकार्यकारणभावाधिक्यं न दोषाय फलमुखत्वात् ॥

शक्तिज्ञानस्य पदनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितशक्तित्वावच्छिन्नसांसर्गिकविषयतानिरूपितार्थनिष्ठविशेष्यताशालिज्ञानत्वेन लक्षणाज्ञानसाधारणरूपेण शाब्दबोधे कारणत्वम् । कारण-

तावच्छेदककोटौ शक्तित्वपर्याप्तावच्छेदकताकसांसर्गिकविषयता न निवेश्यते । शक्य-  
संबन्धसंसर्गकपदप्रकारार्थविशेष्यकज्ञानेऽपि शक्तेः संसर्गतया भानात् निरुक्तकारणताव-  
च्छेदकं लक्षणाज्ञानसाधारणमिति दीक्षितश्रीकण्ठभट्टाचार्याः ॥

(३) केचित्प्राचीननैयायिकाः, लक्ष्यार्थबोधे लक्षणाज्ञानं कारणमिति सर्वसंप्रतिपन्नम् ।  
गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यादौ तीरविषयकशाब्दबोधे शक्यप्रवाहसंबन्धितीरतात्पर्यज्ञानं कारणत्वेन  
कृतम् । अतः लक्ष्यार्थबोधकारणज्ञानविषयस्य तात्पर्यस्य लक्षणात्वकल्पनमुचितमिति  
शक्यसंबन्धिप्रतीतीच्छयोच्चरितत्वपर्यवसितं शक्यसंबन्धिनि तात्पर्यं लक्षणेति वदन्ति ॥

इदं पुनरत्र चिन्तनीयम् । तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिर्लक्षणाबीजमिति तान्त्रिकसिद्धान्तः ।  
तात्पर्यस्य लक्षणात्वे तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिः तात्पर्यबीजमिति स्यात् । तच्च नोपपद्यते स्वानुप-  
पत्तेः स्वबीजत्वासंभवात् । अपि च शाब्दबोधानुकूलपदार्थस्मृत्यौपयिकः संबन्धो वृत्तिः ।  
अतश्च लक्ष्यार्थस्मृतेः प्राक् लक्षणाया वृत्तेर्ज्ञानमपेक्षितम् । वृत्त्या पदार्थोपस्थित्यनन्तर-  
मेव तथोपस्थापितपदार्थं प्रकरणादिना वक्तृतात्पर्यज्ञानं जायते । तात्पर्यस्य लक्षणात्वे  
तस्या ज्ञानं पदार्थस्मृतेः पूर्वं न संभवतीति सा वृत्तिर्न स्यात् । किञ्च लक्ष्यार्थस्मृतये  
लक्षणा । स च शक्यसंबन्धज्ञानादेव संभवतीति शक्यसंबन्धस्यैव लक्षणात्वसंभवात् तदति-  
रिक्तः संबन्धिप्रतीतीच्छयोच्चरितत्वभागो व्यर्थः । अपि च प्रवाहे तात्पर्यस्यापि गङ्गापद-  
शक्तित्वापत्तिः । न चेष्टापत्तिः शक्त्यतिरिक्तलक्षणाया एवासिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । यदि च  
वृत्त्योपस्थापितार्थे तात्पर्यग्रहोदयात् तात्पर्यनिर्वाहकत्वेन शक्तिः तात्पर्यातिरिक्तास्वीकर-  
णीया स्वस्य स्वनिर्वाहकत्वानुपपत्तेरित्युच्यते । तदा लक्ष्यार्थतात्पर्यनिर्वाहकतया तात्पर्या-  
तिरिक्ता लक्षणा वृत्तिः स्वीकरणीयैवेति ॥

(४) अन्ये तु अशक्ये तात्पर्यं लक्षणा । शक्यार्थे तात्पर्यस्य लक्षणात्वाभावादशक्ये  
इत्युक्तमिति वदन्ति । अत्र कल्पे लक्षणाशरीरे शक्यसंबन्धस्याप्रवेशात् तदतिरिक्तांश-  
वैयर्थ्यं न संभवति । परन्तु तदतिरिक्ता दोषाः संभवन्त्येव । किञ्च घटमानयेति  
वाक्यजन्यशाब्दबोधे घटकर्मत्वयोः संसर्गः (आधेयत्वं) भासते । तत्रापि वक्तुस्तात्पर्य-  
मस्ति । एवञ्च अशक्ये संसर्गे (वाक्यार्थे) लक्षणा स्यात् । न च शक्यसंबन्धो

लक्षणेति मतेऽपि आधेयत्वरूपसंसर्गे घटपदशक्यघटस्य प्रतियोगित्वादिः संबन्धोऽस्तीति संसर्गस्य लक्ष्यत्वं दुर्वारमिति वाच्यम् । गङ्गायां मीनः इत्यत्रापि गङ्गापदशक्यप्रवाह-संबन्धः तारे वर्तते । परन्तु तदुपस्थितिः तज्जन्यतीरोपस्थितिर्वा न शाब्दबोधोपयोगिनीति तत्र लक्षणा मूकेत्युच्यते । तदुक्तं मणौ ‘लक्षणायां तात्पर्याभावेन लक्षणाया मूकत्वात्’ इति । एवं संसर्गोऽंशे शक्यसंबन्धरूपलक्षणायाः सत्त्वेऽपि सा मूकैव तस्याः शाब्दबोधो-पयिकत्वाभावात् । तात्पर्यस्य लक्षणात्वे संसर्गोऽंशे तात्पर्यस्य शाब्दबोधप्रयोजकत्वेन मूकत्वासंभवात् संसर्गोऽंशे शाब्दबोधानुकूललक्षणा दुर्वारैव ॥

(5) अपरे तु स्वार्थसंबन्धेन गङ्गापदं तीरं बोधयिष्यतीति प्रयोक्तुरभिप्रायो लक्षणा । प्रयोक्तुरभिप्रायविशेषाज्ञाने लक्ष्यतीराज्ञानादिति वदन्ति ॥

इदमत्रावधेयम् । गङ्गायां मीन इत्यत्र गङ्गापदं शक्त्या प्रवाहं बोधयिष्यतीति वक्तुरभिप्रायोऽस्ति । स च तथाविधप्रयोगे निमित्तं न तु स एव शक्तिः । तथैव स्वार्थ-संबन्धेन गङ्गापदं तीरं बोधयिष्यतीति वक्तुरभिप्रायः गङ्गायां घोष इति प्रयोगे निमित्तम् । न तु स एव लक्षणा । किञ्च लक्ष्यस्मृतये लक्षणा अपेक्ष्यते ! गङ्गापदस्य तीरबोध-कत्वे प्रयोजकः संबन्धः शक्यसंबन्ध इति सिद्धं भवन्मतेऽपि । अन्यथा निरुक्ताभि-प्रायवतो वक्तुर्भ्रान्तत्वापत्तेः । एवञ्च तीरस्मारकत्वेन क्लृप्तः शक्यसंबन्ध एव लक्षणेति युक्तम् । वक्तुर्भिप्रायज्ञानं च शाब्दबोध एवोपयुज्यते न पदजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितौ । वृत्तेश्च पदजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितावेवोपयोगः । एवञ्च वक्तुर्भिप्रायाज्ञानेऽपि गङ्गापदात् शक्य-संबन्धेन तीरस्मृतिरूपपद्यते इति ॥

(6) अन्ये जरन्नैयायिकाः शक्यादशक्योपस्थितिर्लक्षणा । गङ्गायां घोषः इति वाक्यश्रवणे गङ्गापदात् शक्यप्रवाहस्य स्मृतिर्जायते । ततः तत्र घोषाधारत्वान्वयानुपपत्ति-प्रतिसन्धानम् । ततः स्मृतगङ्गापदात् पुनः शक्यप्रवाहस्मृतिः । तथा च प्रवाहसंबन्धिनस्तीरस्य स्मृतिः । ततः तीरान्वयबोधः । तीरोपस्थापकः गङ्गापदशक्यः प्रवाहः । न च वारद्वयं शक्यप्रवाहोपस्थितिकल्पनायां गौरवात् शक्यसंबन्धाख्यसंबन्धेन गङ्गापदमेव तीरस्मारकं स्वीक्रियतामिति वाच्यम् । संबन्धिज्ञानं तत्तत्संबन्धिज्ञानत्वेन अपर-

संबन्धिस्मारकम् । गङ्गापदस्य शक्तिसंबन्धेन प्रवाहस्मृतिप्रयोजकत्वं, प्रवाहस्य स्वसंबन्धितीरस्मृतिप्रयोजकत्वञ्च क्लृप्तम् । एवञ्च स्मारकत्वेन क्लृप्ताभ्यां गङ्गापदप्रवाहाभ्यामेव शाब्दबोधोपयोगिन्याः तीरोपस्थितेः संभव इति शक्यसंबन्धेन गङ्गापदस्य तीरस्मारकत्वं न कल्प्यते गौरवात् । इत्थञ्च गङ्गापदस्मृतशक्यार्थप्रवाहस्यैव तीरस्मारकत्वे लाक्षणिकं पदं नानुभावकमिति प्रवादोऽपि संगच्छते । पदं वृत्त्या स्वजन्योपस्थितिद्वारा शाब्दबोधे कारणम् । गङ्गापदञ्च न शाब्दबोधविषयसंसर्गप्रतियोगितीरस्मारकमिति न तीरानुभावकम् । न च गङ्गापदस्याननुभावकत्वे तीरान्वितशब्दबोधो न स्यादिति वाच्यम् । तत्समभिव्याहृतघोषपदादेव तीरान्वितविषयकशाब्दबोधोपपत्तेरित्याहुः ।

अत्रेदमालोचनीयम् । घटपदजन्या घटाद्युपस्थितिरेव घटपदस्य शक्तिः किन्न स्यात् । यदि च शाब्दबोधानुकूलोपस्थित्यौपयिकः पदपदार्थसंबन्ध एव वृत्तिः । तदुक्तमभियुक्तैः ‘ उपस्थितिहेतुर्हि वृत्तिः न तु सैव ’ इति । अतः शक्यार्थोपस्थितिर्न शक्तिरित्युच्यते । तदा लक्षणापि अशक्यतीराद्युपस्थितिरूपा इति न युज्यते ।

अपि च प्रत्ययानां स्वप्रकृत्यर्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वमिति व्युत्पत्तिः । तत्र च प्रकृत्यर्थत्वं वृत्त्या प्रकृतिजन्योपस्थितिविषयत्वम् । गङ्गापदात्तीरस्यानुपस्थितत्वे तीरं न सप्तमीप्रकृतिगङ्गापदार्थ इति तीरान्वितसप्तम्यर्थधारत्वावगाही शाब्दबोधो न स्यात् । न च प्रत्ययानां प्रकृत्यर्थोपस्थापितार्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वव्युत्पत्तिरपि स्वीक्रियते इति गङ्गा-

(6) “ शब्दव्यापारतो यस्य प्रतीतिस्तस्य मुख्यता ।

अर्थावसेयस्य पुनर्लक्ष्यमाणत्वमुच्यते ॥

यस्य तु शब्दव्यापारगम्यार्थपर्यालोचनया अवगतिः तस्य लाक्षणिकत्वम् ” इति निरूपयन्तो मुकुलभट्टाः अमुमेव पक्षमनुसरन्ति ॥

“ मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्योगे रूढितोऽथ प्रयोजनात् ।

अन्योऽर्थो लक्ष्यते यत्सा लक्षणारोपिता क्रिया ॥ इति काव्यप्रकाशव्याख्याने शक्यसंबन्धेनाशक्यप्रतिपत्तिलक्षणेति प्राचीनमतेनेदं लक्षणमिति प्रदीपकारा निरूपयन्ति ॥

पदार्थप्रवाहोपस्थापिततीरेण सप्तम्यर्थाधारत्वान्वयबोधः संभवतीति वाच्यम् । तादृश-  
व्युत्पत्त्यन्तरकल्पने गौरवात् । अपि च शब्दं जानातीति वाक्यात् आकाशविषय-  
कत्वावगाही शाब्दबोधः स्यात् । आकाशस्य द्वितीयाप्रकृत्यर्थशब्देन समवायसंबन्धेन  
उपस्थापितत्वात् । यदि समवायेन प्रकृत्यर्थोपस्थापिते न प्रत्ययार्थान्वयः । तदा यत्र  
लक्ष्यार्थे शक्यस्य संबन्धः समवायः तत्र घटादितात्पर्येण प्रयुक्ते नीलमानयेत्यादौ नीलरू-  
पविशिष्टघटाद्यन्वितविभक्त्यर्थविषयकः शाब्दबोधो न स्यात् । नीलपदशक्यार्थनीलरूपेण  
समवायेनैव तद्विशिष्टघटस्योपस्थापितत्वात् । न च प्रत्ययानां प्रकृतितात्पर्यविषयान्वि-  
तस्वार्थबोधकत्वमिति व्युत्पत्तिः स्वीक्रियते । तीरं गङ्गापदतात्पर्यविषय इति तेन विभक्त्य-  
र्थान्वयः । शब्दं जानातीत्यत्र आकाशः न शब्दपदतात्पर्यविषय इति न तेन विभक्त्य-  
र्थान्वयः । व्युत्पत्त्यन्तरकल्पनाच्च न तन्निबन्धनं गौरवमिति वाच्यम् । स्वोपस्थापक-  
प्रकृतिकत्वरूपप्रकृत्यर्थत्वापेक्षया स्वप्रतिपादनेच्छयोच्चरितप्रकृतिकत्वरूपस्य प्रकृतितात्पर्य-  
विषयत्वस्य गुरुत्वेन प्रत्ययजन्योपस्थितिकार्यतावच्छेदकस्यातिगुरुत्वात् । न च प्रकृत्यर्थ-  
त्वं न प्रकृतिजन्योपस्थितिविषयत्वमात्रम् । घटादिपदात्समवायेनोपस्थापितस्य आका-  
शस्य घटादिपदरूपप्रकृत्यर्थत्वापत्तेः । अपि तु वृत्त्या प्रकृतिजन्योपस्थितिविषयत्वम् ।  
वृत्तित्वञ्च शाब्दबोधानुकूलपदार्थोपस्थितिप्रयोजकपदपदार्थसंबन्धत्वम् । एवञ्च निरुक्त-  
वृत्तिज्ञानसहकृतप्रकृतिज्ञानजन्योपस्थितिविषयत्वं प्रकृत्यर्थत्वमिति पर्यवसितम् । तदपेक्ष-  
या च न प्रकृतितात्पर्यविषयत्वं गुर्विति वाच्यम् । वह्नितात्पर्येण धूमोऽस्तीति प्रयुज्यते ।  
तत्र धूमपदस्य न वह्नौ लक्षणा । धूमपदाद्धूमोपस्थितौ तेन वह्नेरनुमातुं शक्यत्वेन अन्यल-  
भ्यत्वात् अनन्यलभ्यःशब्दार्थः इति न्यायात् । तत्र धूमपदतात्पर्यविषयवह्निना प्रत्ययार्था-  
न्वयबोधः स्यात् । तस्मात् प्रत्ययानां प्रकृत्यर्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वमिति व्युत्पत्तिरेव स्वीकर-  
णीया । तथा सति गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यत्र प्रवाहोपस्थिततीरेण सप्तम्यर्थाधारत्वान्वय-  
बोधो न स्यादित्युक्तमिति ॥

(7) के चन मीमांसकाः शक्यनिष्ठः अशक्यसंबन्धो लक्षणा । सा च पदार्थवृत्तिः ।  
गङ्गापदाच्छक्त्या प्रवाहे स्मृते तेन स्वसंबन्धिनस्तीरस्य स्मृतिर्जायते । तथाच लक्ष्यार्थ-  
स्मारकः शक्यार्थः । अत एव शक्यादशक्योपस्थितिर्लक्षणेति वृद्धतार्किकाः । तत्र

शक्यादिति ल्यबलोपे पञ्चमी । शक्यमाश्रित्येत्यर्थः । अशक्यस्य उपस्थितिः येन इति बहुव्रीहिणा अशक्योपस्थितिपदात् अशक्योपस्थितिप्रयोजकः लभ्यते । तथाच शक्याश्रितः अशक्योपस्थितिप्रयोजकः संबन्धः लक्षणेति फलितम् । अन्यथा यथाश्रुते वृत्तिज्ञानप्रयोज्यपदार्थज्ञानस्य शाब्दबोधहेतुत्वं नतु शाब्दबोधहेतुपदार्थज्ञानस्यैव वृत्तित्वमित्यसंगत्यापत्तेः । एवञ्च गङ्गापदार्थप्रवाहनिष्ठः तीरसंयोगो लक्षणेति वदन्ति ।

अस्मिन्नपि पक्षे लक्ष्यस्य न प्रकृत्यर्थत्वमिति तेन प्रत्ययार्थान्वयो न स्यात् । अपि च लक्षणा पदवृत्तिः वृत्तित्वाच्छक्तिवदिति अनुमानालक्षणायाः पदवृत्तित्वमेव युक्तम् ॥

(४) वृत्तिवार्तिककृतस्तु मुख्यार्थसंबन्धेन शब्दस्य प्रतिपादकत्वं लक्षणेत्याहुः । अत्र प्रतिपादकत्वमात्रोक्तौ अभिधायामतिव्याप्तिः । शक्त्या प्रतिपादकत्वमभिधा इति तैरभिधा लक्षणेतेः ।

इदं पुनरत्रालोचनीयम् । मुख्यार्थसंबन्धेनेति तृतीयान्तार्थः मुख्यार्थसंबन्धप्रयोज्यत्वं प्रतिपादकत्वान्वयि । शब्दस्येति षष्ठ्यन्तार्थः शब्दनिष्ठत्वमपि तत्रैवान्वेति । प्रतिपादकत्वञ्च प्रतीतिजनकत्वम् । एवञ्च मुख्यार्थसंबन्धाधीनं शब्दनिष्ठं प्रतीतिजनकत्वं लक्षणेति फलितम् । गङ्गापदस्य तीररूपलक्ष्यार्थप्रतीतिजनकतायां मुख्यार्थसंबन्धः कथं प्रयोजकः । गङ्गापदस्य तीरेण मुख्यार्थसंबन्धः (प्रवाहसामीप्यम्) संबन्धः । गङ्गापदस्य संबन्धिनः तीरस्मृतिजनकतायां संबन्धविधया शक्यसंबन्धः प्रयोजक इति यद्युच्यते । तदा शाब्दबोधानुकूलपदार्थोपस्थित्यौपयिकसंबन्धत्वरूपं वृत्तित्वं मुख्यार्थ-

(७) अस्मिन्मते पदेन बोध्यं शक्यं पदार्थेन बोध्यं लक्ष्यमिति व्यवहियते । अभिहितान्वयवादे पदार्थसंसर्गो वाक्यार्थः लक्ष्यः । परन्तु गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यत्र गङ्गापदार्थेन लक्ष्यस्य तीरस्य स्मृतिर्जायते । स्मृतये च प्रवाहतीरयोः संबन्धज्ञानमावश्यकम् । वाक्यार्थस्तु अपूर्वं इति शाब्दबोधार्पूर्वं तस्य स्मृतिर्नास्ति । अतश्च वाक्यार्थे संबन्धज्ञानमपि नापेक्षितम् । इत्यञ्च तीरस्य लक्ष्यत्वं गङ्गापदाभिहितप्रवाहस्मार्थत्वम् । वाक्यार्थस्य तु पदार्थानुभाष्यत्वं तत् । पदार्थबोध्यत्वाद्वाक्यार्थे लक्ष्यत्वव्यवहार इति बोध्यम् ।

संबन्धस्य क्लृप्तमिति तस्यैव लक्षणात्वमुचितम् । न तु तत्प्रयोज्यप्रतिपादकतायाः मानाभावाद्गौरवाच्च । न च मुख्यार्थसंबन्धेनेत्यत्र तृतीयार्थः अवच्छिन्नत्वं प्रतिपादकत्वेऽन्वेतीति वाच्यम् । लक्ष्यनिष्ठस्य मुख्यार्थसंबन्धस्य शब्दनिष्ठायां प्रतीतिजनकतायामवच्छेदकत्वासंभवात् । स्वप्रतियोगिवाचकत्वसंबन्धेन तस्य पदनिष्ठत्वेऽपि जनकतावच्छेदकस्य मुख्यार्थसंबन्धस्य वृत्तित्वसंभवे निरुक्तपरंपरया मुख्यार्थसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतीतिजनकतायाः लक्षणात्वे गौरवात् । न च तृतीयान्तार्थः शक्यसंबन्धप्रयोज्यत्वं प्रतिपत्तावन्वेति । प्रतिपादकत्वञ्च प्रतिपत्त्यनुकूलो व्यापारः । एवञ्च शक्यसंबन्धप्रयोज्यप्रतीत्यनुकूलव्यापारो लक्षणेति वाच्यम् । तादृशव्यापारविशेषस्य शक्यसंबन्धरूपत्वे मुख्यार्थसंबन्धो लक्षणेति वक्तुमुचितम् । तदतिरिक्तत्वे, क्लृप्तसंबन्धभावस्य शक्यसंबन्धस्य लक्ष्योपस्थितिप्रयोजकत्वेन क्लृप्तत्वात्तस्यैव लक्षणात्वसंभवे व्यापारान्तरकल्पनायां मानाभावः । यदि शक्यसंबन्धेनेत्यत्र तृतीयार्थः अभेदः व्यापारान्वयी । शक्यसंबन्धाभिन्नः प्रतिपत्त्यनुकूलव्यापारो लक्षणेत्युच्यते । तदा लक्षणायां संबन्धनिमित्तकत्वप्रतिपादकेन “ तस्मात्सादृश्यगर्भतदन्यसंबन्धनिमित्ततया गौणी शुद्धा चेति लक्षणाया एव द्वैविध्यम् ” इत्यग्रिमग्रन्थेन विरोधः इति ॥

(९) मीमांसकास्तु गभीरायां नद्यां घोषः इत्यादौ वाक्यलक्षणायाः स्वीकरणीयतया तदनुरोधेन बोध्यसंबन्धो लक्षणेति वदन्ति । तेषामयमाशयः । निरुक्तस्थले गभीरनदीतीरवृत्तिर्घोषः इति शाब्दबोधोऽनुभवसिद्धः । स च पदलक्षणया न निर्वहति । तथाहि न तावन्नदीपदस्य नदीतीरे लक्षणेति युक्तम् । गभीराभेदस्य तीरे बाधेनानन्वयापत्तेः । यदि नदीपदलक्ष्यार्थैकदेशनद्यां गभीरपदार्थस्याभेदान्वयः तदा पदार्थः पदार्थेनान्वेति न तदेकदेशेनेति व्युत्पत्तिविरोधः । नापि गभीरपदस्य तीरे लक्षणा । नदीपदार्थस्यानन्वयापत्तेः । न च विशेष्यवाचकनदीपदस्य गभीरनदीतीरे लक्षणा । तत्पदस्य तादृशार्थे लाक्षणिकत्वात्पर्यग्राहकञ्च गभीरपदमिति वाच्यम् । विनिगमनाविरहेण गभीरपदमेव गभीरनदीतीरलक्षकं नदीपदं तात्पर्यग्राहकमित्यस्यापि सुवचत्वात् । तथाच विनिगमनाविरहेण सिद्धं चेदुभयमपि सिद्धमेवेति न्यायेन उभयोः पदयोः लक्षणाद्वयं



स्यात् । अतः गभीरायां नद्यामिति पदसमुदायरूपवाक्यस्यैव गभीरनदीतीरे एका लक्षणा युक्ता । तादृशपदसमुदायेन च गभीराभिन्ना नदी बोध्यते । तत्संबन्धश्च तत्तीरे वर्तते । न च नदीपदशक्यार्थस्य तीरे साक्षात्संबन्धो वर्तते । गुणवाचकगभीर-पदार्थगाम्भीर्यस्य तु तीरे नदीद्वारकः परम्परासंबन्धः । एवञ्च साक्षात्संबन्धेन नदीपदान्न-दीतीररूपलक्ष्यार्थोपस्थितेः शीघ्रं संभवेन नदीपदस्यैव लक्षणेति वाच्यम् । निम्नं गभीरं गम्भीरमिति कोशात् गभीरशब्दस्य गाम्भीर्यविशिष्टवाचकत्वेन गभीरपदार्थतीरयोः साक्षात्संबन्धस्यैव सत्त्वेन विनिगमनानवकाशात् । नच लाघवात् नीलादिपदानामिव गभीरप-दस्यापि गाम्भीर्ये धर्मे शक्तिरिति वाच्यम् । नीलो वर्णः इत्यादिः गुणे स्वारसिकः प्रयो-गोऽस्ति । गाम्भीर्ये च गभीरपदस्य स्वारसिकः प्रयोगो नास्ति । अत एव गभीरपदस्य न गाम्भीर्यवाचिता । अन्यथा घटादिपदानामपि लाघवात् नैयायिकमते घटत्वमात्रवाच-कत्वापत्तेः । न च प्रत्ययानां प्रकृत्यर्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वमिति व्युत्पत्तिः । विशेष-णवाचकपदोत्तरविभक्तिः प्रयोगसाधुत्वमात्रार्था । एवञ्च नदीपदोत्तरसप्तमी आधेयत्ववा-चिका । विशेषणवाचकगभीरपदोत्तरसप्तमी निरर्थिका । नदीपदोत्तरसप्तम्याश्च न गभीरपदं प्रकृतिरिति गभीरपदार्थगभीरनदीतीरान्विताधेयत्वावगाही शाब्दबोधो न स्यात् । अतः आधेयत्वार्थकसप्तमीप्रकृतौ नदीपद एव लक्षणोचितेति वाच्यम् । गभीरपदस्य तादृशनदीतीरलक्षकत्वे तस्य विशेषणपदत्वाभावेन तदुत्तरसप्तम्या आधेयत्वार्थकतासंभवात् । प्राथम्याद्गभीरपदस्य लक्षणाङ्गीकारे अन्यत्र विशेषणपदोत्तरविभक्तेः साधुत्वसंपादकत्वेऽपि अत्र विशेष्यवाचकपदोत्तरविभक्तेः साधुत्वसंपादकत्वकल्पनसंभवात् विशेषणविभक्तित्वेन सामान्यतः साधुत्वार्थकत्वकल्पनायां मानाभावाच्च ।

ननु कीदृशवाक्ये लक्षणा । न तावद्गभीरायां नद्यामिति वाक्ये । तदुत्तरं सप्तम्या अभावेन लक्ष्यगभीरनदीतीरान्विताधेयत्वबोधासंभवात् । न च तादृशवाक्यलक्ष्य-स्य गभीरनदीतीरस्य आधेयतासंबन्धेनैव घोषपदार्थे अन्वयः संभवतीति वाच्यम् । तादृ-शसमुदायस्य अर्थवत्त्वेन नामत्वात् तदर्थस्य आधेयतासंबन्धेन घोषनामार्थे अन्वयस्य नामार्थयोरिति व्युत्पत्तिविरुद्धत्वात् । गभीरायां नदीति भागस्य च न गभीरनदीतीरे लक्षणा । अमेदान्वयबोधे समानविभक्तिकत्वस्य तन्त्रत्वात् गभीरायां नदीति भागेन

गभीराभिन्ननदीबोधासंभवेन तादृशसमुदायबोध्याप्रसिद्ध्या तत्संबन्धरूपलक्षणाया अप्रसिद्धेः । यदि च स्तोकं पचतीत्यत्र स्तोकपदासमानविभक्तिकपचधातूपस्थापिते पात्रे द्वितीयान्तस्तोक-पदार्थाभेदान्वयात् समानविभक्तिकत्वं नाभेदान्वये तन्त्रम् । अपि तु विरुद्धविभक्तिराहित्य-मेव । गभीरपदोत्तरविभक्तिविरुद्धविभक्तिराहित्यञ्च नदीपदे वर्तते इति तद्भाष्यबोध्यः प्रसिद्ध-तीति मन्यते । तदापि गभीरनदीतीरान्विताधेयत्वबोधो न स्यात् प्रत्ययानां स्व-प्रकृत्यर्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वव्युत्पत्तेः । गभीरायां नदीति भागस्य सप्तमीप्रकृतित्वा-भावादिति चेन्न ।

गभीरायां नदीति भागस्य लक्षकत्वे तस्यार्थवत्त्वेन नामत्वात् तदुत्तरविभक्तेः तदर्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वे विरोधाभावः । एवं गभीरायां नद्यामिति भागस्य गभीरनदी-तीरवृत्तौ लक्षणा । स च नामार्थः अभेदसंबन्धेन घोषनामार्थेऽन्वेति । नामार्थयोर्भेदे-नान्वयस्यैव व्युत्पत्तिविरुद्धत्वात् ।

ननु गाव्यादीनामपभ्रंशानामपि लाक्षणिकत्वापत्तिः । गावीशब्दबोध्यगोसंबन्ध-स्य प्रसिद्धेः । तथा च वृत्तिमत्त्वस्यैव साधुत्वात् तेषामपि साधुतापत्तिरिति चेन्न । एतदनुरोधेन प्रमाधीनस्वजन्यबोधविषयसंबन्धो लक्षणा । अपभ्रंशादौ शक्तिभ्रमादेव शाब्दबोध इति अपभ्रंशजन्यबोधः न प्रमाधीनः । एवञ्च निरुक्तस्य अपभ्रंशबोध्यस्या-प्रसिद्ध्या तत्संबन्धरूपा लक्षणा न संभवतीति न अपभ्रंशानां साधुतापत्तिः । तस्मा-द्वाक्यलक्षणानुरोधेन बोध्यसंबन्धो लक्षणेति ॥

तत्रेदं बोध्यम् । पदविशेषघटितानुपूर्व्याः लक्षकतावच्छेदकत्वकल्पने गौरवात् पदलक्षणाया उभयवासिद्धत्वाच्च पदलक्षणैवोचिता । एवंच गभीरायां नद्यां घोषः इत्यत्र गभीराभिन्ना नदीति बोधानन्तरं नदीपदं गभीरपदं वा गभीरनदीतीरं लक्षयति न वाक्यम् । विनिगमनाविरहात् पदद्वये लक्षणायाः स्वीकारेऽपि नान्यतरपदवैयर्थ्यम् । नदीपदेन गभीरनदीतीरबोधे जननीये गभीरपदसमभिव्यवहारो नियामकः । गभीरपदेन तादृशबोधे जननीये नदीपदसमभिव्याहारो नियामकः इति परस्परतात्पर्यग्राहकत्वात् ।

वस्तुतस्तु नदीपदस्यैव गभीरनदीतीरे लक्षणा । गभीरपदं तात्पर्यग्राहकम् । न च विनिगमनाविरहः शङ्क्यः । नीलायां यमुनायां घोषः शुक्लायां गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यादौ विशेष्यवाचकपद एव लक्षणा । नीलशुक्लादिपदशक्यार्थः रूपमेव । तेन च लक्ष्यस्य तीरस्य परम्परासंबन्धः । नदीपदार्थेन च साक्षात्संबन्धः इति विनिगमकसद्भावात् । एवञ्च विशेष्यवाचकपदे लक्षणायाः कृतत्वात् गभीरायां नद्यां घोषः इत्यत्रापि विशेष्यवाचक-नदीपद एव लक्षणा । तस्मात्पदलक्षणयैवोपपत्तौ वाक्ये लक्षणा अनावश्यक्यी ।

अपि च गभीरायां नदीति भागस्य लक्षकत्वे तस्य नामत्वात्तदन्तर्गतगभीरपदोत्तर-सप्तमी लुप्येत । सुपो धातुप्रातिपदिकयोरित्यनुशासनात् । न च पदसमुदायरूपस्या-स्य कृतद्धितसमासाश्चेति नियमबलेन प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञा न संभवतीति वाच्यम् । तथा सति गभीरायां नदीति भागोत्तरं सप्तम्युत्पत्त्यसंभवात् तद्भागस्य सप्तमीप्रकृतित्वाभावात् तदर्थतीरान्वितसप्तम्यर्थधियत्वबोधो न स्यात् । अपि च गभीरायां नदीं व्रजेदिति वाक्यादपि गभीरनदीतीरकर्मकत्वावगाही शाब्दबोधः जायेत । गभीरायां नद्यामिति भागस्य गभीरनदीतीरवृत्तिलक्षकत्वे तस्य घोषे अभेदेनान्वयो न संभवति । अभेदान्वये समानविभक्तिकत्वस्य तन्त्रत्वात् तस्य चात्राभावात् । तस्माद्वाक्ये लक्षणा न संभवति ।

किञ्च स्वबोध्यसंबन्ध इत्यत्र स्वबोध्यत्वं स्वजन्योपस्थितिविषयत्वं, स्वजन्यशाब्द-बोधविषयत्वं वा । आद्ये समवायेन घटपदजन्यस्मृतिविषयाकाशसंबन्धस्य पटे सत्त्वात् पटादेः घटादिपदलक्ष्यत्वव्यवहारापत्तेर्दुर्वारत्वात् । द्वितीये गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यत्र गङ्गा-पदस्य लाक्षणिकत्वानुपपत्तिः । तत्रत्यगङ्गापदात् प्रवाहस्य स्मृतिरेव न प्रवाहान्वित-विषयकः शाब्दबोधः । बाधज्ञानपर्यवसितस्य अन्वयानुपपत्तिज्ञानस्य सत्त्वात् । एवञ्च प्रवाहः न गङ्गापदजन्यशाब्दबोधविषय इति तत्संबन्धो न गङ्गापदस्य लक्षणा स्यात् । अतः शक्त्या स्वजन्योपस्थितिविषयत्वमेव स्वबोध्यत्वम् । तत्र गङ्गापदेन प्रवाहशाब्द-बोधाजननेऽपि शक्त्या प्रवाहोपस्थितेर्जातत्वाद्गङ्गापदबोध्यत्वं प्रवाहस्य संभवति । एवञ्च शक्तिप्रयोज्यस्वजन्योपस्थितिविषयसंबन्धापेक्षया शक्यसंबन्धस्य लघुत्वात्तस्यैव लक्षणात्व-मुचितम् । वाक्ये च शक्तिः मीमांसकैरपि न स्वीकृतेति लक्षणा संभवति इति ।

(10) आलंकारिकास्तु शक्यसंबन्धो लक्षणा । गङ्गापदशक्यप्रवाहसामीप्यं गङ्गा-  
पदस्य तीरे लक्षणा । तथा च गङ्गापदात् तीरत्वविशिष्टस्य स्मृतिर्जायते । यद्रूपविशिष्टतया  
गृहीते संबन्धग्रहः जातः एकसंबन्धिज्ञाने सति तेनैव रूपेण अपरसंबन्धिनः स्मरण-  
स्यानुभवसिद्धत्वात् । परन्तु पदजन्यतीरत्वविशिष्टोपस्थित्या गङ्गात्वेन तीरविषयकः  
गङ्गावृत्तिर्घोषः इति शाब्दबोधो जायते । तीरे घोषः इति प्रयोक्तव्ये गङ्गापदशक्यार्थ-  
प्रवाहगतशैत्यपावनत्वादिप्रतिपत्तये गङ्गायां घोषः इति प्रयुज्यते । गङ्गात्वेन तीरशाब्द-  
बोधे सति गङ्गावृत्तिधर्मविशेषप्रतिपत्तिस्तीरे जायते । तदुक्तं काव्यप्रकाशे “ तटादीनां  
गङ्गादिशब्दैः प्रतिपादने तत्त्वप्रतिपत्तौ हि प्रतिपिपादयिषितप्रयोजनसंप्रत्ययः ”  
इति । तथाच व्यञ्जनया प्रवाहगतशैत्यपावनत्वादिप्रतिपत्तये गङ्गात्वेन तीरशाब्दबोधः स्वीकर-  
णीयः । इत्थञ्च अनुभवानुरोधात् शक्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकलक्ष्यार्थविशेष्यकशाब्दबोधे  
लक्षणाज्ञानस्य कारणत्वं कल्प्यते । नच पदार्थोपस्थितिशाब्दबोधयोः समानप्रकारकयोरेव  
कार्यकारणभावात् तीरत्वप्रकारकतीरस्मृतेः गङ्गात्वप्रकारकतीरशाब्दबोधो न संभवतीति  
वाच्यम् । लाक्षणिकबोधातिरिक्तशाब्दबोध एव समानप्रकारकपदार्थस्मृतेः हेतुत्वं  
कल्प्यते उक्तानुभवानुरोधात् । न च गङ्गात्वेन रूपेण घोषाधारत्वानन्वयनिश्चयस्य  
सत्त्वात् गङ्गात्वेन घोषाधारत्वावगाही शाब्दबोधो न संभवतीति वाच्यम् । समानप्रकारकं  
समानविशेष्यकश्चायोग्यताज्ञानं प्रतिबन्धकम् । न विभिन्नविशेष्यकमपि समानप्रकारक-  
ज्ञानम् । तथा च गङ्गात्वेन प्रवाहे घोषाधारत्वानन्वयनिश्चयसद्भावेऽपि गङ्गात्वेन तीरे  
घोषाधारत्वावगाही शाब्दबोधो नानुपपन्नः । तस्माल्लक्षण्या गङ्गापदात्तीरत्वेनोपस्थित-  
स्यापि तीरस्य गङ्गात्वेनैव शाब्दबोधः इति वदन्ति ।

(11) नव्यनैयायिकास्तु सर्वेषां शब्दानां सर्वार्थवाचकत्वे मानाभावात् गङ्गापदस्य  
तीरे शक्तिर्नास्ति । गङ्गापदोपस्थापिततीरस्य शाब्दबोधे भानात् शाब्दबोधोपयिकतीरस्मृतिप्रयो-

नागेश मते शक्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकलक्ष्यार्थबोधः शक्तिः प्रयोज्यः ।

अस्मिन्मते तादृशो बोधः शक्यसंबन्धरूपलक्षणाप्रयोज्यः इति विशेषः ॥

जकः गङ्गापदतीरयोः कश्चन संबन्धो वाच्यः। पदज्ञानस्य एकसंबन्धिज्ञानविधयैव पदार्थोप-  
स्थितिजनकत्वनियमात् । यत्र च शक्यसंबन्धज्ञानादेव तीरमुपस्थितं तत्र तीरान्वितशाब्दबो-  
धस्य सर्वानुभवसिद्धत्वात् शाब्दबोधौपयिकपदार्थस्मृत्यौपयिकत्वेन संप्रतिपन्नः स्वतस्सिद्ध-  
संबन्धभावः शक्यसंबन्धः तादृशसंबन्ध इति युक्तम् । सैव लक्षणा । गङ्गायां घोषः  
इत्यत्र गङ्गापदशक्यप्रवाहसामीप्यं लक्षणा । यथा संयुक्तविशेष्यकज्ञानप्रकारीभूतं  
धूमत्वं चक्षुरिन्द्रियव्यवहितधूमयोः संबन्धः । विशेष्यस्य धूमानुयोगिकत्वात् संसर्ग-  
विशेषणसंयोगस्य चक्षुरिन्द्रियप्रतियोगिकत्वाच्च । तथा शक्यसंबन्धस्य लक्ष्यतीराद्यनु-  
योगिकत्वात् शक्तेः पदप्रतियोगिकत्वाच्च शक्यसंबन्धः (प्रवाहसामीप्यम्) गङ्गापदतीरयोः  
संबन्धः । यद्यपि शक्यसंबन्धः लक्ष्यार्थनिष्ठः । तथापि स्वप्रतियोगिवाचकत्वरूपपरं-  
परासंबन्धेन शब्दनिष्ठत्वाच्छब्दनिष्ठव्यापार इति व्यवहियते । तत्र एकसंबन्धिनः गङ्गा-  
पदस्य ज्ञाने अपरसंबन्धिनः तीरस्य स्मृतिर्जायते । एवं गङ्गापदस्य यद्यदर्थः संबन्धग्रहो  
जातः तेषां सर्वेषामपि स्मृतिर्जायते । ततः गङ्गापदशक्यार्थप्रवाहघोषयोरन्वयानुपपत्ति-  
प्रतिसन्धानम् । ततः प्रकरणादिना वृत्त्युपस्थापिततीरे तात्पर्यज्ञानम् । ततः तीरान्वित-  
विषयकः शाब्दबोधो जायते । न च प्रवाहवृत्तिर्घोषः इति शाब्दबोधोजनने कथं तत्रानुप-  
पत्तिप्रतिसंधानं संभवतीति वाच्यम् । वाक्यार्थस्यापूर्वत्वेऽपि शाब्दबोधजननात्पूर्वं तच्छा-  
ब्दबोधेच्छयोच्चरितत्वरूपतात्पर्यज्ञानस्येव अनुपपत्तिप्रतिसन्धानस्यापि तत्तत्पदार्थस्मरणे सति  
संभवाविरोधात् । किञ्च प्रवाहवृत्तिर्घोष इति शाब्दबोधे जाते अनुपपत्तिप्रतिसन्धानं न  
संभवति । प्रवाहस्य घोषाधारत्वमनुपपन्नमिति ज्ञानं घोषः प्रवाहावृत्तिरिति ज्ञाने पर्य-  
वस्यति । तत्र च प्रवाहवृत्तिर्घोषः इति शाब्दबोधस्य बाधज्ञानविधया प्रतिबन्धकत्वात् ।  
न चेदं रजतमिति भ्रमानन्तरं नेदं रजतमिति बाधज्ञानवदिदमपि ज्ञानं जायतामिति  
वाच्यम् । लौकिकसन्निकर्षाजन्यदोषविशेषाजन्यतद्वत्ताबुद्धावेव तदभाववत्तानिश्चयः प्रति-  
बन्धकः । अतः इदं रजतमिति प्रतिबन्धकज्ञानसत्त्वेऽपि लौकिकसन्निकर्षजन्यं नेदं रजत-  
मिति प्रत्यक्षं संभवति । अत्र तु गङ्गायां घोषः इति वाक्यश्रवणकाले गङ्गाघोषयोरि-  
न्द्रियासन्निकृष्टत्वादनुपपत्तिज्ञानं लौकिकसन्निकर्षजन्यं न संभवति । दोषविशेषजन्यज्ञानञ्च

न प्रकृतोपयोगि । अतः शक्यार्थान्वितशाब्दबोधानन्तरं अनुपपत्तिप्रतिसन्धानं न युज्यते । तस्मात्तत्पदार्थस्मरणानन्तरं अनुपपत्तिप्रतिसन्धानं जायते ।

यद्रूपवत्त्वेन गृहीते संबन्धज्ञानं एकसंबन्धिज्ञानेन तेनैव रूपेण अपरसंबन्धिनः स्मृतिरनुभवसिद्धा । तीरत्वविशिष्टे संबन्धज्ञानं जातमिति गङ्गापदातीरत्वेनैव तीरस्य स्मृतिः । समानप्रकारकयोरेव शाब्दबोधपदार्थोपस्थितयोः कार्यकारणभावात् तीरत्वेनैव तीरशाब्दबोधः । इत्थञ्च शक्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकलक्ष्यार्थबोधे लक्षणाज्ञानस्य कारणत्वं न कल्प्यते । न वा समानप्रकारकयोः पदार्थोपस्थितिशाब्दबोधयोः कार्यकारणभावः लाक्षणिकबोधातिरिक्तविषयकः कल्प्यते । न च गङ्गात्वेन तीरस्याभाने गङ्गागतशैत्यपावनत्वादीनां न तीरे प्रतीतिरिति प्रयोजनालम्ब इति वाच्यम् । तीरस्य गङ्गापदप्रतिपाद्यत्वज्ञानान्मानसात् गङ्गागतशैत्यपावनत्वादीनां तीरे प्रतीतिः संभवति । स्पष्टश्चायमर्थः काव्यदर्पणे । एवञ्च लाक्षणिकवाक्यजन्यशाब्दबोधो न भ्रमः तीरत्वेनैव तीरविषयकत्वात् । न च देवदत्ते अजधनत्वस्य यज्ञदत्ते अविधनत्वस्य चान्वयतात्पर्येण अजाविधनौ देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तौ इति प्रयोगवारणाय समस्यमानपदार्थयोरेकधर्मावच्छिन्नान्वय एव द्वन्द्वसमाससाधुता स्वीकरणीया । गङ्गापदलक्ष्यतीरस्य तीरत्वेन बोधे गङ्गायां मीनघोषौ स्त इत्यत्र मीनघोषयोरेकधर्मावच्छिन्नान्वयाभावात् द्वन्द्वो न साधुः स्यादित्युक्तमिति वाच्यम् । समस्यमानपदार्थयोरेकपदोपस्थाप्यान्वयित्वे द्वन्द्वसमाससाधुता इति स्वीकारेऽपि निरुक्तप्रयोगवारणं संभवति । तत्र एकपदोपस्थाप्यान्वयाभावात् । गङ्गायां मीनघोषौ स्त इत्यत्र तीरत्वेन भासमानस्यापि तीरस्य प्रवाहोपस्थापकगङ्गापदेनैवोपस्थापितत्वात् तदन्वयेऽपि न द्वन्द्वासाधुता । न चैवं नियमस्वीकारे अजाग्रामौ नयतीति साधुः स्यात् नीडातुनोपस्थापितसंयोगे ग्रामस्य तेनैवोपस्थापितायां संयोगावच्छिन्नक्रियायां अजायाश्च अन्वयविवक्षायां एकपदोपस्थाप्यान्वयित्वस्याक्षतत्वादिति वाच्यम् । तुल्यतया एकपदोपस्थाप्यान्वयिताया एव द्वन्द्वसाधुताप्रयोजकत्वोपगमात् । नीडातोः संयोगावच्छिन्नक्रियानुकूलव्यापारे शक्तत्वात्तेन संयोगस्य व्यापारविशेषणतावच्छेदकतया क्रियायाः व्यापारविशेषणतया चोपस्थितत्वात् तयोस्तुल्यतया एकपदोपस्थाप्यत्वाभावात् निरुक्ता-

न्वयविवक्षायां द्वन्द्वसाधुता । गङ्गायां मीनघोषौ स्त इत्यत्र लक्ष्यतीरस्यापि शक्यप्रवाहस्येव विशेष्यतयोपस्थापितत्वात् तुल्यतया एकपदोपस्थाप्यानवयित्वमक्षतमिति द्वन्द्वसाधुता निर्वहति ।

अथवा गङ्गायां मीनघोषौ इत्यत्र गङ्गापदस्य गङ्गातीरोभयत्वावच्छिन्ने लक्षणा । मीनघोषोभयत्वावच्छिन्नं गङ्गातीरोभयत्वावच्छिन्नवृत्ति इति शाब्दबोधः । मीने प्रवाहवृत्तित्वस्य घोषे तीरवृत्तित्वस्य च बोधो मानसः । एवञ्च एकधर्मावच्छिन्नान्वयित्वनियमाङ्गीकारेऽपि न दोषः । गङ्गापदलक्ष्यतावच्छेदकोभयत्वरूपैकधर्मावच्छिन्नान्वयित्वस्याक्षतत्वात् । तथा च शक्यतावच्छेदकरूपेण लक्ष्यार्थभानं नावश्यकम् ।

इत्थञ्च आयुर्धृतमिति वेदवाक्यजन्यशाब्दबोधः प्रमैवेति वेदकर्तुः शाब्दबोधसमानाकारज्ञानवतः न भ्रमवत्त्वापत्तिः । अन्यथा आयुष्टेन धृतशाब्दबोधस्य भ्रमत्वात् तत्समानाकारप्रयोगहेतुज्ञानवतः वेदकर्तुरीश्वरस्य भ्रमवत्त्वमापद्येत ।

कमलानि कमलानीत्यत्र लाक्षणिककमलपदात् सौरभविशिष्टकमलत्वेनैव बोधः । एवञ्च दण्डवात्रक्तदण्डवानिति वाक्यादिव निरुक्तवाक्याच्छाब्दबोध उपपद्यते । वृक्षो महीरुह इति व्याख्यानवाक्ये महीरुहपदस्य महीरुहपदप्रतिपाद्ये लक्षणा । ज्ञानसामान्ये शब्दभानानङ्गीकारेण तत्तच्छब्दभेदेन शाब्दबोधस्योपपादयितुमशक्यत्वात् । तथा च उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकविधेयतावच्छेदकयोः वृक्षत्वमहीरुहपदप्रतिपाद्यत्वयोर्भेदादभेदान्वयबोधः सम्यगुपपद्यते ।

अतद्भावेऽपि तदुपचारः इति न्यायसूत्रावयवं अतच्छब्दस्य तेन शब्देनाभिधानमिति विवृण्वन्ति न्यायभाष्यकाराः । ‘सहचरणात् यष्टिकां भोजयेति यष्टिकासहचरितब्राह्मणोऽभिधीयते’ इत्यादिना तेन शब्देनाभिधाने निमित्ततया सहचरणादिकमेव निरूपयन्ति नत्वारोपम् । इत्थञ्च केषांचित्पाचीननैयायिकानां शक्यतावच्छेदकारोपस्वीकारोऽपि नादरणीयः । उपपद्यते च ‘शक्यादन्येन रूपेण ज्ञाते भवति लक्षणा’ इत्यभियुक्तोक्तिः ।

स च शक्यसंबन्धः साक्षात्परंपरासाधारणः । गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यत्र तीरे शक्यार्थस्य साक्षात्सम्बन्धः संयोगविशेषः । इन्द्रा स्थूणा इत्यत्र तत्कर्मकपूजाप्रयोजनकत्वं परंपरासंबन्धः । न हि प्रयोजनं लक्ष्यं संबन्धाभावादिति काव्यप्रकाशपर्यालोचनया गौण्यतिरिक्तस्थले परंपरासंबन्धस्य लक्षणात्वास्वीकारो नोपादेयः । उक्ततादर्थ्यादीनां अखण्डसंबन्धत्वकल्पनागौरवात् । लक्षणयापि शैत्यपावनत्वादीनां प्रतीतिः संभवतीति वादिनां नैयायिकानां प्रयोजनं न लक्ष्यमिति काव्यप्रकाशसंगमनस्यानावश्यकत्वात् ।

शक्यविनाभूतार्थस्य शाब्दबोधवारणाय शक्याविनाभाव एव लक्षणा । मञ्चाः क्रोशन्तीत्यादावपि पुरुषे मञ्चपदलक्ष्यार्थे शक्यार्थाविनाभावः क्रोशनकाले वर्तते इति न लक्षणानुपपत्तिरिति केचित् । तन्न । घटमुच्चारयेत्यत्र घटशब्दः स्वस्मिन्लक्षणिक इति नैयायिकसिद्धान्तः । तच्च नोपपद्येत घटपदशक्यार्थेन घटपदस्य देशतः कालतो वा अविनाभावस्याभावात् । अपि च यत्रान्वययोग्यौ शक्याविनाभूतौ द्वावर्थौ संभवतः तत्र एक एव शक्याविनाभूतोऽर्थः शाब्दबोधे भासते इत्येतत्तात्पर्येणैव निर्वाह्यम् । एवञ्च शक्यसंबन्धमात्रस्य लक्षणात्वेऽपि तात्पर्यविरहेणैव शक्यविनाभूतार्थस्य शाब्दबोधवारणसंभवाच्छक्याविनाभावस्य लक्षणात्वस्वीकारो व्यर्थः । सादृश्यरूपः शक्यसंबन्धः गौणीत्युच्यते । गौर्बाहीकः इत्यत्र गोपदस्य गोसदृशे लक्षणा । सादृश्यञ्चात्र गोवृत्तिजाड्यादिमत्त्वम् । एवञ्च जडो बाहीक इति शाब्दबोधः । जाड्यादिगुणस्य गोपदलक्ष्यतावच्छेदकत्वात् सम्यगुपपद्यते ‘लक्ष्यमाणगुणैर्यौगाद्वृत्तेरिष्टा तु गौणता’ इत्यभियुक्तोक्तिः ।

तस्माच्छक्यसंबन्धो लक्षणा । सा च पदमात्रवृत्तिः । प्रत्येकपदशक्त्यैव बोधोपपत्तौ पदसमुदायरूपवाक्ये शक्तेरभावेन शक्यसंबन्धरूपलक्षणाया असंभवात् इति निरूपयन्ति ।





## University Notes

### CONVOCATION.

The sixth Annual Convocation of the University was held on Friday the 20th November 1936, presided over by His Excellency Lord Erskine, G.C.I.E., the Chancellor of the University. The Address to the graduates was delivered by the Hon'ble Sir Phiroze Sethna Kt., of Bombay.

### OUR VICE-CHANCELLOR.

The Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar, P.C., C.H., LL.D., was delegated by the Government of India to enquire into the conditions of Indian Labour in Malaya. He left Annamalainagar on the 20th November 1936 and after completing his labours on the Government of India delegation he returned to this country on the 20th January 1937. The report of the delegation is awaited and we are sure it will be a valuable contribution towards solving the difficulties of our nationals in that part of the world.

During the period he was away M.R.Ry. T. R. Venkatarama Sastriar Avl., B.A., B.L., C.I.E., Advocate, acted as our Vice-Chancellor.

### CONGRESSES AND CONFERENCES.

The following members of the Staff attended as delegates of the University the Conferences noted below :—

Prof. M. S. Sundaram	..	The 12th All-India Educational Conference at Gwalior.
Rao Saheb C. S. Srinivasa-chariar	..	The Vijayanagara Foundation Sex-centenary Celebrations at Hampi.
Prof. R. Ramanujachariar	..	The Philosophical Conference at Delhi.
Dr. B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu	..	The 20th All-India Economic Conference at Agra.
Mr. M. K. Muniswami	..	Do. Do.

Dr. S. Ramachandra Rao	..	The Indian Science Congress at Hyderabad.
Dr. K. Aswath Narain Rao	..	Do. Do.
Mr. L. K. Govindarajulu	..	Inter-University Zone Committee of the Board of Cricket Control at Hyderabad.

### CENTRAL ADVISORY BOARD OF EDUCATION.

The Government of India nominated the Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar, P.C., C.H., LL.D., Vice-Chancellor as a member of the Central Advisory Board of Education to the Government of India.

\* \* \* \*

### UNVEILING THE PORTRAIT OF THE EX-VICE-CHANCELLOR.

The Founder-Pro-Chancellor presented to the University a life-size oil painting of M.R.Ry. Dewan Bahadur S. E. Ranganathan Avl., M.A., I.E.S., Ex-Vice-Chancellor of the University, which was unveiled by His Excellency the Chancellor on the 20th November 1936.

The Founder-Pro-Chancellor in requesting the Chancellor to unveil the portrait said :

"I am most grateful to Your Excellency for your kind consent to unveil the portrait of M.R.Ry. Dewan Bahadur S. E. Ranganathan, Avl., M.A., I.E.S., (retired), our Vice-Chancellor for a continuous tenure of six years in all. In 1929, when the Right Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar, our first Vice-Chancellor, was called away to East Africa on an Imperial mission Government kindly lent the services of the Dewan Bahadur temporarily for a year. Having made a name as a popular educationist during his long association with the Presidency College as Professor of English from 1907 to 1929 with very little interruption, he had just then been appointed Principal of the Government College at Kumbakonam. He was then no stranger to the Sri Minakshi College, the nucleus of this University, for early in its history he was one of the two great educationists who came on Commission to inspect the College with a view to its status being raised from second grade to first grade in 1922. In 1928 Mr. Ranganathan had just returned, having concluded his labours as the Chairman of a University Commission visiting all the Colleges of the Non-Andhra area. His Excellency Lord Goschen, the then Chancellor, was pleased to extend the period of his loan to the University for the rest of the normal period of a Vice-Chancellor ; and later, for another period of three years. During all these six years he had

arduous work both in the academic and administrative spheres. The courses modelled on those of the Madras University were altered in the light of his great experience at the Madras University as member of the Syndicate, Chairman of the Boards of Studies and Examiner in English and as the Chairman of the Inspection Commission. On the administrative side, he had to see to the building up of this University Colony and providing more quarters for Staff, more lecture halls, the erection of a Sports Pavilion, the equipment of a play-ground and the institution of an electric supply scheme and the starting of a Ladies' Club. Thus he gave of his best to the University. For his labours in the direction of promoting social contact between the teachers and the taught, we are indebted to him. In the working of the Women's Club and promoting the social life of the colony he was ably assisted by the sympathetic and genial personality of his wife.

By his signal service in the cause of collegiate education from 1907 to 1934 he has earned the gratitude of several generations of his students and the warmest regard of the public. Even in retirement he does not stint himself for work in the cause of education. It is only a few days ago he returned from serving the cause of the classical and vernacular languages of the country. At gatherings of teachers and in discussions for the betterment of education his counsels have been of great value.

It is true he lives here in spirit by his work at the University. To the present students of this University who have seen him, his memory will be quite fresh ; but to remind those that might come hereafter, it is necessary to furnish the aid of a resemblance. His portrait should adorn the Senate Hall in the Library and Administrative Buildings and will be taken there when the erection of the New Buildings is complete."

His Excellency the Chancellor in unveiling the portrait said :

"Raja Saheb, Ladies and Gentlemen—It is a very pleasant duty which you have asked me to perform and I am indeed glad to have this opportunity of paying my tribute to one to whom this University is so deeply indebted. Of the holder of the office of Vice-Chancellor much is required—great intellectual attainments, a real administrative ability and, more than these, a large-hearted understanding of human nature, capable of drawing forth all that is best in the character of those committed to his charge and at the same time of stamping the impress of his personality upon them. All these qualities and more we find in Mr. Ranganathan, and in honouring him, we do honour ourselves. After a successful career at college, Mr. Ranganathan chose to go abroad to complete his studies, and wisely did he choose, for he went to Scotland. I am happy to think that what he learned there stood him in good stead in later years. Thereafter followed a long period of devoted service to the

cause of education in South India and our Presidency College will not soon forget so kindly a professor and warden.

But it is with the birth of this University that his name will ever be most closely associated and there could be no finer testimony to his achievement than the flourishing position to which in seven short years it has attained. For Mr. Ranganathan laid his foundations wisely and well. His University was to be no exotic growth divorced from the realities of his country's life and educational system. He believed that it should provide an all-round training, should cater for the many-sided needs of growing youth, and through corporate activities, should make itself first and foremost a mould of character and a mother of fine men and women. Let that objective be achieved and on that sound basis would assuredly grow the brilliance of literary and scientific attainment which is more taking to the outward eye. I think few will question how right Mr. Ranganathan was and how badly India needs more men of his stamp. His retirement is a great loss to our educational service, but it is good to know that he is not lost to Madras, but is still here and ready to help and advise, I hope, for many long years to come. I am sure that nothing could please him more than to see this admirable portrait hanging here, a constant reminder to future generations of students of what their University owes to his wise guidance."

\*

\*

\*

\*

#### INFORMATION BUREAU.

In accordance with the resolution passed by the Senate in October, 1935, recommending the institution of a Bureau of Information of careers for graduates to provide facilities for their employment, arrangements have been made to supply information about vacancies and competitive and other examinations.

\*

\*

\*

\*

#### COLONISATION SCHEME

The Syndicate has appointed a special committee to explore the possibilities of utilising the agricultural lands in the possession of the University for purposes of colonisation by such students of the University as are in need of employment and are prepared to take to private farming on the lines of the Punjab Colonisation Scheme. The following were appointed to constitute the Committee :

M.R.Ry. Rao Bahadur M. R. Ramaswami Sivan Avl. (Convener).  
Nawabzada Sadaat Ulla Khan, B.A. (Oxon), I.A.S., Deputy Director  
of Agriculture, IV Circle, Madras.

The Assistant Director of Agriculture, Cuddalore.

Dr. B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu, M.A., PH.D., B.COM., BAR-AT-LAW.

Mr. K. S. Venkataramani, M.A., B.L. and

The Registrar.

## RESEARCH.

The following is the statement of research work done by the various departments and published in other journals.

## PHILOSOPHY

Mr. P. S. Naidu.	Tandava Lakshana.	Book published.
in collaboration with Dr. B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu.	Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty.	Philosophical Quarterly, 1936 .
	An Extension of Prof. MacDougall's Theory.	Indian Philosophical Congress.
Prof. R. Ramanujachariar.	The Philosophical Impli- cations of the theory of Evolution.	do. 1936.

## HISTORY

Rao Saheb C. S. Srinivasachariar.	Edited and Contributed papers to.	Dr. S. K. Aiyen- gar Commemoration volume.
	Contributed a paper to.	Jayanti Ramayya Pan- tulu's Commemora- tion volume.
	do.	Silver Jubilee volume of the Tanjore Karanthai Tamil Sangam.
	do.	Pandit C. R. Namasi- vaya Mudaliar Com- memoration volume.
	do.	Jaina Commemoration volume of Lahore.
Mr. R. Sathianatha Iyer.	The Kadavaraya Problem.	Dr. S. K. Aiyen- gar Commemoration volume.
	Historical Notes on the Mudrarakshasa.	Mm. Prof. S. Kupp- swami Sastriar Com- memoration volume.

## ECONOMICS

Dr. B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu.	Ten Year Plan for Agri- culture.	Bulletin No. 2, The S. I. E. & L. O. Eco- nomic Council.
	The Economics of Public Health.	A. M. Vol. VII.
	The Great Depression.	Financia Expertus.
	Economic Intelligence in India.	Indian Review.

- |                             |  |   |
|-----------------------------|--|---|
| Mr. V. G. Ramakrishna Iyer. | India's Agricultural Incomes.<br>The Financing of Provincial Autonomy.<br>Small Scale Production in India.<br>The Administration of Income-tax in India. | Eco. Jl. (Lond.),<br>Financia Expertus (Udipi).<br>The New Review (Calcutta).<br>Indian Economic Conference (Agra). |
| Mr. M. K. Muniswami.        | Some suggestions for increasing Railway Revenue in India.  | Indian Economic Conference (Agra).  |

## MATHEMATICS

- |                                  |  |   |
|----------------------------------|--|---|
| Prof. A. Narasinga Rao.          | On Quadratic Equations.<br><br>The Contract of Varieties in $n$ -space.<br>Observations on Father Racine's Paper.<br>On certain cremon transformations in circle-space connected with the Miquel-Clifford Configuration. | The Mathematics Student Vol. IV.<br><br><br>Camb. Phil. Society, Proceedings.                           |
| Dr. S. S. Pillai.                | On Warings Problem. II.<br><br>On Sets of Square Free Numbers.<br>On $A^x - B^y = C$ .   | Journal of the Indian Math. Soc. Vol. II.   |
| Dr. S. S. Pillai and Dr. Chowla. | The number of representation of a number as the sum of $n$ non-negative $n^{th}$ powers.<br><br>Hypothesis K of Hardy and Littlewood.  | Quarterly Journal, Vol. VII.<br><br>Math. Zeitschrift, Vol. 41.   |
| Dr. B. Ramamurti.                | On the line of striction of a quadric.   | The Mathematics Student, Vol. IV.   |
| Mr. S. Subramaniam.              | The section of a cone by a plane through its vertex.<br>The Madras Land Revenue System—Some Aspects.<br>The Role of Weights in International Trade Statistics.   | Mathematical Gazette, 1935.<br>Indian Journal of Economics, 1936.<br>Indian Journal of Economics, 1936. |

## PHYSICS

- Dr. S. R. Rao. Magnetic properties of colloidal powders of metallic elements. Current Science Vol. IV. pp. 572-576.
- Magnetism and cold-working in metals—Part I. Poly Crystals. Proceedings of the Indian Academy of Sciences, Vol. IV. pp. 37-53.  
do. pp. 186-203.
- Do. Part II. Single Crystals of bismuth, zinc and tin.
- Soft X-rays and photo-electrons from nickel at different temperatures. Current Science Vol. 5 pp. 73-74.
- Dr. S. R. Rao and Mr. K. C. Subramaniam. Magnetic susceptibility of single crystals of lead, thallium, and tin. Philosophical Magazine, Vol. 21, pp. 609-624.
- Mr. K. C. Subramaniam. Magnetic susceptibilities of some organic compounds in different physical states. Proceedings of the Indian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 3, pp. 420-427.
- The diamagnetism of some metallic hallides. „ Vol. 4, pp. 404-413.
- Mr. P. S. Varadachari and Mr. K. C. Subramaniam. Magnetic Studies of sulphur and some sulphur compounds. „ Vol. 3, pp. 428-434.

## ZOOLOGY

- Mr. A. Ramakrishna Reddy. "Crab-fishing" in the Ceded districts. Current Science Vol. 5, No. 3.

## TAMIL

- Prof. S. S. Bharatiar. A Poem of 225 verses known as Marivayil. Book published by the Professor himself.
- Mahavidvan R. Raghava Aiyengar. Dissertations (1) Pattinapalai (2) Perumpanaruppada. The Tamilian Law of Inheritance. The origin of the Velirs. World Mother Worship. Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastriar Commemoration volume.
- Mr. E. S. Varadaraja Aiyer. "Ancient Tamilian Warfare." do.
- Mr. K. Vellaivarnan. "Ancient Tamilian Architecture." do.
- Thevaram and Periapuranam.



## SAMSKRIT

Mahamahopadhyaya Professor S. KuppeSwami Sastri.	A substantial paper on Mandana and Suresvara in the history of Advaita. Dhvanyaloka with Locana and the Upalocana. (Second Fasciculus).	The Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute, Poona. Madras Law Journal Press, Mylapore.
Mr. V. A. Ramaswami Sastri.	Tattvabindhu.  The Rasa-aspect of the Malati Madhava.	Published by the Annamalai University. Professor S. KuppeSwami Sastriar Commemoration volume. Poona Orientalist.
Mr. B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma.	A paper on the Agama-prakarana of the Mandukya karikas. Vijayindra - tirtha and Ramacarya-two Dwaita Philosophers.	Professor S. KuppeSwami Sastriar Commemoration volume
Mr. K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastri.	Nagananda and the Santarasa.	Professor S. KuppeSwami Sastriar Commemoration volume.
Mr. V. Subramania Sastri.	Harmony of the Puranic Texts.	Professor S. KuppeSwami Sastriar Commemoration volume

## Reviews

*The Mysore University English-Kannada Dictionary—Part I (A to Billow).* 96 pages. Printed by the Superintendent, the Government Press, Bangalore. Price not stated.

This publication is the first part of an authoritative English-Kannada Dictionary which the Government of Mysore have arranged to get prepared by a special committee of Kannada scholars and publish in twelve parts. As the Chairman of the Editorial Committee writes in the preface, "A sufficiently comprehensive and authoritative English-Kannada Dictionary which would help to convey into the vernacular modern ideas in English has long been needed" and it is difficult to understand why no attempt to remedy this defect was made all these years, considering that Kannada is the state language of Mysore and is spoken in parts of Madras and Bombay Presidencies and H. E. H. the Nizam's Dominions.

As at present constituted, the committee of publication consists of Mysore scholars only, but probably it would have been better if two or three Kannada scholars from outside the state had been included so that there might have been a better likelihood of the Dictionary being accepted as a standard work in the whole of Kannadadesa.

The Committee deserves the congratulations of all Kannadigas for the very thorough way in which the work, which evidently must have been arduous, has been accomplished. Such an important work must not be allowed to take too long to finish, but the staff seems to be totally inadequate to enable the Committee to complete the work within a reasonable period.

Without any intention of disparaging the excellent work done by the Committee, I may be permitted to make one or two suggestions. The important work of scrutinizing the pronunciation of English words and transcribing them into Kannada script should be done by a special sub-committee consisting of experts in both the languages. The Dictionary is meant for the use of all Kannada-speaking people, be they scholars or mere literates and the use of simplest possible Kannada words in the Dictionary might, with advantage, be considered by the Committee.

The price of the Dictionary is not stated. It would help to popularise it, if a reduction in price could be offered to advance subscribers, although I am sure the Committee would have already considered the matter.

K. A. N. R.

*Acoustics.* By Mr. R. K. Viswanathan Avl., B.A. (Hons.), Lecturer in Physics, (Annamalai University. Price Rs. 1-8-0).

I congratulate the authorities of the Annamalai University for having given the author the opportunity to write this book and I welcome with pleasure the text-book on Acoustics written in Tamil by Mr. R. K. Viswanathan, B.A.(Hons.), for the use of students preparing for the Sangeetha Bhushana title.

In eleven well chosen and well arranged chapters the author has given a clear and good account (without entering into mathematical details) of the main principles of Sound and Music, such as the production and properties of sound waves, vibrations of strings and air columns, mechanism of audition, Musical scale and Temperament.

One interesting feature is the excellent way in which the author has discussed the nature of the musical instruments used in South India. A general account is also given of phonograph, gramophone and the radio music. The chapter on Temperament is ably written. But the author as a man of science could well have discussed his views on 22 or 24 srutis. A comparative study of melody and harmony in music could also have been very advantageously added.

The book is very well written and well serves the purpose for which it is written. The printing and get up compare very favourably with the best publications. The author's free use of transliteration throughout the book may not stand in the way of easy grasp of the subject. But I wish that this transliteration could be reduced to a minimum by the use of corresponding terms in Tamil wherever they exist.

I heartily congratulate Mr. R. K. Viswanathan and the University for the excellent treatise giving in a compact volume all fundamental ideas of sound and music. The book though intended for Sangeetha Bhushana course should certainly prove to be of immense help to an intelligent reader who desires to have definite ideas of the fundamentals in Acoustics.

P. E. S.

*A Study of Economic Depression in Rural Kistna.*—By Ch. Sitharama Sastry and C. Sriramanarasimham. Published by The Madras Provincial Co-operative Union. pp. 58.

In this brochure the authors place before the general public the results of a personal enquiry they conducted into the economic conditions of Rural Kistna during the depression years. How hard the agri-

culturist has been hit by the depression, and what adjustments he has made to the new situation are the main themes of the work, and to elucidate these, different aspects of rural economic life are examined. Crop distribution, price dispersion, cost of agricultural wages—these are some of the topics dealt with. The enquiry was intensive and was confined to select villages in the district, but the villages were wisely chosen so as to cover both the delta and the uplands. Within the limits set by circumstances the enquiry was thorough, and the authors have to be 'congratulated on the mass of information they have been able to gather together and interpret. They have been singularly fortunate in disarming suspicion and inducing the ryot to part with information usually not made available to the Rural Investigator.

Their chapter on costs of cultivation and the net income of the agriculturist will be found to be interesting reading, and amazing to a degree, and it will not be strange if this amazement should at times verge on disbelief. So appalling are the conditions depicted therein. On the topic of rural debt liquidation the authors have valuable suggestions to make, but one misses direct data bearing on the debt position. Agricultural wages are examined in detail, and a few pages are devoted to the treatment of village artisans and their miserable plight. A more balanced selection of crops, and a change over from money payments to payments in kind are discoursed as two essential parts of the process of adjustment which the agriculturists have been able to make to the new situation. But of even more significance than these, in the opinion of the authors, have been the sale of 'distress gold,' and the lowering of the standard of life. In conclusion there is a plea for a planning of rural economy, a diversification of occupations and the conversion of potential to effective demand. The work contains also useful graphs and informing appendices. Unfortunately some graphs and some appendices to which reference is made in the text are not found in the book.

This is a book which will well repay reading.

C. W. B. Z.



# JOURNAL

## OF THE

# ANNAMALAI UNIVERSITY

---

VOL. VI.

MAY, 1937

NO. 3.

---

## On Waring's Problem VI

*(Polynomial summands).*

By

S. S. PILLAI

*(Annamalai University)*

### §1. INTRODUCTION.

The following notations are used:  $p$  denotes always a prime,

$$f(x) = a_n x^n + a_{n-1} x^{n-1} + \dots + a_0,$$

where  $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n$  are integers;  $a_0$  and  $n$  are positive integers different from zero; and  $f(x)$  is not a multiple of  $p$  for all  $x$  and any  $p$ . (1)

$(a, b, c, \dots)$  denotes the greatest common divisor of  $a, b, c, \dots$

$$D = (na_0, n-1a_1, n-2a_2, \dots, 2a_{n-2}, a_{n-1}) \quad (2)$$

$K$  = the greatest integer which divides  $f'(x)/D$  for all values of  $x$ . (3)

$\theta_1 = \theta_1(p)$  is the greatest power of  $p$  which divides  $D$ ; i.e.,  $p^{\theta_1} \mid D$ , but  $p^{\theta_1+1}$  "does not divide"  $D$ .

Similarly  $\theta_2$  is the greatest power of  $p$  which divides  $K$ .

$$\theta = \theta(p) = \theta_1 + \theta_2.$$

$$\gamma = \gamma(p) = \begin{cases} \theta + 1 & \text{when } \theta_2 = 0, p \geq 3 \\ \theta + 2 & \text{when } \theta_2 = 0, p = 2 \\ \theta + 2 & \text{when } \theta_2 \geq 1, p \geq 3. \\ \theta + 3 & \text{when } \theta_2 \geq 1, p = 2. \end{cases}$$

$$P = P(p) = p^\gamma.$$

$\varphi = \varphi(p) =$  the highest value of  $r$  such that  $f(x) \equiv e, \pmod{p^r}$  for all values of  $x$  and suitable  $e$ , if any; i.e.,  $f(x) \equiv e, \pmod{p^q}$  is true for all  $x$  and some  $e$ , and  $f(x) \equiv E \pmod{p^{q+1}}$  is not true for all  $x$  and any  $E$ .

$$Q = \prod_p p^{\varphi}.$$

$U = \text{Max. } p^{\gamma-\varphi}$ , when  $p$  runs through the divisors of  $KD$ .

$$M = Q + \text{Max. } \{2n + 1, U\}.$$

$G(f)$  is the least value of  $s$  such that every large integer is the sum of  $s$  or fewer values of  $f(x)$ , where  $x$  takes any non-negative integral value.

The main object of this paper is to prove the following result.

$$G(f) \leq \text{Max. } \{M, 25n^3 \log n\} + 2n\{4 \log n + \log \log n + \log 80\} + 3, \quad (4)$$

provided  $n \geq 20$ .

[See theorem V.]

Hence in particular, if  $M = O(n^3 \log n)$ , then  $G(f) = O(n^3 \log n)$ .

When  $n \leq 20$ , a corresponding result is proved. [See theorem VI]

The proof is based on Vinogradov's famous method and his latest results on Weyl's sums. The theory of the Singular series for polynomials is developed partially. In this, though I use only Davenport's theorem (lemma 11), it was I Chowla's generalization and applying that to  $\Gamma(k)$  in Waring's problem, which gave me the suggestion. As a matter of fact at first I arrived at the main result of the paper only by using I. Chowla's generalization of Davenport's theorem.

If we use this generalized theorem, we can improve the value of  $U$ , which I hope to do on a later occasion.

## §2. THE THEORY OF THE SINGULAR SERIES.

The following further notations are used :—

$$\varrho = e^{\frac{2\pi ia}{q}}, \quad (a, q) = 1; \quad S_{a, q} = \sum_{r=0}^{q-1} \varrho^{f(r)};$$

$$B_{a, q} = 1/q S_{a, q}; \quad A(q) = A(q, s, N) = \sum_a^s B_{a, q} e^{\frac{-2\pi ai}{q} N};$$

$$\mathfrak{N} = \mathfrak{N}(N) = \sum_{q=1}^{\infty} A(q); \quad \chi_p = \chi_p(N) = \sum_{\lambda=0}^{\infty} A(p^\lambda).$$

$M(p^l) = M(p^l, N) =$  the number of solutions of

$$\sum_{v=1}^s f(h_v) \equiv N \pmod{p^l}, \quad 0 \leq h_v < p^l. \quad (5)$$

$N(p^l) = N(p^l, N) =$  the number of primitive solutions of (5); i.e., the number of solutions of (5) with the restriction that for at least one  $h_v$ ;  $f(h_v)$  is not congruent to 0 (mod.  $p^{l+1}$ )

$h'$  always denotes a number such that  $f(h')$  is not congruent to 0 (mod.  $p^{l+1}$ ).

L.S. always stands for Satz in Landau's Vorlesungen über Zahlen Theorie Vol. I.

$$\delta_1 = 1/(12 \cdot 2n^3 \log n) \quad \text{when } n \geq 20,$$

and  $\delta_1 = -\varepsilon + \frac{1}{2}n^{-1}$  when  $2 \leq n \leq 19$ , where  $\varepsilon > 0$ .

*Lemma (1):* When  $(q_1, q_2) = 1$ ,

$$S_{q_1} \cdot S_{q_2} = S_{q_1 \cdot q_2}.$$

$$q_1 \cdot q_2 = e^{\frac{2\pi i r_1}{q_1}} e^{\frac{2\pi i r_2}{q_2}} = e^{\frac{2\pi i (r_1 q_2 + r_2 q_1)}{q_1 q_2}}$$

is a primitive  $q_1 q_2^{\text{th}}$  root of unity, where  $(r_1, q_1) = 1$ ,  $(r_2, q_2) = 1$ .

When  $h_1$  and  $h_2$  run through complete residue systems (mod.  $q_1$ ) and (mod.  $q_2$ ) respectively,

$$\begin{aligned} S_{q_1} \cdot S_{q_2} &= \sum_{h_1} q_1^{f(h_1)} \sum_{h_2} q_2^{f(h_2)} = \sum_{h_1} q_1^{f(h_1 q_2)} \sum_{h_2} q_1^{f(h_2 q_1)} \\ &= \sum_{h_1} q_1^{f(h_1 q_2 + h_2 q_1)} \sum_{h_2} q_2^{f(h_2 q_1 + h_1 q_2)} \\ &= \sum_{h_1} \sum_{h_2} (q_1 q_2)^{f(h_1 q_2 + h_2 q_1)} = S_{q_1 \cdot q_2}; \end{aligned}$$

because  $h_1 q_2 + h_2 q_1$  runs through a complete residue system (mod.  $q_1 q_2$ ). [L.S. 281]



*Lemma (2):* When  $(q_1, q_2) = 1$ ,  $A(q_1)A(q_2) = A(q_1q_2)$ .  
[See L.S. 282]

*Lemma (3):* For  $l > 0$ ,

$$A(p^l) = -p^{-(s-1)(l-1)}M(p^{l-1}) + p^{-(s-1)l}M(p^l).$$

Proof runs exactly on similar lines as for L.S. 285.

*Lemma (4):* For  $l \geq 0$ ,

$$\sum_{\lambda=0}^l A(p^\lambda) = p^{-(s-1)l}M(p^l). \quad [\text{See L.S. 286}]$$

*Lemma (5):* \* If  $\varphi(x) \equiv 0 \pmod{p^t}$  for all  $x$ , where all the coefficients of  $\varphi(x)$  are not multiples of  $p^t$ , then  $(x^p - x)^t$  divides  $\varphi(x)$ ,  $\pmod{p^t}$ .

Let  $\psi(x)$  be a polynomial such that

$$\psi(x) \equiv 0 \pmod{p^t} \text{ for all } x. \quad (7)$$

$$\text{Obviously, } (x^p - x)^t \equiv 0 \pmod{p^t} \text{ for all } x. \quad (8)$$

Let  $g(x)$  be the greatest common divisor of  $\psi(x)$  and  $(x^p - x)^t$ ,  $\pmod{p^t}$ .

Then from (7) and (8),

$$g(x) \equiv 0 \pmod{p^t} \quad (9)$$

Now  $g(x)$  is a divisor of  $(x^p - x)^t$ ,  $\pmod{p^t}$

So if  $g(x) \not\equiv (x^p - x)^t$ ,  $\pmod{p^t}$ , then from (9), for some  $0 \leq a \leq p-1$ ,

$$(x^p - x)^t / (x - a) \equiv 0 \pmod{p^t} \text{ for all } x.$$

For  $x = a + p$ , when  $t \geq 2$  and for  $x = a$ , when  $t = 1$ , the above congruence is not satisfied.

$$\text{So } g(x) = (x^p - x)^t \pmod{p^t}.$$

Since  $g(x)$  divides  $\psi(x)$ ,  $\pmod{p^t}$ , the lemma follows.†

\*I am indebted to Dr. R. Vaidynathaswamy for the suggestion that  $(x^p - x)^t$  is the polynomial  $\varphi(x)$  of smallest degree all of whose coefficients are not multiples  $p^t$  such that  $\varphi(x) \equiv 0 \pmod{p^t}$  for all  $x$

†If we don't want to make use of lemma (5), in the introduction define  $\gamma$  by the following relation  $\gamma = \theta_1 + 2\theta_2 + 1$  or  $\theta_1 + 2\theta_2 + 2$  according as  $p \geq 3$  or  $p = 2$ . Then all the rest will remain valid.

*Lemma (6):* Let  $\varphi(x) = A_0x^n + A_1x^{n-1} + \dots + A_n$ ,

$$A_0 = \frac{a}{q} + \frac{\lambda}{q^2}, \quad |\lambda| \leq 1, \quad (a, q) = 1.$$

$$F = \sum_{x=R+1}^{R+B} e^{2\pi i \varphi(x)}.$$

Then, when  $n \geq 20$ ,

$$F = O(B^{1-\delta}),$$

where

$$\delta = 1/12 \cdot 2n^3 \log n, \quad \text{when } C_1B \leq q \leq C_2B,$$

$$\delta = 1/20n^3 \log n, \quad \text{when } C_2B \leq q \leq C_3B^{n-1-1/n},$$

$$\text{and } \delta = 1/8n^3 \log(10n^2/c), \quad \text{when } C_3B^{n-1-1/n} \leq q \leq C_4B^{n-c},$$

where  $c, C_1, C_2, C_3, C_4$ , are arbitrary positive constants.

This is proved by Vinogradov, see page 393. *Zentralblatt für Mathematik*, 13 Band Heft 9. (4, August, 1936).

*Lemma (7):* When  $n \geq 20$ ,

$$S_{a,q} = O(q^{1-1/12 \cdot 2n^3 \log n}).$$

This follows from lemma (6); by taking  $A_0 = \frac{aa_0}{q}$ .

*Lemma (8):* If  $\delta = 1/2^{n-1}$ , and  $\varepsilon > 0$ , then

$$\sum_{x=R}^{R+B} e^{\frac{2\pi i a}{q} f(x)} = O(B^\varepsilon q^\varepsilon) \quad \{B^{1-\delta} + \frac{B}{q^\delta} + B^{1-n\delta} q^\delta\}$$

This is a modified statement of Hilfssatz 6 in Landau's paper 'Zum Waring's Problem' (*Mathematische Zeitschrift*. Band 12. page 236).

*Lemma (9):* When  $n \geq 2$ ,  $\delta = 1/2^{n-1}$ ,

$$S_{a,q} = O(q^{1-\delta+\varepsilon})$$

This follows from lemma (8), by taking  $B = q$ .

*Lemma (10):*  $S_{a,q} = O(q^{1-\delta_1})$ .

This follows from lemmas (7) and (9).

*Lemma (11):\** Let  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_m$  be  $m$  different residue classes (mod.  $p$ );  $\beta_1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_n$  be  $n$  different residue classes (mod.  $p$ ). Let  $\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_l$  be all those different residue classes which are representable as  $\alpha_i + \beta_j$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} i &= 1, 2, \dots, m. \\ j &= 1, 2, \dots, n. \end{aligned}$$

Then  $l \geq m + n - 1$ , provided  $m + n - 1 \leq p$ .

This is Davenport's theorem.

*Lemma (12):* If there are two residue classes (mod.  $p$ ) in  $f(x)$ , then there are at least two residue classes  $A, B$  (mod.  $P$ ) in  $f(x)$  such that

$A$  is not congruent to  $B$  (mod.  $p$ ).

Let the residue classes (mod.  $p$ ) in  $f(x)$  be  $a$  and  $b$ .

Then  $f(x_1) \equiv a$  (mod.  $p$ ).

and  $f(x_2) \equiv b$  ( , , ).

Let  $f(x_1) \equiv A$  (mod.  $P$ ).

and  $f(x_2) \equiv B$  ( , , ).

Obviously,  $A$  is not congruent to  $B$  (mod.  $p$ ).

*Lemma (13):* If  $a$  is not congruent to  $b$  (mod.  $p$ ) and  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_s$  be different residue classes (mod.  $p^l$ ) and  $s < p^l$ , then in the set

$$\alpha_1 + a, \alpha_2 + a, \dots, \alpha_s + a \tag{10}$$

$$\alpha_1 + b, \alpha_2 + b, \dots, \alpha_s + b$$

there are at least  $s + 1$  residue classes (mod.  $p^l$ ).

(1)  $\alpha_r + a$  is not congruent to  $\alpha_t + a$  (mod.  $p^l$ ).

otherwise,  $\alpha_r \equiv \alpha_t$  ( , , )

(2)  $\alpha_r + a \equiv \alpha_t + b$  ( , , )

and  $\alpha_s + a \equiv \alpha_t + b$  ( , , )

are impossible ; for, if it is possible, by subtraction, we get

$$a_r \equiv a_s \pmod{p^l}.$$

So if there are only  $s$  residue classes in (10) we should have

$$a_r + a \equiv a_t + b \pmod{p^l},$$

where  $t$  is unique and different for different  $r$ .

$$\text{Hence } \sum_{r=1}^s (a_r + a) \equiv \sum_{t=1}^s (a_t + b) \pmod{p^l}$$

$$\text{Therefore, } sa \equiv sb \pmod{p^l}.$$

Since,  $a$  is not congruent to  $b \pmod{p}$ ,

$$s \equiv 0 \pmod{p^l}.$$

So the lemma follows

*Lemma (14):* If there are two residue classes  $\pmod{p}$  in  $f(x)$ , then when  $s \geq P$ ,

$$N(P) \geq 1, \text{ where } N(P) = N(p^\gamma).$$

From lemma (12), there are at least two residue classes  $A$  and  $B \pmod{P}$  in  $f(x)$  such that  $A$  is not congruent to  $B \pmod{p}$ .

Therefore, starting from  $A$  and  $B$  and by repeatedly applying lemma (13) with  $A$  and  $B$  for  $\beta_1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_n$ , we get that the number of residue classes  $\pmod{P}$  in

$$\psi_1 + \psi_2 + \dots + \psi_s, \text{ where every } \psi = A \text{ or } B, \quad (11)$$

$\geq s + 1$ , provided  $s < P$ .

Now  $s + 1 \geq P$ , if  $s \geq P - 1$ .

So if  $s \geq P - 1$ , (11) will represent every residue class  $\pmod{P}$ .

So, when  $s \geq P - 1$ ,  $f(h') + \psi_1 + \psi_2 + \dots + \psi_s$  contains all the residue classes  $\pmod{P}$ .

Since by the definition of  $h'$ ,  $f(h')$  is not congruent to  $0 \pmod{p^{\theta+1}}$ , the lemma follows immediately.

**Lemma (15):** Corresponding to every  $N$ , there is a  $t = t(N)$  such that, when  $s \equiv t \pmod{p^\varphi}$ , and  $s \geq p^{\gamma-\varphi}$ ,  $N(P) \geq 1$ .

From (1) and the definition of  $\varphi$ , there is an  $a$  such that  $(a, p) = 1$ , and  $f(x) \equiv a \pmod{p^\varphi}$  for all values of  $x$ ; and there are at least two residue classes  $A$  and  $B \pmod{p^{\varphi+1}}$  in  $f(x)$ . Then

$$A = n_1 \cdot p^\varphi + a, \text{ and } B = n_2 \cdot p^\varphi + a, \quad n_1 < p, \quad n_2 < p$$

$$\text{So } n_1 \text{ is not congruent to } n_2 \pmod{p}. \quad (12)$$

Let  $f(x_1) \equiv A \pmod{p^\varphi}$ , and  $f(x_2) \equiv B \pmod{p^\varphi}$ . Further let  $f(x_1) \equiv A_1 \pmod{P}$  and  $f(x_2) \equiv B_1 \pmod{P}$ .

Let  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_s$  be  $s$  different residue classes  $\pmod{P}$ . Then if we assume that there are only  $s$  residue classes  $\pmod{P}$  in

$$\alpha_1 + A_1, \dots, \alpha_s + A_1 \quad (13)$$

$$\alpha_1 + B_1, \dots, \alpha_s + B_1,$$

arguing as in the proof of lemma (13), we arrive at the conclusion that

$$s(A_1 - B_1) \equiv 0 \pmod{p^\gamma}.$$

$$\text{So, from (12), } s \equiv 0 \pmod{p^{\gamma-\varphi}}.$$

So, if  $s < p^{\gamma-\varphi}$ , we get that (13) contains at least  $s+1$  residue classes  $\pmod{P}$ . By applying this successively, we get that when  $s \geq p^{\gamma-\varphi} - 1$ , the set  $\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \dots + \beta_s$ , where every  $\beta = A_1$  or  $B_1$  will contain exactly  $p^{\gamma-\varphi}$  classes  $\pmod{P}$  and they are

$$sa, sa + p^\varphi, sa + 2p^\varphi, \dots, sa + (p^{\gamma-\varphi} - 1)p^\varphi.$$

$$\text{Let } N \text{ be any integer and } f'(h') \text{ be not congruent to } 0 \pmod{p^{\varphi-1}}.$$

$$\text{Further let } N - f(h') \equiv ta \pmod{p^\varphi}, \quad t < p^\varphi.$$

Then from what we have proved above, we conclude that when  $s \geq p^{\gamma-\varphi} - 1$  and  $s \equiv t \pmod{p^\varphi}$ ,

$N - f(h') \equiv \beta_1 + \beta_2 + \dots + \beta_s \pmod{P}$  is solvable for  $\beta$ 's in terms of  $A_1$  and  $B_2$ .

Hence we get that when  $s \geq p^{\gamma-\varphi}$  and  $s - 1 \equiv t \pmod{p^\varphi}$ ,  $N(P) \geq 1$ .

**Lemma (16):** If  $\theta = \varphi = 0$ , then, when  $s \geq 2n + 1$ ,  $N(P) \geq 1$ .

Let  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_t$  denote the number of residue classes (mod.  $p$ ) in  $f(x)$ . Then by repeated application of lemma (11), the number of different residue classes (mod.  $p$ ) in

$$\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \dots + \beta_s \quad (14)$$

where every  $\beta = \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots$ , or  $\alpha_t$ ,

$\geq st - s + 1$ , provided this number  $\leq p$ .

Now  $st - s + 1 \geq p$ , if  $s \geq (p - 1) / (t - 1)$ .

Conversely, if  $s \geq (p - 1) / (t - 1)$ , (14) will represent every residue class (mod.  $p$ ).

Hence, when  $s \geq (p - 1) / (t - 1)$ ,

$f(x_1) + \dots + f(x_s) \equiv N - f(h')$ , (mod.  $p$ ) has at least one solution in  $x_1, \dots, x_s$ .

Therefore when  $s \geq (p - 1) / (t - 1)$

$$f(x_1) + \dots + f(x_{s+1}) \equiv N \pmod{p} \quad (15)$$

has at least one primitive solution. When  $p > n$ ,  $f(x) \equiv a \pmod{p}$  has at most only  $n$  solutions; for  $\varphi = 0$ .

So the number of residue classes (mod.  $p$ ) in  $f(x)$ .

$\geq [p/n] + 1$  or  $p/n$ , according as  $p \neq n$  or  $p = n$ .

$$\text{Hence, } \frac{p-1}{t-1} \leq \frac{p-1}{\frac{p}{n}-1} = \frac{n(p-1)}{p-n} \leq \frac{np}{p-n} \leq 2n, \text{ when } p \geq 2n.$$

But when  $p \leq 2n - 1$ ,

$$\frac{p-1}{t-1} \leq 2n - 2; \text{ for, since } \varphi = 0, t \geq 2.$$

Therefore, when  $s \geq 2n$ , (15) has at least one primitive solution.

So the lemma follows.

**Lemma (17):** Corresponding to every  $N$ , there is an  $r_o = r_o(N)$ , such that, when  $s \equiv r_o \pmod{Q}$  and  $s \geq \text{Max. } \{U, 2n + 1\}$   $N(P) \geq 1$ , for every  $p$ .

$$(1) \quad \theta = \varphi = 0.$$

In this case, the result follows from the previous lemma.

$$(2) \quad \theta \geq 1, \varphi = 0.$$

Now also there are at least two residue classes  $\pmod{p}$  in  $f(x)$ .

Further  $s \geq U \geq p^{\gamma-\varphi} = p^{\gamma} = P$ .

So by lemma (14), we get that  $N(P) \geq 1$ .

$$(3) \quad \varphi \geq 1.$$

From lemma (15), there is a  $t = t(N) = t(N, p)$  such that when  $s \geq p^{\gamma-\varphi}$  and  $s \equiv t(N, p) \pmod{p^{\varphi}}$ ,  $N(P) \geq 1$ . Now it is possible to choose  $r_o = r_o(N)$  such that

$$r_o \equiv t(N, p), \pmod{p^{\varphi}}, \text{ for every } p \text{ for which } \varphi \geq 1.$$

Hence for  $s \geq U$  and  $s \equiv r_o \pmod{Q}$   $N(P) \geq 1$ .

From (1), (2), and (3), the lemma follows.

**Lemma (18):** When  $l \geq \gamma$ ,

$$N(p^{l+1}) = p^{s-1}N(p^l)$$

$$\text{Let } f(h_1) + \sum_{v=2}^s f(h_v) \equiv N \pmod{p^l}, \quad (16)$$

where  $f'(h_1)$  is not congruent to 0  $\pmod{p^{\theta+1}}$  and  $h_1, h_2, \dots, h_s \leq p^l - 1$ .

Further let  $h_2, h_3, \dots, h_s$  be fixed.

Then, since  $f(h' + rp^{l-\theta}) \equiv f(h') \pmod{p^l}$ ,  $h_1 = h' + rp^{l-\theta}$ , where  $r = 0, 1, \dots, p^{\theta} - 1$  and  $h' \leq p^{l-\theta} - 1$ .

Now

$$f(h_1 + yp^{l-\theta}) + \sum_{v=2}^s f(h_v + y_v p^l) - N$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= f(h' + rp^{l-\theta} + yp^{l-\theta}) + \sum_{v=2}^s f(h_v + y_v p^l) - N \\
&\equiv f(h') + (r + y)p^{l-\theta} f'(h') + \sum_{v=2}^s f(h_v) - N, \pmod{p^{l+1}} \\
&= f(h') + \sum_{v=2}^s f(h_v) - N + p^l m(y + r), \\
&\quad \{ \text{where } f'(h') = m \cdot p^\theta, (m, p) = 1 \} \\
&\equiv c \cdot p^l + p^l m(y + r), \text{ from (16).}
\end{aligned}$$

If  $c + m(y + r) \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ , then

$$f(h_1 + yp^{l-\theta}) + \sum_{v=2}^s f(h_v + y_v p^{l-\theta}) \equiv N, \pmod{p^{l+1}} \quad (17)$$

Now when  $y_2, y_3, \dots, y_s$  assume any value from 0 to  $p - 1$ ,  $h_v + y_v \cdot p^l \leq p^{l+1} - 1$ .

Let  $r = ip + t$ , where  $t \leq p - 1$ .

$$\text{Then, if } c + m(y + r) \equiv 0 \pmod{p} \quad (18)$$

$$\text{then } c + m(y + t) \equiv 0 \pmod{p}.$$

Since  $(m, p) = 1$ , the last congruence has a solution  $y = z_t$ , with  $z_t \leq p - 1$ .

For the solution of (18), take  $y = z_t + ip$ .

Then the value of  $y$  for (18) is unique and different for different values of  $r$ .

Hence, corresponding to one primitive solution of (16), there are exactly  $p^{s-1}$  primitive solutions for (17). So the lemma is proved.

**Lemma (19):** When  $l \geq \gamma$ ,

$$N(p^l) = p^{(l-\gamma)(s-1)} N(P).$$

This follows from lemma (18).

**Lemma (20):**  $\chi_p \geq N(P)/P^{s-1}$ .

From lemma (4), when  $l \geq \gamma$

$$\sum_{\lambda=0}^l A(p^\lambda) = \frac{M(p^l)}{p^{l(s-1)}} \geq \frac{N(p^l)}{p^{l(s-1)}} \geq \frac{N(P)}{P^{s-1}}, \text{ from lemma (19)}$$



$$\text{So } \chi_p = \sum_{\lambda=0}^{\infty} A(p^\lambda) = \lim_{l \rightarrow \infty} \sum_{\lambda=0}^l A(p^\lambda) \geq N(P)/P^{s-1}.$$

*Theorem I.* Corresponding to every  $N$ , there is an  $r_o \leq Q$  such that when  $s \geq \text{Max.}\{U, 2n+1\}$  and  $s \equiv r_o \pmod{Q}$ ,

$$\chi_p > 0$$

For  $r_o$  take the  $r_o$  in lemma (17). Then  $N(P) \geq 1$ .

So from lemma (20),

$$\chi_p \geq N(P)/P^{s-1} \geq 1/P^{s-1} > 0.$$

*Lemma (21):*  $S_{a,q} = O(q^{1-\delta})$ .

(Here  $\delta$  is a constant which will be chosen later.)

This is assumed.

*Lemma (22):*  $A(q) = O(q^{1-s\delta})$ .

This follows from lemma (21).

*Lemma (23):* If  $s \geq [2/\delta] + 2$ ,

$$\chi_p \geq 1 - O(p^{-1-\delta}).$$

From lemma (22),

$$\left| \sum_{\lambda=1}^{\infty} A(p^\lambda) \right| = O\left( \sum_{\lambda=1}^{\infty} p^{\lambda(1-\delta s)} \right) = O(p^{-1-\delta}).$$

So the lemma follows.

*Lemma (24):* When  $s \geq [2/\delta] + 2$ ,

$$\mathfrak{S} = \prod_p \chi_p.$$

$$\left| \mathfrak{S} - \prod_{p \leq b} \chi_p \right| \leq \sum_{q \geq b} |A(q)| = O\left( \sum_{q \geq b} q^{-1-\delta} \right) = O(b^{-\delta}).$$

Now this tends to zero when  $b \rightarrow \infty$ .

So the lemma follows.

**Theorem II.** If  $S_{a,q} = O(q^{-1-\delta})$  and  $s \geq [2/\delta] + 2$  and  $s$  satisfies the conditions in theorem I, then

$$\mathfrak{U} > c > 0,$$

where  $c$  is a constant independent of  $N$ .

From lemma (23),  $\chi_p \geq 1 - O(p^{-1-\delta})$ , where the constant in  $O$  is independent of  $p$  and  $N$ . So there is a  $b$  such that

$$\chi_p \geq 1 - p^{-1-\delta/2}, \text{ for all } p \geq b \quad (19)$$

Now from lemma (24)

$$\mathfrak{U} = \prod_{p \leq b} \chi_p \prod_{p > b} \chi_p = \Pi_1, \Pi_2, \text{ say.}$$

From theorem I,

$$\Pi_1 \geq \prod_{p \leq b} P^{-(s-1)} = c_1. \quad (20)$$

$$\text{From (19), } \Pi_2 = \prod_{p > b} (1 - p^{-1-\delta/2}) = c_2 \quad (21)$$

So from (20) and (21).

$$\mathfrak{U} > c, \text{ where } c = c_1 \cdot c_2.$$

**Lemma (25)** Under the hypotheses of Theorem II.

$$\sum_{q \leq M} A(q) \geq c + O(M^{-\delta}).$$

Now, from lemma (22),

$$\left| \sum_{q \leq M} A(q) - \mathfrak{U} \right| \leq \sum_{q > M} |A(q)| = O\left(\sum_{q > M} q^{-1-\delta}\right) = O(M^{-\delta})$$

Therefore, from theorem II, the lemma follows.

**Theorem III.** When  $s$  satisfies the conditions of theorem I and  $s \geq [2/\delta_1] + 2$ , then

$$\mathfrak{U} > c > 0, \text{ where } c \text{ is independent of } N.$$

(For the definition of  $\delta_1$ , see the beginning of § 2). This follows from theorem II, lemmas (7) and (9).

*Lemma (26):* If for a certain  $N_0$  and a certain  $s \geq Q$ .

$N(P) \geq 1$ , then it is true for every  $N \equiv N_0 \pmod{Q}$ .

Since  $s \geq Q$ , from the proof of lemma (15),

$f(x_1) + f(x_2) + \dots + f(x_s)$ , with  $f(x_1)$  fixed will contain the residue classes,  $sa, sa + p^q, \dots, sa + (p^{\gamma-q} - 1)p^q$ .

So by hypothesis,  $N_0$  belongs to one of the above numbers  $\pmod{p^\gamma}$ . Hence  $N$  also belongs to one of the above  $\pmod{p^\gamma}$ .

So the lemma follows.

*Lemma (27):* Given  $N_0$ , there is an  $s \leq M$ , such that for every  $N \equiv N_0 \pmod{Q}$ ,  $\omega(N) > c > 0$ , where  $c$  is independent of  $N$ .

This follows from the previous lemma and the proof of theorem II.

*Lemma (28):* If  $0 \leq f'(t) \leq \frac{1}{2}$ ;  $f''(t) \geq 0$ , in the interval  $g \leq t \leq h$ , then

$$\sum_{t=g}^h e^{\pm 2\pi i f(t)} = \int_g^h e^{\pm 2\pi i f(t)} dt + O(1),$$

This is a well-known result.

*Lemma (29):* If  $\lambda$  is real and positive and is not an integer,

$$\text{then } \left| \sum_{x>b}^H e^{2\pi i \lambda x} \right| < 1/2(\lambda),$$

where  $(x)$  denotes the distance  $x$  from the nearest integer.

This is also well-known.

### §3. PROOF OF MAIN RESULTS.

**3.1. Further notations and assumptions:**  $k$  is a fixed positive integer;  $k_0 = 2k - 1$ .

Since  $f(x)$  denotes only a single residue class  $\pmod{p^q}$ ,  $f(x_1) + f(x_2) + \dots + f(x_{k_0})$  denotes only a single residue class

(mod.  $Q$ ) for all values of  $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{k_0}$ . Let us denote this residue class by  $R_0$ . That is

$$f(x_1) + \dots + f(x_{k_0}) \equiv R_0 \pmod{Q},$$

for all values of  $x_r$ , ( $r = 1, 2, \dots, k_0$ ).

Now for  $s$ , we take the least value of  $s$  which satisfies the conditions of theorem II when  $N_2 = W - R_0$ , where  $W$  is any fixed integer. That means, from lemma (27),

$$\omega(N_2) > c > 0, \text{ when } N_2 \equiv W - R_0 \pmod{Q},$$

for this  $s = s(W, R_0, k)$ . (22)

Hereafter  $s$  stands only for this particular one; and  $s \leq \Gamma$

Further, we take  $N \equiv W \pmod{Q}$ . (23)

Let  $K_0 = a_0 + |a_1| + \dots + |a_n|$ .

$N_0$  is a positive integer.

$F = [^{1/n}(N_0/K_0)^v]$ , where  $v = 1/n$ .

$R = [F^a]$ ,  $Y = [F^b]$ ,  $\tau = [2nK_0F^l]$

$N_0 - N_0F^{-\psi} < N \leq N_0$  and  $N$  satisfies (23);

where  $a, b, l$  and  $\psi$  are positive constants.

$x_0$  is a positive integer such that for all  $x \geq x_0$ , each of  $f(x)$ ,  $f'(x)$ ,  $f''(x)$  is positive. (24)

$\xi$  runs through the numbers not exceeding  $F^{n-1}$ , which can be expressed as the sum of exactly  $k-1$  values of  $f(x)$  with each  $x \geq x_0$ ; and  $X$  denotes the number of such numbers  $\leq F^{n-1}$ .

$$u = \xi + f(v),$$

where  $v = F, F+1, \dots, 2F-1$ .

When  $F$  is large, Numbers  $u$  are all different and  $u < K_0 2^n F^n$ .

$$\sigma = n(1-v)^k.$$

$c$  is a positive constant, but it is different on different occasions.

In the rest of the paper we proceed on the assumption that the conditions marked A, B, C, etc., are satisfied and at the end we choose the constants so that these conditions are actually satisfied.

*Lemma (30):*

When  $F^d < q = O(F^l)$ ,  $\sum_{y=1}^Y e^{2\pi i a/q f(y)} = O(Y^{1-\delta_2})$ .

This is assumed.

( $\delta_2$  is a constant which will be fixed later).

Further let  $\Gamma = \text{Max.}\{M, [2/\delta] + 2\}$ , where  $\delta$  has the same value as in lemma (21).

3.2. *Lemma (31)*  $X > c \cdot F^{n-1-\sigma}$ .

Let  $N_s(x)$  denote the number of numbers not exceeding  $x$ , which can be expressed as the sum of  $s$  values of  $f(x)$  with  $x \geq x_0$ .

Now  $N_1(x) \geq c \cdot x^\nu$ .

$$\begin{aligned} N_2(x) &\geq \sum_{r=x_0}^{x^\nu} N_1\{f(r) - f(r-1)\} \geq c \sum_{r=x_0}^{x^\nu} N_1(c \cdot r^{n-1}) \geq c \sum r^{1-\nu} \\ &> c \cdot x^{\nu(2-\nu)} = c \cdot x^{1-(1-\nu)^2} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} N_3(x) &\geq \sum_{r=x_0}^{x^\nu} N_2\{f(r) - f(r-1)\} > c \sum N_2(c \cdot r^{n-1}) \\ &> c \sum_{r=x_0}^{x^\nu} r^{(n-1)\{1-(1-\nu)^2\}} > c \cdot x^{1-(1-\nu)^3} \end{aligned}$$

Proceeding like this we get that

$$N_s(x) > c \cdot x^{1-(1-\nu)^s}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{So } X = N_{k-1}(F^{n-1}) &> c \cdot F^{(n-1)\{1-(1-\nu)^{k-1}\}} = c \cdot F^{n-1-n(1-\nu)^k} \\ &= c \cdot F^{n-1-\sigma} \end{aligned}$$

3.3. *An Integral.* We introduce the following sums depending on  $\alpha$ .

$$T = \sum_{x=x_0}^F e^{2\pi i \alpha f(x)};$$

$$T_1 = \sum_{x=x_0}^{K_1} e^{2\pi i a f(x)}, \text{ where } K_1 = mK_0 F.$$

$$V = \sum_v e^{2\pi i a f(x)}; \quad S = \sum_{\xi} e^{2\pi i a \xi}.$$

Let  $y$  be an integer  $0 < y < Y$ ; and consider.

$$(3.21) \quad I_{y, N} = \int_0^1 T^{s-3} T_1 V^2 S^2 e^{2\pi i a f(y)} e^{-2\pi i a N} d\alpha,$$

where for the interval of integration we can substitute the interval  $-\tau^{-1} \leq \alpha \leq 1 - \tau^{-1}$ .

For every  $\alpha$  in the last interval, we have

$$(3.22) \quad \alpha = a/q + z; \quad (a, q) = 1; \quad 0 < q \leq \tau; \quad |z| \leq 1/q\tau.$$

We divide the interval of integration into two classes, putting in the first class the intervals with

$$(3.23) \quad \alpha = a/q + z; \quad (a, q) = 1; \quad 0 < q \leq F^d; \quad -\tau^{-1} \leq z \leq \tau^{-1}.$$

$$A \quad d < l,$$

and in the second class the remaining intervals. It is easy to see that the intervals of the first class do not overlap and every  $\alpha$  in the second class can be represented by (3.22). Corresponding to this division, we can write,

$$(3.24) \quad I_{y, N} = H_{y, 1} + H_{y, 2}$$

§3.3. Asymptotic formula for  $H_{y, 1}$ . We introduce the following integrals:

$$\varphi_1 = \int_{x_0}^F e^{2\pi i z f(x)} dx;$$

$$\varphi_2 = \int_{\tau}^{K_1} e^{2\pi i z f(x)} dx;$$

$$\psi_1 = \int_F^{2F} e^{2\pi i z f(x)} dx.$$

In  $T$ , put  $x = tq + r$ ;  $r = 0, 1, \dots, q-1$

where for every  $r$ ,  $t$  takes all integral values in the interval  $x_0 < qt + r \leq P$ .

So, for  $T$ , we get

$$T = \sum_{r=0}^{q-1} \sum_t e^{2\pi i (u/q + z)f(rt+qt)} \\ = \sum_{r=0}^{q-1} e^{2\pi i u/q f(r)} K_r;$$

where  $K_r = \sum_t e^{2\pi i z f(qt+r)}$ .

Let  $F(t) = |z| f(qt + r)$

$$\text{Then } f'(t) = |z| q f'(qt + r) \leq \frac{q \cdot K_0 n F^{n-1}}{\tau} \leq \frac{n K_0 \cdot F^{n-1+d}}{\tau} \leq \frac{1}{2},$$

provided,

$$B \quad l \geq n - 1 + d.$$

So in the interval considered for  $t$ ,

$$0 \leq F'(t) \leq \frac{1}{2} \text{ and } F''(t) \geq 0.$$

Hence from lemma (25),

$$K_r = \int_{(x_0-r)q^{-1}}^{(F-r)q^{-1}} e^{2\pi i z f(qt+r)} dt + O(1) = \frac{\varphi_1}{q} + O(1)$$

Hence we obtain

$$(3.31) \quad T = \varphi_1 B_{a,q} + O(q).$$

In a similar way we prove that

$$(3.32) \quad T_1 = \varphi_2 B_{a,q} + O(q).$$

$$(3.33) \quad V = \psi_1 B_{a,q} + O(q).$$

Again

$$(3.34) \quad S = \sum_{\xi} e^{2\pi i a/q \xi} + O(|z| X P^{n-1}).$$

$$(3.35) \quad e^{2\pi i a f(v)} = e^{2\pi i a/q f(v)} + O(|z| Y^n)$$

$$(3.36) \quad e^{2\pi i a N} = e^{-2\pi i a/q N - 2\pi i z N_0} + O(|z| F^{n-\Phi}).$$

We put

$$(3.37) \quad Z = F, \text{ if } |z| \leq F^{-n}.$$

$$Z \leq |z|^{-v}, \text{ if } |z| \geq F^{-n}.$$

Then we can verify\* that

$$\varphi_1 = O(Z); \quad \varphi_2 = O(Z); \quad \psi_1 = O(Z).$$

Therefore by lemma (21), the main term of the right hand side of the equalities (3.31)–(3.36) is  $O(Zq^{-\delta}); O(Zq^{-\delta}); O(Zq^{-\delta}); O(X); O(1); O(1)$ .

$$* \int_{x_1}^F e^{2\pi i z f(x)} dx = \int_{x_1}^A + \int_A^F = O(A) + I \quad (\text{say}).$$

Put  $y = zf(x)$ . Then  $dy = zf'(x)$ .

$$y = a_0 z x^n \{1 + O(1/x)\}; \quad zf'(x) = a_0 z n x^{n-1} \{1 + O(1/x)\}$$

$$y^{1-v} = a_0^{1-v} z^{1-v} x^{n-1} \{1 + O(1/x)\} = \frac{zf'(x)}{(a_0 z)^v} \{1 + O(1/x)\}$$

$$\text{So } \frac{1}{zf'(x)} = \frac{1}{(a_0 z)^v y^{1-v}}$$

$$= 1/a_0^v z^v y^{1-v} \left\{ 1 + O\left(\frac{1}{x}\right) \right\} = 1/a_0^v z^v y^{1-v} = O\left(\frac{1}{z^v y^{1-v}} \cdot \frac{1}{x}\right)$$

$$= O\left(\frac{1}{z^v y^{1-v}} \cdot \left(\frac{z}{y}\right)^v\right) = O\left(\frac{1}{y}\right)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{So } I &= \int_{zf(A)}^{zf(F)} \frac{e^{2\pi i y}}{zf'(x)} dy = \frac{1}{a_0^v z^v} \int_{zf(A)}^{zf(F)} \frac{e^{2\pi i y}}{y^{1-v}} dy + O\left(\int_{zf(A)}^{zf(F)} \frac{e^{2\pi i y}}{y} dy\right) \\ &= O\left(\frac{1}{z^v}\right) + O\left(\int_{zf(A)}^{zf(F)} \frac{dy}{y}\right) = O\left(\frac{1}{z^v}\right) + O(\log |z| f(F)) \end{aligned}$$

Now  $F^{-n} \leq |z| \leq F^{-l}$ , when  $l \geq n-1+d$ . So  $\log zf(F) = O(\log z)$ .

Hence  $I = O(z^{-v}) + O(\log z) = O(z^{-v})$ .

Therefore  $\varphi_1 = O(A) + O(z^{-v}) = O(z^{-v})$ .

Similarly, we can prove the result for  $\varphi_2$  and  $\psi_1$ .



The ratios of the remaining terms to the last values are

$$O\{Z^{-1}q^{1+\delta} + |z|F^{n-1} + |z|F^{bn} + |z|F^{n-\psi}\} = O(F^{-\psi}) (1 + |z|F^n),$$

provided.

$$C_1 d(1 + \delta) \leq 1 - \psi.$$

$$C_2 \psi \leq 1.$$

$$C_3 bn \leq n - \psi.$$

So

$$(3.38) \quad T^{s-3}T_1V^2S^2e^{2\pi ia(f(y)-N)} \\ = E_y F_y + O(Z^s q^{-s\delta} X^2 F^{-\psi} (1 + |z|F^n)),$$

where  $F_y$  depends only on  $z, y, n, x_o$  and  $N_o$ , and

$$(3.39), \quad E_y = B_{a,q}^s \left( \sum_{\xi} e^{2\pi i a \frac{\xi}{q}} \right) 2e^{2\pi i a / q f(y)} e^{-2\pi i a N / q}.$$

$$(3.310) \quad E_y = O(X^2 q^{-s\delta}).$$

Integrating (3.38) with respect  $z$  between the limits  $z = -\tau^{-1}$  to  $z = \tau^{-1}$ , we get that the

part of  $H_{y,1}$  corresponding to any fixed  $a$  and  $q$  is  $Q_y E_y + L$ ,

where  $Q_y$  depends only on  $y, n, N_o$  and  $x_o$ . Now

$$L = O\{X^2 F^{-\psi} q^{-s\delta} \left( \int_0^{F^{-n}} F^s dz + \int_{F^{-n}}^{\tau^{-1}} F^n z^{1-\psi} ds \right) \\ = O\{X^2 F^{s-n-\psi} q^{-s\delta}\}.$$

$$\text{So } \sum_{q=1}^{F^d} \sum_a L = O\{X^2 F^{s-n-\psi}\}, \text{ for } s \geq [2/\delta] + 2.$$

Hence

$$(3.311) \quad H_{y,1} = Q_y D_y + O(X^2 F^{s-n-\psi}), \text{ where}$$

$$(3.312) \quad D_y = \sum_{q=1}^{F^d} \sum_a E_y; \quad (a, q) = 1.$$

§3.4. Estimation of  $Q_y$ . We sum up the equality .

$$(3.41) \quad I_{y, N} = H_{y, 1} + H_{y, 2}$$

of (3.24) for all values of  $N$  satisfying the conditions

$$N_0 - N_0 F^{-\psi} < N \leq N_0$$

and  $N \equiv W \pmod{Q}$ . By the definition of our  $s$ ,

the result of summation of the left side is equal to the number of solutions for  $x$  and  $N_1$  of the system of inequalities.

$$(3.42) \quad N_1 - N_0 F^{-\psi} < f(x) \leq N_1$$

where  $N_1 = N_0 - f(x_1) - f(x_2) - \dots - f(x_{n-3}) - u - u' - f(y)$ , and  $x$  runs through  $x_0, x_0 + 1, \dots, K_1$ ; every  $x_i$  runs over the set of values  $x_0, x_0 + 1, \dots, F$ ;  $u$  and  $u'$  take the values described for  $u$  in §3.1 (independently).

Now

$$\begin{aligned} N_1 - N_0 F^{-\psi} &\geq N_0 - (s - 3)K_0 \cdot F^n - 2 \cdot 2^n K_0 F^n - K_0 F^{bn} - N_0 F^{-\psi} \\ &\geq (m K_0 F - 1)^n - K_0 F^n (s - 3 + 2 \cdot 2^n) - K_0 \cdot F^{bn} - K_0 F^{n-\psi} \\ &\geq K_0 F^n \left\{ m^n - \frac{m^{n-1}n}{F} - 2 \cdot 2^n - s - F^{bn-n} - m^n F^{-\psi} + 3 \right\} \\ &\geq K_0 F^n \{m^n - m^{n-1} - 2 \cdot 2^n - s\}, \text{ provided} \end{aligned}$$

$$D_1 \quad F > n$$

$$D_2 \quad b \leq 1$$

$$D_3 \quad F^\psi \geq m^n.$$

But  $m^n - m^{n-1} - 2 \cdot 2^n - s \geq 1$ , if  $m \geq m_0 = m_0(s)$ ,

Since  $s$  is fixed, we choose for  $m$  the fixed value  $m_0$ . So,

$$N_1 - N_0 F^{-\psi} > K_0 \cdot F^n.$$

So the number of solutions of the inequality (3.42) for every given  $N_1$  is

$$a_0^{-\psi} \{N_1^\psi + O(1) - (N_1 - N_0 F^{-\psi})^\psi + O(1)\} > c \cdot F^{1-\psi}.$$

Hence the whole number of solutions of (3.42).

$$(3.43) \quad > c \cdot X^2 F^{s-1} \cdot F^{1-\psi} = c \cdot X^2 F^{s-\psi}.$$

The part of  $H_{y, 1}$  corresponding to  $q = 1$

$$= Q_y X^2,$$

and its summation for all  $N$  in the above interval

$$\leq Q_\nu X^2 \cdot c \cdot N_\alpha F^{-\psi} < c \cdot Q_\nu \cdot X^2 F^{n-\psi}.$$

When  $q > 1$ , from lemma (29)

$$\left| \sum_N e^{-2\pi i a/qN} \right| < 1/2(a/q) = \frac{q}{2a}$$

and so by (3.310), when  $q > 1$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_N H_{\nu, 1} &= O \left\{ Q_\nu X^2 \sum_{q=2}^{F^d} q^{-s\delta} \sum_a \frac{q}{2a} \right\} \\ &= O \left\{ Q_\nu X^2 \sum_{q=2}^{F^d} q^{-1-\delta} \log q \right\} = O(Q_\nu X^2). \end{aligned}$$

Hence, when  $q$  runs through all values in the interval  $0 < q \leq F^d$ .

$$\sum_N H_{\nu, 1} < c \cdot Q_\nu X^2 F^{n-\psi} + O(Q_\nu X^2) < c Q_\nu X^2 F^{n-\psi}.$$

In the intervals of the second class, by lemma (29),

$$\left| \sum_N e^{-2\pi i aN} \right| = O(1/(\alpha)) = O(F^l).$$

So

$$\begin{aligned} (3.44) \quad \sum H_{\nu, 2} &= O(F^{s-2+l} \int_0^1 \sum_u \sum_{u'} e^{2\pi i \alpha(u-u')} d\alpha) \\ &= O(F^{s-2+l} XF) = O(XF^{s-1+l}) \\ &= o(X^2 F^{s-\psi}), \end{aligned}$$

provided

$$Es - 1 + l < n - 1 - o + s - \psi, \text{ i.e., } l < n - o - \psi.$$

Hence from (3.41), (3.42), (3.43) and (3.44), we get that

$$(3.45) \quad Q_\nu > c \cdot F^{s-n}.$$

§3.5 Estimation of  $D_\nu$ . It follows from (3.39), that

$$E_\nu = \sum_{N_2} e^{-2\pi i a/qN_2} B_{a, q}^s$$

where  $N_2 = N - \xi - \xi' - f(y)$ ,

where  $\xi'$  also takes the same set of values as  $\xi$  but independently.

Therefore

$$D_y = \sum_{N_2} \sum_{q=1}^{F^d} A_q(N_2).$$

From lemma (27), from the definition of  $s$  in §3.1, it follows that for all these  $N_2$ ,

$$\varpi(N_2) > c > 0.$$

So from lemma (25), we conclude that

$$\sum_{q=1}^{F^d} A_q(N_2) > c + O(F^{-d\delta}), \quad (c \text{ is independent of } N_2).$$

$$> \frac{c}{2}, \text{ provided}$$

$$F^{-d\delta} > \frac{c}{2}.$$

Hence

$$(3.51) \quad D_y > \sum_{N_2} \frac{c}{2} = \frac{c}{2} X^2 > c X^2.$$

( $c$  is different on different occasions).

Hence from (3.311), (3.45) and (3.51), we get that

$$(3.52) \quad H_{y,1} > c X^2 F^{s-n} + O(X^2 F^{s-n-\psi}) > c X^2 F^{s-n}, \text{ provided}$$

$$G F > c.$$

§3.6. The fundamental integral. Now we put  $N = N_0$ , and investigate the integral.

$$(3.61) \quad I_{N_0} = \sum_{y=1}^Y I_{y, N_0}$$

$$= \int_0^1 T^s \bar{3} T_1 V^2 S^2 e^{-2\pi i a N_0} \sum_y e^{2\pi i a f(y)} da.$$

By dividing the interval of integration into two classes as in §3.3, we represent the integral as the sum of two terms,

$$(3.62) \quad I_{N_0} = H_1 + H_2.$$

Now,  $H_1 = \sum_y H_{y, 1}$ .

Therefore from (3.52), we have

$$(3.63) \quad H_1 > cX^2YF^{s-n}.$$

In the intervals of the second class,  $F^d < q \leq \tau = O(F^l)$ .

$$\begin{aligned} \text{So } \sum_{y=1}^Y e^{2\pi i u f(y)} &= \sum_{Y}^{y=1} e^{2\pi i n/q f(y)} + O(|z| Y^{n+1}) \\ &= O(Y \cdot F^{-d\delta_2}) + O(Y^{n+1} q^{-1} \tau^{-1}), \text{ [from lemma (30)]} \\ &= O(F^{b-d\delta_2}) + O(F^{bn+b} \cdot F^{-d} \cdot F^{-l}) \\ &= O(A) \text{ say.} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Hence } H_2 &= O(A \cdot F^{s-2} \int_0^1 V^2 S^2 d\alpha) \\ &= O(A \cdot F^{s-2} \cdot F \cdot X) = O(AF^{s-1}X). \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{H_2}{H_1} &= O\left(\frac{AF^{s-1}X}{X^2YF^{s-n}}\right) = O\left(\frac{XYF^{1-n}}{XYF^{1-n}}\right) \\ &= O\left(\frac{A}{F^{n-1-\sigma} \cdot F^b \cdot F^{1-n}}\right) = O(AF^{\sigma-b}) \\ &= O(F^{\sigma-d\delta_2} + F^{\sigma+bn-l-d}) \\ &= o(1), \end{aligned}$$

provided

$$H \quad d\delta_2 > \sigma.$$

$$I \quad \sigma + bn < l + d.$$

Hence

$$I_{N_o} > cX^2YF^{s-n} > 0$$

§3.7. Now the conditions to be satisfied are :

- |                                     |                               |                              |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|
| (1) $d < l$ ;                       | (5) $b \leq 1 - \psi/n$ ;     | (9) $F, G$ ;                 |
| (2) $l \geq n - 1 + d$ ;            | (6) $D_1, D_3$ ;              | (10) $d\delta_2 > \sigma$ ;  |
| (3) $d(1 + \delta) \leq 1 - \psi$ ; | (7) $b \leq 1$ ;              | (11) $\sigma + bn < l + d$ . |
| (4) $\psi \leq 1$ ;                 | (8) $l < n - \sigma - \psi$ ; |                              |

Conditions (6) and (9) are satisfied if  $N_o > c$ .

Now put

$$(1) \quad k = [n \log (2n/\delta_2)] + 2, \quad (3) \quad d = \frac{1}{2}; \quad (5) \quad \psi = 1/n^6;$$

$$(2) \quad b = 1 - \frac{1}{n^2}; \quad (4) \quad l = n - \frac{1}{2}; \quad (6) \quad N_o > c.$$

Then all conditions are satisfied.

So we arrive at the result that if  $N_o > c$ , and  $k = [n \log (2n/\delta_2)] + 2$ , then for a suitable  $s \leq \Gamma$ ,

$$I_{N_o} > 0.$$

But  $I_{N_o}$  is the number of representations of  $N_o$  in the form.

$$N_o = f(x) + f(x_1) + \dots + f(x_{s-1}) + u + u' + f(y),$$

with  $x, x_1, \dots, x_{s-1} \geq x_o$ .

The right side of the above is a sum of

$$1 + s - 3 + 2k + 1 = s + 2k - 1 \text{ values of } f(x).$$

Therefore, we arrive at

*Theorem IV.* If  $\sum_{y=1}^Y e^{2\pi i q f(y)} = O(Y \cdot F^{-\delta_2})$

for all  $q, F^{\frac{1}{2}} < q \leq O(F^{n-1})$

and  $Y = [F^{1-\nu^2}]$ , then

$$G(f) \leq \Gamma + 2[n \log (2n/\delta_2)] + 3.$$

§3·8. *Lemma (32):* When  $n \geq 20$ , and  $F^{\frac{1}{2}} < q = O(F^{n-1})$ ,

$$S_1 = \sum_{y=1}^Y e^{2\pi i q f(y)} = O(Y F^{-\delta_3}),$$

where  $\delta_3 = 1/40n^3 \log n$ .

$$(1) \quad q \leq Y \cdot \text{i.e., } q \leq F^{1-\nu^2}.$$

$$S_1 = \left( \frac{Y}{q} \right) \sum_{y=1}^q + \sum_{y=1}^{q_1}, \text{ where } q_1 < q.$$

So from lemma (6)

$$S_1 = O(Y/q \cdot q^{1-\delta} + q_1^{1-\delta} \text{ or } q_1) \text{ according as } q_t \begin{matrix} > \\ < \end{matrix} q^{1/(n-1-v)}$$

Therefore

$$S_1 = O(Y \cdot q^{-\delta}) = O(YF^{-\delta\delta}) = O(YF^{-\delta_3}), \text{ for } \frac{1}{2}\delta = \delta_3.$$

$$(2) \quad Y < q = O(F^{n-\frac{1}{2}}).$$

$$\text{Since } Y = F^{1-v^2}, F^{n-\frac{1}{2}} \leq Y^{1-\frac{1}{2}+2/n^2} = Y^{n-(\frac{1}{2}-2/n^2)}.$$

In lemma (6), put  $c = \frac{1}{2} - 2/n^2$ .

$$\text{Then } 8 \log \frac{10n^2}{c} = 8 \log \frac{10n^2}{\frac{1}{2} - 2/n^2} < \frac{40 \log n}{1-v^2}; \text{ for } n \geq 20.$$

So in this case

$$S_1 = O(Y^{1-\delta_3/(1-v^2)}) = O(YF^{-\delta_3}).$$

From (1) and (2), the lemma follows.

Lemma (33): When  $2 \leq n \leq 19$ , and  $F^{\frac{1}{2}} < q = O(F^{n-\frac{1}{2}})$ ,

$$S_1 = \sum_{v=1}^Y e^{2\pi i a/qf(v)} = O(YF^{-\delta_4}),$$

where  $\delta_4 = (1/2 - 1/n)/2^{n-1} - \epsilon$ .

From lemma (8),

$$S_1 = O(Y^{\epsilon} q^{\epsilon}) \{Y^{1-\delta} + Yq^{-\delta} + Y^{1-n\delta} q^{\delta}\},$$

where  $\delta = 1/2^{n-1}$ .

Now  $\epsilon$  is arbitrary.

So  $Y^{\epsilon} q^{\epsilon} = O(F^{\epsilon})$ ,  $\epsilon$  has different values on the two sides.

Hence

$$S_1 = O(Y \cdot F^{\epsilon}) \text{Max}\{Y^{-\delta}, q^{-\delta}, Y^{-n\delta} q^{\delta}\}$$

$$Y^{-\delta} \leq F^{-b\delta} < F^{-\delta/2}.$$

$$q^{-\delta} \leq F^{-\delta/2}.$$

$$Y^{-n\delta} \cdot q^{\delta} \leq F^{-n\delta(1-v^2)} \cdot F^{\delta(n-\frac{1}{2})} = F^{-\delta(\frac{1}{2}-1/n)}$$

So  $S_1 = O(Y \cdot F^{-\delta(1/2-1/n)+\epsilon}) = O(YF^{-\delta_4})$ .

§3·9. Proof of the main result.

(1)  $n \geq 20$ .

From lemma (32),

$$2[n \log(2n/\delta_2)] \leq n\{4 \log n + \log \log n + \log 80\}.$$

(2)  $3 \leq n \leq 19$ .

From lemma (33),

$$2[n \log(2n/\delta_2)] \leq n\{n \log 2 + 3/n\} = n^2 \log 2 + 3.$$

Hence from theorem IV, we get

*Theorem V.* When  $n \geq 20$ ,

$$G(f) \leq \text{Max}\{M, 25n^3 \log n\} + 2n\{4 \log n + \log \log n + \log 80\} + 3.$$

*Theorem VI.* When  $n \geq 3$ .

$$G(f) \leq \text{Max}\{M, 2^n + 4\} + 2n^2 \log 2 + 6.$$

## ERRATA

Page 171 for last 4 lines, read  $\gamma = \gamma(p) \begin{cases} = \theta_1 + 2\theta_2 + 2 & \text{when } p \geq 2 \\ = \theta_1 + 2\theta_2 + 1 & \text{when } p \geq 3 \end{cases}$

Omit lemma (5) and the foot notes.

Read  $s-1$  for  $s$  in line 2 page 178; lines 2, 12, 15 page 180; and in line 3 page 182.

Read  $p^{q+1}$  instead of  $p^q$  in line 8 page 178.

and  $p^{q+1}$  instead of  $p^{q-1}$  in line 22 page 178.

Read  $y_{\sqrt{p}} p^l$  instead of  $y_{\sqrt{p}} p^{l-\theta}$  in line 7 page 181.

Read  $U$  instead of  $Q$  in lines 1, 3 page 184.



# Some Experiments on the Utilisation of Indigenous Raw Materials

By

K. ASWATH NARAIN RAO.

(Annamalai University)

The Government of India established about two years ago, the Industrial Intelligence and Research Bureau to collect and disseminate industrial intelligence, to co-ordinate industrial research that is being done in different parts of the country — in a few universities, under the Provincial Directors of Industries and by a few enterprising industrialists—and to encourage investigation of industrial problems by the award of prizes, etc. The Bureau has, also, its own laboratories at the Test House, Alipore, Calcutta where work on some selected problems is being done.

It seems, desirable, to place on record some work that has been done in a number of fields during some years, so that the information may be readily available to those who require it. The work relates to utilisation of some minor forest products, manufacture of glue from hide fleshings, utilisation of iron ore for the manufacture of brown paints, etc. The work on forest products was done in collaboration with Messrs. C. Varadhan and S. L. Janniah (*Quarterly Journal of the Mysore Forest Department*, 1934, 7).

## FOREST OIL SEEDS

Large scale expression of oil from the following oil-seeds : Sandal, Nagasampige, Mukarathi, Surthi, and Gangunge was investigated at the New Oil Mills, Platform Road, Bangalore. The methods suggested so far for expression of oil from Sandal seed are all uneconomical and wasteful. It was hoped to express a good proportion of the oil in the seed in the Krupp's Expeller, but the oil is so sticky and viscous and contains such a large quantity of resinous matter, that the attempt did not meet with much success. This is very disappointing in view of the fact that sandal seed oil is a drying oil with a high Iodine Value and suitable for the manufacture of soft soap. Medley oil of good quality suitable for the manufacture of ordinary soap was expressed in 35% yield from these seeds mentioned above.

*Sagade seed oil.* These seeds (called "Kusum" in Northern India, *Schleichera Trijuga*) have a loose outer shell and a hard inner shell or

## EXPERIMENTS ON UTILISATION OF INDIGENOUS RAW MATERIALS 199

pericarp. The outer shell, the pericarp and the kernel form 56, 24 and 20 per cent respectively of the total weight of the seeds.

The oil-content of the seeds with the pericarp and without it was determined by extraction with various solvents.

Part of Seed.	Solvent.	Percentage of fat.
Kernel	30-50° petrol	58·5
Kernel	Carbon tetrachloride	60·7
Kernel and pericarp	do.	29·8
Pericarp	do.	6·2

The semi-solid fat obtained was greenish-yellow in colour, the fat from the pericarp being much harder than that from the kernel.

By expression on a large scale in the Oil Mills (yield 28 to 30 per cent), these seeds gave an oil which deposited a small amount of solid on long standing. The physical and chemical constants of the oil expressed in the Mills were determined and are given below :—

Acid value	.. 44·3
Iodine value	.. 57·1
Refractive Index at 30° C	.. 1·4637
Saponification value	.. 220·1
Titre	.. 46·5° C

The oil and Nitrogen in the cake were found to be :—

	Per cent.
Oil	.. 10·8
Nitrogen	.. 2·05

*Dhupa fat.* Dhupa fruits (*Vateria Indica*) are fairly hard, with an outer shell, which splits and opens out on the fruit ripening. Large quantities of these fruits are exported to Germany and other foreign countries, on account of the high-class edible fat obtainable from them. The chief difficulty in the way of developing this industry, here, has been that the fruits are attacked by maggots immediately on ripening, unless dried very soon. Therefore, any attempt to express the fat has to be made in the area in which the fruit grows, the interval between plucking the fruits and expressing the fat from them being as small as possible.

An attempt was made to prepare the fat by boiling the shelled and crushed seeds with water and skimming out the melted fat which floats on top—a process practised by poorer classes in Malnad Districts in Mysore State. The yield of the fat by this method was, however, very poor—1 per cent. Solvent extraction with petrol (30° to 50°) after drying the shelled seeds and powdering them gave 17 per cent fat. A

yield of 8 to 9 per cent was obtained by expression on a large scale in the expeller. The fat is greenish-white in colour, rapidly bleaching on exposure.

The oil and Nitrogen content of the cake from the Oil Mills were found to be :—

Oil	.. 6.7 per cent.
Nitrogen	.. 1.0 „

It is hoped to attack the seeds by cellulose-destroying bacteria like "Delbruckia" in order to recover the fat.

*Jalari (Shorea Telura)*. The seeds of this tree extracted with benzene gave 1 per cent. of a clear oil. Since the yield was small, the work was not continued.

*Ganja Oil (Hempseed oil)*. The seeds gave on extraction with petrol (50° to 60°), 32 per cent. of a clear, light-green oil, which darkened on keeping. The following were the constants of the oil :—

Specific gravity at 27° C	.. 0.9254
Saponification value	.. 188 to 193
Iodine value	.. 146 to 150

It is a semi-drying oil, its iodine value being fairly high, so that its chief use is for making cheap paints. It was being used in Madras and Mysore for being mixed with paints for marking toddy trees which practice has been given up now. It is likely to be useful after purification for the manufacture of soft soaps also.

The seeds are not available in any considerable quantity, so that commercial exploitation of the oil has not been possible.

*Sandal seed oil*. Sandal seeds are available in large quantities in the forests, each sandal tree yielding a fairly good amount per year. The oil is particularly useful for the manufacture of liquid soaps, its iodine value being fairly high. So far, the commercial exploitation of the oil has not been successful, on account of the difficulty of expressing the sticky, viscous oil from the seeds.

The seed is small and sufficiently soft to be crushed between the fingers. It has a thin pericarp, forming about two-fifths of the weight of the seed.

Extracted with benzene, the seeds give 47 per cent of oil and the kernel alone about 65 per cent. The brownish-yellow oil is thick, vis-

cous, and almost odourless. A drop on a watch-glass exposed to air, dries slowly to a reddish-brown plastic mass, but a small quantity of oil smeared on glass plate and exposed, dries up quickly to a thin tough film. The physical and chemical constants of the oil are given below :

Specific Gravity at 27°	..	0·9305
Refractive Index at 55° C	..	1·4785
Saponification value	..	172 to 175
Iodine value	..	102 to 105
Acid value	..	19 to 22

As can be seen, it is a semi-drying oil and should be most useful for the manufacture of varnishes and liquid soaps. The difficulties in the expression of pure sandal seed oil are sure to be surmounted.

It is hoped that a large scale collection of the seeds at an economical rate will be organised by the Forest Departments. In fact, in the case of all oil-seeds, the chief obstacle in the way of commercial exploitation is the prohibitive cost of collection of the seeds.

## ESSENTIAL OILS

*Essential Oil of Karibe (Clausena Wildenowii).*—The leaves and twigs (44 lbs.) of this shrub were distilled in steam yielding 56 gms. of a reddish-brown essential oil with a powerful odour, possessing a distinct resemblance to lemon grass oil. The yield is 0·25 per cent. It is understood that this shrub grows abundantly round about Bangalore. The oil is under investigation with a view to find out its economic importance.

*Essential Oil of Chigatmari (Lansium Aannamalayanum).*—This wood is available in fairly large quantities in Malnad parts in Mysore State and has a very powerful smell which seems to disappear on chopping the wood into small pieces and exposing them to the atmosphere for a few days. A large quantity of oil was distilled in order to find out its suitability for incorporation in perfumes and other toilet articles and its consequent market value.

The distillation results are given below.

233 lbs. Milva chippings (mixture of heart-wood and white wood) were distilled in steam. After 10·5 hours when distillation was complete, 4·4 lbs. of oil and 440 lbs. of condensed steam had been collected.

Yield : 1·9 per cent on the weight of the wood. Steam ratio : oil : steam : : 1:100,

209 lbs. Heart-wood chippings were distilled in steam.

Time for distillation	.. 11.5 hours
Yield of oil	.. 3.7 lbs. i.e. 1.8 per cent
Ratio of oil to steam	.. 1:81

136.5 lbs. white wood chippings were distilled in steam.

Time for distillation	.. 6.0 hours
Yield of oil	.. 1.5 lbs. i.e. 1.1 per cent
Ratio of oil to steam	.. 1:146

The distillation was very rapid in the beginning slowing down considerably towards the end.

During the first 1.5 hours, 1.85 lbs. of oil were collected with only 40 lbs. of condensed steam. During the next 2.75 hours, 1.6 lbs. of oil were collected with 60 lbs. of condensed steam. During the last 7 hours, .7 lb. of oil was collected with 200 lbs. of condensed steam.

The oil which distilled in the beginning was pale-yellow in colour, while the later fractions were dark-green. The oil has a powerful and penetrating odour not unlike that of sandal oil.

Specific gravity at 27° C.	.. 0.8976
Refractive Index at 23° C.	.. 1.4952-1.4960
( $\alpha$ ) <sup>D</sup>	.. -89.8°

A large quantity of wood was distilled at the Sandal Oil Factory, Mysore, where a yield of 1.64 per cent was obtained and a steam ratio of 1:300 was recorded.

## MANUFACTURE OF GLUE

Glue is an important article which is imported in fairly large quantities into India, the quantity in 1934-35, being 16,000 cwts. valued at Rs. 3,82,000. Commercially, glues are of many kinds depending on their origin and are classified as hide glue, size glue and bone glue. For our present purpose, taking into account the locally available material, only hide glue need be considered. In tanneries, pieces and cuttings of swollen hides, are obtained as by-products during their shaping and are known as fleshings. These fleshings are available in very large quantities in the tanneries and their disposal is a problem to the tanners. Investigation has been confined to the utilization of these as the starting material.

Manufacture of glue on a large scale from fleshings in the tanneries cannot be strictly considered a cottage industry. For the latter purpose, the process has to be simplified further and the product obtained will necessarily be of a lower quality, but sufficiently good for the ordinary work of the carpenter. The fleshings or sinews from the slaughter house will form the raw material in this case.

Fresh hide fleshings from the tanneries are generally wet and it is not necessary to dry them unless it is desired to preserve them as such for some time before they are treated. Since for dehairing hides, plenty of lime is used in the tanneries, it is necessary to remove the adhering lime and calcium carbonate formed from it by the action of atmospheric carbon dioxide. Plenty of dirt and extraneous harmful impurities are also generally present and have to be removed. The fleshings are therefore thoroughly washed with cold water with efficient stirring to remove these as much as possible by mechanical action. Even after this preliminary washing, plenty of lime and calcium carbonate will be found admixed in the fleshings. They are removed by neutralizing with diluted commercial sulphuric or hydrochloric acid (1:1) in just a little excess over the right quantity, draining off the liquor which contains a lot of salt and washing the residue thoroughly with water to free it of acid. Freedom from acid should be ensured, as any acid in the residue will affect the quality of the final product adversely.

It may be mentioned that the quantity of acid required to remove the lime and calcium carbonate varies considerably in the case of different samples, naturally depending on the quantity of lime that has been used for dehairing and also on the efficiency of the preliminary washing.

This process of cleaning and acid treatment is not necessary in the case of sinews obtained in villages and slaughter houses. Just a little washing with water to remove any mud or dirt adhering will be quite sufficient. In the case of hides, however, dehairing by the use of lime has to be done.

The fleshings which have thus been completely freed of lime are then soaked in good clear water in the proportion of 1 : 4 and vigorously boiled with agitation for 3-4 hours. The aqueous extract is drained off and the process repeated twice or thrice with smaller quantities of water. The extracts are all mixed and evaporated in an open pan by means of steam or on an open fire. In practice, it will be found more convenient to start the evaporation of the first extract, the later extracts being added as and when they are ready. The evaporation is carried

on to a stage when the residue in the pan becomes thick and a smear on a glass plate forms a thin solid film on cooling. The stage at which concentration has to be stopped can be learnt only by experience. This is the most important step in the manufacture.

Immediately this stage is reached, the thick syrup should be poured into shallow trays (about 2" in depth) to cool and set. In winter, *i.e.*, from October to February, the jelly will slowly harden and thin slabs can be taken out. It is better if some oil, *e.g.*, castor oil is smeared on the trays before the syrup is poured, as this will facilitate the removal of the slabs easily. They are then placed in trays constructed of wire netting and allowed to dry slowly in a shady place with plenty of breeze, rearranging them at intervals to express fresh surfaces. In summer months, it will be necessary to chill the jelly to make it set, by the use of ice or in a refrigerator. It will, however, be more convenient to manufacture most of the glue required, in winter.

Liquid glue itself can be placed on the market and is suitable for most purposes. The difficulty of getting it to set without much expense is the greatest problem and this will be avoided by selling liquid glue as such. Moreover, it can be manufactured during the whole year. It will be an excellent commodity, if only it can be made popular. With cautious propaganda and demonstration of the efficiency of liquid glue which is as good as the solid, it should be possible to introduce it into the market. After all, glue is used in carpentry and other work, only after dissolving in water. In order to keep the liquid glue properly preserved from putrefaction, it will be necessary to add a small quantity of an antiseptic like carbolic acid or creosote.

The quantities handled in the laboratory were one cwt. lot fleshings. The yield of glue on the weight of the wet fleshings has been found to be about 8-10%, and when worked on a large scale, could be improved to about 12%.

Detailed proposals and estimate for the manufacture of glue in the tanneries will naturally depend on the quantity of fleshings available, whether all the glue produced can be sold profitably and whether part-time labour can be had. There is usually a good water supply available in all the tanneries and a hand pump may be necessary to pump the water to the tank where the digestion of the fleshings is done. Wrought or galvanized iron tanks of 200-400 gallons capacity, evaporating pans of similar capacity and a number of trays of galvanized iron and wire gauze will be necessary. The whole cost of the

equipment should not be more than Rs. 600-800. If old vessels are already available, the saving in the estimate will be to that extent.

In the case of villagers who want to carry out the manufacture as a cottage industry, the household earthenware pots themselves will quite do.

It is difficult to discuss the question of marketing the glue produced, in this paper. The sale of glue manufactured in the tanneries will be done by the owners and will depend on their marketing organisation, initiative and enterprise. In the case of villagers who produce glue, the question is a little more complicated. In the U.P., all the glue manufacturers have formed themselves into the Cawnpore Glue Makers Co-operative Society, Fazalganj, Cawnpore, which markets the products for the members who are mostly illiterate. In Punjab, a Co-operative Union under the Co-operative Department was formed with a view to collective purchase of raw materials and sale of finished products. But it is understood that due to certain misunderstandings, it was wound up some time ago.

### UTILIZATION OF IRON ORE

The utilization of Hematite and Limonite available at Kemmanugudi in Mysore for the manufacture of brown paints was investigated in collaboration with the Whitelead Syndicate, Bangalore. It was found that these materials were very good for making brown paints and far superior to Ochre in that their oil absorption was only 2/5 of that of Ochre. It was also found that different shades of brown could be obtained by heating the ore at different temperatures prior to its admixture with oil. Special equipment was, however, found necessary in order to reduce the ore into a condition sufficiently fine to answer the specifications of the Indian Stores Department.

These investigations were carried out at the Indian Institute of Science and the laboratories of the Government of Mysore.

Annamalainagar,  
24th April, 1937.



# The Present Status of the Study of Human Emotions

By

P. S. NAIDU,

(Annamalai University)

*A warmth within the breast would melt  
The freezing reason's colder part,  
And like a man in wrath the heart  
Stood up and answered 'I have felt.'*

—Tennyson, 'In Memoriam', cxxiv, 4.

*'There is a light in my heart, but when I seek to bring it into the understanding, it is extinguished. Which illumination is the true one, that of the understanding, which discloses, indeed, well-defined and fixed shapes, but behind them an abyss, or that of the heart, which, while indeed it sends rays of promise upwards, is unable to supply the want of definite knowledge?'*

—Jacobi from 'Uberweg's History of Philosophy,' Vol. II, p. 200.

'Dynamic' is the word which, more than any other, is truly expressive of the spirit of our age. The change from the old, conservative, and static attitude to the modern, progressive and dynamic attitude to life is the most significant characteristic of this new age of illumination. Nor is this a change affecting only man's attitude to life. It has shaken the very foundations of the external world so confidently laid by nineteenth century science. The physical and the biological sciences have realised, through their penetrating insight into the workings of the sub-microscopic realm, that nature is dynamic; but the social sciences are rather slow to learn the lesson, since the spectre of the 'rational man' still seems to beckon to them from a far off illusory realm. Not science alone, but art too exhibits the unmistakable signs of a profound change in its outlook on life. The revival of Bharata Natyam in our country, to mention only one typical movement, is full of significance, for the very essence of the dance is dynamism.

While his outlook on life is undergoing a profound change, modern man is moved from within by a strange but potent spirit of restlessness, which urges him to strive after the unknown and the undefined. The craze for speed, the hustler's frantic rush round the globe, the growth of the cubist, futurist and impressionist styles in art, and the

rapid spread of sur-realism are so many signs of the times which he who runs may read. Modern man's wistful and lonesome pursuit of he knows not what is pathetically exhibited in his effort to define for himself the ideal relationship between the sexes. Marriage, the sex instinct, preservation and propagation of the species, love and liberty have all been confused each with the others, each being made in turn the standard by which the others should be evaluated. And all the while man has hidden from himself the supreme end for which these are merely so many means. Hence it is that in this particular social institution the restlessness of spirit is intensely manifested at the present day.

Dynamism and restlessness are, therefore, the most outstanding characteristics of our age. So, it is not surprising to find that Psychology has been influenced profoundly by the spirit of the times; for after all, this spirit of restlessness and striving after the undefined is *the* subject for investigation in psychology. It is the task of psychology and psychology alone to probe deep into the mind and get at the source of the universal dynamism of the modern age. The contemporary schools of psychology, in spite of violent disagreement among themselves on several matters of fundamental importance, are agreed in the attitude they take up towards man, the subject of their study. Revolting against the static, elementaristic mental-chemistry of the later nineteenth century, they, with one accord, declared that they would study the activity of man, the dynamic being. The Behaviourist is at one with his opponents in this matter. Even the Factor-School engaged in the investigation of, what for a long time has been considered, the most static aspect of man's endowment, have come to recognise the existence of new factors, such as 'w' and 'v', which make for dynamism in intelligence. Spearman realised the power of conation even in his first work of importance, wherein he says, "The intensity of cognition can be controlled by conation".<sup>1</sup> In a later work<sup>2</sup> though he says that 'On the whole it would appear that the influence of instincts and interests upon cognitive ability has an unexpectedly restricted scope', yet he admits that 'In certain exceptional cases, however, such an influence is so strikingly suggested as to urge the pressing need for at least further investigation'.<sup>3</sup> F. C. Thomas in his recent book expounding the standpoint of the London School says, 'It seems, then, that present cognitive efficiency depends always upon these two orectic factors. On the one hand, it depends on conscious conative control; and on the other, on the un-

(1) *The Nature of Intelligence*, &c., p. 347.

(2) *The Abilities of Man*, p. 341.

(3) *Ibid*, p. 341.

conscious effects of volition. It follows, therefore, that we have to enunciate a law of control, namely, that the intensity of cognition can be controlled by conation and volition.'<sup>4</sup> It is plain, therefore, that the leaders of the great schools of psychology, as well as those engaged in research in restricted branches of the science, admit that the subject of their study is the dynamic nature of the living organism.

An important implication in this universal attitude of the different schools of psychology is the suggested affiliation between this science and the physical sciences on the one hand, and the biological sciences on the other. Sir Oliver Lodge has held tenously to the faith that mind could be reconciled with matter through ether. Though this ether as a third entity reconciling two others, matter and mind, through itself, has disappeared, yet Sir Oliver's faith has been fulfilled in a marvellous manner. Matter as the dynamic centre of energy has ceased to be ultra-mental. The essence of the nucleus of matter is restless energy; the urge of this energy manifesting itself in intra-atomic movements. And it is the very same urge which is the essence of mind too, the essence which is studied by psychology.

As in physics so in biology, it is the universal energy in the form of urge to life and for life that is attracting the attention of the serious minded investigators (of the type of Haldane and Driesch). Not evolution, not embryology, not even cytology and cytogenetics, but it is the change from the bio-physical to the Bionomic or the Ecological attitude that augurs well for the future of biology. The study of the organism in its natural habitat will lead to the investigation of its activity, and of the urge to such activity; in other words, to the investigation of the mind of the organism. Biology and Psychology will have to join forces soon in their attack on the mysteries of organism.

The social sciences are rather behind the times, since they are still obsessed with the idea of the 'rational man.' But the recent publication of Professor J. M. Keynes' book, "The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money," which has evoked violent opposition as well as support, is an indication of the healthy change of outlook in economics. Even the political economist, who loves to be submerged under a pile of statistics and Blue Book reports, is realising that man is dynamic and that his activities can be understood only in terms of the powerful impulses that move his inner nature. Economics has been singled out for special mention here, because, it is the most popular (and also the most

(4) Ability and Knowledge, p. 100.

sought after by governments of the present day) of all the social sciences. In the field of general sociology too the change of attitude is noticeable. Ever since Pareto discussed non-logical conduct in his voluminous work, "Mind and Society," the sociologist has been anxious to secure a proper psychological grounding for his science. But the classical psychologist was so preoccupied with his sterile analysis of consciousness that he could not lend a helping hand to the sociologist in laying the necessary foundations. Professor McDougall, however, came to the rescue by publishing his *Social Psychology* in 1908. The treatise is a prominent land-mark in the history of psychology and sociology, for it lays bare, for the first time, the hidden recesses of the human mind which impel man to action. Modern Hormic Psychology gives us a glimpse into the secret springs of human action; and when these springs are examined carefully it is found that they rest on EMOTIONS. So it is that emotions have come to occupy the focus of the psychologist's attention.<sup>5</sup> 'The human beings psychology now studies are creatures . . . . . in whom emotion and impulse are powerful factors in determining conduct and in whom reason seems less decisive than was long supposed.'<sup>6</sup>

## II

Though emotions are so intimate a part of our nature that they cannot be easily brushed aside, yet their study has been neglected for a long time. 'For some reason human beings, when they become reflective, tend strongly to regard man's rational nature as peculiarly and essentially himself.' This scientific neglect, coupled with the popular illusion, has created in our minds a false scale of values. But man pays a terrible penalty for uprooting violently the main springs of his conduct and character. Charles Darwin writes with great feeling in his auto-biography, 'My mind seems to have become a kind of machine for grinding general laws out of large collections of facts, but why this should have caused the atrophy of that part of the brain alone, on which the highest tastes depend, I cannot conceive. . . . . If I had to live my life again, I would have made a rule to read some poetry and listen to some music at least once in every week; for perhaps the parts of my brain now atrophied would have been kept active through use. *The loss of these tastes is a loss of happiness, and may possibly be injurious to*

(5) The Wittenberg Symposium is a significant indication of the direction in which contemporary psychology is moving.

(6) Heidebreder, *Seven Psychologies*, p. 48.

*the intellect, and more probably to the moral character, by enfeebling the emotional part of our nature.*'<sup>7</sup>

Man is moved very powerfully, indeed, by emotions, and he cannot but be aware of the working of the strong impulses within his inner nature. Yet we witness the surprising phenomenon of the denial of emotions by the popular mind, and of their utter neglect by scientific psychology. In a sense this need not cause us any surprise, for one of

(7) C. Darwin, *Autobiography*, London, 1902, pp. 50-1. (The Italics are ours). Mill and Spencer too have deeply regretted the overdevelopment of their intellect at the expense of their finer emotions and feelings. Mill says, '.....I now saw, or thought I saw, what I had always received with incredulity—that the habit of analysis has a tendency to wear away the feelings, as indeed it has, when no other mental habit is cultivated, and the analysing spirit remains without its natural complements and correctives . . .

My education, I thought, had failed to create these feelings in sufficient strength to resist the dissolving influence of analysis, while the whole course of my intellectual cultivation had made precocious and premature analysis the inveterate habit of my mind. I was thus, as I said to myself, left stranded at the commencement of my voyage, with a well-equipped ship and a rudder, but no sail; without any real desire for the ends which I had been so carefully fitted out to work for; no delight in virtue, or the general good.....

I had now learnt by experience that the passive susceptibilities needed to be cultivated as well as the active capacities, and require to be nourished and enriched as well as guided.....I thought that it (analysis) had consequences which required to be corrected, by joining other kinds of cultivation with it . . . The cultivation of the feelings became one of the cardinal points in my ethical and philosophical creed.

J. S. Mill, *Autobiography* (World Classics), pp. 116, 117 & 120.

Herbert Spencer, the redoubtable champion of the intellect, is very sparing in his praise of reason. 'I must have dimly felt then' he says, 'what I afterwards clearly saw, and have set forth in the *Principles of Psychology*, 388-391, the fact that belief in the unqualified supremacy of reason is the superstition of Philosophers.'

*Autobiography*, vol. I, 253-4.

'It had become manifest to me that men are rational beings in but a very limited sense; that conduct results from desire, to the gratification of which reason serves but as a guide.'

*Autobiography*, vol. II, 365-6.

'I was not, and never had been, among those who labour under the delusion that intellectual culture produces moral elevation.'

'The critical tendency dominant in me...has similarly entailed advantages and disadvantages.....A further effect has been to render my enjoyment of works of art less than it might else have been. The readiness to dwell upon defects has diminished the appreciation of beauties.....'

*Autobiography*, vol. II, 443.

the fundamental lessons that we have learnt from the psycho-analyst is that man loves to screen, from others and from himself too, the real motives to his actions, hiding these in the depths of the unconscious. What, then, are the forces, conscious and unconscious, that have impelled man to cover up elaborately the emotions which are so insistent and powerful in himself? The belief had somehow gained ascendancy over the popular mind that emotions, being not respectable, should be suppressed or at least kept from view. Influenced by false Victorian prudery and the standards of a superficial civilisation which demanded the *keeping up of appearances* as the high watermark of polite behaviour, the ordinary man came to look down upon emotions and their natural expression. And this popular attitude infected scientific outlook. Psychology was influenced by the more advanced physical and biological sciences. The fetish of reason ruled science for more than two milleniums. The standard of analysis set up by such science was necessarily rationalistic, mechanistic and deterministic. Emotions, being purposive by nature, do not easily fit into a mechanistic scheme. They are so elusive that they do not lend themselves to an objective treatment of the type prescribed by nineteenth century science. Yet as psychology had borrowed its elementaristic method from the physical sciences, it had to submit itself to the sway of rationalism, and had either to throw emotions overboard, confining itself to an analytic study of consciousness, or to keep emotions within its fold by treating them as static entities, capable of being dissolved into elementary conscious states. Both alternatives were espoused by psychology during the closing decades of the last century. The human mind is approached more easily through its cognitive than its conative aspect. It is easier to theorise on a basis of a mechanistic analysis of conscious processes of the human mind. And theorising is the chief aim of science.<sup>8</sup>

(8) '....theorists have another very powerful motive for preferring to think of non-logical conduct as logical. If we assume that certain conduct is logical it is much easier to formulate a theory about it than it is when we take as non-logical. We all have handy in our minds the tool for producing logical inferences, and nothing else is needed. Whereas in order to organise a theory of non-logical conduct we have to consider hosts and hosts of facts, ever extending the scope of our researches in space and in time, and ever standing on our guard, lest we be led into error by imperfect documents. In short, for the person who would frame such a theory, it is a long and difficult task to find outside himself materials that his mind supplied directly with the aid of mere logic when he was dealing with logical conduct.'

A very significant reason for the general neglect of emotions may be given in the words of W. Trotter. 'The only reason I can find' he says, 'is that during centuries this subject has been treated philosophically, not psychologically and the method of philosophy is necessarily intellectualistic. Only the adult and complex forms of the affective life were considered, without regard to their evolution, which alone brings us to their origin. The part played by movements as psychological factors and by unconscious activity were forgotten, or misunderstood.'<sup>9</sup>

The adoration of Greek ideals, resulting in the worship of reason as the only power making for good conduct in man, because Greek Ethic strove to establish the supremacy of reason, is a general characteristic of western thought. But as Pareto says, 'All these people fail to notice that the worship of 'reason', 'truth', 'progress', and other similar entities is like all cults, to be classed with non-logical actions.' Hedonism and Utilitarianism could not have flourished but for the conational foundation on which they were built. The logical fiction has worked so far in psychology, but we are discovering that it is impossible 'to be completely quantitative and psychological at the same time.' The champions of atomistic psychology are aware of the powerful nature of emotions, but they neglect them because they are unable to find a place for them in their analytic scheme. Though emotions have been neglected wilfully sometimes, unwittingly at other times, they have always asserted themselves against the united efforts of the analytic psychologists and the theologians to repress them.

It should however be noted that emotion was not always the 'Cinderella of the psychic household.' Plato, Aristotle and the early Christian writers recognised fully the importance of emotions to human life. Later Christian thought, however, with its violent and unreasonable antagonism to pagan culture and hatred of all that is natural, came to look down upon the flesh as the seat of passion, and strove to repress the emotions; and early psychology falling under the sway of theology emulated the example set by the latter and banished emotions from its fold. But by the Sixteenth century, long before the present dynamic revolt, we find ungrudging recognition given to man's emotional make-up and its importance in conduct. The French psychologist Vives declared the supremacy of feelings and built up a science of emotions. Brett says that 'his work on the "Passions" marks a new era in the history of that troublesome subject, not by virtue of a new classification, but rather on account of the careful way in which the phenomena

(9) Pareto, *Mind and Society*, vol. I, p. 304.

are described.' Rousseau, Hobbes and even Huxley were not slow to acknowledge the dominance of emotions in the individual and social life of man. Spencer, Mill<sup>10</sup> and Wundt; Alexander, Ward and Stout (not to mention Schopenhauer and Nietzsche) are the leading figures in the movement which culminated in the Hormic revolt against classical psychology. The forces of revolution were gathering volume very gradually, and were ready to burst forth when McDougall raised the standard of revolt in 1908.

Though the ground was, in a general way, favourable for the inauguration of the science of emotions, yet external forces were adverse to its establishment. So we find that scientific interest in emotions is of very recent origin. The Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology very significantly says that 'the use of the word emotion in English Psychology is comparatively modern.' Research in Psychology left the field of emotions severely alone, so that the number of papers on feelings and emotions was scarcely more than a twentieth of the total number. But since McDougall's epoch-making entry into the domain of Social psychology affairs have taken a turn for the better, and emotions are coming into their own.

### III

If Psychology became lethargic under the soporific influence of rationalistic science, what then, we may ask, was it that roused it from its fatal slumber? We have already mentioned the names of the great leaders of thought who were convinced of the sovereign rule of emotions over the life of man. It was during the last decade of the nineteenth century that experimental psychology and psychiatry gave indications of certain disturbing factors in general psychological theory. The workers in these two fields were pioneers of a very aggressive type. Describing their characteristics as well as of those engaged in allied fields Woodworth says, 'In theory, the psychologists of 1900 subscribed to the definition of psychology as the science of consciousness, but in practice they were studying performance as well as experience, in theory they were for an analytical psychology patterned after chemistry, with elementary sensations, images, and feelings, and with complex thoughts and emotions composed of these elements in varying combinations; but in practice they often disregarded this scheme. In theory they were strong for a physiological psychology, but in practice they made a pro-

(10) Spencer and Mill retracted later their admission regarding the nature of emotions.



found bow to the brain and passed on their way, since cerebral processes were still too obscure to afford much insight into mental processes.'<sup>11</sup>

The most outstanding figure in the movement towards dynamism at the time was Freud. There is supreme significance in the fact that emotional renaissance in psychology synchronised with the reign of Freudianism. The great leader of the Psycho-analytic movement shines as the champion of motive psychology which claims recognition and demands investigation in its own right. 'Freudian psychology is deep psychology, exploring below the surface, it comes upon the trodden and suppressed motives and mechanisms, exposes a sub-conscious activity, discloses the sources of conflict within the competing motives and the imposed struggle between the individual and the encircling collective forces of restraint . . .'<sup>12</sup> Freud unveiled ruthlessly the human mind, exposing it in all its garish hideousness. He forced the artificial civilisation with its sham respectability to look beneath its own surface and behold the slimy repulsiveness of its conflicting emotions. And self-lauding respectability enraged at being exposed within and without chose to deny Freud.

Close on the heels of Freud came the great war of 1914, conducting a vast natural experiment on the human mind. This unparalleled world catastrophe is unique in its revelation of the hidden motives to activity in human life. Ages of repression had altered very little indeed the structure of the mind. When the artificial barriers of a false civilisation were hewn down in the war field the current of emotions, hitherto damned up, burst forth tearing up the bed of the stream and breaking down the banks. The war hospitals were crowded with patients apparently well in body but very ill in mind. The thoughtful doctors had unlimited opportunities for studying the structure of the human mind hidden hitherto from the eyes of the unbelieving medical practitioner of the orthodox school. The war served as a great inspirer and instigator of psychological studies.

The work of Freud, the upheaval produced by the War and Professor McDougall's treatise on Social Psychology are, without doubt, the three great forces that brought about a revolution in the psychology of emotions. One other factor has not been mentioned so far and that is the well known theory of James and Lange. By its very paradoxical nature and by its uncompromising denial of the verdict of commonsense,

(11) R. S. Woodworth, *Contemporary Schools of Psychology*, Pp. 10-11.

(12) *Feelings and Emotions* (The Wittenberg Symposium), p. 34.

the theory threw out a bold challenge to the psychologist, who had perforce to take notice of it and carry on the necessary investigation into the nature of emotions. The theory has not been 'buried with elaborate rites' as Titchner believed he had in his Text-book. Its survival down to the present day is a sign not only of its vitality, but also of the keenness of the interest which contemporary psychology is evincing in the emotional equipment of the human mind. In addition to these factors Jastrow mentions the Doctrine of Evolution, the Genetic and Differential studies in Psychology, improved technique in the study of the problems of Group Psychology, Experimental Psychology and Psychological Aesthetics as the antecedent forces that have stimulated the systematic and scientific investigation of the emotions.<sup>13</sup>

'Reason' as Hume observes rightly, 'is and ought to be the slave of passions.' Even in abstract thought we find that it is emotion that sustains and preserves intellectual activity. This discovery we owe to hormic psychology. It is in no sense an exaggeration of the fact to say that nothing great has been achieved by one incapable of feeling, since a person without feeling is endowed with but poor intellect. The intellect is a great dissolving and disintegrating force, while emotion binds and unifies the varying elements of human nature. It is true that analysis reveals the component factors in the dynamic nature of man, but the force that holds these elements together and gives them the necessary push is, not the intellect, but the hormic urge to life. Contemporary psychology has realised fully that 'feelings and emotions are no longer a superficial manifestation, a simple efflorescence; they plunge into the individual's depths; they have their roots in the needs and instincts . . . ' Mankind is only a little bit reasonable and to a great extent very unintelligently moved in quite unreasonable ways.'

Hence it is that psychologists are proclaiming with one voice the sovereignty of emotions in human nature. In this hymn of praise the voice of the leader, Professor McDougall, sounds loudest and clearest. As the first and most outstanding exponent of hormic psychology, he has propounded a theory of emotions which bids fair to surpass all others in clarity and profundity. But the theory needs extension so that it might cover the moral, the aesthetic and the religious emotions. Such an extension could be made only by one who is steeped in the spirit of Indian Philosophy.

# The Age of Tholkappiam

## SECTION II.

By

S. S. BĪARATI

(*Annamalai University*)

In section (1) we canvassed and critically reviewed the arguments and the data for those arguments set forth in the Chronology to disprove the antiquity of Tholkappiam and to establish its *modernity*. We shall now try to negotiate the theorem on the directly affirmative side and discuss all the available facts, that bear on the question at issue and help us to reach some definite and positive conclusions regarding the age of Tholkappiam. In my thesis, *Tamil classics and Tamilakam*, published in 1913, I reviewed many of these facts ; and the findings they then led me to have since remain unchallenged. Their historic value and probative force are so sound and irresistible as would justify a reference to them here once more.

And these facts, although they accord in their scope of suggestion and in the evidentiary significance, may yet be appropriately dealt under two categories (viz.) (i) external facts of intrinsic historic value incidentally recorded in early literature outside Tholkappiam, and (ii) self-suggestive internal indications in Tholkappiam pointing to irresistible conclusions ; and we shall here discuss them separately.

### I. EXTERNAL FACTS.

i. a. In dealing with the external evidence, I shall unhesitatingly ignore all myths and legends, however hoary they be, unless they are warranted by recorded facts to warrant historic calculations. For instance, we have no use for the orthodox allegations that the author of Tholkappiam was Thrana Dhoomagni, brother of Parasurama, and that he was brought to the Tamil country from his north Aryan home by his would-be guru, the mythical Agasthya of yore.

For, these very legends are such cannibalist-monsters that they ruthlessly annihilate each other. Parasurama was already an aged senior contemporary of Dasaratha Rama ; and if one were to believe the stories about Parasurama, he could have had no brother living even when he defied and was discomfited by his junior rival, the youthful Rama of Ayodhya. We are told that, as ordained by his holy father,

Parasurama even in his youth killed his mother and all his brothers too. But this is not after all the most serious inconsistency we encounter in these legendary accounts. We are asked to believe that the Aryan sage Agasthya borrowed this Bargava Brahman boy for his disciple from his own callous father Jamadagni, and brought him down into the far southern Tamilaham along with 18 other knightly scions of martial clans, whom Lord Krishna lent to the Dwarfish sage at Dwaraka to be his escort on his way south and to become the progenitors of all the Velir chiefs and feudal lords in Tamilakam.

But we read that Rama met and vanquished Parasurama early in the second or Treta Yugam, and that Krishna ruled in Dwaraka at the close of the third or Dvapara and till the very dawn of the fourth or Kali yuga. We are also informed in this context that Agasthya after coming south with these Dwarakite A.D.C.'s of Krishna's gift, hypnotised with his sweet-tuned lute the great monster Ravana into submission. These bewildering miracles of making the murdered brother of Parasurama resurrect and survive the catastrophies of two long eons, and then meet Krishna's feudatories in Agastya's company in a colonising campaign in the Tamilian jungles in the extreme south, would stagger of course any imagination. It would be credulity running riot to put faith in such unmeaning and preposterous myths and to try to build history on their foundation.

It is just as probable as otherwise that the name Tholkappiar may be quite a Tamil name, and need not be a Tathava metamorphosis of the Sanskrit word Kavya. There are other scholars with the name Kappiar in the classical age. We have Kappiyarrukappiyanar and Palkappiyanar. And just to distinguish the earlier scholar of the same name, who was the author of this great Tamil grammar named after him, the distinctive appellation 'Thol' was added to his name. And Thol (தொல்) means 'of yore'. We have a parallel to this usage of distinctive appellations in the instance of two other scholars—Kapilar and Tholkapilar, who have both contributed exquisite poems to the Thokainools or classic anthologies. The very attribute 'Thol' (தொல்) prefixed to the name of the author of Tholkappiam forcibly suggests that his must be an age-long name of fame long anterior to the times of Kappiyanar and Palkappiyanar, who were probably among the early third Sangam luminaries living many decades or even one or two centuries before the epic age represented by Silappadikaram. And it is perhaps some later Aryanophiles that suggested a Sanskritic origin for the name Tholkappiar, deriving the word, Kappiyar from its nearest phonetic Sanskritic analogue 'Kavya', and then built a whole legend about this Tamil grammarian being a descendant of the house of Brigu and Kavi of the

Vedic age. He might have been a Tamilian well acquainted with early Aryan literature, or a Tamilised Brahman of great attainments and erudition in both Sanskrit and Tamil lores. It is unnecessary to pursue this question further here.

And I have already shown in my thesis on Agastya published in this Journal Vol. IV. No. (i) how utterly unreliable and unwarranted are the Agastya-legends at least in so far as they relate to the history of Tamil literature, and to the reputed discipleship of the author of Tholkappiam to this Aryan sage. It is thus both unnecessary and irrelevant to traverse all this ground over again in this enquiry. I shall therefore endeavour here only to draw attention to trustworthy facts of literary records, which would stand scrutiny and would thereby warrant belief.

The author of the Chronology affirms, and almost all modern research scholars agree with him that the Heroics 400 (Purananuru) and the Erotics 400 (Ahananuru) should be reckoned as the oldest among the Tamil classics, much older than the Love lyrics (Kalis), Ten Tens (Patirruppattu), the Ten Idylls (Pattupattu), and very much older than the earliest epics of Silappadikaram and Manimekalai. Whatever be the views about Manimekalai, all responsible research scholars now agree to accept the reasoned conclusions of the late Kanakasabhai Pillai as regards the age of Silappadikaram. In his well-known brochure "Tamils 1800 years ago" Mr. Pillai canvassed all the relevant arguments on both sides, and has shown why Silappadikaram cannot be later than the second century A.D. Some doubt was, of course, cast by Mr. Swamikannu Pillai's astronomical speculations based on incorrect data and some unsound hypotheses; but later investigations of veteran students of history have not only dispelled these unwarranted doubts, but have considerably reinforced Mr. Pillai's considered opinion and settled conclusion as to the age of Silappadikaram. Historians have since accepted that there is nothing to suggest that the Chera king Senguttuvan and the poets Parinar and Ilango Adigal may have lived later than the 2nd Century A.D. And all the classic anthologies known as 'Thokai-Nools' are undoubtedly older than this 'epic of the anklet' fondly known to the scholars as Silappadikaram. If this Tamil epic is of the 2nd century A.D., then the classical anthologies must date back some four or five centuries before Silappadikaram. And there is some excellent evidence which makes this inference almost irresistible. This epic expressly refers to the subsidence of the far-famed Pandian's Tamil territories in the Indian Ocean; and what is of especial importance and interest in this connection is that this reference to the lost-land is as luminously informing as it is topographically exact, "வடிகேவெலறிந்த

வான்பகை பொறாது, பஹுளியாற்றுடன் பன்மலையடுக்கத்துத், குமரிக்கோடுங்  
கொடுங்கடல்கொள்ள. ” —(Silappadikaram—Kathai XI, lines 18-20.)

These lines in substance can be rendered as follows:—“The cruel sea swallowed the tracts of Pandinad along with the watershed of the river ‘Pahruli’ and all the numerous hills therein right down to the embankments of the river ‘Kumari’, as if in spite for the hauteur of the Pandian King, who defiantly trampled down the breakers’ might and reclaimed or wrested land from the maw of the hungry sea.” The Kumari in these lines is the traditional extreme southern-bourn of the prehistoric Tamilaham. There is some controversy as to whether this Kumari was a river or a mountain. While the late scholar Arasan Shanmuganar espoused and expounded the montane theory, all the other savants held fast only to the riverine hypothesis. I have dealt at length with these varying views in my recent thesis “Pre-deluge Pandinad and its southern boundary”; and it is unnecessary to go over the same ground once again in this inquiry. Whether Kumari was a river or was a mountain, it would not affect the value and bearing of this reference in Silappadikaram for purposes of our present inquiry anywise. The only point for us here is that this Kumari formed the southernmost boundary of the Tamilian home of yore, and as such separated Tamilakam from the non-Tamil country to the further south. And as on this point there is perfect unanimity, there is no need to pursue the ‘river versus hill’ controversy any further.

But what matters much in this connection is the reference to the sea-swallowed old river Pahruli in the Pre-deluge Pandinad. That a large tract of the Pandian’s dominions was engulfed by an angry sea is affirmed by many other passages in early Tamil classics. I shall quote just one such reference to clinch the point :

மலிதிரை யூர்ந்துதன் மண்கடல் வெளவலின்  
மேலிவின்றி மேற்சென்று மேவார்நாடிடம்படப்  
புலியொடு விண்ணீக்கிப் புகழ்ப்பொறித்த கிளர்கெண்டை  
வலியினுன் வணக்கிய வாடாச்சீர்த்தென்னவன்.

Mullai Kali—verse 104.

This is again positive and plain. The lost Tamil land is located in the south of the modern Cape Comorin ; and the poet specifically adds that the Pandian monarch and his surviving subjects after the subsidence moved northward and founded a new dominion, carving out of the old Chera and Chola territories slices for their new colony. There is thus unmistakable and abundant proofs for the traditional subsidence of the southern strips of old Tamilaham and for the advent of the Tennaavans—the kings of the Southern Tamilaham—in the present Pandinad from

their submerged southern home. But the reference to the Pandian's river Pahruli in their lost lands has a significance and a bearing on the present enquiry—all unique in itself. Viewed in its proper perspective, it affords cogent reason to postulate an age for some at least of the lyrics of the Purananuru far anterior to that of all the other Sangam works now extant.

It is a well established custom with the early Tamil poets in their songs to wish their kings more days of health and happiness than the sands in the beds of the chief rivers that glided by their capital towns, to wit :—

1. For Chola : சிறக்கநின்னாருயுண், மிக்குவருமின்னீர்க் காவிரி எக்கரிட்ட  
மணலினும்பலவே —Purananuru, St. 43.

2. For Chera : “மண்ணுள்வெந்தே நின் வாழ்நாட்கள் தண்ணுன்பொருகை  
மணலினுஞ்சிறக்க ” Chilap. XXVIII, 126-28.

3. And when we come to the Pandyan King, we find his name coupled with that of the river Pahruli in a similar manner :—

எங்கோவாழிய குடுமி ! தங்கோச்  
செந்நீர்ப் பசும்பொன் வயிரியர்க்கீத்த  
முந்நீர் விழவினெடியோன்  
நன்னீர்ப் பஹுளிமணலினும்பலவே.

Puram. St. 9.

When we see these lines stand addressed to a king by a contemporary poetess, it will be far too gratuitous and even preposterous to presume that she should have inauspiciously requisitioned the name of a dead imaginary or non-existing river in the case of this Pandyan king alone, while in respect of the other two Tamil monarchs contemporary poets have had recourse only to their respective living streams. It would be strange to expect this poetess to refer to the sands of a dead river, rather than to those of the living Vaigai which has been associated by the later classical poets with the names of the Pandyan monarchs, while their tuneful brethren attached to the other two Tamil kings made use of the Kaveri and the Porunai for a like purpose. And the irresistible inference is that the stanza from Purananuru was composed by a poet, who had lived prior to the classic subsidence of the southern Tamil continent and while the river Pahruli was still watering the submerged southern Pandyan province. That Pahruli was the chief Pandyan river wiped off the Indian Map with a vast extent of Tamil territory, is borne testimony to not only by the great commentators, but also by the old poets of the Sangam era as already shown above.

Thus it will be clear that some at least of the lyrics of *Purananuru*, (like the one quoted with a direct reference to 'Pahruli' as a living river,) should have been composed some time prior to the subsidence of the Southern continent, and that some centuries should have again intervened between this submersion and the third Sangam age for this story of the deluge to have crystallised itself into a tradition in their poems. If the first or the second century of the Christian Era be taken as the latest date for the literary activities of this third Tamil Academy at Maḍura, it will not be far wrong if the earlier songs in *Purananuru* are assigned to at least the 5th or 4th century B.C.

i. b. We have also grounds to believe that *Tholkappiam* should be as old, if not older. Every Tamil student is aware of the unbroken tradition that *Tholkappiam* is of the first or second Sangam age, and was one of the standard authorities on grammar for the last and third Tamil Academy. If the tradition were worth anything, this orthodox Tamil grammar should have been in existence long prior to the diluvial catastrophe that swallowed up *Kapadapuram*, the seat of the second Academy. *Valmiki* also speaks of this lost city in his *Iliad*, as the fortified seat of the Pandyan court, south of the river *Tambraparni* which *Hanuman* might come across in his southward expedition in quest of *Sita* (*Kishkinda-Kanda*, 41st. Sarga, 19th. Sloka). As neither *Madura* nor the river *Vaigai* was of any importance in his time, the Aryan *Homer* evidently took no notice of them in his topography of the Tamil country. *Valmiki* is now believed by the European and Indian Scholars alike to have flourished at the latest, about the 6th century B.C. According to the tradition, *Tholkappiam* was composed before the Pandyan kings had moved their court from *Kapadapuram* into the modern *Madura*. And so it cannot have come into existence after at least the 6th or the 5th century B.C. For *Kapadapuram* was sea-engulfed and lost in the deluge long before the age of *Chandragupta*, *Megasthenes* and *Asoka*. And we have unimpeachable records of their times to assure us that already the fame of Modern *Madura* as the flourishing Pandyan metropolis had spread far and wide so as to reach the brilliant courts of these great Aryan kings in *Pataliputra* in the north east and of the Grecian monarchs in *Bactria* in the north west extremes off the trans-Vindhyan half of the great Indian continent.

i. c. In the *Arthasastra* of *Chanakya*, he refers to the pearls imported into *Patalipuram* from the great Pandyan emporiums by the significant causal name "*Kapatakam*". This was because, to the inland Aryans in north India, pearls were a novelty; they had not been familiar before with these peculiar products of the Pandyan gulfs off the Southern *Tamilakam*. They were first imported into the north from



the then Pandyan capital Kapatam; and hence they were named "Kapatakam" (i.e.) products from Kapatam. This name for pearls once coined and given currency to naturally stuck on, though the city that gave birth to this name itself was later lost in the sea. Instances of semantic changes of this kind are common in the history of all languages. Koranadu, more properly Koorai nadu—a suburb of Mayavaram, was the original birth place of a type of sarees which were named after this place of origin; but soon this name was appropriated to one type or design of sarees wherever made. In the same way although the city of Kapatam was dead and lost in the subsidence of the southern Pandinad, her fame survived in the name she gave to the pearls she once sent out to the various foreign markets. And Chanakya referred to these pearls received from the Pandyan coasts into Patalipuram by their original causal name of Kapatakam. Surely we know Kapatam was not in existence in the time of Chanakya. For, his contemporary, Megasthenes, mentions Madurai as the then Pandyan Metropolis: and we know from the Tamil classics that only after the deluge which engulfed Kapatam with the Southern Pandinad, the Pandyan kings founded their great capital "Koodal" which has later been known as "Madurai". The very name Madurai is not to be found in the earlier poems of the Sangam classics which speak of this latest Pandyan City only as Koodal. It is only in the later pieces and anthologies, we frequently meet with the name Madurai. In any event, the deluge which cost the Pandyan kings their original capital Kapatam must be prior to the age of Chandragupta and Megasthenes in the 4th century B.C. when Madurai had become the Pandyan metropolis, but after the age of Valmiki (6th century B.C.) who refers only to the original Pandyan capital Kapatam. The natural inference is that in the 6th or the 5th century B.C. the subsidence must have taken place. And the Ceylon traditions recorded in the Mahavamso and Deepavamso just confirm this identical period of the deluge, inferred from the Indian classical tradition recorded in the early Tamil literature about Tholkappiam being composed in the pre-deluge Pandyan Capital of Kapatam, and would more than justify and warrant the inference that its age cannot be later than the 5th century B.C.

i. d. The fact that fewer Aryan words are met with in Tholkappiam than even in the earliest extant Sangam poems such as Aham and Puram is also a circumstance suggesting and supporting a finding in favour of a greater antiquity for Tholkappiam than may be assigned to any of the Sangam classics.

i. e. There is yet another fact that points to a greater antiquity for Tholkappiam than for the earliest of the Sangam classics now extant.

It is a known fact that in Tholkappiar's age, whatever it be, Tamil writers were well conversant with Sanskrit and its literary lores. Tholkappiar himself is believed on all hands to have been an erudite Brahman Sanskritist with profound Tamil scholarship. Nevertheless we are told by his College friend Panambaranar, who writes the preface to the classic grammar, that Tholkappiar found his inspiration only in Aindiram. He does not even refer to Panini's grammar as even a collateral source for Tholkappiar to draw upon. We know that since Panini wrote his now-famous Vyakaranam in Sanskrit, the theory that all Sanskrit dhatus or roots should be verbal and that all nouns are derived from such verbal roots has alone been holding its ground. The earlier theory of Sakatayana, Nairuktas and Gargya that all dhatus need not be verbal probably found their highest authority in 'Aindiram', an earlier pre-Panini grammatical treatise since utterly lost through desuetude. This apparent connexion between Tholkappiam and Aindiram will be patent to all who study in a scientific manner the chapter on Uriccol in the former. That Tholkappiam follows the Gargyan or Aindric theory and does not attempt to derive nouns from verbal roots would itself suggest that he belongs to the pre-Panini school and probably also to pre-Panini age. Had Panini's masterpiece been in existence at his time, it would have been impossible to explain how his Vyakaranam should have been ignored both by Tholkappiar and his college-mate, or why it should have been less known in the south than the obsolete 'Aindiram'. The only reasonable inference therefore is that Tholkappiar wrote his great grammar before Panini was born to enrich the Aryan tongue with his classic grammar. As Panini's age is now taken to be not later than the 4th Century B.C., Tholkappiam must have come into existence many decades prior to it. It may be that each item of these circumstantial evidences taken individually may not be enough warrant to conclude in favour of this great age for Tholkappiam. But it is hardly possible to escape the conviction forced upon us by the cumulative effect of all these links, which taken together point unmistakably and uniformly to about the 5th or the 6th century B.C. being the latest margin for Tholkappiar's age.

## II. INTERNAL INDICATIONS

ii. Fortunately for the orthodox school these are not the only proofs available on this issue. There is very strong and cogent internal evidence in this great grammar itself which irresistibly shifts its age back at least by some centuries before that of the earliest poems in the classic anthologies now known as "Togai-nuls". Books like Ahananuru and Purananuru, Narrinai and Kalittogai reveal their great old age

on their very face. That all the gems in these collections are not of the same period, nor even of the so-called third Sangam age, is beyond all question. They bear marks of having been carefully gathered and reverently garnered in the course of some long decades by master critics whose erudition and taste have won for their learned conclave an imperishable niche in the Temple of the Tamil-muse. It is a fact of history that this last royal Academy in the Pandyan metropolis had spent all its palmy days before Jesus was born, and that their evening was almost sinking into shades at the end of the 2nd century A.D. The earliest poems in these anthologies must therefore have been of an age four to five centuries before the gloom of night threw its pall on the tomb of the famous Madura Academy. Nevertheless we come across numerous lapses even in these oldest poems infringing many a rule laid down in the highly venerated treatise of Tholkappiar. A study of some of these derelictions in the classical poems, for which the author of the Chronology claims a greater antiquity than for Tholkappiam, would afford a very highly instructive and interesting reading.

Tholkappiam consists of three divisions, Eluttu, Col and Porul (orthography, etymology and contents or poetic themes). In each of these sections the author has made a masterly marshalling up of the precepts and rules of technique in accord with the usages in the Tamil language and literature of his times. I shall try to cite here a few illustrations showing how violently the classic poems have infringed these rules in Tholkappiam. (1) In Eluttathikaram or the section on letters, we meet with these following rules:—

- (i) கதநபமவெனு மாவைந்தெழுத்தும்  
எல்லாவயிரொடுஞ் செல்லுமார்முதலே—28.
- (ii) சகரக்கிளவியு மவற்றோரற்றே  
அ, ஐ, ஒள, வெனு மூன்றலங்கடையே—29.
- (iii) ஆ, எ, ஒ, வெனு மூவயிர், ஞகாரத்துரிய—31.
- (iv) ஆவோடல்லது யகரமுதலாது—32.

In utter defiance of every one of these rules, the poets of the classic period have used many a word in their poems. (vide)

சமம் (புறம். 72)	சந்து (மலைபடு)
சகடம் (குறு. 165)	ஞமலி (புறம். 74 & பட்டின 140)
சண்பு (மதுரைக்காஞ்சி)	ஞமன் (புறம். 6)
சதுக்கம் (திருமுருகு)	ஞரலல் (பதிற்று & திருமுருகு)
சந்தி (... ..)	ஞிமிறு (புறம் 93)
சமம் (... ..)	யவனர் (பதிற்று முருகு & முல்லை)
சலம் (மதுரைக்)	யூபம் (புறம். 15, 224; பதிற் 67; மதுரைக்கா. 27)
சவட்டி (பெரும்பாண் & பதிற்று)	யூகம் (திருமுருகு)

(ii) In Collathikaram or section on etymology, Tholkappiam lays down as follows :— “அவற்றுள்,

முன்னிலைதன்மை யாயிரிடத்தொடு  
மன்னுதாசும் வியங்கோட்கிளவி.

(Sutram, 221.)

But in Sangam classics, in numerous stanzas, we find instances of a direct violation of this rule against the use of optative mood in reference to the nouns in the 1st and 2nd persons :

“யாணர்வைப்பி னன்னாட்டுப்பொருந் !  
வானவரம்பனை நீயோ பெரும !  
... ..  
நடுக்கின்றி நிலையரோ ... ..  
பொற்கோட்டிமயமும் பொதியமும் போன்றே”

Again Puram verse No. 6 ends as follows :

“தண்டாவீகைத் தகைமாண்குடுமி !  
தண்கதிர் மதியம்போலவும் தெறுசுடர்  
ஒண்கதிர் ஞாயிறுபோலவும்.....  
மன்னுகபெருமநீ நிலமிசையானே.”

Again we have,

“கார்நறுங் கடம்பின் கண்ணிருடி  
வேலன் வேண்ட வெறிமனைவந்தோய் !  
கடவுளாயினுமாக  
மடவை மன்ற வாழிய முருகே !”

(Narrinai, verse 34.)

And in Puram verse No. 9, the concluding lines read as follows :—

“எங்கோ வாழிய குடுமி ! தங்கோச்  
செந்நீர்ப் பசுப்பொன் வயிரியர்க்கீத்த  
முந்நீர் விழவினெடியோன்  
நன்னீர்ப்பஹ்னி மணலிலும்பலவே.”

Again in Ahananuru stanza No. 13, we find as follows :—

a. “(நீ)இவட்பிரிந்துறையின், நோயின்றாக.”

And so also in Ahananuru :—

b. “.....நின்றேர்  
முன்னியங்கூர்தி பின்னிலையா  
தூர்க், பாக.....(அகம்-44)

c. “கடவுக, காண்குவம், பாக!—

(Ibid., 54.)

d. “.....தாமரை  
வண்டுதுபனிமல ராருமூர !  
யாரையோ ? நிற்புலக்கேம்,  
வாழியரெந்தை !

(Ibid., 46.)

- e. “.. பெருந்தகையிழந்த கண்ணினை! பெரிதும்  
வருந்தினை, வாழியார், நீயே !

(Ibid., 59.)

(f) In stanza No. 85 and in many others as well in Ahananuru, and in stanza Nos. 11, 16, 18, 22, 32, 49, 86, 212, and others of Narrinai, we find phrases like வாழிதோழி and வாழியநெஞ்சே frequently used in contexts of direct addresses. In all these, and many similar instances even in the earliest classics, optatives in relation to nouns in the 2nd persons have been freely used. And instances for optatives even in regard to nouns in the 1st person are not wanting. To quote but two stanzas, Nos. 71 and 72 of Purananuru, should suffice for this purpose :

“அவர்ப்புறங்காணே னாயிற்சிறந்த  
பேரமருண்க ணிவளினும்பிரிக;  
மெலிகோல் செய்தே னாகுக;

வன்புலங்காவல் மாரியான்பிறக்கே.”

(Stz. 71.)

Yet again, we read as follows :

“ .....வேந்தரை  
அருஞ்சமஞ்சிதையத் தாக்கி முரசுமொடு  
ஒருங்ககப்ப்டேனாயின்,  
குடிபழிதூற்றங் கோலேனாகுக,  
புரப்போர் புன்கண்கூர  
இரப்போர்க்கியா இன்மையானு றவே.

(Stz. 72.)

These are glaring instances in the earlier classical poems of open violation of Tholkappiar's rules on this head.

(iii) And when we come to the Porulathikaram we are confronted in almost all the extant Sangam classics with wholesale infringements of positive injunctions of Tholkappiam in many directions.

(1) Rule 56 of (Ilampuranam) Agattinai in Porulathikaram reads as follows :—

“நாடகவழக்கினுஞ் செய்யுள்வழக்கினும்  
பாடல்சான்ற புலனெறிவழக்கம்  
கலியேபரிபாட் டாயிரு பானினும்  
உரியதாகு மென்மனார் புலவர்”

And Seyyuliyal rule No. 106 lays down

“ .....புறநிலைவாழ்த்தே  
கலிநிலைவகையும் வஞ்சியும்பெறு.”

and rule No. 107 extends the same prohibition to a greater extent in the following words:—

“வாயுறைவாழ்த்தே அவையடக்கியலே,  
செவியறிவுறாவென வவையுமன்ன.”

In rule No. 154 the same principle is affirmed from another point of view. Whereas the previous rules quoted above prohibited the use of Kali and Vanji metres for the four types of poetic address, namely, புறநிலை வாயுறை செவியறியுறா and அவையடக்கு Rule No. 154 only allows the use of Venba and Asiriya metres for the first three of these types. And rule No. 153 also lays down that the Kali-venba metre is only appropriate for Kaikkilai poems, while by rule No. 117 Paripadal metre is told out as exclusively appropriate for erotic poems. Even a cursory glance at the Sangam classics would show that every one of these rules is more honoured by breach than observance by the third Sangam poets. Almost all the erotic poems of this age except Kalittogai are in Agaval and Venba metres banned for them by Tholkappiar and prescribed only for ethical poetry. (Vide, the whole of aham, Narri-nai, Ainkurunuru and Kuruntogai—all erotics in Agaval metre. And Karnarpathu, Ainthinai—Aimpathu, Kural—(Kamattupal), Etcetera—all erotics in Venba metre.).

And most of the Paripadal verses that are now extant are not erotic, but relate to non-erotic puram-poetry.

(2) Again, instances of infringement of other rules of Tholkappiar's Porulathikaram are also abundantly available in the Sangam classics. Rules 4, 5 and 11 of Marapiyal in Porulathikaram restrict the use of the word 'pillai' பிள்ளை to the young ones of certain species of animals. But in verse 107 of Kuruntogai this word is used for a young wild cat for which Tholkappiar would only allow the appellation of குட்டி (vide Rule 6 of Marapu). Again, Rules 8 and 9 of மரபியல் ban the use of the word குருளை to the young ones of any animals other than the specified five, namely dogs, pigs, tigers, hares and foxes. Verse No. 119 of Kuruntogai violates this prohibition and gives this name to young snakes (vide, சிறு வெள்ளா வினவ்வரிக் குருளை). Verse No. 38 of the same book uses this word for a young monkey, for, which rule 22 prescribes the exclusive appellation of குழவி. Rules 63 and 64 restrict the use of the word நாகு only to the young ones of cows, buffaloes, reindeers and crabs, and taboos its use for all else. And yet in Agam verse 85 we see this rule violated by its use for a young 'Vengai' tree, for which no warrant whatever can be found in Tholkappiam or in any other grammar for that matter. Kuruntogai verse No. 64 affords another instance of infringement of this rule of Tholkappiam by appropriating this word for a young fish.

(3) Tholkappiar classifies the particles of comparisons into four specified divisions, and ordains severally their uses for particular similes of defined purposes or types (vide, sutrams Nos. 287, 288, 289, 290, 291 in Uvama Iyal of Porulathikaram). But there is not any one of the Sangam classics which has not broken all these injunctions in Tholkappiam. All these particles have been taken pell-mell, and used for all kinds of similes irrespective of their types or purposes, and without any reference whatever to the scope, composition or complexion of the similes and metaphors they are made to serve. Thus we find in all the early classics breaches of rules and laws of Tholkappiar's grammar in great abundance. Yet in all these cases of infringements in the classics of injunctions of Tholkappiar, we may notice a phenomenon worth considering.

Even among Sangam classics violations of this kind are less frequent in Purananuru and Agananuru, Narrinai and Airikurunuru, while they are relatively more prolific in the later works like Pattuppattu, Silapadikaram, etc. Manimekhalai, one of the latest works of this age errs most in this direction, as will be apparent to any one who takes a dip into it. If Tholkappiar had lived at the time of or after these works, he could not have made rules in disregard of the usages in all these classic poems, nor would he have ventured to outcaste numerous words enshrined in them by formulating rules of grammar banning them all. Every grammarian should have deduced his principles only from the standard literary works held in esteem in his times; and he should have scrupulously made provisions to meet even rare usages, and also to anticipate and accord with the tendencies of his times. And no grammar could discountenance or taboo words and forms sanctioned by great masters of literature. Tholkappiar could not therefore have lived anywhere about the time of the Sangam poets and much less after; for, in that case he could not have framed so many rules in every one of his three sections of his grammar in such utter disregard and defiance of all the classic works of the Sangam age as we have just shown them to be. And if he did, no scholar would have paid any regard or attention to such a grammatical treatise as it would offend all the great classics held in high esteem in Tamilaham. Tholkappiam should have ruled the roast at an age far anterior to the age of these classics; for, words and morphological forms could not be smuggled into a language in the teeth of the rules of grammar in a single season and in great numbers.

Such words and forms proscribed by the ordinary rules of grammar could only creep in by stealth and in stages, and ordinarily would have to linger long in the shade before they could freely and openly mingle with their privileged fellows. It would take them even longer to

muster into a colony sufficiently strong to extort for themselves a general amnesty, and to secure immunity and sanction for their use in literary works in a manner to enforce revision of the system of grammatical laws to make room for them. We have already on the reckoning of the author of the Chronology itself found it necessary to take some at least of the earlier classical poems found in the collections of Purananuru, Agananuru, etc. back to a period not later than the 3rd and 2nd century B.C.; and a few verses like the one referring to the river 'Pahruli' in Purananuru may have to be thrust back even to the pre-deluge Kapatam-age of the Pandyan empire, which would take us to at least the fifth century B.C. The verse of (நெட்டிமையார்) wishing the Pandyan king to live as many days as the countless grains of sand in the bed of his 'Pahruli' river itself offends the rule of Tholkappiyar's grammar by using the (வியங்கோள்) or a verb in the optative mood in relation to a noun in the second person, which is definitely banned in Tholkappiam. It stands to reason therefore that Tholkappiam must have preceded all the earliest poems in Agam and Puram, which in themselves may be as old as the 4th or even the 5th century B.C.

By reviewing the facts of history bearing on this question we found ourselves led to the same conclusion that Tholkappiam could not have been later than the 6th or 5th century B.C. And now a dispassionate discussion of the internal evidences also drives us to the same view. It is thus abundantly clear that the age of Tholkappiam could never be in any post-sangam period, nor could it be even coeval with the poems in the 'togai-nuls', some of which appear to go as far back as the 4th and 5th century B.C. Tholkappiyar therefore must have lived and written his great book in the pre-deluge Pandyan Capital in or before the 6th century B.C. The author of the chronology assigns, on the contrary, Tholkappiam to the 6th or 7th century A.D.; and the reasons he gives for his opinion were canvassed and found to be untenable in the previous section. And in this section we have dealt with facts and evidences of historic and literary value unmistakably taking Tholkappiam to the 6th or the 7th century B.C. with a chance of its age being shifted still further back perhaps, but never forward.



# தொல்காப்பிய ஆராய்ச்சி

By

S. S. BHARATI  
(Annamalai University)

## பொருளதிகாரம், அகத்திணை இயல்.

எழுத்துஞ் சொல்லும் செய்யுளுக்கு இன்றியமையாத மொழியிலக்கணமாதலின்; அவற்றை முறையே முன்னிரண்டதிகாரங்களாக வகுத்துக்கூறின தொல்காப்பியர், புலவர்க்குரிய செய்யுட்பகுதியைப் பொருளதிகாரமெனும் பெயருடன் மூன்றாமதிகாரமாக வகுத்தார். மக்கள் கருத்துக்களை விளங்க வெளிப்படுத்துங்கருவியனைத்தும் செய்யுளெனப்படும். செவ்விய உளப்பாடு, அதாவது உளத்துறுங்கருத்தைக் கேட்போருளத்துறக் கூறுதற்குரிய சொற்றொடர்க ளெல்லாம் செய்யுளாகும். பாட்டே செய்யுளென்பது பிற்காலப் பிழைவழக்கு. உரை, பாட்டு, நூல், பிசி, குறிப்புமொழி, மறைமொழி, பழமொழி எனப்பலவகையானும் பல்வேறுருவிற்கேன்றி நின்று பொருள்பயப்பனயாவும் செய்யுளேயாம். செய்யுளெல்லாம் பொருள்பற்றியவே யாகலானும், பொருளொன்றே மக்கள்குறியாக, செய்யுள் அப்பொருளின் குறியீடாகலானும், மக்கள் பொருளாகக் கருதுவன பற்றியும், அப்பொருளுரைக்குங் கருவியாகும் செய்யுள்பற்றியும், அவையிற்றுக் குறுப்பும் துணையுமாவன பிறப்பற்றியும் கூறுவனவற்றைத் தொகுத்துக் கூறும்பகுதி பொருளதிகாரமெனப் பெயரிடப் பெற்றது.

இனி, ஆரியர் செய்யுள் அனைத்தும் அறம் பொருள் இன்பம் வீடு என்பவற்றுள் ஒன்றும் பலவும் பொருளாகக் கொண்டே அமைதல் வேண்டுமென்பர். தமிழ்ப் புலவர் மக்கள் பொருளாக மதிப்பன எல்லாம் செய்யுளுக்குரிய வாகும் எனக்கொள்வார். அப்பொருளெல்லாம் மக்கள் வாழ்வொடு படுவதாகலானும், மக்கள் வாழ்வும் அகமும் புறமுமென இரண்டிலடங்குவதாகலானும், பொருளை அகமும் புறமுமென இருகூறும் வகுத்துக் கூறுவதே தமிழ் மரபாகும். அம்மரபு மேற்கொண்டு தொல்காப்பியரும் தமிழ்ச் செய்யுட்பொருளை அகப்பொருளும் புறப்பொருளுமாக இருகூறுக்கி, அவற்றின் பொது இயல்புகள் அல்லது இலக்கணங்களைத் தம் நூலின் பொருளதிகாரப் பகுதியில், முதற்கண் அகத்திணையியல்—புறத்திணையியல் என முறையே வகுத்தமைத்து, பிறகு அவற்றுள் அகத்தின் சிறப்பியல்புகளை—களவியல்—கற்பியல்—பொருளியல்களில் விளக்கி, அவற்றின் பிறகே அப்பொருள்களை அறியக் கூறும் கருவியாகிய செய்யுளியல்புகளை மெய்ப்பாட்டியல்—உவமவியல்—செய்யுளியல் என மூன்றுபகுதிகளில் கூறி, இறுதியில்—செய்யுள்

செய்வார் தமிழ் மரபு பிறழாமற் காத்தற்கு வேண்டியனவற்றை மரபியலில் தொகுத்து விளக்கிப்போந்தார்.

இதில், முதற்கண்ணதாய இவ்வகத்திணை யியல் மக்களின் அகவொழுக்கம் அல்லது காதலற வழக்குகளின் பொதுவிலக்கணம் கூறுதல் நுதலிற்று. அகமாவது, காதலர் உளக்கிடையும், அவர் காதல் கதிர்த்து வினைப்பட்டு அன்றோர் மனை வாழ்க்கையிற் றொடர்புறுவது மாறும். திணையாவது—ஒழுக்கம். ஆகவே அகத்திணை என்பது காதல்கண்ணிய ஒழுக்கலாரும். அவ்வொழுக்கப் பொதுவியல்புகள் கூறுப்பகுதி அகத்திணையியலெனப் பெயர்பெற்றது. (அதுவேபோல், புறத்திணையென்பதும் மனைவாழ்க்கைக்குப் புறமான மக்களின் சமுதாயத்தொடர்புடைய ஒழுக்கமாகும். அதுபற்றிக் கூறுமிலக்கணப் பகுதி புறத்திணையியலெனப்படும்.)

இனி, அவர்காலத் தமிழ் நூல்வழக்கை மேற்கொண்டு, அகப்புற வொழுக்கங்களைத் தொல்காப்பியர் எவ்வேழுதிணைகளிலடக்கி யமைத்தார். அவற்றுள், அகவொழுக்கங்களை முறையே கைக்கிளை-முல்லை - குறிஞ்சி-பாலை - மருதம் - டெய்தல் - பெருந்திணை எனமுறைப்படத் தொகுத்தார். காதல் ஒருவர் பாற்கதிர்த்து, மற்றையோர் மாட்டுப் பருவமன்மையாற் பால்விளியுணராப் பான்மையிற் சிறக்கத்தோன்றா நிலையே கைக்கிளை. எனில், இந்நிலை, கன்றியகாதலன் “காமாஞ்சாலா இளமையோள் வயின்” — தனக்கேமம் சாலப்பெறானெனினும், தன்னலம் விழையாமல் பழி பிழையொழித்து அவனலம் பேணியொழுகும் காதற்பெற்றிய தாகலின், அதனை முதலில் வைத்து, இருபாலும் காதலொத்துக் கனிந்து சிறந்த அன்பினைந்திணைகளை அதன்பின்னமைத்து, அவற்றின் பின் காதல் கண்ணாது கழிகாமப் பழி பிறங்கும் பெருந்திணையைப் பிரித்து நிறுத்தி முறைப்படுத்தினார். இவ்வெழுதிணைகளையுமிம்முறையாற் றொகுத்துக் காட்டினரெனினும், விரிக்குங்கால் இலக்கணம் நிறைந்த ஐந்திணைகளையும் தொடர்புடன் பலபட விளக்கி, தம்மியல் கூறுமளவில் அமைவவான கைக்கிளை பெருந்திணைகளி னிலக்கணங்களை முறையே இறுதியிலிரண்டு தனிச் சூத்திரங்களாற் றெளித்து முடிப்பார்.

## 1. கைக்கிளைமுதலாப் பெருந்திணையிறுவாய் முற்படக்கிளந்த வெழுதிணையென்ப.

(இதன்பொருள்) : —கைக்கிளைமுதலாகப் பெருந்திணை இறுதியாக முன்னே சொல்லப்பட்ட அகத்திணை ஏழாமென்று கூறுவர் தமிழ் மொழி வல்லார்.

இச்சூத்திரத்தில் அகத்திணையேழும் நிரலே கூறப்பெறாமையானும், இதன் பிறகுள்ள சூத்திர வைப்புமுறையில் கைக்கிளையை முதலாகவும் அதனையடுத்து அன்பினைந்திணையும் இறுதியிற் பெருந்திணையுமாக அமைத்துக் கூறப்பெறாமல், முதற்கண் அன்பினைந்திணை கூறி அவற்றின்பின் கைக்கிளைபெருந்திணைகள் தொடர்ந்து கூறப்படுவதாலும், “முற்படக்கிளந்த வெழுதிணை” என்பது அகத்திணையியலில் இச்சூத்திரத்தின் பின் அமைத்துக்கூறப்பட்ட முறையைச் சுட்டாதென்பது

வெளிப்படை. எனவே ஈண்டு “முற்படக்கிளந்த” என்பது இடத்தால் முற்படக் கூறும் அமைப்பு முறையோடு பொருந்தாமையால், காலத்தால் முற்படக்கிளந்த வொன்றையே குறிக்குமெனக் கொள்ளக்கிடக்கின்றது.

பொருளதிகாரத்தின் முதலில், பொருள் அகம்புறமென இருவகைப்படு மென்பதும், அவற்றுள் பின் கூறப்பெறும் புறத்திணை ஏழாதல் போலவே அகத்திணையும் ஏழாமென்பதும், அவ்வகத்திணையும், கைக்கிளை, நடுவணைந்திணை, பெருந்திணை என ஏழாக வகுக்கப்படுமென்பதும் ஆகிய இவற்றைச்சட்டிய சில சூத்திரங்கள், அகத்திணையின் முதற்கண் இச்சூத்திரத்திற்கு முன்னே ஆசிரியரால் அமைக்கப்பட்டிருத்தல் வேண்டும். அவ்வாறாயின் மட்டும் ‘முற்படக்கிளந்த’ எனுமிச்சூத்திரச் சொற்களுக்குப் பொருளமைதியும், ‘கைக்கிளைமுதலா’ எனுந்தொடர்க்குப்பொருளும் அமைவதாகும். தொல்காப்பியத்துட் சூத்திரங்கள் சில கடல்கோளாலும் புலம்பெயர்தலாலும் வீழ்ந்து மறக்கப்பட்டிருத்தல் கூடுமென்பது களவியலுரையாலும், ‘தலைமகள் கூற்று உணர்த்திய சூத்திரம் காலப்பழமையால் (ஏடு) பெயர்த்தெழுதுவோர் விழு எழுதினர் போலும்’ என்னும் இளம்பூரணர் உரைக் குறிப்பாலும் தெளியப்படும். அவ்வாறு கொள்ளக்கால் இச்சூத்திரச் சொற்றொடர்கள் பொருள்தும் பொருளமைதி பெறுமாறில்லை. ஆதலாலும் ‘முற்படக்கிளந்த’ என்னுந் தொடருக்கு, ‘இதற்குமுன்னே ஆசிரியர் கூறிப்போந்த’ என்று அமையப்பொருள் காண்பதே பொருத்தமாகும்.

## 2. அவற்றுள்,

நடுவணைந்திணை நடுவணதொழியப்

படுதிரைவையம் பாத்தியபண்பே.

(இ-ள்.) அவற்றுள் நடுவணைந்திணை — முன்னேச் சூத்திரத்துட்கூறிய ஏழுதிணைகளுள் முதலுங்கடையுமான கைக்கிளை பெருந்திணைகளை நீக்கி, நடுகின்றன முல்லை, குறிஞ்சி, பாலை, மருதம், நெய்தல் எனும் ஐக்திணை,

நடுவணதொழிய—

தம்முள்நடுவுநிலைத்திணையாகியபாலையொழிய,

படுதிரைவையம் பாத்தியபண்பே—கடல்குழந்தநிலத்தைப்பகுத்த இயல்பேயாம்.

இதில் ஐந்திணை - எழுவாய்; பாத்தியபண்பே-பயனிலை; ‘ஒழிய’ என்னும் வினையெச்சம் ‘பாத்திய’ எனும் பெயரெச்சங்கொண்டும், அப்பெயரெச்சம் ‘பண்பே’ எனும் பெயர் கொண்டும் முடிந்தன. வையம்-பாத்திய என்னும் வினைக்குச் செயப்படுபொருள். உலகம் ‘நானிலம்’ எனப்படுதலானும், அது குறிஞ்சி, முல்லை மருதம் நெய்தலென நிலத்தியல்புபற்றிப் பகுக்கப்படுதலானும், பாலைக்குத் தனித்தூரிய நிலம் பிறிதின்மையானும், முல்லைமுதல் நெய்தலீரான நிலங்களையே அவ்வகத்திணையாகப் பொருள் நூலுடையார் கொள்ளுதலானும், உலகத்தை நானிலமாகப்படுத்த

இயல்பே பாலையொழிந்து நாலுதிணையுமாகும் என்பதை இச்சூத்திரம் விளக்கிப் போர்த்தது.

3. முதல்கருவுரிப்பொரு ளென்றமூன்றே  
நுவலுங்காலை முறைசிறந்தனவே  
பாடலுட்பயின்றவை நாடுங்காலை.

(இ-ள்.) பாடலுட்பயின்றவை நாடுங்காலை—புலவர் செய்யுளில் வந்து பயிலும் விழுக்குகளை ஆராயுங்கால், முதல் கரு உரிப்பொருள் என்ற மூன்றே—முதற்பொருள், கருப்பொருள், உரிப்பொருளென வகுத்த மூன்றாமே, நுவலுங்காலைமுறை சிறந்தனவே—செய்யுளுக்குரிய புலனெறி விழுக்கம்பேசுங்கால் முறையே சிறந்தனவாம்.

முறை சிறந்தன என்பதனால், முதலிற்கருவும், கருவின் உரியும், ஒன்றி நொன்று முறையே சிறப்புடைத்தாமெனவும், மூன்றே சிறந்தன என்பதனால் சிறவாப்பிறப்பொருளும் உளவாமெனவும் பெறுதும். அகப்பாட்டுக்களில் உரிப்பொருளேதலையாய தென்பதும், அதற்கு முதலுங் கருவும் சிறப்புதவந்துணையாகச் சார்ந்துவருபொருளேயாமென்பதும் வெளிப்படை. இனி, இம்மூன்றுமேயன்றி இவை போலச் சிறவாத பிறப்பொருளும் உளவாதல் அகத்திணையியல் “மரபுநிலைதிரியா மாட்சியவாகி, விரவும் பொருளும் விரவுமென்ப” என்னும் 45ஆம் சூத்திரத்தால் தெளியப்படும். இதில் மூன்றே என்பதில் ஏகாரம் தேற்றமும் பிரிநிலையுமாம். சிறந்தனவே என்பதிலேகாரம் இசை நிறையாகவேனும் அசை நிலையாகவேனும் கொள்ளுக.

4. முதலெனப்படுவது நிலம்பொழிதிரண்டி.  
னியல்பெனமொழிப இயல்புணர்ந்தோரே.

முன்னைச் சூத்திரங்கூறும் மூன்றனுள் முதற்பொருளினத்தென இச்சூத்திரம் விளக்குகிறது.

(இ-ள்.) முதலெனப்படுவது—முதற்பொருளென்று கூறப்படுவது, நிலம்பொழுதிருண்டினியல்பு—நிலமும் பொழுதுமாகிய இரண்டினியல்பாம், எனமொழிப இயல்புணர்ந்தோரே—என்று சொல்லுவார் பொருளிலக்கணம் உணர்ந்த புலவர்.

இதில் இறுதியேகாரம் அசைநிலை.

5. மாயோன் மேய காடுறையுலகமும்  
சேயோன்மேய மைவரையுலகமும்  
வேந்தன்மேய தீம்புனலுலகமும்  
வருணன் மேய பெருமணலுலகமும்  
முல்லைகுறிஞ்சி மருதம்நெய்தலெனச்  
சொல்லியமுறையாற் சொல்லவும்படுமே

இது மேலே இரண்டாஞ் சூத்திரத்துட் கூறியாங்கு, நானிலம் முறையே நான்குதிணைக்கு உரிமைபெறு முறை கூறிற்று.

(இ-ள்) மாயோன்மேய காதையுலகமும்—கருநிறக்கடவுள் உறைவிடமாகிய நிரைமேயும் காட்டுநிலப்பகுதியும், சேயோன்மேய மைவரையுலகமும்—செவ்வேளுறையும் மஞ்சதவழும் மலைநிலப்பகுதியும், வேந்தன்மேய தீம்புனலுலகமும்—இந்திரனுக் கிருப்பிடமாகிய இனிய புனல்நிறை நிலப்பகுதியும், வருணன்மேய பெருமணலுலகமும்—கடல்கெழுக்கடவுளாகிய வருணன் விரும்பும் அகன்ற மணல் நிலப்பகுதியும், முல்லை குறிஞ்சி மருதம் நெய்சுலெனச் சொல்லிய முறையாற்சொல்லவும் படுமே—முறையே முல்லை குறிஞ்சி மருதம் நெய்தல் என்ற பெயர்களாற் சொல்லவும் படுமே.

சொல்லிய முறையாற் சொல்லவும் படுமே என்பதனால், இந்த நாற்றிணைக் குரிய நானிலங்களும் ஈண்டுச்சொல்லாத வேறுமுறையாலும் கூறப்பெறும் என்பது பெறப்படும். இதில் நானிலப்பகுதியும் அவற்றிற்குரிய திணைப்பெயரும் நிரனிறையால் கூறப்பெற்றன. ஈண்டுகூறப்பெற்ற மாயோனுஞ் சேயோனும், கருநிறக்கடவுளுஞ் செவ்வேளுமாகத் தொன்றுதொட்டுத் தமிழர் தொழும் கடவுளராவர். கருநிறத்தைப் பழிப்பதன்றிப் பாராட்டுதல் தொல்லாரியர் வழக்கன்று; தமிழிலோ எழில் பாராட்டி ‘‘மாயோன்’’ எனவும், ‘‘மாயோயே’’ எனவும் வரும் பழம்பாட்டுக்களின் தொடர்களும் குறிப்புக்களும் இங்குச் சிந்திக்கத்தக்கனவாம். இனி, இந்திரனும் வருணனும் ஆரியர் வழிபடுங் கடவுளராய்க் கருதப்பெறினும், அறப்பழங்காலத்தே அவர் திராவிடர் வழிபட்ட தெய்வங்களாகவும், பிறகு அவரிடம் ஆரியர் வாங்கித் தம் வழிபடுகடவுளராகிக் கொண்டனரெனவும் சிலமேனாட்டுப் புலவரின் ஆராய்ச்சிக்கட்டுரைகளால் அறிகின்றோம். உண்மையெதுவாயினும் பண்டைக்காலமுதல் இக்கடவுளர் பெயரும் வழிபாடும் தமிழகம் அறிந்ததென்பது தெளியப்படும்.

இச்சூத்திரத்தானும் முன்னைய சூத்திரத்தானும் முதற்பொருளின் முதற்பிரிவான நிலத்தியல்பும் திணைத்தொடர்பும் கூறப்பெற்றன. இனிவருஞ் சூத்திரங்களால் அதன் இரண்டாம்பிரிவான காலவியல்பும் பாகுபாடுகளும் கூறப்படும்.

## 6. காருமாலையு முல்லை; குறிஞ்சி கூதிர்யாம மென்மனூர் புலவர்.

(இ-ள்.) காரும்மாலையும் முல்லை-கார்காலமாகிய பெரும்பொழுதும், மாலேப் பொழுதாகிய சிறுபொழுதும் முல்லைத்திணைக்குச் சிறந்தன; குறிஞ்சி கூதிர்யாமம்-கூதிரென்னும் பின்பெயற் காலமாகிய பெரும்பொழுதும், நள்ளிரவாகிய யாமமென்னுஞ் சிறுபொழுதும் குறிஞ்சித்திணைக்குச்சிறந்தன; என்மனூர் புலவர் - என்று கூறுவர் புலவர்.

ஓராண்டு-இளவேனில், முதிர்வேனில், கார், கூதிர், முன்பனி, பின்பனி என இவ்விரண்டு மாதங்கொண்ட பருவம் அல்லது பெரும்பொழுது ஆறுகப்பகுக்

கப்படும். இதில் கார்காலம் முன்பெயற்கநலமான ஆவணியும் புரட்டாசியும் எனத் திங்களிரண்டு கொண்டதாகும். கூதிர் பின்பெயலும் வாடையுமுடைய ஐப்பசியுங் கார்த்திகையுமான திங்களிரண்டு கொண்ட பெரும்பொழுதாகும்.

விடியல் அல்லது காலே, நண்பகல், ஏற்பாடு, மாலை, யாமம்; வைகறையெனப் பகல் மூன்று, இரவுமூன்றாக ஆறு சிறுபொழுதுகள் கூடியது ஒருநாளாகும். ஈண்டு யாமம் என்பது இரவின் நடுக்கூறுகிய சிறுபொழுதாம்.

## 7. பனியெதிர் பருவமு முரித்தெனமொழிப.

(இதுமேலேச்சூத்திரத்திற்கோர் புறனடை)

(இ-ள்) பனியெதிர் பருவமும்—முன்பனிக் காலமும், உரித்தென மொழிப—குறிஞ்சித் திணைக்குரியதெனக் கூறுவர் (புலவர்).

முன்பனிக்காலமாவது மார்கழி தை ஊர்த்திங்களிரண்டு கொண்ட பெரும் பொழுதாம். ‘பருவமும்’ என்பதிலும்மை குறிஞ்சித்திணைக்குக் கூதிரேயன்றி இப்ப ருவமும் உரியதாம் எனப்பொருள்தருதலால், இறந்ததுதழீஇய எச்சவும்மை. ‘மொழிப’ என்பதனால் அதற்குரிய எழுவாயான புலவர் என்பது அவாய் நிலையாற் கொள்ளப்படும்.

## 8. வைகுறு விடியல் மருதம்; ஏற்பாடு

நெய்தலாதன் மெய்பெறத்தோன்றும்.

(இ-ள்) வைகுறு விடியல்மருதம்—பொழுது புலராத இரவினிறுதிப் பகுதியான வைகறையென்னும் சிறுபொழுதும், பொழுதுபுலர்ந்து எல்லெழுங் காலையான விடியலென்னும் சிறுபொழுதும் மருதத்திணைக்குச் சிறந்தனவாகும்; ஏற்பாடு நெய்தலாதல் மெய்பெறத்தோன்றும்—சுடர்படும் பகற்கால மூன்றும்பகுதியாகிய சிறுபொழுது நெய்தற்றிணைக்கு உரியபொழுதாதல் பொருள்பெறத் தோன்றுவதாகும்.

எப்படும்பொழுதை ஏற்பாடென்பது தமிழ் வழக்கு. இன்றும் தமிழ் வழக் கழியா மேல்கடற்கரையில் படுஞாயிற்றின் திசையைப் ‘படுஞாறு’ எனவழங்குதல் உலகறிந்தசெய்தி. இதில் வைகுறு என்பது வைகறையின்மருத. “வைகறை விடியல்” என்றே இளம்பூரண அடிகள் பாடங்கொண்டிருப்பதும் இதனை வலியுறுத்தும். “வைகுறு விடியல்” என்பதில் எண்ணும்மை சூத்திரச்செறிவுநோக்கித் தொக்கது. இனி, ‘வைகுறு விடியல்’ என்ற தொடரை வைகுறுதலாகிய விடியல் எனக்கொண்டு பொழுதுபுலர்தற்குமுற்பட்ட இறுதியிரவுக்காலத்தையே குறிக்குமென்றும், ஏற்பாடு என்பது சுடரெழுந்து வெயிலெறிக்கும் காலைப்பொழுதைக் குறிக்குமென்றும் ஆசிரியர் சிவஞானமுனிவர் தம் தொல்காப்பிய முதற்கூத்திரவிருத்தியில் கூறுகின்றார். வைகறையும் விடியலும் ஒருபொருட் கிளவிகள் என்னுமவர் கொள்கை பண்டைத் தமிழ்ப்புலவர்க் குடன்பாடன்றென்பது சங்கத்தொகை நூல்களில் பல விடங்களிலும் பயின்றுவரும் குறிப்புக்களால் தெளியப்படும்.

வைகறையும் விடியலும், முன்னும் பின்னுமாக வரும், இருவேறு சிறுபொழுதுகளே யென்பது, மதுரைக் காஞ்சியில்

“.....வில்லோர்

நயந்த காதலர் கவவுப்பிணித்துஞ்சிப்

புலர்ந்துவிடி விடியல் எய்த (662, 663, 664)

என்ற அடிகளில் இரவு புலர்ந்து கதிர்விரியும் காலையை விடியலென்றும், பிறகு

“இரவுத்தலைப்பெயரும் ஏமவைகறை” என்று அதேபாட்டில் 686 - ஆம் வரியில் வைகறையை விடியலினின்றும் வேறுபிரித்து, அது இரவுத்தலைப்பெயரும் எமஞ்செய் காலமென்றும், மாங்குடிமருதனார் கூறுதலால், வலிபெறுவதாகும். அன்றியும் பெருங்குன்றார்ப் பெருங்கௌசிகனார் தாம்பாடிய மலைபடுகடாத்தில்

“வேய்ப்பயில் விளையுட் டேக்கட்டேறல்

குறைவின்றுபருகி நறவுமகிழ்ந்துவைகறைப்

பழஞ்செருக்குற்ற அனந்தல்தீர” எனும்

171, 172, 173 வது அடிகளில் வைகறைப் பொழுதைக்கூறி, பிறகு

.....“நள்ளிரு ளலரி

விரிந்தவிடியல் வைகினிர்கழிமின்” என்று

இருளலர்ந்து பொழுது புலர்ந்து கதிர்விரிந்த விடியற்காலத்தை வேறுபிரித்தோதினர். இஃது இவ்விருபொழுதையும் இவ்வாறே வெவ்வேறாக மதுரைக் காஞ்சியில் விளக்கிய மாங்குடி மருதனார் கொள்கையே அடிப்பட்ட தமிழ் வழக்கென்பதனை வெள்ளிடை மலைபோல் விளகருவதாகும். ஈண்டுப்பெருங்கௌசிகனார் “நறவுமகிழ்ந்து வைகறைக் காலத்தே அனந்தல்தீர, கடமான் கொழுங்குறையும் ..... பயிணிணப் பிளவை.....தடியொடு விரை இ.....குறமகளாக்கிய வாலவீழ்வல்சி அகமலியுவகை யார்வமொடனை இ.....மனைதொறும் பெறுகுவீர்” என்றுமுதற்கூறி, பிறகு அவ்வாறுண்ட நீவிர் விடியல்வரை வைகி விடிந்தபிறகு கழிவீராக; ஏனெனில், நீர்போகும் ஆறு,.....“பரலவற்போழ்வீர்

கரந்துபாம் பொடுங்கும் பயம்புமாருளவே” (அதனால்)

“குறிக்கொண்டு.....நோக்கி

வறிதுநெறியொரீஇ வலஞ்செயாக் கழிமின்” எனக் கூத்தருக்கு வைகறைப் பொழுதில் வழிக்கொண்டு பாம்பொடுங்கும் பள்ளங்களில் வீழ்ந்திடர்ப்படாமல் தங்கிக் கதிர்விரிந்த விடியற்காலத்தே புறப்படுமாறு கூறுதலால், இவ்விருகாலமும் இருவேறு சிறுபொழுதுகளே என்பது தெள்ளத்தெளியக்கிடைப்பதாகும். இன்னும் மலைபடுகடாத்திலேயே

“வான்கண் விரிந்த விடியலேற்றெழுந்து” என 257 வது வரியிலும்,

“நொய்ம்மரவிறகின் நெகிழிமாட்டிப்

பனிசேணீங்க வினிதுடன்றுஞ்சிப்

புலரிவிடியற் புள்ளோர்த்துக்கழிமின்”

என 446 முதல் 448 வது வரிகளிலும் வைகறையின் வேறுபட்ட விடியற்காலத்தை விளக்கியிருப்பது பாராட்டிச் சிந்திக்கத்தக்கது. இனி, அகநானூற்றில் 37, 41-ஆம் பாட்டுக்களில்

“வைகுபுலர் விடியல் வைபெயர்த்தாட்டி” எனவும்

“வைகுபுலர் விடியல் மைபுலம்பரப்ப” எனவும் முறையே இரவுபுலர்ந்து கதிர்விரியும் விடியற்காலம் இனிது விளக்கப்பெற்றும், 42 வது பாட்டில்

“பெரும்பெயல் பொழிந்த ஏமவைகறை” எனவும், 308 வது பாட்டில்.....

“கங்குல்.....

.....ஆவியழி துளிபொழிந்த வைகறை” எனவும், வைகறை விளக்கப்பெற்று மிகுந்தது. இவ்விரு சிறுபொழுதும் ஒழிய, எற்பாடு இவற்றின்வேறாய் பகலிற் திப்பொழுதென்பது,

“பகன்மாயந்திப் படு சுடரமையம்” என அகம் 48-ஆம்பாட்டிலும் தெளிக் கப்படுகிறது. விரிவஞ்சி இதனுடன் நிறுத்தலாயிற்று. இனைய பல பழம்புலவர் பாட்டுக்களால் பொழுது புலர்ந்து கதிர்விரியும் இளவெயிற் காலையாய் பகற்பொழுதின் முதற்பகுதியே விடியலென்றும், பொழுது புலருமுன்னுள்ள இரவின் இறுதிப்பகுதி நேரமே வைகறையென்றும், சுடர் படும் பகலிறுதிக்காலமே எற்பாடென்றும் மயக்கத்திற் கிடனின்றித் தெளியக்கிடக்கின்றது.

“முல்லை குறிஞ்சி மருதம் நெய்தல் பாலையென முறைசெய்தற்கேது, மாலை, யாமம், வைகறை, காலை, நண்பகல் என்னும் சிறுபொழுதின் கிடக்கைமுறையே யன்றி வேறின்மையானும், ஏனைத்திணைகட்குச் சிறுபொழுது ஒரோவொன்றையாகலின் மருதமாத்திரைக்கிரண்டு கோடல் பொருந்தாமையானும், அஃதுரையன்றென மறுக்க” என்னும் சிவஞானமுனிவர் கூற்றும் பொருந்தாமையறிக. சிறுபொழுது ஐந்து மாலைமுதல் நண்பகல் வரையெண்ணி நிறுத்தப்படின, ஒருநாளுலப்புறமல் பிற்பகல் பேரின்றி வீணேவிடப்படுவதாகலின், ஈண்டு எண்ணப்பெறாத பிற்பகலாகிய சிறுபொழுதொன்றுண்மையும் அதுவே எற்பாடாவதும் விளக்கமாகும். அன்றியும் அன்பினைத்திணைமுறை சிறுபொழுதின் கிடக்கை முறைபற்றியதேயாகும் என்பதற்கு முனிவரவர்களின் கொள்கை தவிரப்பிரிதாதரவின்மையானும், பெரும் பொழுதாறினை ஐந்துதிணைக்கு ஒரோவொன்றாய்க் கொடுத்தமையாமல், குறிஞ்சிக்குக் கூதிரோடு முன்பனியும், பாலைக்கு வேனிலொடு பின்பனியும் ஆக இவ்விரண்டு பருவத்தத்துவைத்தும், மருதத்திற்கும் நெய்தலுக்கும் பெரும்பொழுதெதுவும் பிரித்துரிமை செய்யாமலும் சூத்திரிக்கும் ஆசிரியர் முறையிற் பொருத்தம் காணும் முனிவரவர்களுக்கு மருதத்தினை யொன்றற்குச் சிறுபொழுதிரண்டமைத்தலில் பொருத்தாப் பெருந்தவறு காணுதற்குரிய அவசியத்தை விளக்கினார்களாயில்லை. இனி, நாற்கவிராஜ நம்பியார் சிறுபொழுதைந்தென்று கூறுதலால் பண்டைப்புலவர் பாட்டுக்களைப் பொய்யாக்கித் தொல்காப்பியர் சூத்திரங்களுக்கும் புதுப்பொருள் காண்பது உரையறமாகாது. மேலும் வைகறையும் விடியலும் மருதத்திணையான ஊடலுக்கு



உரித்தாமாறும், மாலையையும் யாமத்தையும் பரத்தையர் வீட்டிற்கழித்த தலைவன் தன் மாட்டு மீட்டுவரும் வைகறை விடியற்காலங்களில் தலைவி அவனோடுதல் இயல்பாவதும், பிறகு பொழுதேறி விருந்தினர்க்கு வேளாண்மை செய்தலால் ஊடல் தீர்தல் முறையென்பதும், பண்டைய அகத்துறைப் பாட்டுக்களால் இனிது விளங்கும்.

“ஊடுதல் காமத்திற்கின்பம் அதற்கின்பம்  
கூடிமுயங்கப்பெறின்” எனும் குறளால்

ஊடுமிடத்தெல்லாம் கூடுதலினின்றியமையாமை பெறுதற்கில்லை. கூடி முயங்கப்பெறின் அதற்கின்பம் என வள்ளுவர் விதந்து கூறுதலால், ஊடலிறுதியில் கூடப்பெறப் பொழுதுகளும் பலவுளவாதல் இயல்பென்பது பெறப்படும். அள்ளர் நன்முல்லையாரின் குறுந்தொகைப் பாட்டில் விரிகதிர் விடியலைக்காலையென்றும், வைகறையை விடியலென்றும் மாறிக்கூறியதனால் வைகறையின் வேறுபட்ட விரிகதிர் விடியல் உண்டெனப் பண்டைப்புலவரின் பல பாட்டுக்கள் கூறுவதைமறுக்க வொண்ணாது. அதுவேபோல் அப்பாட்டில் எற்பாடு கூறப்பெறாமைகொண்டு ‘பகல் மாயந்திப்படு சுடர்ப்’பொழுதான எற்பாடு இல்லையெனலும் இயலாது. கூறப்பட்ட தொன்று உண்டெனலாமன்றிக் கூறப்பெறாமைகொண்டு உள்ளதொன்றை இல்லையெனத் துணிதற்கு அளவை நூலிடந்தராது. மேலும், இப்பாட்டினடிகளில் சொற்றொறும் வருகின்ற வும்மை எண்ணும்மையே யாகும். ‘என்று இப்பொழுதைந்தும்’ என முற்றும்மை பெறாமையானும் சிறுபொழுதைந்தேயாம் என்னுமுடிவிற்கு இக்குறுந்தொகைப் பாட்டடிகள் இடந்தராவாம். எவ்வாற்றானும் பண்டைப்பாட்டுகள் பலவற்றுள்ளும் வைகறையும் விடியலும் இருவேறு சிறுபொழுதுகளாமென விதந்து கூறப்பெற்றிருத்தலானும், இச்சூத்திரத்தில் வைகறையையும் விடியலையும் கூறி அவற்றின் வேறாய் எற்பாடும் கூறப்பெறுதலானும், இரவுக்குச்சிறுபொழுது மூன்றாவதுபோல் பகலுக்கும் மூவேறு சிறுபொழுது வேண்டப் படுதலானும், ஈண்டு வைகுறு, விடியல், எற்பாடு என்பனமூன்றும் முறையே கங்குலிறுதிப்பொழுதான வைகறையும், வெயிலொடு விரிகதிர் விடியலான பகல் முதற் சிறுபொழுதாகிய காலையும் மருத்துக்கும், பகலிறுதியில் சுடர்படும் பொழுதான எற்பாடு நெய்தலுக்கும் சிறப்புறவருமெனும் உரையே உண்மையுரையாமெனத் தெளிதலெளிதாம். அதனால் நச்சினர்க்கினியரொடு இளம்பூரண அடிகளும் இதுவே இச்சூத்திரப்பொருளாகக் கூறுதல் அமைவுடைத்தாகும்.

9. நடுவுநிலைத்தினையே நண்பகல்வேனிலொடு  
முடிவுநிலைமருங்கின் முன்னியநெறித்தே,

(இ-ள்) நடுவுநிலைத்தினையே—அன்பினைத்தினையுள் நடுகின்ற பாலைத்தினையே, நண்பகல் வேனிலொடுமுடிவு நிலைமருங்கின்—நடுப்பகல் வேனில் முதிர்ந்த நிலையில் அதனொடு பொருந்துமிடத்து; முன்னிய நெறித்து—கருதிய பிரிவுக்குரிய வழித்தாகும்.

எனவே நண்பகலாகிய சிறுபொழுதும் முதிர்வேனிலாகிய பெரும்பொழுதும் பாலைத்திணையாகிய பிரிவிற்குத் தனித்தனியுரிமை கொள்ளுதலேயுமன்றி, இவை தம்முட் கூடிய முதிர்வேனிலின் நண்பகல் பிரிவுக்கு மிகவும் சிறப்புரிமையுங் கொள்ளுமென்பது இச்சூத்திரத்தில் விளக்கப்படுகிறது. முதிர்வேனிற்காலம் ஆனியும் ஆடியுமாகிய திங்களிரண்டுமாம். இதில், வேனிலென்பது முதிர்வேனிற் பருவத்தையே குறிக்கும்; அதுவே பிரிவுக்குரியதாகலின். முதிர்வேனிலிற் பிரிந்தார் கார்காலத்திற் கூடுவர். இளவேனில் கூடுதலுக்கே உரிய பருவமாகும். பணிக்காலத்திற் பிரிந்தார் இளவேனிலிற் கூடுவர்.

“அறவர் ... :... \* ... ..

பாண்டி. லொப்பிற் பகன்றை மலருங்

கடும்பனி யற்சிர நடுங்கக் காண்டக

... ..

கோங்கங் குவிமுதை யவிழ ஈங்கை

நற்றளிர் நயவர துடங்கு

முற்று வேனின் முன்னிவந் தோரே.”

[நற்றிணை. 86.]

என்ற நக்கீரரின் நற்றிணைப்பாட்டும்,

“.....புணர்மிணை: என இணர்மிசைச்

செங்க ணிருங்குயி லெதிர்குரல் பயிற்று

மின்ப வேனிலும் வந்தன்று.”

[நற்றிணை. 224.]

என்னும் பெருங்கடங்கோவின் நற்றிணைப்பாட்டடிகளும், பிரிந்த காதலர் திரும்பக் கூடும் “காமர் வேனின்மன் இது” என்னு மகப்பாட்டடியும்,

“ஊடினீ ரெல்லா முருவிலான் றன்னுணை

கூடுமி னென்று குயில்சாற்ற—நீடிய

வேனற்பா ணிக்கலந்தான் மென்பூர் திருமுகத்தைக்

கானற்பா ணிக்கலந்தாய் காண்.”

எனவரும் சிலப்பதிகார வெண்பாவும், பணிக்காலம் பிரிவுக்கும், இளவேனில் கூடலுக்குமே ஏற்புடைத்தென்பதை வலியுறுத்தல் காண்க.

10. பின்பனிதானு முரித்தெனமொழிப.

(இ-ள்.) முதிர்வேனிலேயு மன்றி) பின்பனிச்சாலமும் பிரிவுசுட்டும் பாலைத்திணைக் குரித்தாகுமென்று கூறுவர் (புலவர்).

பின்பனிப்பருவம் மாசியும் பங்குனியுமாகிய திங்களிரண்டும் கொண்டதாகும்

11. இருவகைப்பிரிவும் நிலைபெறத்தோன்றினும்

உரியதாகு மென்மனார்புலவர்.

(இ-ள்) இருவகைப்பிரிவும்—முன்னையிரு சூத்திரங்களிலும் கூறப்பெற்ற வேனிற் பிரிவும், பின்பனிப்பிரிவும், நிலைபெறத்தோன்றினும்—பிரிதனியித்தங்களாக

அமையாது, பிரிந்துநின்ற பாஸ்யாகவே உருப்படினும், உரியதாகும் என்மனார் புலவர்—அது பாஸ்குரியதேயாகும் என்று கூறுவாற்புலவர்.

முதிர் வேனிலிற் பிரிந்தார் கார்காலத்து மீண்டுவந்து கூடலும், பனிக்காலம்பிரிந்தார் இளவேனிலில் மீண்டு கூடலும் மரபென்பது அகத்துறைப் பழம்பாட்டுக்களாலும் இனிது விளங்கும்.

இதில் இருவகைப்பிரிவென்பதற்கு உரையாசிரிய ரிருவரும் இருவேறுரைகள் தருவாராவர். தொல்காப்பியர் தம் இலக்கணநூலில் யாண்டும் தாம் நுதலும் பொருளை ஐயமறவரையறுத்து விளக்குவதைக் கடனாகக்கொண்டொழுகும் பான்மைபாராட்டத்தக்கது. உரைகாரர் கூறும் “பிரிவுவகைகளை அவர்கருதினராயின் அவற்றை இங்குக் குறியாமல் இருவகைப் பிரிவெனப் பொதுவிற்கூறி, வேண்டுமோர் வேண்டியாங்கு மாறிப்பொருள் கொள்ளுமாறு கூறிப்போகார். தானே வகைகளை விளக்காது தொகையைமட்டும் கூறுவது இலக்கணநூலார் மரபாகாது. அதனால் ஈண்டு ‘இருவகைப்பிரிவு’ என்னுந் தொடர் சுட்டும் வகையிரண்டும், இதனொடு தொடர்புபடத் தொல்காப்பியர் தாமே கூறியவாதல் வேண்டும். முதிர்வேனிற்பிரிவை முன் ஒன்பதாஞ் சூத்திரத்திலும், பின்பனியிலும் பிரிவுண்டென்பதைப் பத்தாஞ் சூத்திரத்திலும் கூறியமைத்தாராதலின், இவ்விருவகைப் பிரிவு என இச்சூத்திரத்தில் அவற்றைத் தொகுத்துச் சுட்டினரென்பதே பொருந்துவதாகும். காலிற்பிரிவும் கலத்திற் பிரிவுமென நச்சினூர்க்கினியர் கூறுவதே தொல்காப்பியர் கருத்தென்பது அவர் சூத்திரங்களில் யாண்டும் சுட்டப்பெறாமையால் அஃது இங்கு பொருள்நன்மையறிக.

இனி இளம்பூரணர் கொள்கையும் அமைவுடைத்தன்று. “தலைமகளைப் பிரிதலும், அவளையுடன் கொண்டு தமர்வரைப் பிரிதலும்” என்று பிரிவிருவகைத்தாமென் பதிவர் கூற்று. இதற்கும் தொல்காப்பியத்தில் யாண்டும் ஆதரவில்லாததோடு, தலைமகன் தலைமகளைக் கொண்டுதலைக்கழிதலையும் பாஸ்யென்ற இவர்கூற்று பொருளொடு பொருந்தாப் பெயரிடும்பிழைக்கும் ஆசிரியரை யாட்படுத்துவதாகும். பிரிவும் புணர்தலேபோல் தலைமகன் தலைமகள் தம்முளாவதோர் ஒழுக்கமேயாதல் வேண்டும். கொண்டு தலைக்கழிதலில் இவ்விருவருந் தலைக்கடித் தம்முட் பிரியாமல் ஒருங்கு செல்வராதலால், அஃதவர் காதற்றுகிறையில் பாஸ்யாமாறில்லை. அவர் கூடியிருக்கவும் தலைவி தலைவனுடன் செல்லும்பொருட்டுத் தன் தமரைப்பிரிந்து செல்லல் பாஸ்யெனில், தலைவியைக்காண வருந்தலைவன் தன் தமரையும் பாங்கரையும் பிரிந்து வரல் பாஸ்யேயாதல் வேண்டும். இவ்வாறு யார்யாரைப் பிரிந்தாலும் பாஸ்யென்று கொள்ளுதற்கு இலக்கணநூலிடந்தராது. அகத்திணைகளனைத்தும் காதலர்தம்முள் நிகழும் அன்பொழுக்கம் பற்றியதேயாகுமன்றி, அவருள் ஒருவருக்கும் அயலவர்க்கும் இடைப்பட்ட ஒழுக்கத்தையும் தொடர்புகளையும் சுட்டமாட்டா. ஆதலானும், காலத்தால் வேறுபட்ட பிரிவிரண்டையும் இதற்குமுன் தனியிரண்டு சூத்திரங்களில் ஆசிரியர் விளக்கினராகலானும், இச்சூத்திரத்தில் அவற்றையே இருவகைப் பிரிவுமெனத் தொகுத்துக் கூறி நிறுத்தினர் எனலே பொருத்தமாகும்.

# **SIDDHITRAYA**

**By**

**YĀMUNĀCĀRYA**

*Edited with English Translation and Notes*

**By**

**R. RAMANUJACHARI**

**AND**

**K. SRINIVASACHARI**



देहादिविशिष्टसम्बन्धितया दृश्यमानसुखदुःखज्ञानादिकार्यं विशिष्टवर्तिनीमेवात्मोत्पादशक्तिं कल्पयति धूम इवार्देन्धनसम्बन्धिनि धूमध्वजे स्वोत्पादनसामर्थ्यम् , ब्रीह्यङ्कुर इव च सतुषतण्डुले । अपि च बोधे सत्येवात्मनोऽनात्मव्यवच्छेदे सम्भवति कृतं तच्छक्त्याश्रयणेन ।

न चैवं सति बोध एव परमात्मेति युक्तम् ; तस्याश्रयप्रतियोगिसापेक्षस्वरूपत्वात्, आत्मनश्च 'तद्विपरीतस्वभावत्वात् ; साक्षाच्च चेतयितुरहमर्थस्य स्फुरणात् , अनुभवतर्कागमबलेन चितिमत आत्मभावस्यानन्तरमेव प्रपञ्चितत्वाच्च ।

न च चितिमात्रात्मवादेऽपि तस्यागन्तुकाविषयसम्बन्धे बोधत्वमध्यारोप्य बोद्धृत्वसमर्थनसाधीयः ; सम्बन्धस्योभयनिष्ठतया अर्थस्यापि बोद्धृत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

Effects, such as, knowledge of pleasure and pain, which are found to be associated with one connected with a body, will lead to the conclusion that the potency to produce them resides only in the self thus qualified ; even as smoke will only point to the fact that the capacity to produce it resides in the fire associated with wet fuel ; or as paddy-sprout leads to the inference that the capacity to produce it resides only in the rice associated with the husk. Further, when it is possible to differentiate the soul from the non-soul with the aid of the presence of consciousness alone, it is unnecessary to posit the potency to know.

It is not right to maintain that consciousness itself is the self ; because the nature of consciousness is to depend upon a substrate and a correlative, while the self has an opposite character ; and because the self, the knower, unlike consciousness, shines forth directly ; and because, on the strength of every-day experience, reasoning (*tarka*) and scriptural testimony, it has already been shown at great length that the quality of being the self belongs only to that entity which is endowed with knowledge.

Even on the doctrine that consciousness itself becomes the soul, owing to the erroneous superimposition of the quality of knowledge on its accidental relation with objects, it is unreasonable to contend that consciousness itself (which possesses this relation) may (as a consequence of this illegitimate transference) be justifiably treated as the knower. For, inasmuch as the relation dwells in both the relata, the object too would have to be regarded as knower.

न च कार्यकारणभाववद्वयवस्थितत्वम् । तत्र जनिमतो जनयितुश्च परस्परापेक्षा-  
नियमलक्षणसम्बन्धः । इहापि स एवेति चेन्न ; अपेक्षाहेत्वभावात् । किमर्थमर्थश्चै-  
तन्यमपेक्षते, चैतन्यं वार्थम् ?

सिद्धयर्थमिति चेत्, कः सिद्धयर्थः ? न तावदुत्पत्तिः ; तस्या निर्ज्ञातनिमित्तान्तर-  
त्वात् । घटादयो हि प्रसिद्धमृद्गण्डचक्रभ्रमणादिपर्याप्तनिमित्तान्तरशालिनो न चितिमपि  
निजजननेऽपेक्षन्ते । निरस्तश्च विज्ञानमात्रवादः । नित्यस्यात्मन उत्पत्त्यर्थमर्थापेक्षेति  
सुव्याहृतम् ॥

सिद्धिः प्रकाश इति चेत्, किं भो आत्मा स्वयंज्योतिरप्यर्थाधीनप्रकाशः, यदसौ  
तदर्थमर्थमपेक्षते ? महनीयमिदमात्मवेदित्वम् ।

It is not right to suggest that, though the relation is found in both the relata, the quality of being the knower is definitely attributed to only one specified member of the relata (i.e. consciousness), just as in the case of the relation of cause and effect (where, while the causal relation resides in both, only one specified member of the relata is taken to be the cause, and the other to be the effect). For there (i.e. in the case of cause and effect) the relation is in the form of invariable mutual dependence of the producer and the produced. If it be said that here also the same mutual dependence prevails, (we reply) not so. For (in the present case) there is no occasion for mutual dependence. Why (we ask) does the object stand in need of consciousness ? And why, again, does consciousness require the object ?

If you were to reply, (that this dependence is) for the purpose of *siddhi*, (we ask) what is meant by *siddhi* ? It cannot denote origination ; for origination is well-known to depend on other causes. Indeed, pots and the like have for their causes other well-known factors, which are complete in themselves, such as, clay, staff, the rotation of the wheel, etc. ; (hence) they do not require for their origination consciousness also. (If it be said that the so-called factors are in reality only consciousness, and hence, objects such as, pots and the like, really depend on consciousness itself, it may be replied that) the doctrine that things are nothing but thoughts (*viññāna*) has already been refuted. To maintain that the soul which is eternal depends upon objects for its origination would, indeed, be ridiculous.

If you were to say that *siddhi* denotes manifestation, (we ask) 'Well sir ! do you then contend that because it depends on objects for its manifestation, the soul, though self-luminous, possesses a manifestation which is dependent on objects ? Your understanding of the nature of the soul would, indeed be praiseworthy !'

प्रकाशश्च न संविदतिरेकी कश्चिदर्थधर्मस्सम्भवतीत्यावेदितम् ॥

सम्भवन्नप्यसौ न चितिस्वरूपमात्रनिमित्तः ; सर्वदा सर्वार्थप्रकाशप्रसङ्गात् । न हि सदा सन्निहितसमग्रकारणं कार्यं कदाचिद्भवति । आगन्तुकातिशयाश्रयणे वा नामान्तरेण ज्ञानमेवाङ्गीकृतमिति तद्वानेवायमात्मा आयातः ॥

नन्वेवमर्थसिद्धिव्यवस्थापकतया अभ्युपगतं ज्ञानमागन्तुकं क्रियारूपमिति कथं तदा-  
त्मस्वभावः ? तथाहि—अर्थान्तरगतत्वे सति जनकद्रव्यान्तरं प्रति कार्यत्वादिकेन रूपेणा-  
साधारणो गन्तव्यदेशप्राप्त्यादिर्यं प्रत्यसाधारणः, तत्समवेतागन्तुकासाधारणगमनादिक्रिया-  
जन्यो दृष्टः । तादृशी चार्थसिद्धिर्यं पुरुषं प्रत्यसाधारणी तत्समवेतादृशक्रियाजन्येति  
शक्यमनुमातुम् ॥

(Nor could the object depend on consciousness for its manifesta-  
tion ; for) it has already been shown that manifestation cannot be a  
quality different from consciousness and residing in objects.

Even if it were a quality different from consciousness, it cannot be  
said to be dependent on consciousness alone ; for (in that event) there  
would be the manifestation of all objects at all times. Indeed, all the  
causal factors being present at all times, the effect could not arise on some  
occasions only (i.e., since consciousness which is the cause of manifesta-  
tion is eternal, the manifestation cannot be occasional). If the speci-  
fic quality (known as manifestation) were treated as an occasional pro-  
perty, then, it would amount to (your) admitting consciousness itself  
under a different name. Thus, the conclusion is inevitable that the  
soul is the possessor of consciousness, and not mere consciousness.

(The objector may ask) since knowledge, which has been admitted  
to account for the manifestation of different objects at different times,  
is occasional and is of the nature of a process or activity, how can it be  
treated as an essential quality of the self ? To make the matter clear :—  
When results, such as, reaching a certain destination, reside in some  
objects (e.g. the places reached), they are peculiar to others (e.g. Deva-  
datta) who are responsible for these (results) in so far as these are  
effects ; such results are found to be produced by activities, like proceed-  
ing and so on, which are occasional, peculiar and inherent in those  
to whom the said results are peculiar. Hence, it is but right to infer  
that the manifestation of objects which resembles these (i.e. reaching  
the destination and the like) is produced by an activity, which is similar  
to the activities mentioned before and which is inherent in that person  
to whom the manifestation is peculiar.



मैवम्; अक्रियाजन्येनाभावप्राप्तक्षेत्राद्विषयत्वेन क्षेत्रिणं प्रत्यसाधारणेन क्षेत्रजव्रीह्या-  
दिस्वत्वेन चानैकान्त्यात् । न च निर्व्यापारतया क्षेत्रिणस्तत्राजनकत्वम् ; व्यापारकालादिना  
व्यभिचारात् , तद्भावभावित्वस्य चाविशेषात् । तज्जीवनमेवं तत्र जनकव्यापार इति चेत् ,

It is not so ; for, in view of the fact that the ownership of land and the like is acquired on account of the mere absence of heirs<sup>166</sup> and not in virtue of any activity (on the part of the owner), and in view of the fact that the ownership of paddy and other grains grown in the field—an ownership which is peculiar to the person to whom the field belongs—is not acquired through any activity, (the aforesaid *hetu*) may be said to be vitiated by *anekānta doṣa*. (In order to escape this fallacy it may be suggested that) the owner of the land is not the cause of his ownership in as much as he is devoid of activity ;<sup>167</sup> (but this suggestion) is rendered fallacious by instances, such as activity and time (which, though devoid of activity, are still considered to be causal factors). The statement that when they (i.e. time, activity and the like) exist, the effects follow, (and hence they are considered to be causal factors) is equally applicable to the case of ownership.<sup>168</sup> If it be said that the activity which is responsible for ownership is, indeed, the activity involved in being alive, (we ask) “My dear sir, as this activity is responsible in common with this for taking care of the crops and the like also, how can you maintain that ownership is brought on by a peculiar activity on the part of the owner ? ”

166. It is likely that *abhāvaprāpta* . . . is a haplographical error for *nābhihāva-prāpta* . . . As the expression *nābhihāva* is used in the Dharma śāstras in the sense of relationship, the text as emended, would mean ‘on account of the mere fact of a person being a near kinsman.’

167. To prove that consciousness is an occasional property of the soul, the opponent advances the following argument :—Any result which, while remaining in one object, is peculiar to another causal substance, must be produced by an activity which is occasional, peculiar and inherent in that causal substance. Manifestation, while remaining in pots and the like, is peculiar to the knower (e.g. Devadatta) ; therefore it must be caused by an activity which is occasional, peculiar and inherent in the knower. As this activity goes by the name of knowledge, it follows that knowledge is an occasional quality of the knower.

The *anekānta doṣa* vitiating this argument is exposed by citing the case of ownership, where the *hetu* is present, while the *sādhya* is absent. Though ownership is peculiar to the causal substance, namely, the owner, it need not be produced by any activity on his part.

The opponent may try to escape the fallacy by suggesting that in the instance cited the *hetu* is absent together with the *sādhya*. In other words, he may say that as the owner is not a causal factor at all, ownership cannot be taken to reside in a causal substance.

168. In other words, when the owner exists, his ownership does follow. Hence, though devoid of activity, the owner is certainly a causal factor in respect of his ownership.

ननु तच्छस्यपालनादिसाधारणमिति कथमसाधारणक्रियाजन्यत्वम् ॥

अपि चैवं सति तदेवार्थप्रकाशेऽपि जनकव्यापारोऽस्तु, किमकृतकल्पनया ? सत्यपि तस्मिन्नर्थो न प्रकाशत इति चेत्, स्वत्वं वा किं यथोदितं सति जीवने जायत एव ? ब्रह्मादिसत्ताप्यपेक्ष्यत इति चेत्, इहापीन्द्रियादिप्रत्यासत्तिरिति समानश्चर्चः । अतो यं प्रत्यसाधारणो यथोदितधर्मस्तदीयासाधारणधर्मनिमित्त इत्येतावत् । स चेप्यत एवात्मनश्चैतन्यं रवेरिव तेजस्वित्वम् ।

न च हेतुभेदानुविधायितया 'जानामि' 'अज्ञासिं' इत्यादि कालावच्छेद-प्रतीतेर्गमनादेरिव ज्ञानस्यागन्तुकत्वमनुमेयम् ; आदित्यप्रकाशेनानैकान्त्यात् । अस्ति हि तत्रापि 'इमं देशमादित्यः प्रकाशयति, प्रार्चीकशस्त्रकाशयिष्यति' इति प्रतीतिः ॥

Further, even if being alive were admitted to be a peculiar quality, it might as well be the activity responsible for the manifestation of objects also. Where is the point in positing something unproved ? If it be said that although there is life no object is (sometimes) manifested (and hence, life is not responsible for the manifestation of objects, we ask you in reply) 'Does the aforesaid ownership follow whenever life exists ?' <sup>169</sup> If it be said that the existence of grains, such as, paddy, is also required, (we reply) that here also (i.e. in the case of the manifestation of objects) contact with the senses and the like is required. Thus, in either case the difficulty that may be raised and the explanation offered are similar. Therefore, only this much (can be said) :—the aforesaid quality which is peculiar to a given person has for its cause a special attribute belonging to that person ; and (in conformity with this principle) the fact that the special attribute responsible for the manifestation of objects is consciousness, which belongs to the self even as light belongs to the sun, is acceptable to us.

It is not right to say that, like the act of going, knowledge may be inferred to be occasional, for the reason that there arise cognitions—such as, 'I knew,' 'I know'—which, on account of the fact that they are dependent on several causes, are found to be limited by time. For the instance of the sun's light renders this argument liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa*. Indeed, here also, there are the cognitions 'The sun illumines this place,' 'The sun illumined it' and 'The sun will illumine it.' <sup>170</sup>

169. A person may live and still have no ownership, if the thing owned is either lost or given away to another.

170. Thus even though light is an essential property of the sun, it appears limited by time. Even so, consciousness, though an essential property of the self, may still be limited by time.

स्वारसिकत्वेऽप्यादित्यप्रकाशस्य प्रकाश्यदेशसम्बन्धकादाचित्कतया अवच्छेदप्रतीति-  
रूपपद्यत इति चेत्, इहापि तर्हीन्द्रियादिप्रत्यासत्तिसमासादितयोग्यभावोऽनुभाव्यभेदः स्वा-  
भाविकमात्मनश्चैतन्यगुणमवच्छिनत्तीति तदपेक्षयैवेन्द्रियाद्यनुविधानमतीतानागतप्रत्युत्पन्नत्व-  
प्रत्ययप्रयोगौ चोपपद्यन्ते ।

कथं पुनरत्र निर्णयः द्युमणिमणिप्रकाशादेरिवौपाधिकोऽयं भेदः, न तु गमनपच-  
नादेरिव स्वाभाविक इति ? ताद्रूप्येणैव प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । न हि जातु चिदचिद्रूपोऽयमात्मा  
लोष्टादिवहृष्टचरः । यश्च यद्गुणतयैव साक्षाद्भवति स तत्त्वभावः, मरुदिव स्पर्शगुणतयैवा-  
ध्यक्ष्यमाणः । यो यत्त्वभावो न भवति, स तद्विरहेणापि स्वरूपत उपलभ्यते, गमना-  
दिरहिततयेव देवदत्तादिः ।

If it be suggested that even though the light of the sun is its essential quality, the cognition limited by time may be justified on the ground that its contact with the region to be illumined is occasional, it may be replied that here also the various objects cognised, which acquire the capacity (to limit knowledge) from their contact with the senses, limit the quality of knowledge which is an essential property of the self ; and it is for this reason that the following become intelligible :— the dependence on the senses and the like, cognitions limited by time into the past, the future and the present and all references to the same.

(The opponent may ask) how can it be determined that in this case the distinction of knowledge (implied in the cognitions—‘I knew,’ ‘I know’ and ‘I will know’), like the distinction of the light of the sun or that of the precious stone, is dependent upon limiting conditions, and that, unlike the distinction between the activity of going and cooking, it is not based on the essential nature (of knowledge itself) ? (We reply) the soul is, certainly, perceived as having that nature (i.e. as having consciousness for its essential quality). Indeed, unlike the clod of earth, the soul is never found to be of a non-sentient nature. That which is perceived as having a certain quality necessarily possesses it as its essential nature, even as air, which is perceived to possess the quality of (*sparsā*) touch, (owns it as its essential quality). That which does not possess a certain quality as its essential nature may also be perceived in itself, bereft of that quality, just as persons like Devadatta are perceived even without the activities of proceeding and the like, (which do not form part of their essential nature).

शरीरवदिति चेन्न, असिद्धत्वात् । स्यादेतत्—यथैव खल्वस्वभावभूतेनापि शरीरेण संप्रीचीन एवायं चेतनश्चकास्ति, तथा चैतन्येनापीति । तन्नैवम् ; असिद्धत्वात् । न हि तनुविशिष्टतयैवायं चेतनः परिस्फुरति ; योगिनां प्रणिहितमनसामुपरतबहिरिन्द्रियाणां च देहानुसन्धानविरहेणाप्यहमिति स्फुटमनुभवात् । जानामीति प्रत्ययः शरीरवर्णसन्निवेशनिर्भासशून्यतया तत्त्वान्तरगोचर इति च प्रागेवावोचम् । कर्मानुगुण्येन सुरमनुजादिजातीयतया भिद्यमानास्वांगमापांयिनीषु तनुषु मनस इवैकस्य वर्ष्मणः स्वभावानुबन्धिन्वेनाश्रयितुमशक्यत्वात् । लिङ्गस्य पुनरनुवृत्तावप्यप्रत्यक्षत्वान्न व्यभिचारित्वम् ।

बोधस्वाभाव्ये पुंसः स्वापमूर्छयोः प्रकाशप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्न ; विकल्पासहत्वात् ।

If it be said that consciousness is like the body (in being invariably manifested, though only an accidental possession), (we reply) not so ; for (what is said with regard to the body) itself stands in need of proof. In other words, you may contend that just as the conscious entity shines forth as being invariably associated with the body, even though the latter is not its essential nature, it always shines forth along with consciousness also (even though the latter is not its essential property). (Our reply is) it is not so ; for what is said of the analogous instance requires proof. Indeed, the conscious entity does not shine forth only as being associated with the body ; for to the adepts in yoga whose minds are concentrated and whose external senses have become quiescent the conscious entity clearly shines forth as the 'I,' without there being any thought of the body. I have already stated that the cognition 'I know,' being devoid of the apprehension of the complexion and configuration of the body, must have something other than the body for its object. Further, when bodies become differentiated into several classes, such as, devas and men, in accordance with past deeds, and when they appear and disappear, it is not possible to maintain that a given body, unlike the manas, forms part of the essential nature (of the soul). Although there is the continuity of the subtle body (*liṅgaśarīra*), the charge of *vyabhicāra* cannot be levelled against the argument, as it is not perceived.<sup>171</sup>

Should it be said that if consciousness is an essential attribute of the soul, it should be manifested in the states of sleep and swoon, (we reply) 'not so'; for none of the possible interpretations of this state-

171. The gross body may appear and disappear and thus may not accompany the soul at all times ; but the subtle body, at any rate, being continuous, may accompany the soul at all times and may thus be said to nullify the statement that the soul does not always shine forth along with the body. To this the reply is that as the *liṅgaśarīra* is not open to perception, it cannot be stated that the soul shines invariably along with the *liṅgaśarīra*.

तथाहि—प्रकाश इति पदार्थमात्रसाधारणं ; बोधजन्यं प्रकटतादिपदपर्यायं धर्ममभिप्रेत्य वायं प्रसङ्गः, अथ बोधमेव, तद्विप्रकर्षः \*वा ? आद्ये तदभावादेव न प्रसङ्गः । अभावश्च प्रकटित एव संवित्स्वतस्सिद्धिसमर्थनसमये । भावेऽपि तमःप्रतिबन्धादप्यनुदयस्सम्भवी । इतरयोरभिमतमेवापादितमित्यदोषोद्धावनम् । बोधस्वाभाव्ये हि पुरुषस्य स्वापादि-दशासु च तथाभावोऽभिमत एवेति, न हि तदापादनं दोषाय ॥

अथ मतं स्वापादावपि स्वानुभवसद्भावे जागर इव व्यवहारप्रसङ्ग इति । मैवम् ; व्यवहारागोचरत्वात् । कः खल्वात्मनि व्यवहारः ? न ह्यसावादातुं हातुमुपेक्षितुं वा शक्यः । व्याहारः† प्रसज्यत इति चेत् ; किमङ्ग निर्विकल्पबालमूकादिवेदनविषयो व्याहि-ment will stand scrutiny. To make the matter clear :—When this unwelcome position is said to result, do you mean by *prakāśa*, (1) the quality which is commonly present in all objects and which is generated by *jñāna* and which has for its synonyms terms *prakaṣatā* and the like, or (2) knowledge itself, or (3) the proximity of knowledge ? On the first alternative, there is no room for this unwelcome position at all, because no such quality (known as *prākāṣya*) exists. The non-existence of *prākāṣya* has already been clearly indicated while establishing the self-luminosity of consciousness. And even if it were to exist, its non-origination might as well result from the obstructing factor, namely, *tamas* (darkness). On the other two alternatives, as what has been said is acceptable to me, no defect in my contention has been brought to light. Indeed, when the *puruṣa* possesses consciousness as his essential nature, his possessing knowledge even in the state of sleep is acceptable to us ; hence, to suggest this as a defect in our contention is no charge at all.

If you were to contend that, in case consciousness of oneself were admitted in states of sleep and the like, there would result the prevalence of everyday activities in these states, as in that of waking, (we reply) 'not so'. For the soul is not the object (*viṣaya*) of any activity. What is the nature of the activity in regard to the soul (which, you think, would result) ? Indeed, the soul is incapable of being lifted or cast away or treated with indifference. If it is suggested that there would have to prevail discussion concerning the soul, (we ask) "Dear Sir, is the object of indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) knowledge or that of the knowledge of children, dumb persons and others like them ever discussed (by them) ?" If it is argued that the non-

\* The Benares and Telugu editions read *tadviprakaṣam* ; and the Telugu edition refers in a foot-note to a variant reading *tadaviprakaṣam*. In fact, the reading suggested—*tadaviprakaṣam*—is correct.

† From the context it is clear that *vyāhāra* is preferable to the variant reading, *vyavahāra*.

यत एव ? करणपाटवव्यवजिहीर्षादिसहकारिन्निरहात्तत्र व्याहारानुदय इति चेत्, समानोऽयं विधिरितरत्रापीति निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः ॥

स्मृतिप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् ; अवृत्तित्वात् । यद्युच्येत मूर्छादावात्मानुभवाभ्युपगमेऽर्थान्तरानुभव इव 'एवमहमन्वभूवम्' इति परस्तात्स्मृतिः प्रसज्यत इति, तत्र ; अवृत्तित्वात् । न हि मूर्छा प्रस्वापो वा बुद्धिवृत्तिविशेषः दर्शनस्पर्शनादिवत्, येन स्मृतिबीजं संस्कारमादधीयाताम् । किन्तुद्भूतेन तमसोपरतव्यापारेषु करणेषु निर्वृत्तिकसांसिद्धिकबोधस्वरूपेणावस्थानमात्रमात्मनः ॥

न च बोधस्वभावत्वादेवास्य संस्काराधायकत्वम् ; अनवरतोपचीयमानसंस्कारतया अनिमोक्षप्रसङ्गात् । अनुभवे च स्वानुरूपसंस्काराधाननिरुद्धे सदृशसम्बन्धिदर्शनादि-origination of discussion in regard to these cases is due to the absence of auxiliary causes, such as, the efficient condition of the senses, the desire for discussion and the like, (our reply is) as this type of explanation is equally applicable to the other case also, you are addressing your query to the person who cannot be questioned.<sup>172</sup>

If you were to say that remembrance would have to occur, (we reply) 'not so'; for the states of sleep and swoon are not forms of experience (*vr̥tti*). To explain:—Should it be stated that knowledge of the self exists in the state of swoon or the like, there would have to occur at a subsequent time remembrance (of the self) taking the form 'I experienced it thus,' as in the case of knowledge of other objects, (the reply is) 'not so.' For swoon and the like are not experiences (*vr̥tti*). Indeed, swoon and sleep, unlike the acts of seeing and touching, are not particular modifications (*vr̥ttis*) of the intellect. If they were such modifications, they would give rise to impressions (*samskāras*) which are responsible for remembrance. But, really, swoon and sleep are nothing but the very existence of the soul in its essential nature of *jñāna*, devoid of modifications (*vr̥tti*), when the senses have been withdrawn from their activities on account of the quality of darkness (*tamas*) which is in the ascendent.

It cannot be said that, for the very reason of its having *jñāna* as its nature, the soul can itself generate the impressions ; for, as the soul would then possess incessantly accumulating impressions (*samskāras*), release would for ever become impossible. When an experience has served its purpose by leaving behind impressions appropriate to itself,

172. Compare—Yaścobhayossamo doṣaḥ Parihāropi vā samah | Naikaḥ paryanuyoktavyaḥ Tādṛgarthavicāraṇe ||

When an identical difficulty is encountered by both the rival disputants and when it could be met by either in the same way, it is not open to one of them to level that difficulty as a charge against the other.

समुद्बोधितनिजबीजानुसारेण स्मरणमुपजायते । न चेहात्मस्वरूपबोधस्य जातु चिन्निरोधो जन्म वा ; नित्यात्मसत्ताप्रयुक्तत्वात् । निमित्तान्तराभावश्चानन्तरमेव व्याकरिष्यते । तदेवमनुवर्तमान एवानुभवे कथं स्मृतिरुदयमासादयेत् ?

‘य एवाहं पूर्वद्युरासं स एवाहमद्यापि’ इति स्मृतिसम्भिन्नप्रत्ययोऽपि कालावच्छिन्नस्वरूपगोचरः, न स्वरूपमात्रे ।

अविशदश्च स्वापादौ स्वानुभवः, निर्विकल्पश्च ; पटीयसा सविकल्पकेनावगमेन स्मृतिबीजमाधीयत इति कुतस्तत्प्रसङ्गः ? साम्याच्चाननुभवाभिमानः, शरीरधारणप्रयत्नाननुसन्धानवत् ।

न चाविकृतस्वाभाविकबोधमात्रेणावस्थाने स्वापमोक्षयोरविशेषापत्तिः ; क्लेशवासनानां remembrance arises in accordance with its root cause, (namely, the *samskāras*), which is stimulated by factors, such as, experience of similar objects or of associated things. But here no origination or obstruction for the consciousness of the self can ever exist ; for the consciousness of the self is dependent on the existence of the soul which is eternal. That there is no other cause responsible for the same will presently be shown. Thus, at the very time when an experience continues to exist, how can its remembrance take birth ?

(It may be pointed out that the cognition ‘I who existed yesterday am the selfsame individual even to-day’ clearly indicates that there is remembrance of the self ; to this it is replied—). Even the awareness—‘I who existed yesterday am the selfsame individual even to-day’—which is mixed up with remembrance must be said to be concerned with the self limited by time, and not with the self in its pure nature. In sleep and other similar states, the consciousness of the self is indistinct and is also indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) ; (only) with the aid of knowledge which is clear and distinct and which is determinate (*savikalpaka*) is the basis of remembrance (i.e. the *samskāra*) produced ; when that is so, how could it be said that remembrance would result? Since, having no knowledge of the self and having a knowledge of the self which lacks clearness and distinctness are similar, there arises the false belief that (in sleep) there is no knowledge of the self, even as there is no knowledge of the effort involved in maintaining the body (while such an effort does exist).

It cannot be maintained that if (in the state of sleep) the self exists in its essential nature as an unchanging consciousness alone, there would be no difference between this state and that of release. For in the one case (i.e., in sleep) impressions (*vāsanās*) born of *kleśas*<sup>178</sup> as well as

173. All the manuscripts and printed editions read *samprajñātasamādhāvapi*. But judging from the context, *asamprajñātasamādhāvapi* appears to be the proper

गुणाभिभवस्य चैकत्र भावात्, इतरत्र तदत्यन्तनिवृत्तेः। असम्प्रज्ञातसमाधावपि <sup>174</sup>परमवैराग्य-  
शालिना पटुतरनिरोधसंस्कारेण चरिताधिकारिणा अपवर्णिणा विशेषः ॥

कथं पुनर्निद्राया अवृत्तित्वे प्रबुद्धस्य प्रत्यवमर्शः 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' इत्याद्याः?  
न ह्यननुभूतगोचराः स्मृतयस्सम्भवन्ति । सत्त्वसचिवसमुल्लसिततमोगुणानुभवभावित-  
भावनायोनिः खलु 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्,' 'प्रसन्नं मे मनः,' 'लघूनि मे गात्राणि' इति  
प्रत्यवमर्शः । रजस्तमस्समुद्रेके तु 'दुःखमहमस्वाप्सम्' 'भ्रमत्यनवस्थितं मे चित्तम्'  
इति । सत्त्वरजसी त्वभिभूय नितान्तमुद्धूते तमसि 'गाढमूढं\* सुप्तोऽस्मि,' 'गुरूणि मे  
गात्राणि' 'मुषितमिव मनो मीलितमिव' इति ।

the obscuration of the guṇas exist, while in the other (i.e. in release) they are totally annihilated. (If it be stated that, at least, between sleep and *asamprajñāta samādhi* (super-conscious samādhi) there would have to be no difference, it may be replied that) even the soul existing in the state of super-conscious samādhi that has acquired complete detachment (*vairāgya*), that possesses the most intense saṃskāras conducive to restraint, and that has discharged its duties and is about to enter upon the state of final release, must to be distinguished from the self existing during sleep.

If sleep is not a form of *vṛtti*, how (it may be asked) can remembrances, such as, 'I slept soundly', arise to the person who is awake? Indeed, remembrances having for their object what has not been experienced before never arise. Certainly, remembrances, such as, 'I slept well', 'My mind is perturbed', 'My limbs feel light' have for their causes the impressions (*bhāvanas*) produced by experiences relating to the quality of tamas which is associated with the sattva quality and which is preponderant. When there is an excess of tamas and rajas, there arise cognitions—such as 'I slept uneasily', 'My mind is whirling', 'My mind is unsteady'. When tamas is wholly preponderant having overpowered sattva and rajas, there arise the following recollections—'I have slept wholly oblivious of everything', 'The limbs of my body feel heavy', 'My mind is, as it were, robbed away', 'And it is, as it were, covered over'.

reading. It is reasonable to suppose that a reference to the state of release is followed up by a doubt concerning a state which is the nearest approximation to it.

174. Compare *Yoga-Sūtra* II. 3. 'Avidyāsmītārāgadveṣābhiniveśāḥ kleśāḥ.'

\* *Gāḍham mūḍham* is a variant reading.



सत्यमेवम् ; दत्तोत्तरं ह्येतत् , नैवामी वासनायोनयः प्रत्ययाः, अपि तु तात्कालिक-शरीरेन्द्रियमनोवस्थाविशेषपर्यालोचननिमित्ता आनुमानिका इति । एवंप्रकारं हीमे, ‘ यतः प्रसन्नं मे मनः सम्यगाहारपरिणामवशाल्लघूनि चाङ्गानि, अतस्सुखमहमस्वाप्सम् ’ इति । स्वापावस्थायां वेन्द्रियोपरमतारतम्यवशादविशदतात्कालिकतत्तदनुकूलप्रतिकूलविषयानुसन्धाननिबन्धनतयापि स्मरणमुपपद्यत इति न वृत्त्यन्तरत्वं निद्रायाः ।

कथं तर्हि पारमर्ष सूत्रम् ‘ अभावप्रत्ययालम्बनां वृत्तिर्निद्रा ’ इति ? निरोधपरत्वात्प्रकरणस्य न वृत्तिस्वरूपे तात्पर्यं विपर्ययवत् । ‘ न ह्यतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठं मिथ्याज्ञानं किञ्चिदस्ति ; सर्वसंविदामर्थाव्यभिचारात् । स चाधिकरणसिद्धः । साधयिष्यते चोपरिष्ठात् । कैवल्यभाषि यच्चित् , तत्प्रत्यनीकतया निद्रादेर्निरोध्यत्वेनोपदेशः ॥

(We reply) all this is true enough ; but your question has already been answered thus :—Assuredly, these cognitions do not have the impressions (*vāsanās*) for their source ; but are based on the consideration of the then-existing specific states of the body, senses and the mind (*manas*) ; and these cognitions are the result of inference. Indeed, such cognitions take the following form :—‘ On account of the fact that my mind is tranquil, and that the organs are light consequent on the proper assimilation of food, ‘ I slept well ’ ; (hence, they must be inferential). (Even if they are remembrances), the remembrance may become intelligible, for the reason that it is based on the thought of several desirable and undesirable objects—a thought which exists at the moment (of sleep) and which lacks clearness and distinctness, on account of the varying degrees to which the senses have been withdrawn during sleep ; hence, *nidrā* need not be a separate *vr̥tti*.

(You may ask) how, then, could the *sūtra* of the great sage have come in at all ?—“ *Nidrā* (sleep) is the *vr̥tti*, which is the cause of the non-existence of other *vr̥ttis*.”<sup>175</sup> (The reply is) as the context aims at stating what has to be suppressed, its intention is not to describe the nature of the *vr̥ttis* ; as in the case of *viparyaya* (which, though not a *vr̥tti*, is yet mentioned as that which has to be suppressed). Indeed, a false knowledge which is not based on the object which it reveals cannot be met with ; for all knowledge is invariably associated with an objective reality.<sup>176</sup> And this fact has clearly been proved in the *adhikaraṇa* ;<sup>177</sup> and later it will be established again. As sleep (*nidrā*) is a hindrance to the soul (*cit*) which is to attain release, it is mentioned as something that deserves to be suppressed.

175. Vide p. 109.

176. Compare *Yoga-Sūtra* I. 8. ‘ *Viparyayo mithyājñānamatadrūpapratīṣṭham.*’

177. Evidently the reference is to an *adhikaraṇa* in Nāthamuni’s *Nyāyatattva Śāstra*. As the author is generally in the habit of mentioning the name of the adhi-

अस्तु वा पूर्वोक्तप्रमाणादिवृत्त्यभावकारणभूतप्रचिततमतभोगुणावलम्बना वृत्तिरेव निद्रा, सन्तु च प्रबुद्धप्रत्ययमर्शाश्च स्मरणानि, \*तथा सत्यप्यनवरतानुवृत्तबोधतया स्थितमेव पुंसो बोधस्वभावत्वम् ।

आह—बोधकारणानुवृत्त्यापि बोधानुवृत्तिरूपपद्यत इति कथं तथा? स्वाभाव्य-निश्चयः? इत्थम्

यतस्स्वतस्सतो बोधादिते पुंसो यथोदितम् ।

तमस्स्वापादिकालीनं न सिद्धब्रह्मेत्वसिद्धितः ॥

उपरतानि हि प्रस्वापकाले सर्वाण्येवेन्द्रियाणि सह मनसा । संस्कारस्य च न स्मृतेरन्यत्र सामर्थ्यम् । न च स्वप्रकाशं तमः ; अर्थान्तरवर्तिनोऽप्यनिशं प्रकाशप्रस-

Let it be granted that sleep (*nidrā*) is a *vṛtti* having for its object the most highly developed *tamas*, and that it is responsible for the absence of other *vṛttis* mentioned already, such as, *pramāṇa* ;<sup>178</sup> let it also be granted that the cognitions arising to the person awake are remembrances. Even then, the fact does remain that the soul possesses consciousness as its essential nature, for the reason that it owns a knowledge which always continues to be.

(The opponent may say that) the continuity of knowledge may as well be explained in terms of the persistence of the causes of knowledge, (and ask) how it can be asserted that knowledge is an essential property of the soul, on the strength of the continuity of knowledge. (The reply is :—this assertion is made) on the strength of the reason that without knowledge, which exists in the very nature of the soul, *tamas* which prevails in the states of sleep and the like will not be manifest to the soul ; for there is no causal factor that could manifest it. (It might be said that though knowledge is absent, *tamas* may be manifested with the aid of the senses or *manas* or the *samskāras* ; but this is untenable). For in sleep all the senses together with the mind (*manas*) are quiescent. And the power to produce any knowledge other than remembrances does not belong to the impressions (*samskāras*). (Nor can it be said that *tamas* may reveal itself ; for) *tamas* is not self-luminous ; since it would then have to be invariably manifested to the soul (in the waking state also), when it grasps objects other than *tamas*.

karāṇa to which he refers, in all probability, he would have mentioned the name here also. But unfortunately, it has been lost. cf. pp. 90, 95 and 127.

\* The Telugu and Benares editions read *tathā satyanavarata*. The former refers in a footnote to a variant reading *tathā na satyanavarata*. The emendation we suggest is *tathā satyapyanavarata*.

‡ *Katham tathā* is the reading found in the printed editions ; the proper reading ought to be *katham tayā*.

178. Vide note No. 163.

ज्ञात् । कृतश्च सर्वार्थसाधनतया बोध इति तेनैव करणविरहिणा सता स्वभावभूतेनोद्भूते-  
नोद्भूतवृत्तेस्तमसोऽन्यस्य वा आत्मवर्तिनो गुणस्य स्फुरणमिति बलादभ्युपगमनीयम् ।

नित्यप्रकाशश्च आत्मा, प्रमातृत्वात् । अप्रमातृत्वव्यापकबद्धं ह्यनित्यप्रकाशत्वं  
व्यापकविरुद्धप्रमातृत्वभागिन्यात्मनि नात्मानं लभते ।

स्वतस्सिद्धप्रकाशत्वमप्यस्य ज्ञातृभावतः ।

अज्ञातृत्वेन हि व्याप्ता परायत्तप्रकाशता ॥

कः पुनरयं प्रकाशो योऽस्य नित्योऽभ्युपेयेत स्वाभाविकश्च ? कश्चास्यात्मना स-  
म्बन्धः ? यदि ज्ञानमेव सम्बन्धश्चाश्रयाश्रयित्वम् , ततो हेत्वभावेन साध्याभावस्य व्याप्ति-  
मुपदर्शयितुं निदर्शनतया घटाद्युपादातव्यम् ; यदनित्यप्रकाशमन्याधीनप्रकाशं वा तदप्रमातृ,

For the reason that knowledge is established to be the means for the manifestation of all things, it must be admitted, whether you like it or not, that predominant *tamas* or any other quality residing in the soul becomes manifest (with the aid of this knowledge alone), which, being patent and having in its turn no instrument (for its own manifestation), forms an essential feature of the soul.

Besides, (to put the same syllogistically)—The soul possesses an eternal illumination ; for it is a knower. The possession of non-eternal illumination, which is invariably concomitant with what pervades (*vyāpaka*)—the quality of being other than a knower—cannot find a place for itself in the soul which possesses the quality of being a knower—a quality opposed to the *vyāpaka* (i.e. the quality of being other than a knower).<sup>179</sup> The possession of illumination as an innate property is attributed to the soul, because it is a knower. The possession of an illumination which is dependent upon something other than itself is invariably associated with the quality of being other than a knower.

What is meant by this illumination (*prakāśa*) which is said to be eternal and innate to the soul ? And what exactly is the nature of its relation to the soul ? If illumination means knowledge itself, and if the relation is that of being the container and the contained (*āśrayāśrayitvam*), then (with regard to the aforesaid syllogism) in order to cite the invariable concomitance of the absence of the *sādhya* with the absence of the *hetu*, pots and the like must be cited as illustrative examples in the following way :—Whatever possesses a non-eternal illumination or an illumination depending upon something else is other

179. The syllogism may be stated thus—Nothing possessing non-eternal illumination is a knower. The soul is a knower. Therefore, the soul does not possess non-eternal illumination Cf. *Ved. Sū.* II. iii. 31. *Pumstvādivattvasya satobhivyaktiyogāt.*

यथा घटादीति । तत्र च विशेषनिषेधस्य सामान्याभ्यनुज्ञाक्षेपकत्वादागन्तुकं ज्ञानं घटादाबनुमतमापद्यते ।

अथ तन्मा भूदिति विषयविषयिभाव एव सम्बन्धस्सङ्गीयेत, ततो नित्यवज्ज्ञानविषयत्वमात्मनः प्रसज्येत । ज्ञानविषयीकारश्च साधनविशेषायत्तत्वेन नियत इति न स्वाभाविकत्वसम्भवः ।

अचेतनगोचर एव तथा नियमं इति चेन्न ; चेतनान्तरविषयीकारेऽपि तथाभावदर्शनात् । न चानात्मगोचर एव साधनसापेक्षत्वनियम इति वाच्यम् ; आत्मनोऽप्यानुमानिकागमिकयोगज्ञानविषयीकारे तत्सापेक्षत्वदर्शनात् ।

विरुद्धे चैकस्यैकक्रियायां कर्मकर्तृत्वे, सूच्यग्रस्येवात्मनि वेध्यवेधकत्वे । नित्यत्वनिरतिशयसूक्ष्मत्वव्यापित्वचित्स्वाभाव्यादिरूपेण प्रत्यगर्थस्यौपदेशिकत्वमानुमानिकत्वं वा, than a knower ; like pots, etc. Then, as the negation of something specific presumes the affirming of something else belonging to the same general category, it would result in the admission that occasional knowledge resides in pots and the like.

In order to obviate this difficulty if it be said that the relation (in question) is no other than that of being the object apprehended and being the subject apprehending (*viṣaya viṣayibhāva*), then, the soul would have to be the object of an eternal consciousness. And since the quality of being an object of consciousness is invariably concomitant with that of being dependent upon some specific causal factors, consciousness cannot be an innate property of the soul.

If it be said that this universal concomitance is met with only in the case of insentient objects, the reply is 'not so' ; for even when some other soul is cognised, this dependence on certain causal factors is noticed. It cannot be said that this general law, namely, that all objects of consciousness depend on specific causal factors, applies only to cases other than oneself ; for even in regard to oneself, when it becomes the object of inferential knowledge, knowledge born of scripture, and yogic perception, this dependence upon causal factors is noticed.

Further, in respect of one and the same entity the character of being the object and that of being the subject (or agent) of the self-same activity are contradictory ; just as in the case of a needle, with regard to its point, the qualities of being the piercer and the pierced are contradictory. It is not in respect of itself, but in respect of its features—such as, eternity, extreme subtlety, capacity to penetrate all things, the possession of consciousness as its essential nature—that the soul (*pratyagartha*) comes to be the object of knowledge obtained through inference or through instruction. Since the

न स्वरूपतः । स्वरूपापेक्षयैव स्वतस्सिद्धिरभ्युपेयत इत्यसमाधेयो विरोधः । रूपभेदेन गम्यगमकत्वाङ्गीकारपक्षे सपक्षस्येव\* शब्दादेर्न स्वतस्सिद्धत्वम् ।

अथोच्येत न प्रकाशो ज्ञानम्, अपि तु तन्निमित्तश्चेतनेतरसर्वपदार्थसाधारणो धर्मः, यद्वशात्प्रकाशत इति प्रख्योपाख्ये प्रतायेते सर्वपदार्थेषु । अविशेषेणाश्रयाश्रयित्व-लक्षणश्च सम्बन्धस्तेन सह सर्वभावानाम् । स च यथोदितसाधनबलादेव सांसिद्धिको नित्यश्चात्मन इति

पराकृतोऽयं पक्षः, न ज्ञानातिरेकी प्रकाशो नाम ; यद्यवहारोपजननानुगुणं ज्ञानं तत्प्रकाशत इत्युच्यते । ज्ञेयस्य ज्ञातुः स्वात्मनश्च व्यवहारानुगुणं ज्ञानमुदयत इति illumination described as being innate in the soul is admitted to flow from its very being, the contradiction cannot be reconciled. On the view that the self may be admitted to be at once the knower and the known in virtue of its different aspects, the self, like the examples relied upon, such as, *śabda* (the word), cannot be said to be self-established.<sup>180</sup>

As a third alternative, you might hold that illumination is not knowledge, but a quality which is dependent upon knowledge and which is found alike in all objects, sentient or non-sentient—a quality by whose aid all understanding and reference, namely, 'It is illumined', arise in regard to all objects ; and that the relation of this illumination to all objects, without varying from instance to instance, is just that of being the container and the contained ; and that, on the strength of the afore-said reasons themselves, it follows that such a quality is eternal and essential to the soul.

But this view has already been refuted. There is no *prakāśa* distinct from knowledge. The object about which it could be said 'It is manifested' is that concerning which there is the knowledge capable of rendering it fit for thought and discussion. Since there arises knowledge conducive to discussion concerning the object known, the knower

\*180. (i) The reading in the text is *pakṣasyeva śabdādeḥ* ; but the correct reading should be *sapakṣasyeva śabdādeḥ*. This argument presupposes a syllogism in which *śabda*, *dīpa*, etc., are relied upon as illustrative examples (*sapakṣa*). The syllogism may be set forth as follows :—*ātmā svaviśayaḥ ; svaprakāśatvāt, śabdavat dipavat ca*. It may also be added that the *Vaiyākaranas* hold that a word (*śabda*) illuminates itself while illumining its sense and that there is no verbal cognition (*śābdabodha*) which does not involve a verbal configuration. Compare *Bhartrhari*—*na sosti pratyayo loke yaśśabdānugamādrte*.

(ii) *Vipakṣasyeva śabdādeḥ* is the reading suggested by some. *Ātmā* is the *pakṣa* in this argument ; pots and the like constitute the *vipakṣa* (i.e. examples where the *sādhya*, namely, self-luminosity, is absent). *Śabda* also must be classed among counter examples. If this reading is accepted the translation of the latter part of the sentence would have to be modified as follows :— . . . the self, like the counter examples, such as *śabda*, cannot be said to be self-established.'

युक्तस्त्रिष्वप्येकप्रकारः प्रकाशते इति व्यवहारः ।

तत्त्वान्तरप्रकाशाभ्युपगमे तत्स्वाभाव्ये च पुनः किं चैतन्याश्रयणेन ? न च प्रकाश एव तदिति वाच्यम् ; घटादेरपि प्रकाशवत्तया चेतनत्वप्रसङ्गात् । यद्युच्येत सति चेतनावत्त्वे पुंसः प्रकाशमानत्वमिति, संविदीदानीं का वार्ता ? चेतनैव हि सा, न चेतयते ।

अथ संविदस्तत्सम्बन्धाधीनस्स धर्म इति चेत्, कस्तया सम्बन्धो यस्तन्निबन्धनम् ? नाश्रयाश्रयित्वम् ; घटादेस्तदभावप्रसङ्गात् । न विषयविषयिभावः ; तस्यैवानिरूपणात् । अनिरूपणञ्च भ्रान्त्यधिकरणसिद्धान्तारम्भे संविस्तिद्धौ चानुसन्धातव्यम् । आत्मनस्तस्य चाप्रकाशप्रसङ्गश्च ।

and knowledge itself, it is but right that the reference 'It is manifested' should apply in an identical way to all these three.

If the illumination were to be admitted as a separate entity (i.e. if it is distinct from knowledge), and if the soul has this *prakāśa* for its innate quality, where, again, is the need for attributing consciousness to the soul ? It cannot be said that consciousness is nothing but *prakāśa* ; for even objects, such as pots and the like, would become conscious entities, inasmuch as they possess *prakāśa*. If it is said that (consciousness and *prakāśa* are different and that) *prakāśa* is that which is manifested to the soul when there is possession of knowledge, what about knowledge (*samvit*) ? Indeed, *samvit* is itself consciousness ; and it is not possessed of knowledge.

If it be said that this quality (i.e. *prakāśa*), dependent upon the relation in question, may belong to knowledge, (it may be asked) what exactly is the nature of the relation which acts as the basis of *prakāśa* ? It cannot be that of being the container and the contained ; for, then, pots and the like would have to be deprived of *prakāśa*. Nor can it be the relation of being the apprehending subject and the object apprehended, for the precise nature of this relation defies analysis. The impossibility of such an analysis may be ascertained from that part of the *Bhrāntyadhikaraṇa*<sup>181</sup> (of the *Nyāyatattva*) where the statement of the conclusion (*siddhānta*) commences and from *Samvitsiddhi*. Moreover, (if the quality of being the apprehending subject (*viśayitva*) was the cause of *prakāśa*, since this quality does not exist in the soul and in non-sentient objects like pots, it (*prakāśa*) would have to be denied to the soul as well as to non-sentient objects.

181. While discussing the nature of error, the *Sarvārthasiddhi* (Buddhisara) refers to this *adhikaraṇa*. See the *Tattvamuktākalāpa*, *Sarvārthasiddhi* p. 404.

ज्ञानाधीनप्रकाशाश्रयतैव सिद्धिः, तथा चानुमेयं ज्ञानमिति पक्षः प्रागेव प्रति-  
क्षितः । स्वप्रकाशसंविद्धादिनोऽपि व्यवहारानुकूल्ये वैरूप्यमशक्यपरिहारम् ।

आत्मनि समवेतं ज्ञानमसम्बन्धिन्यर्थे प्रकाशं व्यवहारं वा कथं प्रसुवीतेत्यपि  
चिन्त्यम् । इन्द्रियलिङ्गादिस्वकारणप्रत्यासत्तिवशादिति मा वीचः । न खलु लब्धात्मकं  
कार्यं स्वनिमित्तकारणमनुरुध्य कार्यमारभते । मा भूदुदकाहरणादि घटादेः कुलाला-  
दिसमानाधिष्ठानम् । न च निमित्तकारणनाशे कार्यनाशः । नश्यति चेन्द्रियसम्प्रयो-  
गादिनाशे रूपादिज्ञानम् । अत इन्द्रियेण सह चैतन्यमपि निस्सृत्य तेन तेनार्थेन सन्नि-  
कृष्यते, हस्तादिनेव त्वगिन्द्रियम् । तथा सति हि तदुपाधिकत्वात्तज्ज्ञानस्य युक्तं तद्भा-  
वानुविधायित्वम् । अन्यथोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षनिवृत्तौ किमिति निवर्तते ? ।

The view that *siddhi* is nothing but being the seat of *prakāśa*, which is dependent upon *jñāna*, and that it is with the aid of that *siddhi* that knowledge is inferred to exist has already been refuted. (The defect of mutual dependence—*anyonyāśraya*—involved in that view can by no means be got over by the suggestion that consciousness is itself self-luminous; and is not inferred with the aid of *prakāśa*). Even to the person who contends that consciousness is self-luminous it would be impossible to get over the diversity in regard to the manner in which objects become fit for discussion.

Again, how knowledge, which is inherent in the soul, could generate in the object, which is unrelated to it, a *prakāśa* or discussion is a matter for consideration. Do not say that it is generated by the proximity of the causes of knowledge, such as the senses and reasons (*linga*). Indeed, that which has already come to exist does not produce its effect by depending upon its own efficient cause. Activities pertaining to the pot—such as, fetching water—cannot be treated as having for their bases or superintendent (*adhiṣṭhāna*) what is identical with the potter and the like. Further, when the efficient cause perishes, there is no destruction of the effect; but here, when factors—such as, the contact of the senses—perish, knowledge of colour and the like disappears. Therefore, it has to be said that consciousness proceeding outward along with the senses gets into contact with different objects,<sup>182</sup> just as the organ of touch comes into contact with hands and the like. If that were so, since the knowledge of the respective objects is dependent upon this contact, it is but right that such knowledge should be dependent upon the existence of this contact. Otherwise, why should the knowledge which has already arisen vanish when the contact of the senses with objects falls away ?

182. Compare *Śrī Bhāṣya* on *Ved Sū* II. ii. 27—*nābhāva upalabdheḥ—samban-  
dhaśca samyogalakṣaṇaḥ*. see also the *Tattvamuktākalāpa* p. 652. *Dravyam prāg  
buddhiruktā paramiḥa viṣayaissaṅgamādirnirūpyaḥ samyogam Bhāṣyakārāḥ  
prathamamakathayan nyāyatattvānusrāt.*

ज्ञानजन्यार्थप्रकाशवादिनोऽपि समानोऽयं दोषः । निमित्तकारणं हि ज्ञानम् । कुतस्तन्निवृत्तार्थप्रकाशो निवर्तते ? कुतो वा यावत्तद्भावमवतिष्ठते ? न च सङ्ख्यादिनिदर्शनेनात्र प्रत्यवस्थानं युक्तम् ; ।

असिद्धत्वेन नाशस्य सङ्ख्याया बुद्धिनाशतः ।

एकसङ्ख्येव सङ्ख्यात्वादन्याप्याद्रव्यभाविनी ॥

सर्वा ह्येकाश्रया सङ्ख्या नित्यानित्यार्थवर्तिनी ।

यावदाश्रयसत्येव सम्मता सर्वत्रादिनाम् ॥

द्वित्वादिका परार्धान्ता सङ्ख्या याऽनेकवर्तिनी ।

सापि सङ्ख्यात्वसामान्ये सति कस्मान्न तादृशी ॥

ननु नैकत्वं सङ्ख्या, स्वरूपानतिरेकात् । अतस्साधनविकलमुदाहरणम् । मैवम् ;

The same difficulty confronts also the person who admits *prakāśa* as a quality which resides in objects and which is produced by *jñāna*. For knowledge is the efficient cause of *prakāśa*. Then, why (it may be asked) should the *prakāśa* of the objects disappear at the disappearance of knowledge ? And why should it exist only so long as knowledge lasts ? It is no good trying to meet the difficulty by citing the analogy of number (*saṅkhyā*) and the like.<sup>183</sup> For with the disappearance of the enumerative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*) there does not result the disappearance of numbers. Like number 1 (unity), the other numbers, namely, 2, 3 and so on, for the very reason that they are numbers, exist as long as objects last. That everywhere the number which is based on a single entity and which resides individually in objects, eternal or non-eternal, (i.e. the number 1, unity) lasts as long as the (particular) support lasts is admitted by all disputants. While the generality, namely, numberness, exists therein, why should not the numbers commencing from 2 and ending in infinity, and residing in multitudinous objects, be similar (to number 1 in lasting as long as the support lasts) ?

An objection may be taken to this argument :—Since number 1 is not a number at all, for the reason that it is not something distinct from the *svarūpa* (i.e. the object wherein it is said to dwell),<sup>184</sup> the example cited in the foregoing argument is defective in being devoid of the *hetu*.

183. The analogy may be expressed thus :—When the enumerative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*), which is the efficient cause of numbers 2, 3 and so on, disappears these numbers vanish ; in the same way, when knowledge which is the efficient cause of *prakāśa* ceases to be, *prakāśa* also falls away.

184. This objection is met by Vedānta Deśika in the *Tattvamuktākalāpa* (Adra-vyasara thus—'aikyam svābheda māhuḥ katicana na bhidāstyekameveti dr̥ṣṭeḥ bhedādr̥ṣṭyaikyamohaḥ taditi ca vacanam tatra tatrābhyupetaṁ anyetvetat svasatt-



सङ्ख्यैव सा ; द्रव्यान्तरेऽप्यनुवृत्तेः । यदि हि घटादेस्वरूपमेवैकत्वं, ततो घट एकः पट एक इति सर्वद्रव्यसाधारण्यमेकत्वस्य न स्यात् । न हि घटस्वरूपस्य पटस्वरूपेण सम्भवति सामानाधिकरण्यम् ' घटः पटः ' इति । अस्ति तु तदेकत्वस्य । किञ्च

सङ्ख्यैकता विरुद्धत्वादिसङ्ख्येवान्यसङ्ख्यया ।

एकं द्वाविति न ह्यस्ति सामानाधिकरण्यधीः ॥

यत्त्वंनेकद्रव्यवृत्तिवे सति गुणत्वात्. संयोगवदयावद्द्रव्यभाविनी द्वित्वादिसङ्ख्येति, तन्नानात्वेऽनैकान्तिकम् । न हि सतोरेव घटपटयोस्तन्नानात्वं नश्यति । न च तद्वित्त्व-सङ्ख्यैव; त्रयाणां तदभावप्रसङ्गात् । न च तदेकत्वाभावमात्रम् ; तुच्छस्यापि नानात्वापत्तेः ।

(The reply is) not so. Unity (no. 1) is certainly a number ; for it persists equally in other objects (besides the one with whose very being it is sought to be identified). If no. 1 were identical with the very being of the pot or anything else, then, unity cannot be common to all objects, as is suggested in the expressions, *one pot, one cloth* and so on. Indeed, there is no equation of the being of the pot (*ghaṭasvarūpa*) with that of the cloth to the effect 'The pot is cloth' ; but that equation of No. 1 with the pot (as is evident in the expression 'one pot') exists. Being contradictory to other numbers, unity, like no. 2, must necessarily be a number. In fact, there is no knowledge equating unity with number 2 in the form 'Unity is no. 2.' It may be contended that, like contact (*samyoga*), the numbers commencing from 2 do not last as long as the objects exist, because while they exist in many objects, they are qualities. But such a contention is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa*, in the light of the instance of 'diversity'. For as long as the pot and the cloth exist, diversity will never vanish.<sup>185</sup> It cannot be said that diversity is nothing but duality. (Therefore, it is not possible to get over the fallacy of *anekānta* by suggesting that, after all, diversity and duality are identical). For (if they were identical) in respect of any three objects there would be the absence of diversity. Nor can it be said that diversity is merely the absence of unity. (Hence, the suggestion that diversity is merely a negative quality would not help to remove the fallacy). For (in that case) diversity would have to be attributed to even absolute unreality (*tuccha*). Even though

vam viduritarasamuccityavasthānuvṛttam tatpakṣepi svarūpādadhikamidamiha dvittvamohadisiddheh. pp. 634-5.

185. How the argument comes to be vitiated by *anekānta doṣa* is here explained. In the instance of diversity, even though the *sādhya* is absent, the *hetu* is still met with.

आपेक्षिकत्वादित्वादेः प्रतियोग्यनवग्रहात् ।

बुभुत्सोपरमाच्चापि सत्या एवानवग्रहः ॥

अतश्चैतन्यस्यैवेन्द्रियद्वारा अर्थसन्निकर्ष एव तद्भावानुविधानोपपत्तिः ॥

अन्यच्च—अर्थस्य प्रकाशकं ज्ञानं भवताम् । सर्वं च प्रकाशयवस्तुसन्निकृष्टमेव प्रकाशकं दृष्टं दीपप्रभादि । अतस्तदपि तथेति युक्तमाश्रयितुम्

व्योमवदमूर्तस्य न क्रियावत्त्वमिति चेत्, केयं मूर्तिर्नाम यद्विरहिणः क्रियाऽयोगः । यदि परिभाषिकी द्रव्यत्वे सति काचित्कतेति, इष्यत एव सा चैतन्यं । न हि तत्सर्वगतं द्रव्यम् ; तथा सति युगपत्सर्वार्थसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । काचित्कत्वे तु तद्धि यदैकदैकेन्द्रियेण सम्प्रयुक्तं तदर्थाभिमुखं, न तदेन्द्रियान्तरमधितिष्ठति । अत एव हि युगपत् ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिः ।

the numbers commencing from 2 exist, being dependent upon enumerative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*), their non-apprehension is due to the non-apprehension of the correlative (*pratiyogin*) and the cessation of the desire to know. Therefore, it is only on the admission that consciousness proceeds by way of the senses and establishes a contact with objects that the dependence of *prakāśa* on the presence or absence of this contact could be rendered intelligible.

Indeed, on your view, consciousness is the entity which manifests the object. All manifesting entities, such as, the light issuing from the lamp are found to manifest objects only by getting into contact with the objects to be illumined. Therefore, it is right to admit that consciousness also is of such a nature (i.e. it manifests objects only by getting into contact with them).

If it be objected that a formless object like ether cannot be endowed with activity (in other words, if it is said that consciousness, being formless, cannot enter on the activity of proceeding and getting into contact), (it may be asked) what exactly is meant by 'form' when it is said that the substance wherein it is absent is devoid of activity. If the reply is that it is a technical term standing for that which, while being a substance occupies a limited area, (we say) the attribution of such a form to consciousness is acceptable to us. In fact, consciousness is not an all-pervasive substance. If it were so (i.e. all-pervasive), there would be the manifestation of all things simultaneously. But, on the view that it pervades a limited area, when it is in contact with one sense-organ and directed to the object falling within the range of that sense, it does not (at the same time) permeate another sense-organ. That is why different kinds of sensory knowledge do not originate simul-

निरतिशयवेगं च तत्; युगपदिवातिशीघ्रमनेकेन्द्रियाधिष्ठानदर्शनात्। अतो यथोदितं मूर्तत्वं सिद्धम्।

स्पर्शवत्ता मूर्तिः, तद्विरहान्निष्क्रियत्वमिति चेत्, शब्देनानेकान्तः। स खलु शङ्ख-मुखादेर्देवीयसोऽपि देशान्नोदनविशेषेण लोष्टादिरिव यावद्वेगं प्रतिष्ठते स्पर्शविहीनोऽपि। स्पर्शरहितस्यापि मनश्चन्द्रियस्य क्रियावत्त्वं पदार्थवाक्यार्थविदामुभयेषामपि सम्मतमेव।

कथमतीतानागतयोरसतोश्चैतन्येन सम्प्रयोग इति चेत्, कथं वा विषयभावः? प्रकाशमानत्वं सङ्ख्यादियोगो वा यस्तत्र निर्वाहस्स एवात्रास्तु।

taneously. Consciousness moves with exceeding quickness;<sup>186</sup> for its rapid permeation of the different senses (one after another) is perceived as if it were simultaneous. Therefore, it is to be concluded that the character of possessing a form, in the sense described above belongs to consciousness.

If it is urged that form (*mūrti*) is the quality of possessing touch, and that consciousness, being devoid of such a form, cannot possess any activity, (the reply is) this argument is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa*, in view of the instance of sound (*śabda*). For the sound emanating from the conch, the mouth and the like, though devoid of touch, proceeds, like a missile, with extreme rapidity to places far distant from its source by piercing through space. The fact that *manas*, though devoid of touch, is endowed with activity is admitted both by the *Naiyāyikas* who have understood the categories (*padārthas*) and by the *Mīmāṃsakas* who have inquired into the import of propositions.

How (it may be asked) can objects, past and future, which are non-existent, come into contact with consciousness? (We ask you in turn) how do they become the objects (*viṣaya*) of knowledge? The same explanations that you offer with regard to these<sup>187</sup>—such as (their becoming the object of knowledge means just this:) their becoming mani-

186. Compare the definition of *jñāna*:—‘*atyantavegitātyanta śaukṣmyam nirbaratātathā tathā . . .*’—given *Prathamādhikaraṇa* of the *Nyāya-tattva* and quoted in the *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*, *Buddhipariccheda*. Vide *infra* p. 95 and note 150.

187. *Vedānta Deśika* quotes these passages and discusses them in the *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*. *Rangarāmānujaswāmī* also comments on them. They identify the first (i.e., the view that objects, past and future, become the object of *jñāna*) as the view of the *Naiyāyikas*, and the second (i.e. the view that these objects possess *prākṛtya*) as that of the *Bhāṭṭas*. See *Buddhipariccheda*, p. 266.

# NYAYĀKULISA

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

By

R. RAMANUJACHARI

AND

K. SRINIVASACHARI



श्रीः  
न्यायकुलिशे षष्ठो वादः ।

आमुष्मिकाणामर्थानां चतुर्णामपि सिद्धये ।  
देहादिभ्यो विभिन्नत्वमात्मनः प्रतिपाद्यते ॥

तत्रेन्द्रियादीनां देहव्यतिरेक्तानामनात्मत्वं सुप्रतिपादमिति न तत्रातीव प्रयतित-  
व्यम् । तथा हि—अहंप्रत्ययसामानाधिकरण्यमात्माविवेकमूलम् । तत्र तावदिन्द्रियेषु  
दृश्यते । न हि कश्चिच्चक्षुरहं श्रोत्रमहमिति वा प्रत्येति । देहेऽपि समानमिति चेन्न ;  
देवोऽहं मनुष्योऽहमिति सामानाधिकरण्यदर्शनात् । देवमनुष्यादेः शब्दस्य च नेन्द्रियादि-  
वाचित्वम् ; देवस्य चक्षुर्मनुष्यस्य चक्षुरिति व्यतिरेकनिर्देशात् । देवस्य देह इत्यपि निर्देशो  
दृश्यत इति चेन्न ; देहापेक्षायामौपचारिकत्वात् , आत्मापेक्षायां वा निष्कर्षकत्वात् नीलस्य  
पटस्य गुण इतिवत् । चक्षुरादयोऽपि सन्तु निष्कर्षकाः, व्यतिरेको<sup>१</sup> वा तेषामौपचारिक इति  
चेन्न ; चक्षुश्श्रोत्रादीनां सर्वेषां तथात्वे पर्यायत्वप्रसङ्गात् कायदेहादिवत् । नानासामानाधि-  
करण्यात्तत्तन्निष्कर्षकनानाशब्दाः.....[नितदेवादिशब्दार्थस्य] एकत्वे तस्य पूर्वपूर्वानुपमर्देन  
प्रतीयमाननानात्मत्व(?)सामानाधिकरण्यानुपपत्तेः । नानात्वे चात्मनां प्रत्ये.....[कानुभूत-  
प्रतिसन्धाना] भावप्रसङ्गात् , न देवादिशब्दाः श्रोत्रादिषु भेदेनैव प्रथमानेष्वेकयैव व्युत्प-  
त्त्या साधारणा वर्तितुमर्हन्ति । न च तेषामिन्द्रियत्वमेकं रूपमर्थ इति वाच्यम् ; मनुष्य-  
पिण्डादिशब्दानां पर्यायत्वप्रसङ्गात्<sup>२</sup> ; तेष्विन्द्रियाणां भेदाप्रतिपत्तेः देहभेदस्यैव तत्र  
प्रतीतेः । इन्द्रियाणाञ्चाहमर्थत्वे प्रतिनियतविषयत्वेन तेषां मिथःप्रतिसन्धानानुप-

१. देवस्य चक्षुरित्येवं व्यतिरेकनिर्देश इत्यर्थः ।

२. देवस्य चक्षुरित्यादिवत् मनुष्यस्य चक्षुरित्यादिप्रयोगाद्देवशब्दस्यैव मनुष्यादिशब्द-  
स्यापीन्द्रियवाचित्वात्पर्यायत्वप्रसङ्गः । न च तस्य तस्य विभिन्नेन्द्रियवाचित्वादपर्यायत्वम् ; तत्र  
तत्र देहभेदेऽपि इन्द्रियभेदाभावादिति ।

पतिः । मनस्तु प्रतिसन्धत्तामिति चेन्न; तस्य का (क?) रणत्वात् । व्यासङ्गयुक्ते(ः?) स्मृ-  
तिकरणत्वेन वा सिद्धत्व(त्वाद ?) स्य कर्तृत्वायोगात् । अतः किमत्र विस्तरेण ?

अस्तु इन्द्रियातिरिक्तोऽहमर्थः, प्राणस्तु स्यात् ; स खल्वेक एव वृत्तिभेदाद्विद्यत-  
इति चेन्न ; तस्यापि देवादिशब्दगोचरत्वात् । देहवैजात्ये वैजात्यानुपलम्भेन प्रतिनियत-  
शब्दगोचरत्वाभावात् । निष्क्रिये शरीरे सक्रिये प्राणेऽहमर्थस्य निष्क्रियत्वप्रतीतेश्च ।  
बुद्धिस्तु वा (सा ?) ध्यत्वेन प्रतीयत इति साहसम्<sup>१</sup> । आश्रयाश्रय(यि ?) त्वरूपकर्तृत्वक्रि-  
यात्वयोरेकत्वा (त्रा ?) नुपपत्तेः । ततो द्वितीयापि बुद्धिरित्यवशिष्यते । न च सा सवि-  
षया ; गोचरान्तराप्रतीतेः । अप्रतीतस्य च विषयत्वकल्पनानुपपत्तेः । निर्विषयाया  
बुद्धित्वं स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमेव । तत्तु सिद्धान्ती वक्ष्यति । तस्मादिन्द्रियमनःप्राणबुद्धीनाम-  
नात्मत्वे सिद्धे देह एवात्मेति युक्तम् ।

अत्राह परः कश्चित्—अस्ति तस्यैवाहमिति प्रतीतेः (तिः ?) । न हि स्थूलोऽहं  
कृशोऽहमित्यत्रार्थान्तरमहमाद्याकारस्सम्भवति ; मम शरीरं स्थूलमिति व्यतिरेकदर्शनात् ।  
तत्राहम्प्रत्ययो भ्रान्तिरिति चेत् ; तर्हि ममात्मा वेत्तीति व्यतिरेकदर्शनादात्मनो वेदितुरप्य-  
र्थान्तरमहमर्थः किन्नेष्यते ? तत्रौपचारिको भ्रान्तिरेव न दृष्टत्वात्....[भ्रान्तिनिबन्धनो वा  
दृष्टत्वादसौ व्यतिरे] कनिर्देश इति चेत्, इहाप्येवमस्तु । नैवम्, वेदनानुपपत्तेरिति चेन्न;  
न हि दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नं नाम ।

उपपत्त्या शरीरस्य दृष्टचैतन्यवारणम् (जे ?) ।

अनुमानादनुष्णेषु पर्व (परं ?) (स्पर्शि?) तेन्द्र(तेज?)स्सुसिद्धयति<sup>२</sup> ॥

१. इन्द्रियात्मपक्षे तस्यैव प्राणस्याप्यस्मिन् मते देवादिशब्दवाच्यत्वस्यावश्यकत्वादित्यर्थः ।
२. प्रतिनियतशब्दगोचरत्वायोगादित्यर्थः ।
३. बुद्धेस्साध्यात्मना ज्ञायात्वर्थत्वेन प्रतीयमानतया तस्या आत्मत्ववचनं साहसमित्यर्थः ।
४. सर्वं पा०
५. तेजस्युष्णस्पर्शमस्वीकृत्य तदाश्रयतया परमपि तत्र साध्येतेति भावः ।

देहो जानातीति नोपलभ्यत इति ज्ञेयः ; भेदासिद्धावात्मान्तरपर्यवसानस्यासिद्धेः  
अयं त्वात्मशब्दो देहवचन इत्येव पश्यतु भवान् । ज्ञानाधिकरणत्वाय चात्मान्तरान्वेषणम् ;  
अस्यैव ज्ञातृत्वनिर्वाहे किमर्थान्तरगवेषणया ? भवत्सिद्धान्तवासनाविपर्यासविधुराः कति-  
चित्प्रामाणिकास्तु देहो जानातीत्यपि प्रतिपद्येरन्नेव । तथापि .... [पदार्था] न्तरेषु ....  
[भौतिकेषु] चैतन्यानुपलम्भादभावे . सिद्धे कथं तज्जातीये देहे तत्स्वभाव इति चेत् ; न  
तावदयं स्वभाववादिनो दोषः ; सर्वस्य दर्शनादर्शनाभ्यामेव तथा तथा व्यवस्थापनादनु-  
मानप्रचाराभावात् ; व्यवहारस्य सम्भावनामात्रेणापि सिद्धेः । अत एव हि कचित्कचिद्व्यव-  
हरमाणानां विसंवादसम्भवः । न हि व्यवस्थिते तदवकाशः ।

भवतामपि यद्येषा व्याप्तिस्सिद्धयेत्प्रमाणतः ।

अदृष्टमपि काष्ठादौ चैतन्यं सूक्ष्ममिष्यताम् ॥

शरीरेषु चैतन्योपलम्भात् , इतरत्रानुपलम्भेऽपि जातिभेदेनौषधिषु रूपरसादिविशेष-  
वत्तत्रैव तदिति व्यवस्था युक्ता । गुणावान्तरजात्या रूपरसादिमात्रस्य सजातीयेष्व(पु ?)  
सिद्धस्यावान्तरभेदमात्रं तथा व्यवस्थापनमर्हतीति चेन्न ; तथापि दर्शनानुगुण्येन देहचै-  
तन्यसिद्धयर्थं भूतान्तरेषु सूक्ष्मचैतन्यं कल्प्यताम् । न तु तत्रादर्शनादृष्टबाधः । यद्येवं  
नेष्यते, कथं तर्हि पृथिव्यां रसादिस्समवेयात् ? पृथिव्येकदेशभूतशिलादिषु रसाद्यनुपलम्भाद-  
पृथिव्यात्मकाश्शर्करादयो भवेयुरायुष्मताम् । यदि च दर्शनानुसारेण शिलादिष्वपि तज्जातीय-  
तया सूक्ष्मतत्तद्गुणसद्भावकल्पना, एवमिहापि ।

न च गुणावान्तरजात्या सजातीयेषु सिद्ध(द्धिः ?)दोषाय । एकभूतगुणेष्वेव सा  
व्याप्तिः । अनियमात् । चैतन्यं तु समुदायगुणः । न हि वैशेषिकवदेकाभूतारब्धं शरीर-  
मभ्युपेयः । पाञ्चभौतिकं हि शरीरमुपलभामहे । न च तथा सति मृतशरीरेऽपि चैतन्य-  
प्रसङ्गः ; तस्य सङ्घातान्तरत्वात् । रक्तादिधातुवच्चैतन्यस्यापि तत्र नाशाभ्युपगमात् ।  
अतो मदशक्तिवत्प्रत्येकादृष्टमपि समुदाये दृष्टमभ्युपगम्यताम् ।



स (न ?) च सङ्घातत्वादिना पाराध्यानुमानमचेतनत्वानुमानं वा ; कालात्ययापदेशात् । कथञ्चित्परार्थत्वमात्रेऽपि सिद्धसाधनत्वात् । न च देहस्य चेतनत्वे प्रतिसन्धानानुपपत्तिः बालयुवाद्यवस्थाभेदेन भिन्नत्वादिति वाच्यम् ; एकत्वेनैव तत्रापि प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वात् । एवमेव हि मीमांसकानामभ्युपगमः । अत एव मात्रानुभूतस्य पुत्रेण स्मरणप्रसङ्गोऽप्युपकार नियमः (भ्यः ?) तयोरेकत्वाभावात् । एकवस्य (त्र ?) च तस्यानपायात् । तस्माद्य (क्लिञ्चित्प- देशा ?) पायेऽपि तत्तत्प्रवे (दे ?) शानुभूतस्मरणेष्वपत्तिः ; यतः शिरःपादादिदेशभेदेन सुख- दुःखानुभवेऽप्यवयविनस्तत्र तत्र व्याप्त्या तत्समवायाविरोधः ॥

न च देहस्य जन्मान्तरदृष्टस्मरणानुपपत्त्या प्रथमप्रवृत्त्यसिद्धावुत्तरोत्तरसर्वव्यवहार- विलयश्शङ्कनीयः ; तत्तत्सुखदुःखानुभवसमनन्तरजनितयादृच्छिकप्रवृत्तिविशेष्वन्वयव्यति- रेकाभ्यां हेतुसाद्ब्या (द्वय ?) भावावगमपूर्वकं सर्वव्यवहारोपपत्तेः । न हि निपुणावलोकित- समस्ततत्त्वाद्याश्च तीव्रदुःखानुभवे तत्परिहारौपयिकमेव देहव्यापारमातन्वते ; किं पुनर्बालाः । अत एव केषाञ्चित् स्तन्यपानादिव्यापारासन्निपाते विपत्तिर्भवति । प्रायेण च स्वरसवाहिप्राणादियोगवशेन शरीरचेष्टाः स्वाभाविक्यस्तथा तथा दृश्यन्ते । बुद्धितीव्रत्वादि- योगविशेषोऽपि स्वभावभेदादेवोपपद्यते । स्वसामग्रीसमवधानञ्च सहकार्युपनायकसामग्र्यन्तरा- धीनम् । तदपि तथेति नादृष्टतत्समवायिकल्पना (वि ?) कल्पनावकाशः । अतश्शरीरस्थैव प्रत्येमुः प्रत्येतव्यादव्यतिरेकात् प्रमितिव (द ?) शाया महमिति भासमानस्यात्मत्वं नार्थन्तरस्येति युक्तं पश्यामः ॥

अत्रोच्यते-

पाणी पादौ च नाहं न च भवति सुखं तेषु मय्येवं दृष्टं  
प्रत्येकं चेतनाश्चेत्करतदवयवा नैकतन्त्रा भवेयुः ।

तत्रात्मत्वं न सिद्धयेदवयविनि नतद्वेदमभ्येति तेभ्यः

देवादौ प्रत्यवस्ता स्मृ (प्रत्यवस्थं म ?) तिरपि<sup>१</sup> न भवेदेकदेशानुपज्ञात् ॥

अहंप्रत्ययगोचरो ज्ञाता, स एवात्मेत्यत्र तावद्भवतामविवाद एव । तत्र (न ता ?) तावत् देहावयवाश्चेतयन्ते, तेषामहमिति भावाभावात् । न हि कश्चिदहं पाणिः अहं पाद इति वा, प्रतिपद्यते, ततोऽहंत्वाभावात्तेषु ज्ञानाभावः ।

शिरःपादादिषु सुखदुःखे समवेतः, पादे मे सुखं, शिरसि मे सुखमित्युपलम्भात् । अतस्तत्समानाधिकरणं तदात्मकं वा ज्ञानमपि तत्रैवेत्युचितम् । नैतद्युक्तम् ; यतस्तत्रा-  
स्मदर्थस्य सुखसमवायित्वम् । नह्यस्मदर्थमपहायान्यसमवेतं सुखमध्यक्षमनुभूयत इति कस्य चिद्भ्रान्तिरपास्ता भवति । अतो 'मे सुखम्' इति समवायिनि सिद्धे, बहुप्रदेशत्वात्तस्य, कुत्रेत्याकांक्षायामुपलक्षणतया पादादिव्यपदेश इति । अत्रास्मन्मते अणुरेवात्मा सुख-  
मप्यनुकूलवेदनात्मकं तस्मिन्नेव स्थितमपि तत्तदनुकूलस्पर्शादिविषयदेश...[सम्बन्धिप्रदेश] विशेषितं तथानुभूयते । अत एव हि गीतादिसुखं न श्रोत्रादिस्थमुपलभ्यते, शब्दस्य तद्दे-  
शतयानुपलम्भात् । यदि ह्यस्मदर्थः पादादिरेव स्यात्, वैयधिकरण्यमेव न स्यात् । अतो-  
ऽवयवेषु सुखासमवायात् तन्मुखेनापि चैतन्यसमवायो दुरूपपादः ॥

अपि चावयवाश्चेत्प्रत्येकं चेतयन्ते, ततस्स्वार्था एव भवेयुः । न हि चेतनस्स्वप्रयोजन-  
मपहायार्थान्तरे प्रयतते । अतः स्वप्रयोजनापेक्षिष्वितरपराङ्मुखेषु मिथस्साभ्यसूयेषु च हस्त-  
पादादिष्ववयवेषु एकग्रामवासिषु पुरुषेष्विव महान् विवादस्यात् । ग्रामीणानन्तपुरुष-  
व्यवहारास्सर्व एवैकशरीरे प्रसज्येरन् । न च निर्विकल्पकज्ञानमात्रा (मात्रज्ञाना अ?) वयवा-  
इति युक्तम् ; प्रवृत्तिविरोधात्, सुखादिव्यवहारानिर्वाहाच्च । यस्य खल्ववयवस्य चेष्टा  
दृश्यते तस्य चेष्टानुरूपप्रयत्नचिकीर्षाज्ञानसमवायाभावे तदनुपपत्तेः । ज्ञानविशेषरूपाणां

१. अवयवेभ्योऽवयविनो भेदाभावेऽप्यवयववस्थामात्रे ज्ञानमित्यपि न भवति । अवय-  
वानुपलब्धोपतादवस्थ्यादित्यर्थः स्यात् ; उपरि तदुक्तेः । शुद्धपाठो निरीक्ष्यः ।

२. शङ्कते—शिर इति

वा तेषां प्रवृत्तिकारणत्वेन प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् । न चावयविन्येव समवेतानामेषामवयवव्यापार-  
हेतुत्वमिति वाच्यम्, ज्ञानमात्रस्यापि तथाभावप्रसङ्गात् । अस्त्वेवमिति चेत्, तत्र  
वक्ष्यामः । अपि च (अयञ्च ?) प्रादेशिकस्सार्वत्रिको वावयविगुणश्चैतन्यादिः । न ताव-  
त्प्रादेशिकः ; प्रदेशभूतावयवासमवेतस्य प्रादेशिकत्वानुपपत्तेः । न च सार्वत्रिकः ; सर्वत्र  
चेष्टादिप्रसङ्गात् ।

भेदाग्रहादवयवानां परस्परकार्यभेदानध्यवसाय इति स्थवीयः ; अवयवानां  
मिथो भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् । नाप्यवयविभेदाग्रहो युक्तः ; अवयवकर्तृकस्यावयवि-  
भेदाग्रहस्यावयवान्तरभेदाभेदयोरकिञ्चित्करत्वात् । अवयवान्तरे चावयविनो भेदाग्रहेऽवय-  
विन एव नानात्वेन प्रतीतिस्स्यात्, अद्वैतिनामिवाहमर्थभेदवादिनामात्मनः । अवयवि-  
कर्तृकोऽवयवभेदाग्रहोऽप्यवयवानां स्वातन्त्र्यं द्विगुणयति । स ह्यवयवभेदभिन्नमात्मानमनु-  
सन्दधानो रागद्वेषाभ्यामाभिमानिकभेदगोचराभ्यां व्याहन्यतैवाद्वैतिनामेव, यथा ब्रह्मेति ।

एकावयविपरिग्रहस्त्वेकग्रामपरिग्रहादिवदन्योन्यस्पर्धाविच्छेदाय नात्यन्ताय प्रभवति ।  
एकावयविशेषतया सर्वेषां तदवयवानामविवादः भव...[न्म]त....[इव] मुक्तात्मवदिति  
चेत्, नैतदपि साधीयः ; अहंत्वमादिभावेनावयवानां मिथो भेददर्शनानुपलम्भात् ।  
संसारे हि न तावदेकश्चेतनश्चेतनान्तरमध्यर्क्षमीक्षते ; देहान्तरेऽपि प्रसङ्गात् । न हि हस्तः  
पादं पादो वा हस्तमुभौ वावयवी सम्बोधयन् दृश्यते, दूरे शेषशेषिभावावबोधः । अपि च  
तेषामेवावयवानां नावयवस्या (नानावयव्या ?) रम्भकत्वेन नाशानुत्पादावस्थावयविबाहु-  
ल्यात् तत्तत्तादर्थ्यालाभनिमित्तदुःखबाहुल्यं प्रसज्येत । न च तत्प्रतिसन्धीयते । काला-  
न्तरारभ्यावयविनामेकनियमाभावाच्च नानावयवानां तत्तत्पारार्थ्यकृतविप्रतिपत्तिः पूर्ववदेव  
प्रसज्येत । अतो नैकशेष (षि ?) परिग्रहादप्यैकार्थ्यम् । एवञ्च सर्वदा कार्यचिन्ताचतुरैरव-  
यवैरवयव्यनुवर्तनं क्रियत इति राजसामन्तवार्तामवयवेषु सञ्चारयन्तशेषलोकापहास्य इति  
कृतमत्र विस्तरेण । अतस्सिद्धमवयवा न चेतयन्त इति ।

ननु किमनेनाप्रस्तुतोपालम्भेन ? न हि शरीरवत्तदवयवांश्च स्वतन्त्रांश्चेतनानातिष्ठान (म?) (मह?) इति चेत्सत्यम् ; तथाप्यनेन प्रपञ्चेन तस्यैव मूले निहितः कुठारः । तथाहि— यदा तावदवयवेषु चैतन्यसम्भावना नास्पदाना (नास्पदं?) लभते तदा कैव कथावयविनि ? न हि कारणमन्तरेण कार्यमुदयमासादयति । अवयविगतविशेषगुणानामवयवगतैरेव हि तज्जातीयैरुत्पादः । गुणश्चा (कारणश्चा ?) (इदञ्चा?) वयवारब्धद्रव्यान्तरावयव्यभ्युपगमे वक्तव्यम् । यदा तावदवयवा एव कश्चिद्विशेषमापन्ना अवयवी, नार्थान्तरम्; तदावयव-चैतन्यनिरासमात्रेण चरितार्थता । नह्यवयवातिरिक्तमवयविनि पश्यामः । अत एव ह्यवयव-वास्संश्लेषविशेषमापन्ना एकोऽवयवीति प्रतिपद्यते । तत्र यद्गुणैरवयवैर्योऽवयव्यारभ्यते, तद्गुण एवासौ नान्यादृशः । न च स्थूलस्यै (त्वै?) कत्ववदवयवविभाव एव चैतन्यमुत्पद्यत इति वाच्यम् ; तस्यावयवित्वनिर्वाहकत्वाभावात् । तथात्वे वा स्थूलत्वैकत्ववत्सर्वावयवि-ष्वनुवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् ॥

अपि चावयव्यवस्थायामेव भवतु नाम चैतन्यम् ; तथापि अवयवेष्वेव तस्य वृत्तेः पूर्वोक्तेर्ष्यादिदोषस्तदवस्थ एव ; आश्रयान्तराभावात् । द्वित्वादिवद्यद्यपि साधारणमेकमेव चैतन्यं ; तथापि तेन स्वात्मानं नानाभूतं प्रतिपद्येरन्नेव । तत्र यथा द्वयोरिदमिति निर्दिष्टं फलं द्वित्वाधिकरणयोस्तयोरेव, तथा चैतन्यफलभागित्वमपि चैतन्याधिकरणानां तेषामेवेति सर्वं पूर्वोक्तं तदवस्थमेव । नहि साधारणफलसिद्धये कश्चिदेको विनाशावधि व्याप्ति-यते । अपिच यो गुणो यस्मिन्नवयविनि समवेतः, तद्गुणावान्तरजात्या तज्जातीयगुणवन्त-स्तदवयवाः पृथग्भूताश्चेति दृष्टम् । यदि तज्जातीयगुणोऽवयवेषु नास्ति कथं तस्या-वयव्यवस्थायां तेषु वृत्तिरुपपद्यते । अतश्चैतन्यमात्रस्यावयवेषु निवृत्तेरवयविनि चैतन्य-निरासः । एवं प्रयत्नादेरपि द्रष्टव्यम् ।

एतेन प्रत्येकासमवेतमपि भूतेषु चैतन्यं शरीराख्यसङ्घाते जायते मदशक्तिवत्, चूर्ण-हरिद्रासंयोगजरागविशेषवद्वेति प्रत्युक्तम् । तत्रापि गुणावान्तरजात्या तज्जातीयगुणस्य तद-वयवेषु विद्यमानत्वात्

ननु च....[यदि त]व तमोद्रव्यं परिणामविशेष(षे?)ण महदहंकारतन्मात्राभूत-

पञ्चकरूपमवतिष्ठत इति सिद्धान्तः ; तदा गन्धस्य नाप्सु, रसस्य न तेजसि, रूपस्य न वायावित्यादिक्रमेण कारणेषु कार्यगुणस्य समवायो नाभ्युपेतः । तत्पूर्वावस्थं तदेव हि द्रव्यमुत्तरोत्तरगुणवत्तालक्षणावस्थाविशेषमासाद्य पृथिव्यादिभावमनुभवति । तथावयवेषु कारणेष्वसमवेतमपि चैतन्यमवयविनि जायताम् , किन्तोपपद्यते इति चेत् ; न तावदिदमागमावसेयम् ; तद्विरुद्धत्वात् । देहातिरिक्तः कर्मफलभोक्ता ज्ञानानन्दमयोऽपहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणपरमात्मशरीरभूतोऽपृथक्सिद्धतया तच्छरीरभूतो जीव इति वेदागमप्रसिद्धिः । प्रकृतिपरिणामविशेषस्तु प्रमाणान्तरागोचरशब्दैकसमधिगम्य इति तथैवेष्यते । तत्रापि सावयवस्य नावयवासमवेतगुणाधिकरणत्वमस्ति । तत्र पुनरवयवेषु पूर्वं तदानीमप्यविद्यमानमवयविनि संपद्यतामिति सकलप्रमाणतर्कविरुद्धं को नाम श्रद्दध्यात् ?

यत्तु शरीरचैतन्यसिद्ध्यर्थमन्यत्रापि सूक्ष्मचैतन्यं कल्प्यतामित्युक्तम् ; तदपि कल्पक(कं?)(नं?)शरीरावयवचैतन्यनिरासेन प्रत्युक्तमिति वेदितव्यम् । अवयवेष्ववयवसूक्ष्मचैतन्यमस्त्विति चेन्न ; अवयव(वि?)गुणविजातीयस्यावयवगुणविशेषस्य द्रव्यान्तरावयव (वि?) पक्षास्मत्पक्षयोरविशेषेणानुपपत्तेः । तन्तुपटादिषु शौकल्यादेस्तीव्रत्वादिरविशिष्ट एव । न हि तन्तुषु मसृणशौक्येषु पटस्तीव्रशौक्य इति युज्यते ।

यत्तु भूतसमुदायरूपशरीरगुणस्य प्रत्येकसमवायानपेक्षेति, तदपि प्रत्येकसमवायानपेक्षायामप्यवयवसमवायान(?) पेक्षा दुर्निवारेति निरस्तम् । न चानुपलभ्यमानानां (नना?) नाश्रयचैतन्य....[तत्सौक्ष्म्यादि] कल्पनादाश्रयन्तरकल्पनं गरीयः । प्रत्युत स्फुटप्रतीयमाननिगा (निर्भागा?) हंप्रत्ययवेद्यचेतनस्य देहात्पृथग्भावमात्रमतिलाघवात्प्रत्येत्यव्य....[म् । यत्तु (यस्तु) पृथिवीविशेषेषु गन्धादिविशेषकल्पनं दृष्टान्तः, (तत् ?) सूक्ष्मतरतमादिभावेन क्रमेण तद्गुणानामुपलम्भात् नात्यन्ताय कल्पनमेवेति विशेषः । यत्त्वनुमानादिप्रामाण्यानभ्युपगमात्सर्वमिदमनर्थकमिति , तत् प्रतिज्ञाविरुद्धम् , सर्वस्यानभ्युपगमादित्यादिहेतूपन्यासादित्यादिना प्रामाण्यसमर्थनप्रकरणे प्रत्युक्तम् । अतो देहातिरिक्तश्चेतनः ।

कार्यकारणभावे सत्यन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ।

संस्कारोन्मेषसिद्धयर्थं दृ(र्थमदृ ?)ष्टं सिद्धमात्मानि ॥

कार्यस्य सर्वस्य कादाचित्कत्वात्पूर्वावध्यपेक्षया पूर्वस्य चावधेः किञ्चिज्जातीयस्य तत्तत्कार्यजातीयादन्वयव्यतिरेकवत्तया नियतत्वात्कारणत्वसिद्धो (द्वौ?) भवति कस्यचिदपरिदृश्यमानकारणस्यापि कारणापेक्षा । तत्र फलं पुंसां प्रवृत्तेः । सा चेच्छया । इच्छा च ज्ञानेनेति दृश्यते । तच्च ज्ञानं प्रमितिस्मृतिर्वा भवति । तत्र स्मृतिरननुभूतानि (तानि ?) वर्तमानाऽनुभूतिमपेक्षते । सा च संस्कारद्वारेण कारणं, चिरं निवृत्तत्वात् । संस्कारश्चोद्बोधमपेक्षते । अनन्तेषु पूर्वानुभूतेषु केषाञ्चिदेव सदृशदर्शनादिलब्धोद्बोधसंस्काराणां स्मृतिदर्शनात् । इतरथा सर्वस्मरणप्रसङ्गात् । उद्बोधश्च संस्कारस्य कचिदन्वयव्यतिरेकवद्विदृष्टैः । यत्र तु न किञ्चित्कारणं दृश्यते, यथा किं कर्तव्यमिदानीमिति समानकार्येषु बहुषु चिन्तया तेषु कस्यचित्समीचीनम्, तत्रादृष्टमेव कारणं भवितुमर्हति । तत्तददृष्टविशेषलब्धोद्बोधसंस्कारजनितान्वयव्यतिरेकस्मरणप्रभवं हि तत्तत्कार्यज्ञानम् । तच्चादृष्टमस्मिन्नेव शरीरे संपादित (सम्भावित?) (सम्पाद्यता?) मिति न युक्तम् ; समानदेशस्थानां समानाभ्यासानामेव पुरुषाणामन्योन्यविलक्षणविचित्रस्मरणपाटवात् । तत्तत्संस्कारोन्मेषकारणभूतादृष्टाधिकरणतया शरीरातिरिक्तात्मसिद्धिः ।

अपि चैकस्मिन्नेव जन्मन्यभ्यासातिशयो वैशद्यमप्रमोषश्च करोतीति व्यासमुपलब्धम् । तदेतदुभयमिह जन्मन्यलब्धाभ्यासं जन्मान्तराभ्यासमनुमापयति । दृश्यते हि कस्याचिद्विषयविशेषे स्मृतिवैशद्यमप्रमोषश्च । यतः कर्तव्या (काव्या ?) नि विरचयति ; न शास्त्रार्थमल्पमप्यवगच्छति । अपि चातिसूक्ष्मं शास्त्रार्थमवगच्छति ; न किञ्चिदपि कवयितुं शक्नोति । शास्त्रेष्वपि कश्चिद्व्याकरणे प्रगल्भते, अन्यस्तु मीमांसायाम् । अपरश्च न्याय-तर्के । एवं चित्रास्मृत्यादिशक्तयः प्रतिनियतविषयाश्च तत्तद्विषयाभ्यासमन्तरेणालब्धात्मान-

१. इयं पञ्चमी.

२. तेषु मध्ये किञ्चिद्विषयकमेव ज्ञानमित्यर्थः ।

स्तमनुमापयन्ति । स यस्य, असौ जन्मान्तरस्थायी शरीरातिरिक्त इति सिद्धयति । न चात्र दृष्टाहारादिसामग्रीपरम्पराश्रयणेन समाधातुं शक्यम् ; अभ्यास एव वैशद्याप्रमोषयोः कारणमित्यन्वयव्यतिरेकदर्शनात् तदन्यथाकरणेनादृष्टचरकारणान्तरकल्पनानुपपत्तेः । दृष्टस्य शरीरावस्थादेः, तन्मूलस्याहारविशेषस्य च व्यभिचारित्वात् । यत्तु केषाञ्चिदाहारणां.... [वैशद्यादि] (स्मृत्यादि?) हेतुत्वमायुर्वेदसिद्धमिति स्मर्यते, तदपि जन्मान्तरस्थायिन्यात्मनि संस्काराधारे सिद्धे स्मृतिसमर्थमनःप्रणिधानादियोग्यदेहधातुसाम्यादिहेतुत्वेनेति द्रष्टव्यम् । अन्यथा तन्मात्रहेतुत्वे व्यभिचाराभावप्रसङ्गात् ।

तथा प्रथमप्रवृत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्त्यापि जन्मान्तरसिद्धिः । तत्र यदुक्तं यादृच्छिकं प्रथमकर्मेति, तत् चेष्टात्वाङ्गीकारेणान्यथा वा ? न तावच्चेष्टायाः प्रयत्नवाञ्छाबुद्धिमाला-मन्तरेणोत्पत्तिर्युक्ता । अचेष्टारूपा तु क्रिया पुलकस्वेदादिवदुपजायमाना नास्माभिरनुमानतया वर्ण्यते । शरीरपारार्थ्यादिप्रतिपादनार्थमनुमानजालमत्रानुसन्धेयम् । देहचैतन्ये प्रतिसन्धानमपि<sup>१</sup>.....आत्मन्यपि समानमेतत् । यत् स्मरणे बहिरिन्द्रियानपेक्षत्वमिति चेन्न ; अनुभवेऽपि प्राप्तिसन्तरेणानुग्रहार्थं तदनपेक्षणात् । ईदं....हापि प्राप्त्यर्थमवयवापेक्षेति न वाच्यम् ; अवयविसंयोगस्यैवाव्यभिचारिणः प्राप्तत्वात् । अत एवविधकल्पना-मन्तरेणापि हि स्मरणादिव्यवस्था सिद्धान्त उपपद्यते ।

मम शरीरमिति च ज्ञानमात्मनि शरीरातिरिक्ते प्रमाणम् । न च शरीरशब्दः स्वरूपवचनः ; लोष्टादावपि प्रसङ्गात् । यत्तु शिलापुत्रकस्य शरीरमिति प्रयोगः, सोऽप्यौपचारिक एव ; पुत्रत्वारोपेण प्रवृत्तत्वात् । ममात्मेति व्यतिरेकनिर्देशो मम स्वरूपमिति वद्दृष्टव्यः । आत्मशब्दो ह्यनेकवचनः ।

१. तादृशाहारे सत्यप्यभ्यासाभावे स्मृतिवैशद्यादेरदर्शनेन व्यभिचारस्य स्पष्टतया व्यभिचाराभावस्थानिष्टत्वादिति भावः ॥

२. अत्र पत्रमेकं पतितमिति मातृकासु लिखितमस्ति

३. इहापि. पा.

स्वभावस्थायाञ्चोपन(र ?) तेषु बहिरिन्द्रियेषु योऽहमिति प्रत्यक्षं प्रमीयते, नासौ देहो भवितुमर्हति ; तस्य बहिरिन्द्रियगोचरत्वात् । अन्तःकरणगोचरत्वमपि ज्ञानोपधानेन तस्यैवेति चेन्न ; तस्य स्मृतिमन्तरेण स्वातन्त्र्यवि(न्ध्यायो ?)योगात् । तच्चात्मनः स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वात्, ज्ञानस्य च ज्ञानान्तरापे (रानपे ?) क्षत्वेन स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वात् । ज्ञानावान्तरभेदा- (दत्त्वा ?) चेच्छादीनामन्तःकरणस्य शक्तिकल्पनायां प्रमाणाभावादिति सिद्धमन्यत्र । शरीरस्य त्वात्मनः स्वप्रकाशत्वमयुक्तम् ; शरीरावस्थानिवन्धनत्वे सावयवप्रकाशप्रसङ्गात् । द्रव्यमात्रनिबन्धनत्वे त्वशरीरावस्थायां भूतान्तरे प्रसङ्गात्, सर्वस्य च सर्वदा सङ्कोचानुपपत्तेः । उपवीतो (उपाधितो ?) हि सङ्कोचो न स्वतः ॥

किञ्च

शरीरमेव चेदात्मा विश्वलोकप्रवृत्तयः ।

अदृष्टार्था न सिद्धेयुर्विश्ववैचित्र्यमेव च ॥

सर्वेषां हि बहुविदां पुरुषाणामदृष्टार्थाः प्रायस्संवादिन्यः प्रवृत्तयः । योग्यानुपलब्धकृत- दृष्टहेतुचक्रस्यादृष्टमेव कारणं भवितुमर्हति । अतो ज्ञातृत्वेनाहम् (मिति ?) प्रसिद्धशरीराति- रिक्त आत्मेति सिद्धम् ॥

अत्र केचिदाहुः—प्रत्यगर्थ एवात्मा ; न ज्ञाता अहमर्थः, तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वायोगात् । संविदधीनसिद्धिकं हि सर्वं वस्तुजातम् । संविदो व्यतिरिच्यमानं परागर्थः । संवितु स्वात्मसिद्ध्यर्थमनन्यापेक्षा स्वात्मनश्चाव्यतिरिच्यमाना प्रत्यगर्थः । बहिः प्रकाशते परागर्थः अन्तः प्रत्यगर्थ इति हि तद्विवेकविदः । अन्तः स्वयं चाव्यतिरेके पर्यवस्यति । संविदपेक्षया- चाव्यतिरेकस्संविद एवेति न संवेदिता प्रत्यगर्थः । सोऽपि स्वात्मापेक्षयाऽव्यतिरिक्त एवेति

१. इदं क्रियाविशेषणं, प्रत्यक्षप्रमितिविषयो भवतीत्यर्थः ।

२. अन्तःशब्दः स्वयंशब्दश्चेत्यर्थः



चेन्न ; घटादयोऽपि स्वात्मापेक्षया न व्यतिरिच्यन्त इति तेऽपि तथा भवेयुः । तथापि ते स्वसिद्धिभूतां संविदमपेक्ष्य बहिर्भूता इति चेत् ; एवं संवेदितापीति पश्यतु भवान् ।

अत्रोच्यते—

प्रत्यत्त्वं ज्ञातुरेव स्यान्न ज्ञानेऽप्युपपद्यते ।

• यस्मै प्रकाशते सर्वं तत्प्रत्यगिति तद्विदः ॥

संवेद्यं स्वप्रकाशञ्च जगद्ब्रूया प्रकाशते ।

स्वप्रकाशे ह्यनन्यार्थे प्रत्यत्त्वमिति निश्चयः ॥

जडेषु घटादिभावेषु दृग्गधीनसिद्धिषु परात्त्वं दृग्व्यतिरेकमात्रकृतं तादृक् तादर्थ्यं (उत दृक्ता-  
दर्थ्याः)भावकृतमिति विवेचनीयम् । यस्य हि विपक्षे बाधकस्तर्कोऽस्ति स एव प्रामाणिक  
पक्षः । यदि हि दृग्व्यतिरेकमात्रात्परात्त्वं दृक्तादर्थ्याभावेऽपि दृशि प्रत्यत्त्वं स्यात् ।  
तस्याश्चात्मत्वे पुरुषार्थभाजनत्वायोग्यत्वाद्बन्धमोक्षौ नात्मन इत्यापद्येत । दृक्तादर्थ्यं हि  
पुरुषार्थभागित्वे निदानम् । यस्मै सुखं वा स एव सुखी वेति गीयते ? यस्य सुखं भासते,  
स एवेति चेन्न ; तस्यापि तस्मै प्रकाशमानस्यैव तत्त्वम् । इतरथा जडस्यापि सुखित्वप्रसङ्गः ।  
तदनुकूलमपि हि कश्चित्तनः प्रतिपद्यते । अनुकूलवेदनीयमेव हि सुखम् । तद्विधतिर्वा  
(यद्वा ?) परेण ज्ञायमानपुत्रजन्मनः पुत्रिणस्तदजानतोऽपि सुखित्वप्रसङ्गः । अतः तत्प्रतियोगिकं  
तदर्थज्ञानगोचरश्चानुकूलं सुखं, तथाविधं प्रतिकूलं दुःखं, तत्प्रतियोगिकानुकूलज्ञानं वा  
तादर्थ्यविशेषितं सुखम्, तथाविधं प्रतिकूलज्ञानं वा दुःखमिति सुखदुःखयोस्स्वरूप-  
विवेकः । आत्मधर्मान्तररूपं सुखं दुःखं चेति भवताप्यनभ्युपगतमेव । येनापि वाभ्यु-  
पेतम्, तेनापि तदर्थप्रकाशगोचरतयैव तथेप्यते । अत एव हि जडात्मवादिनः तार्किकाग्रे-  
सराः प्रत्येतुः प्रत्येतव्यादव्यतिरेकः प्रत्यत्त्वमिति तल्लक्षणमाचक्षते । एतेन भवत्पक्षे बाधक-  
प्रमाणमुक्तमित्यप्यनुसन्धातव्यम् । नचैवं कचित्पक्षे<sup>१</sup> बाधकमुत्प्रेक्षितुमपि शक्यम्,

१. तद्विधति वा पा०.

२. तार्किकपक्षेऽस्मत्पक्षे वेत्यर्थः

परोक्ष (पराक्षुः) घटादिषु दृश्यतिरेक्युत्तत्त्वमित्यस्य विपक्षे दृशोऽपि (अदृशोऽपि?) तार्किकात्मनः प्रत्यक्तवे दृशोऽपि धर्मभूतज्ञानस्य चा प्रत्यक्षे (त्वे?) न किञ्चिदत्र बाधकमस्ति । घटादेरपि प्रत्यक्तवप्रसङ्गस्तार्किकपक्षे, तव त्वात्मनोऽपि परात्त्वप्रसङ्ग इति चेत्, स्यादेतदेवं, यद्यदृत्त्वादेव तार्किकः प्रत्यक्तवं ब्रूयात्, अहं वा दृत्त्वादेव परात्त्वम् । नचैवमुभावप्यनु... (भिः) दध्वहे । प्रकाशमानस्य प्रकाशतादर्थ्यात् प्रत्यक्तवम् । तद्व्यतिरेकात्परात्त्वम् । यथा यथं व्यतिरेकश्च विशेषणविशेष्योभयव्यतिरेकात्मना त्रिविधो द्रष्टव्यः । नचैवं सति तार्किकवदस्मत्पक्षेऽपि प्रतीचो जडत्वप्रसङ्गः; प्रमाणान्तरेण तस्य स्वयंप्रकाशत्वसिद्धेः । तच्चोक्तमन्यत्र । एतत्सर्वमभिसन्ध्याहुर्भगवद्वाप्यकारमिश्राः, ' जानामीति धर्मधर्मितया प्रत्यक्षप्रतीति-विरोधादेव ' इति ।

ननु चैवं सति भवत्सिद्धान्ते मोक्षस्य पारार्थ्यान (?) नुसन्धानलक्षणत्वात्परमात्मैक एव प्रत्यक्, अन्ये तु पराञ्च आत्मानः प्रसज्यन्ते इति चेन्मैवम्, तदानीमप्यात्मस्वरूपस्यानन्याधीनप्रकाशस्य स्वस्मै भासमानत्वात् । धर्मभूतज्ञानस्यापि तस्मै भासमानत्वात् । कथमियं चतुर्थी घटते परमात्मशेषत्वादस्येति चेत्सत्यम्, तदानीं धर्मभूतज्ञानगोचरेण तद्विशिष्टेन रूपेणासौ परमात्मार्थोऽवसीयत एव । तथापि तद्विशेष्येण स्वप्रकाशेन रूपेण स्वार्थोऽवसीयते । रूपभेदाच्चाविरोधः । प्रकाशतादर्थ्यमात्रप्रयुक्तं प्रत्यक्तवं भोक्तृत्वं च, परशेषत्वकृतं भोग्यत्वं चेत्यनवद्यमुभयमिति । प्रत्यक्तवं चास्मदर्थः परात्त्वं युष्मदर्थः, प्रत्यक्तवसमानाधिकरणञ्च ज्ञातृत्वं प्रत्यक्षं सर्वलोकेप्रसिद्धमिति को नामास्मदर्थं पराञ्च युष्मदर्थं प्रत्यञ्च ब्रूयादते देवानां प्रियात् ।

अयं चात्मा कर्ता, स्वातन्त्र्यादेव यत्नं प्रति । स्वातन्त्र्यं कर्तृत्वम् । स हि तस्य क्रिया । परमात्मनीवास्मिन्नपि मुख्यं कर्तृत्वम् । अचेतनेषु केवलमुपचर्यते । इदमेव च जगद्वैचित्र्यं (व्यः) निदानम् । न ह्यचेतनं चेतनानधिष्ठितमेव तथा तथा परिणमते यथा-यथा सुखीवेद्या (खित्वाद्या?) पथेत । न चेश्वरः स्वातन्त्र्येण तथा तथा परिणमयति 'समोऽहं सर्वभूतेषु, 'न मां कर्माणि लिपन्ति न मे कर्मफले स्पृहा' 'निरञ्जनं निरवद्यम्' इत्यादि-

प्रमाणविरोधात् । अतो जीवस्वातन्त्र्यं एवं (तन्त्र्यमेव?) पुण्यापुण्यद्वारेण विचित्रसुखदुःखा-  
पादकविश्वपरिणामे कारणम् ।

ननु चेदं सिद्धान्तविरुद्धं बहुप्रमाणविरुद्धं च लक्ष्यते । तथा हि—विश्वप्रपञ्च-  
शरीरः परमात्मेति सिद्धान्तः । ‘यस्य आत्माशरीरं य आत्मानमन्तरोयमयति,’ ‘अन्तःप्रविष्टः-  
शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मा,’ इत्यादि श्रुतयश्च सर्वेषामात्मनां परमात्मशरीरतां तन्निगाम्यत्वञ्च  
प्रतिपादयन्ति । शरीरं चात्रापेक्षया स्वतन्त्रमिति वचनमसङ्गतम् ; प्रत्यक्षविरोधात् । पार-  
तन्त्र्यस्यैव तल्लक्षणतया तत्रैवाभिधानात् । किञ्च ‘एष ह्येवासाधु कर्म कारयति तं, यमेभ्यो  
लोकेभ्य उन्निनीषति । एष एवा साधु कर्म कारयति तम्, यमघो निनीषति, इत्युक्त-  
ष्टापकृष्टगतिसाधनपुण्यापुण्यगतिकर्मसु बलाज्जीवान्परः प्रवर्तयतीति साक्षादेव श्रूयते ।

स्मृतिश्च

अज्ञो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः ।

ईश्वरप्रेरितो गच्छेत्स्वर्गं वा श्वभ्रमेव वा ॥

ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति ।

भ्रामयन्सर्वभूतानि यन्त्रारूढानि मायया ॥

तेषां सततयुक्तानां भजतां प्रीतिपूर्वकम् ।

ददामि बुद्धियोगं तं येन मामुपयान्ति ते ॥

तानहं द्विषतः क्रूरान्संसारेषु नराधमान् ।

क्षिपाम्यजस्रमसुरा(शुभा)नासुरीण्वेव योनिषु ॥

इत्यादिकमेवार्थं विशदयतीति । यदि च जीवस्वातन्त्र्येण कुर्यादीश्वरस्य तत्त्व-  
मतिसंकुचितमेव स्यात् ; सर्वजीवेषु तस्य निरवकाशत्वात् । ततश्च ‘तमीश्वराणां परमं  
महेश्वरम्’ इत्यादिकाः श्रुतयः प्रकुप्येयुरिति चेत् ;

अत्रोच्यते—

जीवत्वाय स्वतन्त्रत्वमीश्वरायत्तमिष्यताम् ।

कर्मणां च फलं पुंसां परानुग्रहनिग्रहौ ॥

तत्र यत्तावदुक्तं शरीरत्वाज्जीवस्य परनियाम्यस्य स्वातन्त्र्यायोग इति ; तत्र नियम-  
नमेव नियाम्यस्य स्वातन्त्र्यमावहतीति ब्रूमः । यथा हि राजा भृत्यमादायामुं देशं नियच्छेति  
नियुङ्क्ते, राजशासनानुवर्ती च भृत्यस्स्वातन्त्र्येणानुतिष्ठति, एवमिहापि । अत्र त्वनिदं प्रथ-  
मपरात्मेच्छागोचरस्य जीवस्य तदनुरूपमनादिस्वातन्त्र्यमिति विशेषः । न हि यत्नेनैव नियम-  
नमिति निर्बन्धः; अनुमतिदानमात्रेणापि तदुपपत्तेः । निवर्तनसमर्थस्यानुमतिरपि हि प्रवर्तन-  
मेव । अत्र त्विच्छाधिक्यमप्यस्तीति विशेषः । नित्यस्यापि परापेक्षत्वं नित्यद्वय्याश्रितनित्य-  
गुणवदविरुद्धमिति सर्वैरभ्युपेत्यम् । ननु यदि निवर्तनसमर्थः, प्रतिषिद्धे कर्मणि प्रवर्त-  
मानमेनं किं न निवर्तयेत् ? तर्हि कूपे पतन्तमिव पुत्रमनुमन्यमानो निर्धृण इत्यापद्येत । स्या-  
देतदेवं, यदि साम्यमेनं न प्रतिबध्नीयात् । समस्तवस्तुनो जीवानामनुकूलप्रतिकूलयोः कर्मणो-  
स्साधारणं स्वातन्त्र्यं दत्त्वा यद्यन्यतरकर्मप्रवृत्तेरवागैव तन्निरुद्ध्यात्, ततः स्वातन्त्र्येण  
प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यं जीवानां निष्फलमापद्येत । कस्मै चित्पुरुषार्थोपहितं यत्नमेव विहन्ति वि . . .  
यश्च मश्च(?) स्यात् ।

अथ प्रतिरूपप्रयत्नक्षणानन्तरं तत्प्रतिबन्धं निवर्तयत्विति मतम्, तदयुक्तम् ;  
द्वितीयादिकर्मस्वनुकूलस्यापि संभवात् । तदानीमपि स्वातन्त्र्यस्यानपायात् । उपक्रमानु-  
कूलशेषप्रवर्तनस्य मात्रयोपक्रमफलकोटिनिक्षेपार्हत्वात् । यदि कृतस्य प्रतिकूलफलं न प्रय-  
च्छेत्, उपक्रान्तस्य तस्य मध्ये निरोधं वा कुर्यात्, तत्र त्वपरस्यानुकूलयत्नं कृतवतः  
फलं प्रयच्छति; प्रतिकूलयत्नवतस्तु न फलम् । प्रत्युत निरोधमेव करोतीति सुमहद्वैषम्यम् ।  
अथ तु पाक्षिकप्रतिकूलप्रवृत्तिशङ्कया जीवेषु स्वातन्त्र्यमेव कारुणिको न प्रवर्तयत्विति  
मतम्, तत्र ईश्वरस्वातन्त्र्यमेवोत्तरम् । धर्मिग्राहकप्रमाणसिद्धञ्चैतत् । न चैतावता निर्धृण-

त्वम् ; प्रसक्तदुःखनिराचिकीर्षारूपत्वात्तस्याः । निरुपाधिः परदुःखासहिष्णुता दयेति हि तल्लक्षणम् । साधारणत्वातन्व्यदानमात्रस्य तथा विरोधाभावात् । स्वातन्त्र्यञ्च स्वतः सत्यकामत्वसत्यसंकल्पाविर्भावदशायामपरिमितपुरुषार्थप्रसाद(धः?)कमित्येव भगवदौदार्यादाश्रीयते । संसारदशायां तन्निवर्तकञ्च (नञ्च न ?) युक्तम् । पुण्यवतः पुण्यप्रवृत्तेर्निवारणायोगात् , पापवतः पापप्रवृत्तेरपि निवारणानुपपत्तेः, सपुण्यपापस्यापि तत्तदंशाभ्यां तत्तत्प्रवृत्तिनिवारणस्य प्रतिबन्धात् । कर्मानपेक्षत्वे विषमे पुंसि समस्य कर्मविरोधेन विषमस्य च वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यदोषप्रसङ्गात् व्यापारानुपपत्तिः । अतो निराचिकीर्षितजीवदुःखोत्पत्तिः जीवमात्रमूला, तन्निराकरणं च भगवतो लीला । न हि उत्पत्त्यमानमेव जानता निरसनीयमिति पर्यनुयोगावकाशः ; लीलाव्याघातप्रसङ्गात् । साम्यव्याघातप्रसङ्गश्च पूर्वोक्तः ।

ननुत्पन्नं दुःखमसहमानस्तदुत्पत्त्यमानमपि न सहेतैव । सर्वज्ञो ह्यसौ । न ह्यनागतं न वेत्तीति युज्यते । उत्पत्त्यमानं च सहमानः तदुत्पन्नमपि सहेतैव । असहमानोऽपि किञ्चित् (स्वित् ?) करोति, तस्य स्वयमेव नश्वरस्य दुःखस्य विनाशप्रौढ्यात् । वैषम्य(भीते?) (रहि ?) तेन चेक्ष्वरेण कारणे सत्यनुत्पादनायोगात् । अतो दयावसरो न दृश्यते । मैवम् , तथापि कश्चिदस्या(दस्य?)वकाशः करुणायाः, यस्य साम्यादिभिः गुणान्तरैः न प्रतिबन्धो दृश्यते । तथा सर्वसाधारणे शास्त्रप्रवर्तने साधुपरित्राणे सामान्य दृष्टा(?)संहारे च । विषमसृष्टिः चतुर्मखात् कर्मविशेषमूलात् (?) । ततः पूर्वं समष्टिसृष्टिः केवलकरुणामूला । लीलारसायैवेति चेत्सत्यम् , तथापि करुणासहचारिणी सा; समानविषयत्वादुभयोः । मोक्षोपायत्वेन लीलाविच्छेदसाधारण्यात् । न च करुणामतिपत्य लीलारसः कश्चित् । ततः उत्पत्त्यमानमेव दुःखं निरुणद्धि । तत्तु साम्यानुरोधेन ज्ञानादिनेति सिद्धं कारुणिकत्व-

१. ईश्वरः कर्मसापेक्षो निर्वर्तयेत्, निरपेक्षो वा ? आद्ये आह-पुण्येति । अन्ये-कर्मैति । तत्रापि समो विषमो वा ? आद्ये पुण्यकृतः कार्ये प्रवर्तनं अन्यस्य निवर्तनञ्च साम्यबाधकत्वाद्विरुद्धम् , पुण्ये पश्चात्तनसुखवत्पापेऽपि तात्कालिकसुखभावाच्च; अन्ये वैषम्यमेव दोषः । अतो निवर्तनव्यापारो नोपपद्यत इति ।

मपि । ततो जीवेषु स्वातन्त्र्यविधानमीश्वरस्य स्वातन्त्र्यमुद्वेलयत्येव । न च करुणां प्रतिक्षिपति ।

यच्चापरमुक्तं पुण्यपापयोः ईश्वर एव साक्षात्प्रेरयितेति, तत्पुण्यपापयोरित्यन्त-  
प्रवृत्तजीवविशेषविषयम्, तत्फलभूतञ्चेत्यनुसन्धातव्यम् । तथैव हि तत्र तत्र प्रकरणे  
स्पष्टमुपलभ्यते । पुण्यस्य हि सुखं, पुण्यानुकूलं जन्म ज्ञानं, रुचिर्वसना चेति फलानि ।  
पापस्यं-हि दुःखं, पापानुकूलजन्मादि चेति सर्वशास्त्रसिद्धमेतत् ।

जीवानां परस्परभेदः प्रत्यक्षः स्वरूपभेदस्य स्वयंप्रकाशत्वात् । अयमेव हि प्रति-  
योगिज्ञानानन्तरं भेद इति व्यवहियते ; प्रतियोग्युपलक्षिताकारे व्युत्पन्नत्वात् भेदशब्दस्य ।  
भावान्तरस्याभावत्वं समर्थितमन्यत्र । तथा विरुद्धधर्माध्यासाच्च जीवानां भेदसिद्धिः ।  
यदि सर्वत्रैकस्यादात्मा बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषकरणतदधिष्ठिता(ष्टाना?)दि व्यवस्था न सि-  
द्धयेत् । न हि यमर्थमेको यदा जानाति, तदैव सर्वोऽपि तम् । तदा ह्यर्थान्तरप्रसक्तो वा  
सुषुप्त्याग्रवस्थापन्नो वा भवत्यन्यः । यदि त्वेकस्य ज्ञानमेव सर्वस्य ज्ञानं स्यात्, शिष्या-  
चार्यबहुश्रुतमन्दमतित्वादिव्यवस्था न सिद्धयेत् । एकेन अनुभूतमर्थं सर्वे च संस्मरेयुः ।  
सुखदुःखादेश्चाप्रतिसन्धानमात्मैक्ये न घटते । प्रतिसन्धातुरात्मन एकत्वे नानावय-  
वावच्छिन्नसुखदुःखादिवन्नानादेहगोचरस्यापि तस्य प्रतिसन्धानमवर्जनीयम् । तथा कस्य-  
चिदिष्टमेव तदैव कस्य चिदनिष्टमिष्टं वा (द्विष्टं वा ?) भवति । एकमेव द्रव्यमेकस्यैकदैव  
देहावयवभेदेनाप्यनिष्ट (प्यनिष्टमिष्ट?)ञ्च दृश्यते; तथा देहभेदेनापीति चेत् ; सत्यम् । तथापि  
तत्तदंशभेदेनेष्टत्वानिष्टत्वाभ्यां प्रतिसन्धानवत् तत्तद्भेदेनापि (तत्तद्देहभेदेनापि?) तदवर्जनी-  
यम् । तथा करणानि ज्ञानकर्माणि....[निर्वर्तयन्ति प्र]त्यात्मनियतेपकारकाणि तत्तन्मात्रा-  
धिष्ठेयानि च भवन्ति । तदपि भोक्तुरधिष्ठातुश्च सर्वत्रैकतां व्याहन्ति । तथा सत्यन्ध-  
वधिराद्यभावप्रसङ्गश्च । यत्किंचिद्देहवर्तिभिरपि चक्षुरादिभिः कारणवत्तत्तद्विषयोपलम्भसंभव-

१. अस्यन्तासिद्धिप्रवृत्त. पा०

२. तथैव कस्यचिदिष्टमनिष्टं वा. पा०

सिद्धेः । न ह्यत्र कतिपयचक्षुरादिवैकल्यनिदानेऽन्धादिव्यपदेशः; अन्धोऽहमिममर्थं न कथं-  
चिदपि जानामीति तद्विषयोपलंभाभावपर्यन्तानुसंधानात् । तथा एकस्मिन्नेवार्थे कश्चित्प्रवर्तते;  
कश्चिन्निवर्तते; कश्चिदेव प्रतिबिम्बितसति<sup>१</sup> । स्वार्थे प्रवर्तमानस्य परैः प्रायशः प्रतिबन्धसम्भाव-  
नन्तु सर्वदा सर्वैरेवास्म्योपजायते । असङ्कीर्णं कार्यान्तरं हि तत् । न हि कस्मिंश्चित्प्रवर्तमाने  
सर्वेऽपि प्रवर्तन्ते । एकस्यैका प्रवृत्तिरेव सर्वेषां प्रवृत्तिरिति चेत्, तर्ह्येकैव सर्वेति कृतार्थता वा  
किं न स्यात् ? एवं चैको घटः सर्वं जगदित्यपि स्यात् । तथाऽप्यात्मान्तरसद्भावे सिद्धे सर्वं  
मेवं वक्तव्यम् ; तत्रैव किं प्रमाणमिति चेत्, चेष्टादिलिङ्गमनुमानम् । तच्च प्रत्यक्ष स्वात्म(क्षम् ।  
स्वात्मः) तादात्म्यमपि केनचिदनुमानेन सिद्धयतीति<sup>२</sup> चेन्न; तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वाप्रत्यक्षत्वसुखत्व-  
दुःखत्वे(सुखित्वं दुःखित्वेः)त्यादिविरुद्धधर्माध्यासेन बाधात् । तस्य सर्वस्यौपाधिकत्वादविरोधे  
सत्यबाध इति चेत्, स किमुपाधिः शास्त्रसिद्धः, उत प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धः । नाद्यः; स्वाभाविके  
जीवभेदे तेषां परमात्मनो भेदे च तस्य तात्पर्यावधारणात् । 'नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतना-  
नामेको बहूनां यो विदधाति कामान्' 'द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परि-  
षस्वजाते, 'पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्टं स्ततस्तेनामृतत्वमेति' 'द्वाविमौ  
पुरुषौ लोके,' 'अतोऽस्मिन् लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः' इत्यादेः ।

‘एको देवस्सर्वभूतेषु गूढः’ इत्यादेरन्तर्यामिपरमात्मविषयत्वात्, जीवाद्वैतवादानां  
प्रकाराद्वैते पर्यवसानात्, अविद्याभेदप्रतिक्षेपस्य तद्वैधर्म्यविषयत्वाच्चास्यार्थस्य न विरोधः  
कचिदपि शङ्कनीयः ॥

यत्तु अविद्याज्ञानादिशब्दैस्तत्रोपदिश्यते तत् यथा यथं प्रकरणादिवशेन कर्म,  
प्रकृतितत्त्वं वा विज्ञेयम् । न च तत्सिद्धिमात्रेण जीवभेदस्तत्प्रयुक्त इत्यापतति । कर्मणस्तु  
विशेषतो जीवभेदापादकत्वमेवेति न शास्त्रेणौपाधिकत्वसिद्धिः ।

१. प्रतिपिपित्सति. पा०.

२. स्वार्थे प्रवर्तमानस्य सर्वदा परैः सर्वैरेव प्रतिबन्धसम्भावनं प्रायशः उपजायत  
इत्यन्वयः—

३. न सिद्धयतीति. पा०

न च प्रमाणान्तरेण । तद्धि न ज्ञावत्प्रत्यक्षम्, तस्य शरीरगोचरत्वेऽपि तस्योपाधित्वेनाप्रतिपत्तेः । आत्माद्वैतोपलंभे सिद्धे हि शरीरभेदानुविधायिन्यासुखदुःखादिव्यवस्थायामस्तदुपाधिकत्वसिद्धिः, यथा श्वेतस्फटिकनिश्चयानन्तरमेव जपाकुसुमस्य तद्वागोपाधित्वनिश्चयः । स्वयंप्रकाशप्रत्यक्षे तन्मात्रोपलंभबलादेवात्माद्वैतमपि सिद्धमिति चेन्न ; आत्मान्तरस्य तत्र प्रथमं योग्यत्वासिद्धेः । अयोग्यस्यानुपलभ्यमानस्य तन्मात्रोपलंभेनाभावनिश्चयायोगात् । अधिकरणमात्रोपलंभो हि प्रतियोगिनो योग्यस्यानुपलम्भात्मकः तस्याभावमधिकरणं तद्धर्मं वा व्यवहारयतीति सिद्धमन्यत्र । अतः स्वरूपसिद्धिरेव स्वयंप्रकाशत्वेनेति नेतरप्रतिक्षेपः ; तथाऽपि तत्र इतरविध्यभावात्तदभावः शङ्क्यत इति चेन्न ; अनुमानेन तत्सिद्धेरुक्तत्वात् । अनुमानत्वमौपाधिकेऽपि भेदे पर्यवस्यतीति चेन्न ; अन्योन्याश्रयत्वात् । औपाधिकत्वसिद्धौ हि आत्मलाभा (भेदा?) सिद्धिः, आत्मान्तराभावे च देहभेदोपाधित्वसिद्धिः सुखदुःखादिभेदभिन्नानुमानस्येति<sup>१</sup> । एवमपि यथाशङ्क्येत, नीलादिगुणभेदोपाधिको घटादिव्यक्तिभेदः व्यक्तिभेदोपाधिको वा तत्तद्गुणभेद इति अन्यतरभेदापलापः प्रसज्येत । तत्रोभयमपि प्रत्यक्षेण भिन्नमुपलभ्यत इति चेत्, इहापि द्वयं प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यामुपलभ्यत इति तुल्यम् । नहि प्रत्यक्षे सत्युपाध्यनवकाश इति शक्यं वक्तुम् ; स्फटिकारूप्यस्य स्वाभाविकत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

अपि च,

देहभेदोऽपि नैकस्य प्रतिसन्धानबाधकः ।

सौभरिप्रतिसन्धानमिष्यते भिन्नदेहजम् ॥

१. एकानुपलम्भस्यान्योपलम्भरूपत्वमभावस्य भावरूपत्वात् । तत्राधिकरणस्वरूपता तद्वै-  
सिधर्मस्वरूपतेति पक्षद्वयाभिप्रायेणाधिकरणं तद्धर्मं वेत्युक्तिः ।

२. सुखदुःखादिभेदप्रयुक्तपरस्परभेदविशिष्टात्मानुमापकहेतोरित्यर्थः ।



एवमात्मभेदस्य धर्मिग्राहकप्रमाणसिद्धत्वादनुमानेनापि नोपाधिसिद्धिः । आत्मभेदापलापस्तु प्रपञ्चापलापसमानयोगक्षेम इति तत्परिहारेण तुल्यं परिहृतोऽन्यत्र । देहोपाधिविधूनन-  
न्यायेनाऽन्यस्याप्युपाधेस्तत्त्वं निरस्तम्

किं च तत्र तावदन्तः करणम् ; तस्यात्मभेदमन्तरेण भेदासिद्धेः । प्रत्यक्षस्यात्मनो ज्ञानोदयमा(यः)नु ?) नुगुण्येन बहिरिन्द्रियोत्तीर्णमन्तःकरणं प्रत्यात्मभेदभिन्नमनुमीयते; तत्कथ-  
मात्मभेदापलापे कारणं भवेत् ? अहंकारस्त्वेकमेव तत्त्वं सर्वेषां साधारणमनुग्रहमातनोति  
तदनुगृहीताश्चात्मानः तत्तददृष्टोन्मिषितरजस्तमस्सहकृतास्तत्परिमाणानुकूलमहि (भिः?) मानं  
कुर्वन्तीति शास्त्रस्थानां निर्णयः । एतद्विलक्षणस्त्वहंकारो न केनापि प्रमाणेन सिद्धयति ।  
दृष्टात्मभेदपरित्यागायादृष्टतद्वेदकल्पनं लोकोत्तरप्रज्ञस्यैव शोभतेतराम् ॥

न च अविद्याभेद एव जीवभेदकल्पकः, तद्वेदस्याप्यसिद्धेः । प्रत्यक्षं ह्यज्ञानं  
ज्ञानाभाव एव । तदतिरिक्तं भावरूपन्तु न कल्पनामन्तरेण सिद्धयति । दर्शनभेदोपपादनाय  
च तत्करणभेदः कल्पनीयः ; न तु तदपह्वाय । स्वयंप्रकाशश्चात्मभेदो दर्शनभेदकोटिनि-  
विष्टो न दृश्यपक्षे निक्षेपमर्हतीति कथं तदभावायाविद्याकल्पनमुपपद्यते । यद्यप्येकस्मै न सर्वे

स्वयं प्रकाशाः, तथापि स्वयं प्रकाशतयैव अनुमीयते (न्ते?) । दृश्यबाधादर्शनमपि मिथ्येति  
वादश्च दृश्यशून्ये दृष्ट्वात्र आत्मनि निरवकाश एव । धर्मभूतज्ञानं हि दृश्यप्रवर्णं नाम, न  
स्वरूपम् । दृश्यबाधे दर्शनमपि मिथ्येत्यप्यसङ्गतम् । अन्यबाधस्यान्यमिथ्यात्वं प्रत्य-  
हेतुत्वात् इत्याद्युक्तमन्यथाख्यातिमाश्रित्य । यथार्थख्यातिसिद्धान्ते तु व्यवहारमात्रमेव  
बाध्यते, न दृश्यमपीति सुतरां दृग्भेदबाधानवकाशः।

१. अन्यत्र कृतेन प्रपञ्चापलापपरिहारेण आत्मभेदापलापोऽपि परिहृतः । परिहारस्य तुल्य-  
त्वादित्यर्थः ।

२. दृश्यत्वे हि मिथ्यात्वम् ; मिथ्याभूततद्भावायाविद्याकल्पनम् । एवमाविद्यकत्वात्पश्चा-  
त्तदभावावधारणं च स्यात् ब्रह्मवत् । स्वप्रकाशः पुनरात्मभेद इति भावः ।

किमाश्रिता चाविद्या जीवभेदं कल्पयेत् ? ब्रह्माश्रितेति चेन्न ; तस्य तद्विरोधित्वात् । अविरोधित्वे चानिर्मोक्षप्रसंगात् । न चाविशदं रूपमविरोधि, विशदन्तु विरोधि निर्वर्तकं चेति वाच्यम् ; निर्विशेषवैशद्यवैशद्ययोरसंभवात् । निर्विशेषस्यापि सद्वितीयत्वमवैशद्यम्, अद्वितीयत्वन्तु वैशद्यमिति विवेक इति चेन्न ; आत्माश्रयत्वप्रसंगात् । सद्वितीयत्वलक्षणाविशदरूपावभासो ह्यध्यासहेतुः, स एव चाध्यासः । अधिष्ठानेन सहाध्यस्यमानस्य प्रकाश एवाध्यास इति सर्वसंमतम् । न न्नाद्वितीयं किञ्चित्पारमार्थिकमस्ति, यतस्तेन सद्वितीयत्वमवैशद्यमिति स्यात् । विशदावभासाद्भेदनिवृत्तावपि चात्माश्रयत्वम् ; भेदनिवृत्त्यात्मकत्वाद्विशदावभासस्य । अवैशद्यञ्च किं स्वभावः, उत अविद्याकल्पितम् ? स्वभावत्वे चानिर्मोक्षः । द्वितीयेऽन्योन्याश्रयत्वम् । अविद्यायाश्च मथ्यात्वादविद्यान्तरापेक्षयानवस्था । स्वपरनिर्वाहकत्वन्तु दृष्टे कार्य एव युज्यते कल्पयितुम् । दृष्टघटदृष्टिभ्यामेव अध्ययनविधिशब्दशब्दादिप्रतिबन्धुद्वारश्च<sup>१</sup> द्रष्टव्यः । कारणदोषमन्तरेण मिथ्यात्वमपि न शक्यते कल्पयितुम् ; स्वतः प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमात् । बाधादेव मिथ्यात्वं परतः प्रामाण्येऽपि । अबाधादेवेश्वरज्ञानस्य न्याये सत्यत्ववदिति<sup>२</sup> चेन्न ; इतः पूर्वं बाधस्यादृष्टत्वात्परत्रापि काले निर्दोषप्रकाशसिद्धत्वेन ह्यस्वरूपवदबाधानुमानात् । न्याये तु धर्मिग्राहकमेव मानमबाधं व्यवस्थापयति । अत्र तु धर्मिग्राहकमानं सत्यत्वमेवावगाहत इति विपरीतमेव ; दोषस्य च परमार्थस्यैव भ्रान्तिनिर्वाहकत्वादधिष्ठानवत् । इतरथा ह्यधिष्ठानमपि सत्यं न स्यात् । एतेनाऽनादित्वादविद्यान्तरं नापेक्ष्यत इति प्रत्युक्तम् । अपरमार्थस्य स्वरूपानादित्वायोगात् । प्रवाहानादित्वे च घटाद्यविशेषप्रसंगात् । ब्रह्माज्ञानवादे बन्धमोक्षव्यवस्थाया असिद्धेशशास्त्रं सर्वमनर्थकमापद्यत इत्याद्यनन्तदोषाः कृत-

१. यथा स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः इत्यध्ययनविधिना वाक्यान्तरमिव स्वात्मापि गृह्यते, यथा च शब्द इति शब्दः घटादिशब्दमिव शब्द इति शब्दमपि वक्ति, तथा अविद्या समिथ्यात्वेऽविद्यान्तरं नापेक्षत इति न युक्तम् ; दर्शनादर्शनाभ्यां विशेषादिति भावः ॥

२. न्यायमते ईश्वरज्ञानस्य प्रमात्वं यथा प्रमात्वबाधकामावात् स्वीक्रियते, तथाऽविद्याया अपि मिथ्यात्वमपि मिथ्यात्वबाधकमानामावादिष्यत इति शङ्का । अविद्यास्वरूपस्य पूर्वं पञ्चाच्च बाधादर्शनेन सत्यत्वसिद्धिर्ना न मिथ्यात्वमिति परिहारः ।

बुद्धिभिरनुसन्धातव्याः । जीवाज्ञानवादश्च यथायथं पूर्वोक्तैरन्योन्याश्रयत्वादिभिरपास्त  
 एव । अतो जीवानां परस्परं परमात्मनश्च भेदस्वामाविक इति परमात्मशरीरभूतस्तदनु-  
 गृहीतः कर्ता अहंप्रत्ययवेद्यः ज्ञानादिगुणकश्शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धिमनःप्राणविलक्षणश्च जीवात्मेति  
 सर्वमवदातम् ॥

इति श्रीभगवद्रामानुजमुनिवरमर्तधुरन्धरस्यात्रिगोत्रप्रदीप-

श्रीपद्मनाभार्यनन्दनस्य वादिहंसनवाम्बुदस्य

श्रीरामानुजार्यस्य कृतिषु न्यायकुलिशे

देहाद्यतिरिक्तात्मयाथात्म्यवादः

षष्ठः ॥

श्रीः

## न्यायकुलिशे

### सामानाधिकरण्य वादस्तप्तमः

भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तानां शब्दानामेकस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तिस्सामानाधिकरण्यमिति लक्षण-  
वाक्यम् । तदिदमसम्बद्धमिव दृश्यते । प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदो ह्यर्थभेदः । कथं तेषामेकस्मिन्नर्थे  
वृत्तिस्सम्भवति ? सा चेदङ्गीकृता कथं निमित्तभेदः ? इति ॥

अत्र केचिदाचक्षते—भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तानामपि केषाञ्चिदेकार्थवृत्तित्वं सम्भवति,  
यथा शुक्लो गौरिति । न चात्रार्थैकत्वासम्भव इति वाच्यम् ; निमित्तयोर्मिथो भेदेऽपि  
विशेष्येणाभेदात्तस्य चैकत्वादेकार्थत्वाविरोधात् । यद्येकवस्तुतादात्म्यं तयोः कथं  
मिथो भेदः ? स चेत्कथमेतत् ? न ह्येकस्य विशेष्यमात्रस्य स्वात्मनाऽभिन्नस्य भेदो दृष्ट इति  
चेत्, सत्यम् ; अत्र तु दृश्यत एव । अतो दर्शनबलेन व्याप्तिमवधूय भेदाभेदयोरविरोध-  
मभ्युपगच्छामः । दृश्यते ह्ययं गौरित्यभेदेन जातिः । अयं शुक्ल इति च गुणः । सामा-  
नाधिकरण्यार्थ एव निरूप्यत इति चेन्न ; प्रत्यक्षोपन्यासात् । यः खल्वयमिति प्रतिभातः  
पिण्डविशेषः स एव हि गौरिति प्रतिभाति । न च दण्डीत्यादिवद्भोत्वादिविशिष्टे विशेषण-  
तयैव गोत्वादयश्च भान्तीति वाच्यम् ; व्यतिरेकेणानुपलब्धेः । यद्धि विशेषणं दण्डकुण्ड-  
लादि, तस्मिन्पृथगनुभूयमानेऽपि<sup>१</sup> तद्व्यतिरेकेण पुरुषोऽवगम्यते । (अतः?) तत्र युक्तं व्यति-  
रेकेणोपलब्धयोर्विशेषणविशेष्ययोस्तथा व्यवस्थापनम् । इह तु यदेवैकदा व्यक्तिरूपेणावसितं,  
तदेवानन्तरं जातिरूपेणापि नित्यमव (नित्यमवसीयत इत्यव ?) (जातिरूपेणापीत्यव ?) श्या-  
भ्युपगमनीयं दर्शनवशादेव द्वैरूप्यम् ।

न चात्र दर्शने बाधकं किञ्चित् ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । गुणजात्योर्भेददर्शनमेव बाधकमिति चेन्न ; भिन्नविषयत्वात्<sup>१</sup> । ततोऽनुमानमिति<sup>२</sup> चेन्न ; उपलब्धिविरोधात्<sup>३</sup> । गुणगुणिनोरेव भेदोपलम्भो बाधक इति चेन्न ; तस्याविरोधापादकस्य बाधकत्वानुपपत्तेः, यथा शुक्लो गौरित्युपलम्भो गोत्वशुक्लत्वयोः । विरोधे सिद्धे बाधक एवेति चेत्, कथमत्र विरोधः ? भिन्नाधिकरणत्वनियमात् (इति चेन्न ;<sup>४</sup>) न हि घटपटयोरभेदो दृष्टचरः । तर्हि घटस्य स्वात्मना भेद इति चेन्न ; व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तमात्रत्वादस्य विरोधस्थानत्वानुपपत्तेः । तथा शुक्लस्य पटस्यागोत्वं गोः कृष्णस्य चाशुक्लत्वं किं न पश्यसि ? गोशुक्लस्य चोपलम्भाद्यदि तत्राविरोधनिश्चयः, एवमत्रापि भवान् समदृष्टिस्स्यात् ; कृतमभिनिवेशेन ॥

तथापि कस्यचित्त्वेनचिद्विरोधः कथं निश्चेय इति चेत्, किमनेनोक्तेन ? सौहार्दे तु वदामः । वैयधिकरण्यनियमादुपलम्भमात्रस्य नियमः । शुक्तिकायामपि रजतावभासादर्थस्य क<sup>५</sup> निश्चयः, विपरीतनिश्चयो वेति चेन्न ; शुक्तिकायां रजतस्य प्रतिक्षेपात् । नेदं रजत-  
स्मति हि तत्र स्फुटः प्रतिक्षेपः । यदि च प्रतिक्षेपमन्तरेण शुक्तिरजतत्वयोरेकत्रावभास-  
स्यात्, कस्तत्र विरोधमुद्भावयेत् ?

१. दर्शनस्य गुणजातिभेदविषयकत्वेऽपि गुणव्यक्तिभेदाविषयकत्वादित्यर्थः ।

२. गुणजाती, साश्रयव्यक्तिभिन्ने, मिथो भिन्नत्वादित्यनुमानं बाधकमिति चेदित्यर्थः ॥

३. अनुमानमभेदप्राहिप्रत्यक्षबाधितमिति भावः ।

४. अत्र 'इति चेन्न' इति अर्थसामञ्जस्याय पूरणीयमिति भाति । तदा चायमर्थः—गुण-  
गुणिनोर्भिन्नाधिकरणत्वनियमाद्विरोध इति चेत्, तर्ह्येकाधिकरणत्वेऽविरोधादभेद इति सिद्धयति । एवञ्च  
घटपटयोः कदाचिदेकाधिकरणत्वादभेदस्स्यात् । ननु एकाधिकरणत्वेऽपि भेदाङ्गीकारे घटस्य स्वात्मनोऽपि  
भेदस्स्यादिति चेन्न ; एकाधिकरणत्वेऽभेद इति नियममञ्जनार्थं घटपटरूपव्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तकथनात्  
एकाधिकरणत्वादेर्भेदप्रयोजकत्वस्यास्मदनुक्तत्वादिति । विमृश्य निर्धार्यम् ।

५. र.व निश्चय इति पा०.

ननु कोऽयं प्रतिक्षेपः ? यदि तत्राभावप्रत्ययः तर्हि तत्र<sup>१</sup> प्रतिपन्न इति भवता-  
मविरोधमर्हतीति चेत्, स्यादेतदेवं, यदि भावनिषेधमन्तरेणाभावस्य रूपान्तरमुपलभ्येत ।  
न तु प्रतियोगिनं प्रत्युदासीनमभावस्य स्वरूपं पश्यामः । भावे तु रूपान्तरेण प्रतिपन्ने  
सामानाधिकरण्यप्रतीतिवि (रवि ?) रोधमेव स्थापयेत् । अन्यथा हि कथञ्चिदेकाधिकरणा-  
पेक्षया भावान्तरप्रतिपत्तिरेव पूर्वस्य बाध इत्यापद्येत । <sup>२</sup>भावाभावात्मकावेव भेदाभेदाविति  
चेन्न ; भेदस्य स्वरूपलक्षणस्य भावात्मकत्वात् ; अमेदस्यापि तादात्म्यरूपस्याभावत्वानुप-  
पत्तेः । न चेतरेतराभाववत्तामात्रेण विरोधः ; अतिप्रसङ्गात् । न चाक्षेपकत्वेन ; शुक्तिका-  
रजतत्ववदविनाभावासिद्धेः । अत्रैव प्रत्यक्षेण बाधात् । <sup>३</sup>प्रत्यक्षबलादविनाभावमङ्गस्तद्बद्ध्युक्त  
तद्वलमिति चेन्न, <sup>४</sup>अनन्यथासिद्धेः प्रत्यक्षस्य । न हि सामान्य<sup>५</sup>मन्यत्र प्रत्येतुं शक्यम् ; येन  
रजतादिवदारोपादिकल्पना स्यात् । न च ‘अयं न गौः गौर्वा नायम्’ इति बाधः ।  
न चार्थक्रियावतोरनयोर्बाधशङ्कापि सम्भवति । कार्यवर्गस्तत्साजात्यञ्चार्थक्रियेति द्रष्टव्यम् ।  
<sup>६</sup>सामान्यविशेषात्मकञ्च विश्वम् ; तद्बाधे किं भविष्यति । अतो भेदाभेदयोरविरोधाज्जाति-  
गुणादयस्स्वाश्रयेण भिन्नाभिन्नाः ॥

विशेषणविशेष्यभावाच्च । न खल्वत्यन्तभिन्नयोः कचिदपि विशेषणविशेष्यभावा  
दृश्यते । दण्डी देवदत्त इति दृश्यत इति (चेन्न ?) संयोगद्वारको हि तत्र विशेषणविशेष्य-  
भावः ; तेनैव चाभिन्नता, संयोगतद्गतोरनतिभेदात् । अत एव चौपाधिकाभेदापगमे

१. तत्रेत्यस्य प्रतिपन्ने, प्रतियोगिमत्तया ज्ञाते इत्यर्थे इति भवन्मतेऽविरोध एव, प्रतियोग्य  
भावयोस्सामानाधिकरण्यादिति.

२. तर्हि भेदाभेदयोरपि परस्परनिषेधरूपतया विरोध एवेति शङ्कते—भावेति ।

३. अन्योन्याश्रयं शङ्कते—प्रत्यक्षेति ।

४. प्रत्यक्षबलमनन्यथासिद्धत्वादेव सिद्धमिति नान्योन्याश्रय इत्याह—अनन्येति.

५. सादृश्यमित्यर्थः

६. अयं गौरित्यत्र जातेर्व्यक्तेर्वा आरोपितत्वस्वीकारे विनिगमनाविरहेण सर्वबाधे किं स्यात्स-  
तीत्यर्थः ।

विशेषणतावगमः । ननु सम्बन्धाभावादिति चेत्, किमभिन्नानां विशेषणत्वे सम्बन्धित्वं प्रयोजकम् ? न तर्हि सम्बन्धः स्वाश्रयं विशिष्यात् ; सम्बन्धान्तराभावात् ॥

अस्ति हि समवाय इति चेत् तर्हि समवयीति प्रत्ययो न स्यात् । न हि तस्यापि समवायान्तरमस्ति । स्वपरनिर्वाहकोऽयमिति चेत्, किमयं स्वस्वाश्रयघटकस्वयमेव, अथ घटकस्सम्बन्धान्तरात्मा, विशेषणत्वे घटकान्तरनिरपेक्षो वा । नाद्यः ; कर्मकर्तृविरोधात् । आकारभेदादार्भवदविरोध इति चेन्न ; १ तस्यापि सम्बन्धान्तरापेक्षायामनवस्था स्यात् । न द्वितीयः ; तत्रैव भेदाभेदप्रसङ्गात् । तद्वरं प्रथममेवाभ्युपगमः । एवं हि तत्कल्पना न स्यात् । न च तृतीयः ; आदावेव प्रसङ्गादतिप्रसङ्गाच्च ।

न स्वभावतो व्यवस्था ; एकस्यैव समवायस्यानन्तैस्सम्बन्धिभिर्विरोधेन वैशिष्ट्या-  
वैशिष्ट्ययोर्निर्वोदुमशक्यत्वात् । नानात्वे चानन्तकल्पना । अतस्तादात्म्यमेव वैशिष्ट्य-  
निर्वहणाय गत्यन्तराभावादभ्युपेतम् । इदञ्च सर्वत्र साक्षात्परम्परया वा यथासम्भवमूह-  
नीयम् ॥

सहोपलम्भनियमाच्च । न च साहित्यमेकस्यैव सम्भवति । न च नियमः (मतः ?)  
पृथगनुपलम्भलक्षणो भेदो<sup>२</sup> दृश्यते । ननु न पृथगनु (गु ?) पलम्भोऽत्यन्तभेदव्यापकः,  
यत्तन्निवृत्त्याऽत्यन्तभेदनिवृत्तिस्स्यात् ; पृथक् सिद्धेरुपाधित्वादिति चेन्न ; साधनव्याप-  
कत्वात् ॥

का चेयं पृथक्सिद्धिः ? न ३ तावद्भिन्नदेशकालत्वम् ; भिन्नदेशानां भिन्नकालानाञ्चा-  
पृथक्सिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । न चैकैकम् ; भिन्नदेशानां भिन्नकालानां वा अपृथक्सिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् ।

१. आकारस्यापीत्यर्थः, आकारिणीति शेषः

२. अत्यन्तभेदः नियमेन पृथगनुपलम्भसहचरितो न भवति । भेदे पृथगनुपलम्भस्यादित्यर्थः.

३. अयं भावः—भिन्नदेशकालोभयकत्वं पृथक्सिद्धिरिति चेत्, देशमात्रभेदे कालमात्रभेदे चा-  
पृथक्सिद्धिस्स्यात् । भिन्नकालत्वं पृथक्सिद्धिरिति चेत्, देशभेदेऽपृथक्सिद्धिस्स्यात् । भिन्नदेशत्वमिति  
चेत्, कालभेदे । भिन्नदेशभिन्नकालान्यतरत्वमित्यपि न, सकलविम्बाद्यपृथक्सिद्धिप्रसङ्गादिति.

नाप्यन्यतरत्वम् ; समदेशकालानां विभ्वादीनामपृथक्सिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । नापि पृथगाश्रयाश्रयित्वम् ; गुणत्वादावतिव्याप्तेः । नापि पृथग्गतिमत्त्वं तद्विशिष्टं वा ; रूपरसयोरव्याप्तेः । न चानाश्रितस्य सत्ता ; सा चासम्बन्धयोर्विद्यमानता ; सम्बन्धस्यैवाकृत्यादावभावात् । तथा चोपपादितत्वात् । न च विशेषणादिभावमपहायावस्थानम् ; विशेषणत्वस्य तादात्म्यनिबन्धनत्वेन तदभावस्य भेदपर्यायत्वात् । भिन्नतयावस्थानमेव पृथक्सिद्धिरिति चेत्, आगतोऽसि मदीयं पन्थानम् । त्यजेदानीमुपाधिव्यसनम् । आत्मानं प्रत्यात्मन एवोपाधिद्वयायोगात् ।

अयमपि गौरिति प्रत्ययाच्च । न ह्ययमिति प्रागननुभूतविशेषोल्लेखोऽन ( ? ) नु भूततया गोत्वेन प्रतिसंधानञ्च केवलभेदेऽभेदे वा घटते । न चैवं व्यक्तिजातिगोचरो (रौ?) भेदाभेदः (दौ?) ; व्यक्तिश्च जातिश्चेति प्रतीतिप्रसङ्गात् । सम्बन्धे च सति सम्बन्धश्चेति प्रतीतिप्रसङ्गः ।

अवयवावयविनोस्समानदेशत्वाच्च । मूर्तद्रव्यमत्यन्तभिन्नमूर्तान्तरोपष्टब्धावकाशमनुपलब्धमित्यवयवसमानदेशोऽवयवी घटस्तदनतिरेकीति लभ्यते ।

अनुमानोदयाश्च (याच्च?) । कथमपरथा चार्वाकपरिपाटी पराक्रियेत? । न खल्वेकेन प्रतिबन्धोपलम्भेऽपरममनुमेयं भवति ; अतिप्रसङ्गात् । न च गृहीतमात्रावधारणायानुमानमिति प्रमाणान्तरमाश्रयणीयम् ।

अतो भेदाभेदयोरपि विरोधाश्रयणेनैवमादिविरोधसहस्रपरिहारास्वयमूहनीयाः । अत एव जातिगुणादिनिमित्तानां शब्दानामसङ्कोचेनैकार्थवृत्तित्वं सम्भवत्येवेति ॥

अत्रोच्यते—

प्रत्यक्षं तावद्विज्ञाभिन्नगोचरमिति न पश्यामः ।



एकैकस्मिन्विशिष्टे वा बुद्धिर्जात्यादितद्वतोः ।

भिन्नाभिन्नत्वमन्योन्यं न समर्थयितुं क्षमा ॥

तथा हि—न तावदेकैकालम्बना बुद्धिर्भेदाभेदव्यवस्थापनाय पर्याप्ता ; तत्तन्मात्र-  
मग्नत्वादर्थान्तरे व्यापाराभावात् । यद्यपि तत्त्वतो निराश्रयजात्यादिमात्रालम्बना निर्धर्मक-  
धर्मिमात्रावगाहिनी च न काचित्प्रत्यक्षा बुद्धिश्चकास्ति ; तथापि तत्तदंशमाकृष्येयं  
व्यावर्ष्यते । न हि तत्र जातिमात्रस्फुरणे व्यक्तितादात्म्यप्रकाशस्सम्भाव्यते ; जातिमात्र-  
गोचरत्वव्याघातात् । एवं व्यक्तिमात्रस्फुरणांशेऽपि द्रष्टव्यम् ।

ननु जातिरूपान्तर्गता व्यक्तिः, तत्स्वरूपान्तर्गता च जातिः तत एवान्यतरप्रति-  
भास एवेतरमिश्रगोचर इति चेन्न ; प्रतीतिस्वरूपमपहाय तथाकल्पनानुपपत्तेः । इतरे-  
तरान्तर्भावि मिश्रगोचरत्म्, मिश्रगोचरत्वे चान्तर्भावि इत्यन्योन्याश्रयापत्तेः । एकैकस्वरूपस्यैव  
व्यतिरिक्तप्रतियोगितया स्वात्मनो भेदात्मकत्वात्तत्रैव तदभेदप्रकाशानुपपत्तेश्च । उपपत्तौ  
विश्वात्मतैव स्यात् । तथापि जातिसंविदो व्यक्तिविषयः कटाक्षः कश्चिदुन्नेयः, येन तत्रैव  
वेदनमुपपद्यत इति चेत्, अहो भवतां संविदभिप्रायरहस्यवेदनम् ; यत् स्फुरणस्वरूप-  
मपहार्यार्थसम्बन्धमस्यास्वगतमध्यवस्यति (न्ति?) तत्रैव वेदनन्तु तत्रैव तस्यास्सत्त्वात् । न  
ह्यन्यत्र विद्यमाना जात्यादयोऽन्यत्र प्रत्यक्षेणानुभवितुं शक्याः । स्फुरणं त्वर्थान्तरवत्परस्पर-  
मपि भेदं प्रतिपादयत्येवेत्युक्तम् । तत एव भेदाभ्युपगमः, अभेदस्तु यदेव वस्तु  
जात्यात्मना पूर्वं गृहीतं तस्यैव पश्चाद्यत्मात्मनोपलम्भादिति चेन्न ; तस्यैवेत्यत्र प्रमाणा-  
भावात् । प्रत्युत न तस्यैवेत्येव हि स्फुरणमुन्नीतम् । तथापि यदि तस्यैवेति न स्यात्, तर्हि  
तदानीं योग्यानुपलब्ध्या निरासः प्रसज्यत इति चेन्न ; तुल्यत्वात् । न तावदेकज्ञानवेद्ययो-  
रंशस्य योग्यानुपलम्भस्सम्भवति ; उपलम्भविरोधात् । क्रमेणोपलम्भे तु भवतोऽपि तुल्यम् ।  
आकारभेदप्रकाशाभ्युपगमादेकाकारोपलम्भवेलायामाकारान्तरस्य प्रकाशाभावेन निरास-  
प्रसङ्गात् । एकतरमग्नत्वादपरस्यानिरास इति चेन्न ; साक्षादनुपपत्तेः (दनुवृत्तेः?) न हि  
व्यक्तिस्साक्षादनुवृत्तिपदम्, जातिर्वा व्यावृत्तः (त्ता?), उन्मज्जनाभावप्रसङ्गात् । अथ तत्र सह-  
कारिसन्निधानम्, सन्तु वा सहसं विरोधाः, स्फुरणं तु न तस्यैवेति दुरपह्वम् । इतरथा  
सर्वस्य सर्वविषयत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

यत्तु न सामान्यरूपं विशेषरूपं वा निर्विकल्पके चकास्ति, सम्मुग्धमेव भिन्नाभिन्न-  
वस्तु भासत इति वदन्ति; तदतिस्थवीयः, विकल्पमन्तरेण तत्र भिन्नाभिन्नगोचरत्वस्य  
व्यवस्थापयितुमशक्यत्वात्। यद्वि विकल्पेन विविच्यते, तदेव हि पूर्वमपि गृहीतमिति  
वक्तव्यम्। अन्यथा अतिप्रसङ्गात्। तत्रैतावान्विशेषः—सविकल्पकेन सप्रकारं गृह्यते  
प्राङ् न तथेति। इदञ्चान्वारुह्य वचनम्। परमार्थतत्त्वविशिष्टालम्बनं न किञ्चिदपि विज्ञानं  
भवतीति।

स्यादेतत्। यद्यप्येकैकस्फुरणं न शबलप्रकाशनसमर्थमिति न तेन तत्सिद्धिः,  
तथाप्ययं गौरिति विशिष्टविषयकमेकं विज्ञानमनन्यथासिद्धेर्भेदाभेदमनयोरवेदयतीति।  
नैतत्सारम्। यतः—

विशेषणविशेष्यत्वे भिन्नाधिकरणे स्फुटम्।

विशिष्टत्वं कथं न स्यादभेदे धर्मधर्मिणोः॥

विशेषणविशेष्यातिरेकि न विशिष्टं नाम किञ्चिद्वस्त्वस्ति। ते तु मिथो भिन्ने संहृत्य  
विशिष्टतया अनुभूयेते। न च संहतिरित्यर्थान्तरम्। तथाप्यनयोरभेदासिद्धेश्चा (द्धेः, १ असि-  
द्धेश्च। अः) नयोरेवाभिन्नं रूपं संहतिरिति चेन्न; दण्डकुण्डलादेरपि तथाभावप्रसङ्गात्।  
न हि त्वन्मतेऽपि तत्र साक्षादभेदः। विशेषणत्वं तु साक्षात्। ज्ञानादीनामर्थेन तादात्म्य-  
प्रसङ्गाच्च। अत एव न तादात्म्याद्विशेषणत्वम्। न च जातिस्वात्मनो विशेषणं विशेष्यं वा  
भवतीति दृष्टम्। न च तथात्वे किं कस्य विशेषणमिति व्यवस्था सिद्धयति। अतस्त्वभावा-  
देव कस्यचित्प्रतिपन्नगुणभावेन यत्प्रतीयमानमुपयुज्यते तत्तस्य विशेषणमिति। इतरत्त्वयोगा-  
दपाक्षिकमिति। एतावता तयोः परस्परमेकप्रतिपत्तावन्तर्भूतयोरुपकार्योपकारिभावमात्रं  
सिद्धयेत्; न त्वभेदसम्भावनागन्धोऽपि।

१. संहतेरर्थान्तरत्वेऽपि न विशेषणविशेष्याभेदसिद्धिः। वस्तुतस्तदर्थान्तरत्वमेवासिद्धमित्यर्थे  
इयं पङ्क्तिस्स्यात्। शङ्कते—अनयोरिति।

२. इतरत्त्वयोगा. पा०

ननु दण्डादिषु विशेषणत्वमात्रं जात्यादौ तु तादात्म्यमपि प्रतीयते । इतरथा तच्छब्दे मत्वर्थीयप्रत्ययनिर्देशस्यादिति चेन्न ; प्रतिबन्धासिद्धेः । पृथक्सिद्धेरुपाधित्वात् । यद्वि यद्विशेषणतैकस्वरूपं तेन तदपृथक्सिद्धम् ; इतरत्पृथक्सिद्धमिति विवेकः । अपृथक्सिद्धमपि कर्म जात्यादिकं वा कदाचिन्मत्वर्थीयप्रत्ययापेक्षमिति चेत्, अभिन्नमपि तथेति तुल्यम् । नियमराहित्यमेव विवक्षितम् ; तच्चाग्निनेषु केषुचिदनपेक्षत्वदर्शनमात्रेण सिद्धयतीति चेत्, तर्ह्यपृथक्सिद्धेष्वित्यपि तुल्यम् । न च भिन्नत्वादपेक्षानियमादभि (मः ; मिः) नेष्वपि शरीरेषु तदनपेक्षत्वदर्शनात् । न च तत्र गङ्गादिपदवल्लक्षणेति वाच्यम् ; मनुष्यशरीरमिति सामानाधिकरण्यप्रसङ्गात् । यश्चापि तथा प्रयुङ्क्ते, सोऽपि निष्कर्ष-विवक्षया । ततोऽपि मनुष्यो ज्ञातेत्येवमादिप्रकारैरात्मसामानाधिकरण्यमेव दृश्यते । तथा देवत्वं मनुष्यत्वमिति निष्कर्षदर्शनाच्च । न हि लाक्षणिकशब्दानां लक्ष्यार्थ (र्थः?) तत्सम्बन्धो वार्थाल्लभ्यो निष्कृष्यमाणो दृश्यते । अतो भेदो विशेषणतावगमयोग्यतेत्येव वक्तुं युक्तम् । ननु (तु?) तादात्म्ये किञ्चित्प्रयोजनं पश्यामः ।

एतदुक्तं भवति—विशेषणं द्विविधं, स्वाभाविकं तदुपाधिकञ्च । तत्र स्वाभाविक-वाचकत्वं (चक?) द्विविधं, निष्कर्षकमनिष्कर्षकञ्च । तत्र निष्कर्षकं विशेषणोपाधिकञ्च वाचकं मत्वर्थीयापेक्षम् ; इतरत्तदनपेक्षमिति नात्र कश्चिद्वेदाभेदोपयोग इति । अत एव विशेषणविशेष्यभावाच्चेत्यनुमानं निरस्तम् ।

यदि च प्रत्यक्षेण भेदाभेदावेकाधिकरणतया प्रतिपन्नौ, तथापि तयोरन्यतरेणेत-बाधान्नोभयप्रामाण्यमध्यवसितुं युक्तम् । यत्त्वविरोधोदबाधनमिति, तन्न ; भेदाभेदयोरितरे-तराभावात्मकत्वान्नेदं रजतमिति विद्विरोधस्य दुर्वारत्वात् । विलक्षणत्वं भेदः, तदभावोऽभेद इति हि सम्प्रदायः । यद्यप्युभयमर्थान्तरम्, तथापि विरोधो दुष्परिहरः ।

तादात्म्यमभेद इति चेन्न ; तादात्म्यश (त्म्याभेदश?) व्दयोर्भेदाभावविवक्षामन्तरेण पुनरुक्तयोरर्थान्तराभावात् । न हि भेदमपहाय गोत्वाश्वत्वयोस्तादात्म्यविरोधे निबन्धनं किञ्चिदुपलभ्यते । बहिरेवं न त्वन्नेति चेन्न ; नियामकाभावात् । शौक्ल्यदैर्घ्यादिषु बहिरपि तथा विरोधानुपलब्धेः । कचिद्विरोधितायां सामान्यतस्सिद्धौ सर्वत्र तत्स्वभावानपायात् ।

वैजात्यं (त्यात्?) नियम इति चेत्, कुत एतत्? । अत्र सामानाधिकरण्या-  
दिति चेत्, शुक्तिरजतत्वादावपि तथाभावप्रसङ्गात् । वैजात्ये वा (चा?) विरोधः ; अविरोधे  
च वैजात्यमिति परस्पराश्रयणञ्च । न हि रूपान्तरेण वैजात्यमुपलभ्यते । किञ्च—

तत्वेतरेतराभावो यत्र भेदः प्रतिष्ठितः ।

तत्र चेत्स्यादभेदोऽपि स्वयं स्वाभावभागभवेत् ॥

न च भेदे सत्यपीतरेतराभावो नास्तीति वाच्यम् ; व्यक्तौ रजतारोपो न शुक्तिकायामिति  
विवेकस्य विलयप्रसङ्गात् । ततश्च....[इतरेतराभा]वभाजोर्जातितद्वतोर्मिथस्तादात्म्ये स्वयमेव  
स्वाभावभाजनमिति भावाभावयोरेविरोधस्यात् ।

१ ततस्सामानाधिकरण्यप्रतीतावपि नाविरोधसिद्धिः । आकारभेदादविरोधसिद्धिरनव-  
स्थादुःसा ॥

यत्तु जातिव्यक्तयोरन्यत्राप्रतीतेरत्यन्तबाधः प्रसज्यत इति, तत्रोत्तरम्—कस्तयो-  
र्बाधमारचयति? न हि वयं जातिं व्यक्तिं वा बाधामहे ; किन्तु तयोस्तादात्म्यम् । प्रती-  
तिश्च तयोरेकत्रैव देशे भवतु कामम् ; अविरोधित्वात् ; नैतावता तादात्म्यमिति ।

यत्तु सहोपलम्भनियमादिति, तत्र ; विरुद्धत्वात् । साहित्यस्यात्यन्तभिन्नैकनिष्ठ-  
त्वात् । तद्गोचरस्य नियमस्य च तत्स्थापकत्वमेव । पृथगानुपलम्भस्तन्नियम इति चेत्, तत्रेदं  
विकल्पनीयम्—स किं भिन्नाकारतया ग्रहणाभावः, अथ भिन्नाश्रयतया, आहोस्विद्विन्नप्रदेश-  
तया, उत ज्ञानद्वयेन, प्रत्यक्षेण विशेषणविशेष्यभावमपहायेति वा । तत्र नाद्यः पक्षः ;  
असिद्धत्वात् । सिद्धौ वा भेदविरोधात् । न हि भिन्नानामपि भिन्नकारण (भिन्नाकारेण?)  
बुद्ध्यभावः । न द्वितीयः ; तत एव । न हि जात्यादिसामानाधिकरण्या (समानाधि-  
करणा?) व्यक्त्यादयः ; जातिगुणयोर्मिथस्तादात्म्यप्रसङ्गाच्च । न तृतीयः ; एकप्रदेशवर्ति-  
नामाकाशकालादीनां भेद(नामभेद?)प्रसङ्गात् । ज्ञेयभेदस्य ज्ञानभेदं प्रत्यप्रयोजकत्वेन चतुर्थोऽपि

पक्षोऽनादरणीय एव । पञ्चमस्तु विरुद्धः ; विशेषणविशेष्यभावस्य भेद एवोपपत्तिरित्युक्तत्वात् । तथा सोपाधिकः । न खलु तादात्म्याभावाद्धटपटौ पृथगुपलभ्येते ; अपि तु पृथगवस्थानात् । तदपि तादात्म्याभावेन साधयाम इति चेन्न ; भेदेन प्रतिपन्नयोरपि गुणगुणिनोः पृथगनवस्थानसिद्धौ तत्र पृथगुपलब्धेवोपाधित्वात् । ततश्शक्तितोपाधित्वं वा । अतस्तादात्म्याभावस्य पृथगुपलम्भेन व्याप्त्यभावात्कथं पृथगनुपलम्भेनाभेदसिद्धिः । तादात्म्याभावस्थानेऽत्यन्तभेदपदप्रयोगेऽप्ययमेव न्यायोऽनुसन्धेयः ।

अयमपि गौरिति तु प्रतिसन्धानमेकोपाधिविशिष्टवदेकजातिवैशिष्ट्यादुपपद्यते । अयं गौरिति सामानाधिकरण्यं विशेषणविशेष्ययोर्भेद एवोपपद्यत इति ह्युक्तम् ।

यच्चावयवावयविनोः (नोरिति ?) भेदेऽप्यभेदसाधनायोपन्यस्तम् , तद्वेदानभ्युपगमादेव परिहरणीयम् । न हि वयमन्योन्यसंश्लेषविशेषभाजमवयवकलापमन्तरेणावयविनमपरमभ्युपगच्छामः । अभ्युपगमे वा ये वाभ्युपगच्छन्ति, तेषाममूर्तत्वसमानदेशत्वयोर्विरोधोऽन्यत्रेति व्यवस्थापनीयम् । न च भेदाभेदपक्षेऽपि समाधानमन्यथा सम्भवति ; भेदांशे विरोधस्यावर्जनीयत्वात् ।

अनुमानोदयान्यथानुपपत्तिरपि नात्र भेदं साधयितुमर्हति । सामान्यविशेषयोर्विशेषणविशेष्यभावेनैवोपपत्तेरिति प्रसङ्गः खल्वेवमेव परिहर्तुं शक्यते । यश्चैषां कश्चिदुद्धोषः— एकैकत्र प्रसक्ता दोषा न समुच्चये सम्भवन्तीति—तदपहास्यम् ; उभयदोषोपसंहारस्यैव सिद्धेः ।

तदेवं भेदाभेदयोरविरोधः प्रमाणपथपरिभ्रष्ट इति कथमेतदवलम्बनेन सामानाधिकरण्यम् ?

अन्ये तु वदन्ति—सामानाधिकरणं वाक्यमखण्डार्थं प्रतिपादयति । अपरार्था कथं मेकार्थवृत्तित्वम् ? न तावत्प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमेकम्, पर्यायत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न च तद्विशिष्टम् ; विशेषणभेदेन विशिष्टताभेदात् । नापि प्रधानार्थकत्वम् ; व्यधिकरणवाक्यस्यैव तथात्वात् । ननु लक्षणवाक्यस्य प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदपरित्यागेनैकार्थत्वनिवन्धनः (न्यः?) किङ्कृत इति ?

अहो भवतां लक्षणवाक्यार्थाभिज्ञता ! न खल्वस्मिन्वाक्ये प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदोऽर्थत्वेन विवक्षितः ; एकार्थवृत्तित्वविरोधात् ; अपि तु पर्यायपदव्यावृत्त्यर्थः । भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तत्वेन व्युत्पन्नानां शब्दानां यत्रैकार्थवृत्तित्वं तत्र सामानाधिकरण्यमिति लक्षणवाक्यार्थः । न चैकार्थतैव सर्वथा हेया ; एकवाक्यताविरोधात् । एवमेकार्थवृत्तित्वविधानात्पर्यायत्वमेव प्रसज्यत इति चेत् , स्यादेतदेवम् , यदि समभिव्याहारलब्धैकार्थत्वात्पर्यायत्वमुच्यते । व्युत्पत्तिलब्धात् तत् । तथापि किं पर्यायव्यवच्छेदेन । एवमप्येकार्थवृत्तिसिद्धेरिति चेन्न ; (यतः?) फलभेदः । न हि घटः कुण्ड इति पदद्वयप्रयोगे प्रतिपदं प्रयोजनभेद उपलभ्यते । नीलमुत्पलमित्यत्र-त्वनीलानुत्पलव्यावृत्तिलक्षणफलोपलम्भादपर्यायत्वं बहुमन्यामहे । न चैतावता अर्थभेदापातः । यदि च पदान्तरं न प्रयुज्येत, विशेषणान्तरान्वयस्स्यात् । तत्परिहाराय तत्प्रयोगः । यदि च निमित्तविवक्षा आश्रीयेत, ततो विशेषणविशेष्यभावेनान्वये जातिगुणादीनामन्योन्यसमवाय-स्यात् । एकपदोपात्तस्य ह्यन्येन विशेषणम् । अतश्च निमित्तानादरः । यद्यपि नीलमुत्पल-मित्यत्र निमित्तभूतविशेषणान्वयः प्रतीयते, तथापि नासौ शब्दशक्तिकृतः । प्रमाणान्तर-सिद्धस्य तु शब्देना (ब्देन?) बाधमारचयति, अन्यपरत्वात् । यथा गामनयेत्युक्ते तद्गतगुण-जात्यन्तरेष्वपि प्रतिलब्धानयनेषु गोत्वातिरेकी न शब्दार्थः ॥

अत एव हि सत्यज्ञानादिवेदान्तवाक्येषु शब्दैकसमधिगम्यमखण्डैकरसं ब्रह्म सिद्धयति । तत्र हि जगत्कारणतयोपलक्षितस्य 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्' इति सजातीयविजातीयस्वगतनानात्वरहितस्य कारणत्वकृतविकाराश्रयत्वादिदोषपरिजि-हीर्षया स्वरूपशोधनाय प्रवृत्तानि निष्प्रत्यूहमखण्डवाक्यार्थं बोधयन्त्येव साक्षादपि च कति-चिन्निषेधन्ति निःशेषमभेदजातम् ॥ अतःशोधकवाक्यान्तरानुरोधात् , कारणवाक्यैकार्थ्यात् , सामानाधिकरण्यस्वाभाव्याच्च शब्दैकसमधिगम्यं ब्रह्म सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्यैर्निःशेषविशेषशून्य-मेवेति ज्ञायते । न च तत्तन्निषेधवशादभावरूपविशेषणसमुन्मेषप्रसङ्गः ; अशेषभावनिषेधेऽ-भावस्यापि तत्त्वता निवृत्तेः । भावप्रतियोगिको ह्यभावः । स च भावस्य कचिद्वृत्तावास्पदं लभते । इह तु सर्वथा सर्वभावेषु विलीनेषु को निषेधार्थ इति ?

अत्रोच्यते—

एकोक्तानतिरेकश्चेन्निष्फलं स्यात्पदान्तरम् ।

अतिरेके कथन्नु स्यादखण्डार्थाभिधायिता ॥

यदि हि नीलमुत्पलमित्यादिपदेष्वेकपदप्रतिपन्नात्पदान्तरप्रतिपन्नं नातिरिच्येत, ततो निष्फलमेव पदान्तरमापद्येत ।

यदुक्तं व्यावृत्तिभेदः फलमिति, तन्न ; व्यावर्त्यभेदाभावात् । तदभेदश्च प्रतिपाद्य-  
भेदाभावात् । प्रतिपाद्यप्रतियोगी हि व्यावृत्तो युक्तः ; अन्यथा अतिप्रसङ्गात् । यदि च  
नीलपदस्य नीलिमविशिष्टार्थो न विवक्षितः, किमित्यनीलव्यावृत्तिरेव फलति । नीलपीत-  
साधारणं हि विशेष्यम् । ततोऽपीतव्यावृत्तिरपि फलमित्यापद्येत । अविवक्षितमपि यमर्थं  
स्मारयति तत्प्रतिव्या (तियोगि व्या?) वर्तत इति चेत्, तर्हि गौशुक्ल इत्युक्ते दशानामपि  
प्रतियोगिनो व्यावर्त्या भवेयुः । व्याघातादेक एवेति चेन्न ; निमित्ताविवक्षायामव्याघातात् ।  
तद्विवक्षायां हि सास्त्रादिमत्त्वबाणत्वादेरेकत्र विरोधः । अविवक्षायान्तु सास्त्रादिमतामबा-  
णादीनाञ्च केषाञ्चित्संभवात्तद्व्यवच्छेदो युज्यत एव ॥

निश्शेषव्यवच्छेदप्रतियोगिव्यवच्छेदो दुर्भेदः । २स च विवक्षितः । तस्मादसमुच्चय  
इति चेन्न ; भवत्पक्षे तदसम्भवः । न ह्यखण्डवाक्यार्थपक्षे नीलपदस्य सकलानीलव्यवच्छि-  
न्नार्थता सम्भवति ; तस्यापि वाक्यार्थस्य नीलगुणत्वाभावेनानीलत्वात्तद्व्यवच्छेदस्य तस्मि-  
न्ननुपपत्तेः । यद्यपि प्रमाणान्तरगम्येषु नीलादिषु लोके वैशिष्ट्यावगमात्प्रतियोगित्वाभावः,  
तथापि वेदे शब्दैकसमधिगम्यस्स खल्वखण्डार्थस्सकलविशेषशून्य इति सर्वपदव्यवच्छेद्य-  
तामर्हतीति कथं तत्तत्पदार्थत्वम् । अतस्तत्तन्निमित्ताविवक्षायामेकार्थ एव न सिद्ध्यति ।

१. सास्त्रादिमतां बाणादीनां पा०

२. व्यवच्छेदप्रतियोगिनां सर्वेषां व्यवच्छेदोऽत्र विवक्षितः । तत्र अनीलव्यवच्छेदापीतव्यवच्छेदादि-  
सर्वव्यवच्छेदग्रहणे तत्प्रतियोगिसामान्यव्यवच्छेदो दुर्वेच इत्यनीलसामान्यव्यवच्छेदपरत्वमित्यर्थः ॥

अथ तस्यार्थत्वादव्यवच्छेद्यत्वम्; त्यज तर्हि निशेषव्यवच्छेदव्यसनम् । सर्वेषाञ्च समानाधिकरणवाक्यानामेक एवार्थः परस्परार्थव्यत्ययो वेत्यापद्येत । निमित्तविरोधाविरोधयोरविशेषेण घटः पट इति सामानाधिकरण्यं प्रसज्येत ।

व्यधिकरणवाक्यस्थानाञ्च पदानामेकार्थविवक्षा किमिति नाश्रीयेत । न च प्रकृत्यर्थातिरिक्तप्रत्ययार्थविरोधादैकार्थ्यं व्यधिकरणवाक्येषु न सिद्धयतीति वाच्यम्; ऐकार्थ्यविरुद्धानामशेषाणां त्याज्यत्वेन निर्णयात्; त्यागमन्तरेणैकार्थ्यमेव न सिद्धयतीति चेन्न; न हि समानाधिकरणवाक्यान्यपि तथा न स्युः । तथाप्यैकार्थ्यं यत्प्रकारजुषां व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धं, तत्प्रकारजुषामेव तदभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति चेन्न; भवद्विवक्षितैकार्थ्यस्य प्रमाणान्तरागोचरत्वात् । प्रमाणान्तरागोचरत्वेऽपि व्युत्पत्त्यगोचरत्वात् । न हि समानाधिकरणवाक्यप्रतिपाद्यं तत्तन्निमित्तविरहीति क्वचिदुपलब्धम् । न च प्रमाणान्तरागांचरेऽपि जायमानं 'विन्ध्याटव्यां मदमुदितो मातङ्गगणस्तिष्ठति' इति वाक्यात् ज्ञानमविशिष्टविषयं दृष्टम् । अतो व्युत्पत्त्यनुसारेण वाक्यार्थनिर्णयस्तत्तन्निमित्तविशिष्टतयैव । अपरथा अतिप्रसङ्गः ॥

अपि च भावाभावयोरितरनिषेधात्मकत्वादनीलनिषेधो नीलमेवेति नीलमविवक्षितम्, अनीलनिषेधस्तु विवक्षित इति व्याहतं को नामान्योऽभिदध्यात् ऋते देवानां प्रियात् ? यदि च तत्तन्निमित्तप्रतियोगिव्यवच्छेदं फलमभिलष्यते, तर्हि तत्तद्व्यवच्छेदविशिष्टस्यार्थस्य प्रतियोगिव्यवच्छेदत्वं (?) भेदादेकार्थता व्याहन्येतैव ।

अथ विशेष्यमात्रत्वाद्वावृत्तीनां न भेदशङ्कावकाशः, तर्हि तन्मात्रस्य प्रथमपदेनैव सिद्धत्वान्निष्फलमेव पदान्तरमापद्येत । यदि च तस्याशब्दार्थत्वं, तदानीं शब्दस्य तदेव निष्फलत्वम् । अथ तस्य व्यवच्छिन्नरूपस्य लक्ष्यत्वेन मुख्यार्थभेदाभावादेकार्थतेति मतम्, तर्हि लक्ष्यस्य धर्मिणो मुख्यार्थत्वाभावादेकार्थतापि न सिद्धयेत्; निमित्तमुख्यानुसारित्वात्तन्मुख्यत्वस्य, यथा सिंहो देवदत्तः, यथा वा त्वत्पृष्ठः पुरुषः स्थाणुः इत्यादिषु ॥

अथवा (?) व्यवच्छेदस्य कुत्रचिदपि पारमार्थिकत्वाभावात्तत्प्रतियोगिनोः व्यव-



च्छेद्य (च्छेदः) स्यापि पारमार्थिकत्वानुपपत्तेरर्थभेदानापादकत्वम्, तर्हि प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तेन किमपराद्धम् ? यत् तदपनुद्यते ।

एवं समानाधिकरणवाक्यार्थमपि वाक्यार्थान्तरवद्विशिष्टमेवोपगम्य पश्चात्सर्वमिध्या-  
त्वमुपपाद्यताम् ; किमनेनैकार्थग्रहणेन । न चाभावस्य स्वगतविशेषाभावादविशेषकत्वमिति ;  
स्वगतविशेषाभावे तद्विशिष्टस्यैव व्यावृत्तेस्वरूपभेदमात्रेणैव विशेषकत्वानपायात् । न च  
विशेषणत्वमपि तत् एव निवर्तत इति वक्तव्यम् ; विशेषणत्वस्य विशिष्टतापेक्षायामनवस्था-  
प्रसङ्गात् । इष्ट एवायमर्थ इति चेत्, अभावेऽपि तथेष्ट्यताम् ; स्वरूपभेदस्य प्रतिसम्बन्धि-  
विशिष्टत्वेन वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् । न च<sup>१</sup> स्वसमवेतमिव (मेवः) विशेषणमित्यभ्युपगम्यैवमेषितुं  
शक्यम् । न च भावान्तराभाववादिनामर्थान्तराभावाद्विशिष्टता न स्यादिति वाच्यम् ; अभा-  
वाख्येन भावभेदेनैव विशेषणतापत्तेः । अतस्सामानाधिकरणं सर्वथा विशिष्टपरमेव । यदि  
परममुख्यार्थव्यतिक्रमो लक्षणाभ्युपगमश्च भवतामभिरुचितः, ततो व्यावृत्तिलक्षणा आश्रीयताम् ।  
एवमाद्यभिसन्धायोक्तं भगवद्भाष्यकारपादैः—‘ इयांस्तु विशेषः एकस्मिन्पक्षे पदानां  
मुख्यार्थता, अपरस्मिंश्च तेषां लक्षणा ’ इति ।

किञ्च लक्षणवाक्यसिद्धयोर्निमित्तभेदैकार्थयोरन्यतरत्र किं (?) कुतो भवतां पक्ष-  
पातः ? । विरोधादिति चेत् ; निमित्तभेदविरोधादेकार्थतैवाप्रामाणिकी हीयताम् । किम-  
व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धनिमित्तत्यागेन ?<sup>२</sup> कश्चात्र विरोधः ? किमेकार्थवत्प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदयोः,<sup>३</sup> अथ  
गुणजात्योः परस्परसमवायप्रसङ्गलक्षणः, किं वा निमित्तयोरेव । नाद्यः ; अन्यगतभेदस्यान्य-  
गताभेदेनाविरोधात् । विशेष्याभेदेनैकार्थत्वमिति विवक्षितत्वात् । न च तत्तद्विशेषणविशिष्ट-  
त्वरूपस्यैकत्वानुपपत्तिदोष इति वाच्यम् ; विशिष्टत्वं हि विशेषणसम्बन्धः, कथं तद्भेदस्य

१. स्वसमवेतमेव विशेषणमिति नेत्यभ्युपगम्य प्रतिसम्बन्धिविशिष्टत्वेनापि स्वरूपभेद एषितुं  
शक्य इत्यर्थः ।

२. निमित्तत्यागो व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धो नेति किं तत्करणेत्यर्थः । अव्युत्पत्तीत्यत्र व्युत्पत्तीति वा  
पाठस्यात् ।

३. एकार्थसम्बन्धिनी ये प्रवृत्तिनिमित्ते तद्वतयोर्मिथो भेदयोर्विरोधः किमित्यर्थः ।

विशेष्यभेदापादकत्वम् । तदेकत्वे च विशिष्टभेदाभावः, प्रधानगोचरत्वाद्विशिष्टशब्दस्य । न च शब्दस्य विशिष्टाभिधानं विरुद्धम् ; निमित्तविशिष्ट एव व्युत्पत्तेस्तदभाव एवाभिधानविरोधात् । न द्वितीयः ; विशेषणानां विशेष्यनिष्ठत्वापेक्षणात् । न ह्यन्यसमवायस्यान्यविशेषणत्वोपयोगः ; अतिप्रसङ्गात् । न च गुणजात्योरेव मिथो विशेषणत्वम् ; तथा अप्रतिपत्तेः । तथात्वे चानिष्ठत्वाभावात् । न च शाब्दे व्यवहारे परस्परसमवायप्रसङ्ग इति वाच्यम् ; प्रसङ्गकाभावात् । १ न हि शब्दस्य विशेषणत्वं तथात्वेनेति कञ्चिद्वृष्टम् । तदा वा कृतं विवादेन ; दर्शनबलादविरोधोपपत्तेः । तस्मादेकेन पदेनोपस्थापितस्य विशेष्यस्यान्यानि विशेषणानि भवन्ति ; न सर्वस्य । अत एव ह्याकाङ्क्षादित्रयं कारणमन्वयस्येति वदन्ति नीतिविदः । न च तृतीयः ; समानाधिकरणपदोपात्तानां नीलत्वोत्पलत्वादीनामेकाश्रयसम्बन्धे विरोधाभावात् ।

नापि सोऽयं देवदत्त इत्यादिषु विरोधश्शङ्कनीयः ; तदेककाल (तद्देशकालः?) (तदेतत्कालः?) (तदिदङ्कालः?) योर्देवदत्तसम्बन्धाविरोधात् । इतरथा क्षणभङ्गप्रसङ्गात् । इदानीं तत्कालसम्बन्धो विरुद्ध इति चेत्, किमिदानीमस्यापि कालस्य संयोगः ? न हि कालस्य कालान्तरापेक्षा ; अनवस्थानात् । यत्रापि विरोधः, तत्रापि तयोरन्यतरस्यैव बाधो युक्तः । ....[न हि] पुरुषस्थाणुरित्युक्ते द्वयोरपि बाधो दृश्यते ।

अपि चात्र प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तव्यतिरेकेण शा(श?)ब्दस्याभिधाने<sup>१</sup> व्युत्पत्तिनैरपेक्ष्यं प्रसज्येत । ततश्च समानाधिकरणवाक्यबलाना(वाक्यं बालाना ?)मखण्डार्थमवबोधयेत् । एवं तावल्लोके विशिष्टगोचरत्वम् । वेदेऽपि तथा अभ्युपगन्तव्यम् ; लोकवेदाधिकरणन्यायात् । तथा च सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्येषु व्यावृत्तिलक्षणा न सङ्गच्छते ।

न च कारणवाक्यैकार्थ्ये सिद्धेऽखण्डार्थत्वं न्याय्यम् ; एतद्वाक्यानुबोधेन तेषामेव विशिष्टार्थत्वोपपत्तेः । न च तेषामप्यद्वैतपरत्वम् ; न हि निखिलजगन्निमित्तोपादानभावोप-

१. शब्दाधीनं विशेषणत्वं परस्परसमवाये सत्येवेति न दृष्टमित्यर्थः

२. अभिधायकत्व इत्यर्थः

योगितया ज्ञानशक्त्यादिगुणसागरीभूतं निखिलचेतनाचेतनशरीरकं परमात्मानमभिदधद्वाक्यं निर्विशेषपरमिति युक्तं वक्तुम् । न च शोधकवाक्यान्तरेण निर्विशेषत्वसिद्धिः ; निषेधस्य सामान्यगोचरस्य विहितविशेषव्यतिरिक्तगोचरत्वात् , विशेषनिषेधसमानविषयत्वाच्च । तथा हि नीतिविदो वदन्ति ।

तस्मात्समानाधिकरणवाक्यार्थोऽन्यथा वर्णनीयः । स उच्यते—अयमत्र तावलक्षण-वाक्यार्थः, प्रवृत्तिरभिधानं तस्य निमित्तं कारणम् । शब्दाः खलु कस्मिंश्चिदर्थे वर्तितुं निमित्त-तया किञ्चित्सामान्यमवलम्बन्ते । एतदुक्तं भवति—शब्दानां वाच्योऽर्थो द्विविधः, द्वारभूतः उद्देश्यश्च । वृद्धव्यवहारे व्युत्पन्नानां व्यवहाराय प्रयुज्यमानानाञ्च तेषां व्यवहार्ये द्वारिणि प्राधान्येन वृत्तिः । द्वारभूते जात्यादौ तदवच्छेदायानन्त्यव्यवहा(व्यभिचा?)रपरिहाराय च तदर्थतयेति<sup>१</sup> । तत्प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं भिन्नं येषां, तेषामेकस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तिर्यमभिधातुर्नि (तुं नि?) मित्तान्वेषणं तस्मिन्नेकस्मिन्नित्यर्थः । तत्र प्रवृत्तिस्सामानाधिकरण्यमिति । अत्र भिन्नप्रवृत्ति-निमित्तानामिति पर्यायपदव्युदासः । एकस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तिरिति व्यधिकरणानामिति । एवं तावलक्षणवाक्यं समञ्जसं भवति । न चात्र व्युत्पत्तिव्यवहारविरोधः ; तन्निमित्तविशिष्टस्यैव सर्वत्र प्रतीतेः । इतरथैव हि विरोध इत्युक्तम् । न चात्र भेदाभेदविरोधः ; निमित्तनिष्ठ-त्वाद्भेदस्य, उद्देश्यगतत्वादेकत्वस्य ।

एवं लोके व्युत्पत्तिव्यवहारयोर्विशिष्टविषयतया सामानाधिकरण्यस्य सुदृढं निरूढ-त्वाद्भेदेऽपि तत्तद्गुणविशिष्ट एव परमात्मा सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्यैस्सिद्धयतीति सर्वं समञ्जसम् ।

इति श्रीभगवद्रामानुजमुनिवरमतधुरन्धरस्यात्रिगोत्रप्रदीपश्रीपद्मनाभार्यनन्दनस्य  
वादिहंसनवाम्बुदस्य श्रीमद्रामानुजाचार्यस्य कृतिषु न्यायकुलिशे  
सामानाधिकरण्यवादस्सप्तमः.

श्रीः

## ॥ सत्कार्यवादोऽष्टमः ॥

श्रुतिरेवैकविज्ञानाद्वदन्ती सर्ववेदनम् ।

सत्कार्यवादं प्रस्तौति संस्थानं जातिमेव च ॥

तथाहि—‘ येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवत्यमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातम् ’ ‘ आत्मनि खल्वरे दृष्टे श्रुते मते विज्ञाते इदं सर्वं विज्ञातम् ’ इत्यादिश्रुतिभिरेकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानमुपदिश्यते । तच्च कथमित्यपेक्षायां ‘ यथा सौम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृण्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् ’ इत्यादिभिरुपपाद्यते । तदवगच्छामः कारणद्रव्यमेवावस्थान्तरापन्नं कार्यद्रव्यमिति । कथमन्यथान्यज्ञानादन्यस्य विज्ञानं स्यात् ॥

तादात्म्ये वा कथं हेतुहेतुमद्भावः ? न हि घटज्ञानेन घटज्ञानमित्युच्यत इति चेत् , सत्यम् । न ह्यत्र कार्यकारणभावेन ते (द्वे ?) ज्ञाने उपदिश्येते; किन्त्वेकज्ञानेन सर्वं विषयीकृतं भवतीति । अत ओदनपाकं पचतीतिवत् प्रत्ययार्थ एव द्वितीयश्रुतविज्ञातादिशब्देन विवक्षित इति नेयम् । एकसर्वशब्दोस्तु कार्यकारणावस्थाद्वयान्वितविषयत्वेना (त्वेन ना ?) धिकविषयत्वम् ।

ननु च कथं तर्हि कारणावस्थविज्ञानेन कार्यावस्थस्य विषयीकृतत्वम् । कार्यावस्थयास्तदगोचरत्वादिति चेत्, सत्यं नावस्थाविषयः; तथापि तस्य द्रव्यस्य ज्ञातत्वव्यपदेश इत्यदोषः । यथा हि तिष्ठतो देवदत्तस्य दर्शनेन गच्छतोऽपि दृष्टत्वव्यवहारः । अपूर्ववदेव देवदत्तो गच्छतीत्युक्ते हि प्रतिब्रवीति, ‘ दृष्ट एव पूर्वं तत्रासीनः ’ इति । एवमिहापि भवितुमर्हति । दर्शनान्तरेषु एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तवाक्यार्थासङ्गतिः भाष्यकारपादैरेव तत्र प्रपञ्चितत्वाच्चेह प्रस्तूयते ॥

अत्रेदं विमर्शनीयम्—कथं कारणद्रव्यमेव कार्यतामनुभवतीति । तत्र हि केचिदाहुः—

कार्यं भिन्नमुपादानाद्बुद्धिशब्दान्तरादिभिः ।

अन्यथा हि प्रपञ्चोऽयं प्र(यमप्र ?) त्यक्षः प्रसज्यते ॥

तथाहि—न तावत्कारणमेव कार्यमित्यभ्युपगन्तुमुचितम् ; बुद्धिभेदात् । स्वरूप-  
भेदो हि बुद्धिभेदव्यवस्थाप्यः । स चोत्तम्यते विरुद्धधर्माध्यासेन । अतो वक्ष्यमाणैर्धर्मभेदैरुत्त-  
म्भितो बुद्धिभेदस्तावत्कार्यकारणद्रव्ययोस्वरूपभेदं व्यवस्थापयति । शब्दभेदादयश्च विरुद्धा  
धर्माः । तन्तवः पट इति शब्दभेदः । सूक्ष्मः स्थूल इति परिणामभेदः । बहवः एक इति  
सङ्ख्याभेदः । निम्नोन्नताद्यवयवसन्निवेशभावाभावात्मा आकारभेदः । आच्छादनादि-  
सामर्थ्यासामर्थ्याभ्यां कार्यभेदः, शक्तिभेदश्च । कार्यस्य स एव ; कारणस्य तु स चा-  
सश्चेति कालभेदः । एवमादयो विरुद्धा धर्मा नैकस्मिन्नेव कल्पन्ते ॥

यदि च प्रागपि कार्यद्रव्यं स्यात्, कारकव्यापारो निष्फलस्स्यात् ।

नित्यानित्यविभागोऽपि न कचिद्द्रव्येषु स्यात् ।

अथावस्थाभेदमाश्रित्यैतत्सर्वं समाधीयत इति मतम्, तन्न ; विकल्पासहत्वात् ।  
तथाहि—किमवस्थाभेदः कार्यकारणयोरनुगत एव, उतानियतः, किं वा कार्ये वा कारणे वा  
व्यवस्थित एव ? नाद्यः कल्पः ; द्रव्यस्वरूपवत्तस्यापि सत्तादिलक्षणस्याव्यवस्थापकत्वात् ।  
किञ्चिद्व्यवस्थितं हि कचित्त्वानुवर्तिनमन्यमपि धर्मं व्यवस्थापयितुमीष्टे । अनुगतं हि  
नामान्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण वा धर्मान्तरविकल्पं प्रत्यप्रयोजकमेव । १ अनियतस्य तु दूरे नियाम-  
कत्वम् । २ नियतश्च स्वाभावसहायः पूर्वोक्तविरुद्धधर्मपक्षनिक्षेपमर्हति । न च कश्चिद्विरुद्धो  
धर्मस्तथाविधं धर्मान्तरमविरुद्धमापादयति । स्वयमविरुद्ध इति कथं नियतः ? अविरोधो  
बुभयत्रान्वयदर्शनेन निर्वाह्यः ; यथा शीतोष्णानुगतस्य द्रव्यत्वादेः ।

१. द्वितीयं दूषयति—अनियतस्येति.

२. तृतीये आह—नियतस्येति.

कश्चासौ<sup>१</sup> ? यदि संयोगादिलक्षणोऽभ्युपगम्यते, कथमसौ प्रागपि विद्यमानः कार्या-  
वस्थां नियच्छेत् । अथ तद्विशेषः, स किं लक्षणः येन कार्यं जायते ? स एवेति चेन्न ;  
कार्यासिद्धौ तदसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । ननु तथाप्यसावस्त्येव ; इतरथान्योन्याश्रयापत्तेः । प्रत्य-  
क्षश्च ; संयोगजातीयत्वादिति चेत्, न ; तथाप्येकत्वस्थूलत्वादीनामाश्रयान्तरमन्तरेणा-  
निर्वाहात् । न हि संयोग एवाश्रयो युक्तः, गुणत्वात् । न च संयोगिनः ; तेषामनेकत्वाद-  
स्थूलत्वाच्च । एकत्वानेकत्वयोः स्थूलत्वास्थूलत्वयोश्च <sup>२</sup> एवमविरोध इति चेन्न, तर्हि किमा-  
श्रयमन्तर्भाव्य कथ्यते<sup>३</sup> । तर्हि भेदाभेदवाद एवाङ्गीकृतस्स्यात् । अन्यथा ह्यनाश्रयस्य गुणस्यान-  
वस्थानप्रसङ्गः<sup>४</sup> । अभेद एवाङ्गीकृत इति चेन्न ; विरुद्धधर्माध्यासाद्भेदस्यापि दुरपहव-  
त्वात् । न च कचिद्देशे तयोस्सामानाधिकरण्यं दृष्टम् ; येनाविरोधोऽपि कथ्येत । किञ्च  
संयोगोपाधिकमेकत्वमिच्छतां कचिदपि साक्षादेकासिद्धेः, पुनरनेकासिद्धौ द्रव्याभावे  
गुणाद्यभावाच्च सर्वलोकापलापः प्रकारान्तरेणोपस्थित इति साधु भवता प्रपञ्चापलापः परिहृतो  
भवति । इदमेव साक्षादेकमिति चेत्, किमयं वाङ्मात्रेणोपचारश्चरद्भास्यते । तर्हि नानात्व-  
मेवौपचारिकमस्तु, एकत्वन्तु न हातुं शक्यमिति चेत् ; अहो भवतां प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वाभिलाष-  
महिमा ; यत्कारणमपहाय कार्यं तिष्ठापयिषन्ति ।

योग्यता सर्वभावानां यावदाश्रयभाविनी ।

अतः प्रत्यक्षताणूनां स्थूला प्रत्यक्षतापि वा ॥

शक्तिर्हि यावदाश्रयभाविनी कार्यानुगुणशक्तिवादिभिरुपेयते । स्थूलश्चार्थः प्रत्यक्ष  
ज्ञानजनक (नन ?) शक्तस्तद्गोचरो भवति । स एव चेदणुभावेनापि वर्तते, कथं तदानीं

१. किञ्चासाववस्थामेदः किरूप इत्यर्थः.
२. कार्यत्वकारणत्वादिवदित्यर्थः.
३. आश्रयमन्तर्भाव्य कथ्यते किम् ? इत्यन्वयः.
४. आश्रयरहितश्चेद् गुणोऽयं न तिष्ठेदित्यर्थः.

प्रत्यक्षो भवेत् । अणुत्वेन वा (?) वर्तमानानामुशक्तिनिश्चयात् । तेषामेव<sup>१</sup> प्रत्यक्षे स्थूलत्वे प्रत्यक्षता न स्यात् । अथ स्थूलत्वमेव<sup>२</sup> सहकार्यसत्त्वादिविशिष्टस्यैव शक्तस्य द्रव्यस्य प्रत्यक्षतेति मतम् ; किं तत् स्थूलत्वम् ? किं महिमगुणशालित्वमेव वैशेषिकोक्तमुपक्र-  
(पग ?) म्यापेक्षिकमनापेक्षिकं च महत्त्वम्, तर्हि परमाणुकारणत्वाद् द्यणुकादिप्रक्रियादीना मभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गः । अथापेक्षिकमेवानन्तम्, तर्ह्यतिसूक्ष्मेष्वप्रतिष्ठं प्रत्यक्षत्वं प्रसज्येत ।

किञ्च यौऽयं पृथिव्यादीनां द्रव्याणां परस्परभेदः, यश्च घटपटादीनामेवानन्तप्रकारः, स सर्वो भवतां न सिद्धयेत् । उपादानादभिन्नस्योपादेयस्य मिथोऽपि भेदानुपपत्तेः ; उपादाने च पृथिवीत्वादेस्तदुपयोगिनो भेदान्तरस्याभावात् । अस्ति नस्वरूपभेद इति चेन्न ; घट-  
द्रव्यविलक्षणस्य घटपटभेदस्य तेनानिर्वाहात् । निर्वाहे वा कथं तेनैव स्वर्णेन रुचकस्वस्तिक-  
वर्धमानादिकार्योत्पादः क्रमेण सङ्गच्छते । किञ्च संस्थानमेव भवतां भेदः ; तस्यैव जाति-  
रूपत्वात्, जात्यादेरेव भेदत्वात् । अतो नानासंस्थानभाक्षु द्रव्येषु भवद्विरेव भेदः कण्ठोक्त्या समर्पित इति किं तद्विरुद्धेन सत्कार्यवादग्रहणेन । किञ्च कार्यद्रव्यं भूत्वा (अभूत्वा ;<sup>३</sup>) भवतीति सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धम् । अवस्थादृष्टान्तोऽर्थानुमानेनापि सिद्धमिति<sup>४</sup> किमर्धजरतीन्या-  
येन । न च साङ्ख्यवत्सर्वं कार्यं सदेवोत्पद्यत इति भवतामभ्युपगमः । न चोपादाननिय-  
मादिसाङ्ख्योक्तहेतुजालावलम्बनमस्ति ; अवस्थास्वसत्कार्यवादसमर्थनाय तेषां प्रत्युक्तत्वात् ।  
अतो वरं स एव<sup>५</sup> द्रव्येष्वश्रितः । किन्तरां सत्कार्यवादक्लेशेनेति ।

१. अणूनमेव प्रत्यक्षमिति स्वीकारे स्थूलत्वे कथं प्रत्यक्षमिति भावः.

२. स्थूलत्वं सहकारीकृत्येत्यर्थः । सत्त्वमर्थक्रियाकारित्वम् । सत्त्वाद्विशिष्टस्येति पा०.

३. अभूत्वा भवतीति पाठो युक्तः न्यायभाष्याद्यनुसारी च ; पूर्वमस्थित्वा पश्चाद्भवतीत्यर्थः.

४. अर्थानुमानेऽपि सिद्ध इति पा०.

अवस्थादृष्टान्तोऽस्यानुमानेऽपि सिद्ध इति पाठस्यात् । सिद्धमिति पाठे कार्यद्रव्यस्याभूत्वा भवनं न केवलं सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धम् । किन्तु अवस्थादृष्टान्तोत्थानुमानेनापि सिद्धमिति भावानुगुणं भावनीयम्.

५. अवस्थायामङ्गीकृतस एवासत्कार्यवादः द्रव्येष्वेवास्त्विति ॥

अत्रोच्यते—

कार्यकारणयोरैक्यं प्रत्यभिज्ञानतस्स्थिरम् ।

विरुद्धधर्मसम्बन्धो व्यवस्थाभेदबन्धनः ॥

पश्यामो हि वयं तदेव मृत्तन्वादिद्रव्यं संस्थानान्तरमासाद्य घटपटादिभावमनुभवतीति । तत्र यदुक्तं स्वरूपभेदो बुद्धिभेदेन सिद्धयतीति ; तत्रासिद्धो बुद्धिभेदः । न्ययुताभेदस्यैवोक्ताकारया बुद्ध्या साधितत्वात् । ततश्च न विरुद्धधर्माध्यासादिभिरुत्तम्भयितुं कल्पयितुं वा शक्यते । ननु उपादानानुवृत्तिरेव दृश्यते ; न तु कार्यस्य प्रागपि सत्तेति चेन्न ; तस्यैव द्रव्यस्यावस्थान्तरप्राप्तिरिति प्रतीतेः । न हि तस्मिन्ननुवर्तमाने द्रव्यान्तरं समस्तीति प्रत्येति । अत एव समानाधिकरणप्रत्ययोपपत्तिः । इतरथा ह्युपादानोपादेययोर्व्यधिकरणप्रत्ययो भवेत् । कथं च भवता दुग्धादिभिर्दध्यादिष्वारभ्यमाणेषु प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिस्स्यात् । न हि तत्रावयवागमो दृश्यते ; दुग्धावयविनस्तदवयवानां वा दध्यनारम्भकत्वाभ्युपगमात् । परमाणूनां दुग्धदधिजातीयानामप्रत्यक्षत्वात् । दध्यवयवानां च पूर्वमसत्त्वात् । अत एव भ्रान्तिरसाविति चेन्न ; निर्वाशत्वात् । तन्नुपटादिभ्यो विशेषाभावात् । अतः प्रत्यक्षमेव निरपेक्षमेवमादिपूदाहरणसहस्रेषु कार्यकारणयोरवस्थाभेद एव न द्रव्यभेद इति व्यवस्थापयति । एवं स्थिते कयानुपपत्त्या द्रव्यान्तरमध्यवस्येम् । विरुद्धधर्माध्यासोऽप्यवस्थाभेदात्सङ्गच्छते । सा चावस्था संयोगादिलक्षणा प्रत्यक्षसिद्धा । तत्र यत्तावदुक्तं, नियतस्तु विरुद्धधर्मान्तरमेवेति ; स्यादेतदेवं, यदि धर्म (र्मि ?) द्वयनिष्ठतया स्वयं स्वाभावश्च प्रतीयेयाताम् । एकधर्मिण्येव कदाचित्स्वयमुत्पद्यत इति सर्वैरवसितत्वात् । संयोगो ह्यसमवायितया<sup>१</sup> भवद्विरपीप्यमाणस्तन्वाद्विषेव समुपजायते, नार्थान्तरे । स तु स्वाधिकरणे स्वाधीनधर्मान्तरमपि व्यवस्थापयतीति किं नोपपद्यते ।

कथमेकत्वं बहुषु व्यवस्थापयेदिति चेत् , तत्किमेकत्वबहुत्वयोर्निरुपाधिकयोर्विरोधः, उतोपाधिभेदापादितयोरपि ? न प्रथमः ; बहुषु प्रत्येकमेकत्वाभावप्रसङ्गात् । न द्वितीयः ;



संयोगविशेषस्यैवोपाधित्वात् । न चैवमौपाधिकत्वे स्वाभाविकैकत्वालाभः ; अस्यैव स्वाभाविकत्वात् । हेतुरेव ह्यत्रोपाधिरिति गीयते । तच्च.....  
 १ स्थितावप्यपेक्षितम् । तदपाये ह्येकत्वं नश्यति । एतावानत्रावयोर्विशेषः—संयोगादसमवायि  
 कारणाद्द्रव्यं जायते, अस्मादेकत्वं त्वन्मते । अस्माकं तु संयोगादेव संयोगिष्वेकत्वमिति ।  
 न चैवं भेदाभेदप्रसङ्गः ; समवायिद्रव्यातिरिक्तस्य द्रव्यान्तरस्य प्रसङ्गाभावात् ।

एतेन स्थूलत्वं व्याख्यातम् । पिठरपाकवादिनां परिमाणद्वयस्यैकाधिकरणत्वं काल-  
 भेदेन तत्तदुपाधितो निरुह्यत एव । तत्र चोपाधिभेदेनेति न विशेषः ; दृष्टत्वादेव हि तत्रा-  
 प्यविरोधः ।

यत्तु विरुद्धधर्माध्यासाद्भेदोऽपि दुर्वार इति ; तत्रासिद्धिः ; विरोधाभावस्योक्त-  
 त्वात् । एतेन च साक्षादेकत्वासिद्धिः प्रत्युक्ता । न चान्यगतमेकत्वमन्यत्रोपचर्यते । न च  
 नानात्वमपि साक्षान्नास्ति । यथा हि प्रत्येकमेकत्वेऽपि तेषामेवापेक्षाबुद्धिगृहीतानां तेन रूपेण  
 बहुत्वाधारत्वम्, एवमपेक्षाबुद्धिगृहीतानां बहुत्वंऽपि तामपहाय संसर्गगृहीतानामेकत्वमेवेति  
 सादृष्टिकमेतत् । स्वातन्त्र्ये चापेक्षाबुद्धिरात्मानं लभते । संयोगविशेषस्तु स्वातन्त्र्यं विरु-  
 णद्धि । अत एव हि कथञ्चित्स्वारसिकं न लभ्यते नानात्वम् । न चेतः परं<sup>२</sup> किञ्चिदेकत्वं  
 कचिद्दृष्टम्, यदलाभादलोपचारं मनुषे । अतो न प्रपञ्चापलापप्रसङ्गः ॥

यच्चापरमुक्तं योग्यता यावदाश्रयभाविनीति, तत्र कार्यप्रतिसम्बन्धिनि कारणे योग्यतेत्य-  
 विवादम् । तत्र यावत्कारणमस्ति, तावद्योग्यतापि स्यात् । कारणं चावस्थितमेव द्रव्यं न केवलम् ।  
 तत्रावस्थाः द्रव्यस्वरूपव्यपदेशहेतवः । तास्संस्थानं जातिरिति चापदिश्यन्ते । न हि केवलस्य  
 द्रव्यस्य व्यपदेशो भवति । द्रव्यमित्यपि गुणाश्रयत्वोपाधिको व्यपदेशः । जात्यवस्थितस्यैव  
 द्रव्यस्य तदवस्थानिबन्धनान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां कारणत्वनिश्चयः । तथा निश्चितस्यैव

१. तत्त्वैक्यनन्तरं स्थितावित्यतः पूर्वं किञ्चिद्गलितमित्यालोच्यते । परन्तु क्वचित् तत्सूचकान्तराल-  
 कल्पनमन्यत्रेवेह न लक्ष्यते । तदत्र यदि किञ्चिदस्ति, तर्हि अवयवस्थितावपीति रीत्या चिन्तनीयम् ॥

२. अन्यदित्यर्थः.

सहकारित्वेन संयोगादिः प्रतिपत्तिमवतरति । संयोगरूपरसादयो हि गुणास्त्वेनैव रूपेण कार्यकारणभावादिकमनुभवन्ति । तथा च यस्य येन रूपेण कारणत्वं निश्चायते, तस्य यावदाश्रयभाविनी शक्तिरित्युक्ते सति, न परमसूक्ष्माणां प्रत्यक्षता परमस्थूलानां वा तन्निवृत्तिरापादयितुं शक्यते । किं वावस्थान्वयतिरेकेण द्रव्यमेव तत्तत्कार्यशक्तमस्तु ; अवस्थाभिरनुगृह्यताम् । नापि (तथापि ?) नातिसूक्ष्मप्रत्यक्षतापत्तिः ; अपेक्षितमहत्त्वविशेषस्यैव यथादर्शनं सहकारित्वोपपत्तेः । तद्विशेषाश्च स्वत एव परस्परतो व्यावृत्ताः कार्यदर्शनानुगुण्येन सहकारितां प्रतिपत्स्यन्ते ॥

एतेन भेदासिद्धिः प्रत्युक्ता । अवस्थाभेदनिबन्धनस्य द्रव्यभेदस्य विशिष्टगाचरस्य विशेष्यद्रव्याभेदेऽपि सिद्धेः । यत्र हि विशेष्यानुवृत्तिः स्फुटतरमवसीयते, तत्रापि विशेषणभेदाद्विशिष्टभेदः प्रतिलभ्यते । यत्र त्वाकाशादिषु विशेष्यस्य द्रव्यस्य धर्मान्तरवत्तया स्फुटतरानुवृत्तिप्रत्ययाभावः, तत्रावस्थाभेदनिबन्धनद्रव्यभेद एवावसातुं शक्यते । नैतावता अवस्थातिरिक्तद्रव्यापलापप्रसङ्गः ; दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणादिभिर्गुणगुणिभेदप्रतिपादकैस्तत्सिद्धेः । अतः स्थानभेदव्युत्पादनमप्यनवद्यम् ; कार्यकारणयोरेव द्रव्ययोस्तथाविधस्य भेदस्येष्टत्वात् । न चैवं भेदाभेदप्रसङ्गोऽपि ; अनन्यापेक्षयोरेकत्रानभ्युपगमात् । यद्यपि परैर्व्यक्तिद्वये कार्यद्वये वा जात्यात्मना कारणात्मना चाभेदः, व्यक्त्यात्मना कार्यात्मना च भेद इत्युपाधिरप्यङ्गीकृतः । तथापि तैर्जातिव्यक्तयोः कार्यकारणयोश्च निरुपाधिकौ भेदाभेदौ साक्षादभ्युपगम्येते । न चैवं कचिदस्माकमस्त्यभ्युपगमः ; संस्थानतद्वतोऽसंस्थानयोश्चात्यन्तभेदात् । तदाश्रयद्रव्यस्य चात्यन्ताभेदात् । तस्य तु विशिष्टाकारेण भेद इत्यत्र न कश्चिद्विरोधः । संस्थानस्थैर्यनिबन्धनो द्रव्यस्थिरत्वव्यपदेशः । आत्मादिषु तन्नित्यत्वनिबन्धनो नित्यत्वव्यपदेशः । अचेतनेषु प्रकृतिद्रव्ये द्रव्यस्वरूपनिबन्धनं (नः ?) । कालेऽपि कार्यकारणात्मनि प्रकृतिवदेवेति न नित्यानित्यविभागाभावोऽपि ॥

न च केवलं सङ्कल्पमात्रेण सर्वमिदं सङ्गिरामहे, येन सर्वत्र सत्कार्यवादो विपर्ययो वा स्वीकर्तुमुचित इति पर्यनुयो (यु ?) ज्येमहि । प्रमाणशरणास्तु<sup>१</sup>—प्रमाणन्तु प्रत्यभिज्ञान-मचेतनमेवानुवृत्तं गोचरयति ; नावस्थावद्भेदम् । अतः कस्यायमुपालम्भः ? यदि च नैवं कारणकार्यद्रव्यस्वरूपनित्यत्वावस्थामेदानभ्युपगच्छेम, कथं तर्ह्यमूर्तानां महदहङ्कारतन्मात्रा-काशादीनामुत्पत्तिमुपपादयेम ? न हि तत्रावयवसंयोगादवयविनोऽर्थान्तरस्यासत् उत्पत्ति-शक्या वक्तुम् । न च तेषामनुत्पत्तिरेव ; श्रुतिसिद्धत्वात्तदुत्पत्तेः । सावयवेषु भूतेषु च भूतान्तरप्रकृतिकत्ववाद्दत्तुक्तावयवाधीनावयविनिष्पत्तिं प्रतिक्षिपति । न चासां श्रुतीना-मर्थापहारस्तर्कविरोधो वा शक्यः कल्पयितुम् ; प्रमाणविरोधे तर्कस्याभासस्थितेः ।

ननु च 'आकाशाद्वायुः' इति च श्रूयते । तत्राकाशैकदेशस्य वाय्वात्मना परिणतस्य क्रियासमवायात्पूर्वदेशप्रहाणाप्रहाणविकल्पानुपपत्तिः । तथा च (हि ?)—प्रहाणं तावदुर्घटम् ; हेयस्य देशस्याभावात् । भावे चाकाशस्यैव वायुतानुपपत्तिः । न हि तदेवाकाशादिकारणपरम्प-रावस्थितद्रव्यं वायुतावस्थां प्राप्य देशान्तरं गतमपि तत्रैव यथावस्थितमिति सम्भवति । आकाश एव कुत्र तिष्ठतीति तद्देशविमर्शे यद्यपि स्वपरनिर्वाहकत्वाद्देशान्तरनिर्देश उपपद्यते, तथापि विभागस्य स्वात्मन्यनुपपत्तेर्देशान्तरापेक्षा विद्यत एव । अत आकाशातिरिक्तदेश-कल्पनापि स्यात् । किञ्च तस्मिन्देशे सच्छिद्रता स्यात् । न (नि ?) छिद्रत्वं हि सलिलराशिव-दुद्धृतविवरपूरणेनेति, तर्हि सक्रियत्वप्रसङ्गः । तच्चायुक्तम् ; विभुत्वात्प्रकृतेः । अप्रहाणमपि दुर्घटम् ; देशान्तरसञ्चारिणो वायोरेव समवायदेशे निष्कम्पावस्थानविरोधात् । निष्क्रियत्व-सक्रियत्वयोरेकत्र विरोधात् । सक्रियस्य पूर्वदेशाविभागे क्रियास्वभावविरोधात् ; पूर्वदेश-विभागपूर्वकदेशान्तरसंयोगजननस्वाभाव्यात्तस्याः ।

अत्रोच्यते—

श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वादिति सूत्रकृता स्वयम् ।

एवामाद्यनुयोगानामुत्तरं प्रतिपादितम् ॥

श्रुत्या प्रमाणभूतया योऽर्थः प्रतिपादितः, तदन्यथानुपपत्त्या कल्प्यतां काममर्थान्तरम्, अर्थापत्तिश्चेत्यबला । नो चेत् पर्यनुयोग एव नास्ति, अन्यथाप्युपपन्नत्वात् । विरोधोऽपि यथा-संभवं सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रमाणसिद्धेषु निरवकाशः । न च वस्त्वन्तरसाधर्म्यादिनुमानं प्रसरति वैधर्म्यादिति ..... १ सम्बन्धिनस्सर्वाकाशदेशसम्बन्धेऽनुपाधि त्वाच्च । अमूर्तस्य तु सर्वगतस्य पूर्ववन्निरंशत्वादेवाद्वयस्य च संयोगस्यानुपाधित्वात् । अन्य-समचेतस्य वा सम्बन्धात् । अतोऽनवयवत्वासिद्धेस्सावयवस्य एकदेशविकारोपपत्तिः । उत्तर-योस्तु कल्पयोर्व्याप्तिविरहः । अस्पर्शस्यारम्भकान्तररहितस्यापि स्वाभाविकदेशभेदाश्रयणेन संयोगवत्कार्यान्तरस्यापि व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः । यथा चावयवा एवावयविनः प्रादेशिकसंयोगादि-व्यवस्थापकाः । न ह्यवयवान्तराणि सन्ति । न चावयवसमवायमन्तरेणावयविनि साक्षात् संयोगान्तरसमवायस्त्वयाभ्युपगम्यते । संयोगान्तरस्यापि त्ववयवा एव प्रदेशव्यवस्थापकाः । न हस्तपुस्तकसंयोगाज्जायमानो देवदत्तपुस्तकसंयोगश्चरणादिदेशे दृश्यते । एवमारभ्यमाणाः कार्यभेदा एवारम्भकदेशासङ्करकारिण इति किं नोपपद्यते । आरभ्यमाणसिद्धद्युत्तरकालं तेषा-मुपाधित्वं पूर्वमेव देशविभागोऽपेक्षित इति चेन्न ; समवायवदुपपत्तेः । यथा हि—अवय-वेष्ववयविसमवायो न कात्स्न्येन । व्यासङ्गस्तु<sup>२</sup> भागसिद्धेः पश्चादेव । भागसिद्धिश्च समवाया-पेक्षेति परस्पराश्रयत्वेऽपि तैरेव भागैस्तुल्यकालमेव वृत्तिविशेषसिद्धिः, तथा तैरेव कार्यैस्तत्प्र-देशभेदसिद्धिः । न च वृत्त्यन्तरत्वादवयववृत्तेर्न भागापेक्षेति वाच्यम् ; परिणामान्तरत्वाद-त्राप्येकदेशादिविकल्पानवसरप्रसङ्गात् । एतत्सर्वमुत्तरं वैभवादुक्तमस्माभिः । पूर्वोक्त एव स्वाभाविकदेशभेदः पारमार्थिक इत्यनुसंधेयम् । एतेन द्रव्यस्य सर्वस्य स्वाभाविकभेदोपपादनेन निरवयवाः ..... न च धर्मिग्राहकप्रमाणविरोधः, अवयविभागज ..... [व्य] क्तिपर्यवसानभूमेस्सूक्ष्मस्य वस्तुनस्सिद्धत्वात् । ते ..... त् प्रदेशभेदा एव हि स्पर्शवायूनामवयवाः । न च तस्य स्वतः प्रदेशभेदा न सन्तीति वाच्यम् ; दिक् संयोग ..... [भेदवत्त्वेन तत्सिद्धेः, न च दि] गुपाधि-

१. अत्र गळितत्वादनन्वितमिव लक्ष्यते ।

२. व्यासङ्गः विभज्य समन्तात् सम्बन्धः— व्यासज्यवृत्तिः ।

कदेशभेदादेव संयोगभेदसिद्धिः ; परस्पराश्रयप्रसङ्गात् । एकदिवसंयोगग्रस्ताखण्डस्वरू ....  
 ..... रात् विनाच दिक्सम्बन्धात् प्रदेशभेदासिद्धेः । अतो द्व्यणुकस्यावयवसंयोगादिना  
 द्व्यणुकान्तर ..... पक्षीणावयवत्वे द्व्यणुकान्तरसंयोगालाभात् त्रसरेण  
 निष्पत्तौ विश्वसिद्धिरपि त्वत्पक्ष एव प्रा ..... गोचरं ज्ञानमात्रं दृष्टान्त इति ....  
 ..... न्वे संयोगवत् प्रदेशभेदानपेक्षणात् । व्यवहारयोग्यतालक्षणस्वभावविशेषात्मक  
 ..... सर्वप्रतियोगिकमेव । तथापि तस्य सङ्कोचकैः कर्मभिः प्रतिबद्धत्वात्  
 संसारिषु तारतम्य ..... हि तत्त्वविदां प्रक्रिया । अतो मूर्तं सर्वं सावयवं  
 द्रव्यं च सर्वं संशयं न ..... रुणद्धि । एतेन यत्परैरुक्तं भूतेष्वेकमेवैकस्यारम्भकं न द्वाभ्यां  
 त्रिभिश्चतुर्भिर्वा ..... तः अनुग्राहकत्वमेवेतरेषामिति, तदपि प्रत्युक्तम् । अर्थान्तर-  
 स्यावयविसंज्ञस्य तत्स ..... [मुदायेना] रम्भे हि तदवकाश इति ॥

इति श्रीभगवद्रामानुजमुनिवरमतधुरंधरस्यात्रिगोत्रप्रदीप-

श्रीपद्मनाभार्यनन्दनस्य वादिहंसनवाम्बुदस्य

श्रीमद्रामानुजार्यस्य कृतिषु

न्यायकुलिशे

सत्कार्यवादोऽष्टमः ॥

## University Notes

### VICE-CHANCELLOR

His Excellency the Governor of Madras has been pleased to nominate the Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar, our Vice-Chancellor, as a member of the Madras Legislative Council.

\* \* \* \* \*

We congratulate Diwan Bahadur S. E. Runganadham, M.A., M.L.C., our Ex-Vice-Chancellor, on his appointment as Vice-Chancellor of the Madras University.

The Degree of Doctor of Science was conferred by the London University on Dr. S. Ramachandra Rao, M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Physics. We congratulate him on the well-merited honour.

Dr. B. V. Narayanaswamy Naidu, Professor of Economics, has been elected Honorary General Secretary and Treasurer of the Indian Economic Association. He has also been elected as Associate Editor of the Indian Journal of Economics.

### COURSES OF STUDIES

The syllabus in Chemistry for the Intermediate Examination was revised and made more definite. In the scheme of examination separate marks were allotted to laboratory record note-books in Physics and in Chemistry as in Botany and Zoology.

The English Honours course was reorganised with a view to giving greater importance to Literature. The new course will come into effect from July 1937.

\* \* \* \* \*

### PUBLICATIONS

The Syndicate has sanctioned the publication of the following works :

1. A Monograph on Jagannatha Pandita by V. A. Ramaswamy Sastry, M.A., Lecturer in Samskrit.

2. Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure by P. Panchapakesa Sastry, Pandit in Samskrit.
3. Trimsacchloki.

### BUILDINGS

The following buildings are nearing completion :—

1. Administrative Buildings and Convocation Hall.
2. Music College.
3. Guests' Quarters.
4. New Hostel Buildings.

## Reviews

*Svarasiddhānta Candrikā*.—By Śrīnivāsayajvan edited by Mr. K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastriar of the Department of Sanskrit, Annamalai University. Price Rs. 5.

*Svarasiddhānta Candrikā* is the work of Śrīnivāsayajvan, the disciple of Rāmabhadra Dīkṣita, the famous *Vyākaraṇācārya* of the Tanjore District in the latter half of the 17th and the former half of the 18th centuries. The author clearly exhibits his thorough mastery of the Taittiriya śākhā of the Yajurveda with Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara bhāṣya and all the works on Sanskrit grammar available in his time. He combines with his scholarship, a keen critical acumen and a dispassionate attitude in his discussion, which are indispensably necessary for those engaged in research. Wherever he differs from another, he frankly gives expression to it, whether he is the *Sūtrakāra*,<sup>1</sup> *Vārtikakāra*,<sup>2</sup> *Mahābhāṣyakāra*,<sup>3</sup> *Haradatta*,<sup>4</sup> *Svaramaṇjarikāra*, *Parimalakāra* or *Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita*. He himself states at the commencement that, since many mistakes were found in the *Svaramaṇjarī*, he felt the necessity to write this work. In the body of the book he condemns, sometimes vehemently, not only *Svaramaṇjarikāra*, but also the author of its commentary, the *Parimala*. The *Parimala* was the work of Girinātha, the son of the famous commentator Mallinātha (14th c.) and pupil of Nṛsimha, the author of the *Svaramaṇjarī*. He also condemns on many an occasion the views of the *Vedabhāṣyakṛt*. This *Vedabhāṣyakṛt* seems to be Bhaṭṭabhāskara and not Sāyaṇa, since many of the statements here are direct quotations from the Bhāṣya of the former or the summary of his views there. His lucid exposition of the different theories and the discussion thereon under तस्यादित उदात्तमर्धह्रस्वम् (Pp. 9-13), उदात्तस्वरितपरस्य सन्नतरः (P. 50) गतिकारकोपपदात्कृत् (P. 180), एकश्रुति दूरात्सम्बुद्धौ (P. 371), विभाषा छन्दसि (pp. 379-382) are very fine. Whenever he condemns Haradatta, Nṛsimha or Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, he quotes for his

1. बहुलग्रहणस्य चिन्त्यं फलम् (p. 93); इतिकरणस्य फलं चिन्त्यम् (p. 341)
2. तेन परादिश्च...इत्यादि सिद्धम् (p. 171)
3. भाष्ये...न तु अस्य वस्तुतः कार्यकालत्वम् (3. 357)
4. हरदत्तादिमते...चिन्त्यम् (pp. 85-86)



authority the *Mahābhāṣya*. In two or three instances he states, in support of his views, the views of Cōkkanātha Makhin, the author of the *Bhāṣyaratnāvalī* and his *prācārya*. In two places he gives the views of his own *ācārya* Rāmabhadra Dikṣita.

The plan of this work was not newly conceived by him, but it is only an improvement on that adopted by Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita in his *Siddhānta-kaumudī*, on the model of the early part of the same work. In a few of the sutras, he adopts a reading different from that adopted by Bhaṭṭoji. Dikṣita, takes उदागध्वेषु क्षेपे as one sūtra on the strength of the *Mahābhāṣya*, though it is taken as two by Bhaṭṭoji and mentions वा भाषायाम् (p. 265) which is not found in Bhaṭṭoji's work. The examples cited here from *Bhāṣā* are generally the same as given by Bhaṭṭoji; while those from the Vedas are taken here from the Taittiriya śākhā; but even there if the passage given by Bhaṭṭoji finds a place both in the Ṛgveda and the Yajurveda, he always prefers to give it.<sup>5</sup>

The sentence अलावृशब्दोऽपि...अनुदात्तः इति (P. 61, ll. 12 & 13) and इति (p. 37, ll. 9 and 13) do not seem to fit in well.

Brahmasri K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastriar, being an *adhīta*veda and *Vāiyākaraṇa* like the author, is well qualified to edit this work. He has done full justice to his qualifications. The printed book, as it stands now, clearly shows how much pains he should have taken to edit it. In the *upodghāta* he lucidly and briefly mentions the benefits of language, proves the priority of the Prātiśākhya to *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, gives a general description of *Svara* from all sources and proves that Ācārya Pāṇini also might have thought of *svarita* to have had a higher pitch than *udātta*. He then gives four reasons for the *ekaśruti* to have come in vogue in later Sanskrit. One of them is the use of *śleṣa* by poets. Would it not have been possible to read the same *śloka* with different tones? Another is the composition of Purāṇas for the sake of *women* and *sūdras*. Is it not said that the *Rāmāyaṇa* was sung? What would have been the harm if the Purāṇas also were sung in the same manner? It seems to me that *ekaśruti* came in vogue outside the sacrifices only after Sanskrit ceased to be the spoken language. Mr. Sastriar adds at the end of the *upodghāta* a short note on the life of the author, and the method of his treatment. Punctuation in certain places in the body of the book may have been more carefully attended to. For in-

stance, the statement containing the *sādhya* may not be separated from that containing the *hētu* by the mark "1".\* A comma may have been used instead, as he has done in other places.

At the end of the book the editor gives the index of the *svara* sūtras of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and the *phiṭ* sūtras, and the vedic quotations, the list of authors and works quoted and corrigenda. It is quite clear that he has taken great pains to prepare them. Still in the bibliography he has failed to mention **याज्ञवल्क्यस्मृति** (noted in p. 331). Some of the errors have escaped his notice and hence do not find a place in the corrigenda.<sup>6</sup> The Sanskrit world is much indebted to the authorities of the Annamalai University in having enabled Mr. Sastriar to edit this work, to Mr. Sastriar for having critically edited it and to the Madras Law Journal Press for the neat execution of the work.

\* Cf. p. 36, l. 8 ; p. 115, l. 4. etc.

(6) इकार (for अकार) in p. 107 l. 11 ; पर्यालो (32, 21) परिमाणात्वे (35, 4), विभक्त्युदात्तत्वं (36, 8), सर्वानुदात्तायम् (36, 17), पर्याय for . पर्यायौ (48, 18) (cf. 372, l. 6) असिद्धस्वेऽपि (91, 1) अणप्रययः (112, 17), क्रौञ्चायनाः (129, 20) पूवाद्धेजः (199, 16), गतिकरको (206, 11) पष्ठयाः (222, 17) नियामसास्ति (250, 21), प्रप्नोतीति (355, 11), प्रयक्षात् (354, 6), आरम्भः (357, 19)



## INDEX TO

# Journal of the Annamalai University

Volume VI 1936-37 (Numbers 1, 2 and 3)

Compiled by

DR. B. V. NARAYANASWAMI NAIDU M.A.,

AND

MR. T. K. VENKATARAMAN B.A. (HONS.).

### AUTHORS

- Asvath Narain Rao (K.) A note on the Spirit and Pharmaceutical Industry of India. p. 156.  
—Some experiments on the Utilisation of Indigenous Raw Materials. p. 198.  
Asvath Narain Rao (K.) and Narasimha Rao (P.L.) Action of Sulphuric Acid on Glucose and Sucrose. p. 155.  
Bharati (S.S.) The Age of Tholkappiam. p. 121 and p. 216.  
—Tholkappia Araichi. p. 139 and p. 230.  
Chidambaranatha Chettiar (A.) The Semantic Principle of Expansion. p. 147.  
Krishnan (V.S.) Some Notes on 'Sir Gawayn and the Greene Knight'. p. 26.  
Munisvami (M.K.) The Tariff and the Handloom—Some Aspects. p. 103.  
Narayanaswami Naidu (B.V.) Unemployment—Its Causes and Cure. p. 30.  
—University Notes. p. 70, p. 159 and p. 241.  
Nayudu (P.S.) The Horne in Purposivistic Psychology and Karma in the Gita—a comparative study. p. 87.  
—On the 'Objectivistic Dogma in Scientific Methodology'. p. 1.  
—The present status of the study of Human Emotions. p. 206.  
Pillai (S.S.) On Waring's Problem III, IV and VI. p. 50, p. 54 and p. 171.  
Ramachandra Rao (S.) and Muthuswami (N.) Optical Scattering by Colloidal Suspensions and Emulsions. p. 107.  
Ramanujachariar (R.) and Srinivasachariar (K.) Siddhitraya.  
—Nyayakulisa.  
Ramasvami Sastriar (V.A.) Bhartrhari a Bauddha ? p. 65.  
Subrahmanyam (S.) and Ramakrishnan (S.) Sixty years of Madras Cereal-prices. p. 39.  
—The Growth of India's Population. p. 47.  
Subrahmanya Sastri (V.) Lakshanavimarsah.  
Sundaram (M.S.) A brief History of English Scholarship. p. 18 and p. 94.

### TITLES

- Action of Sulphuric Acid on Glucose and Sucrose : By K. Asvath Narain Rao and P. L. Narasimha Rao. p. 155.  
(The) Age of Tholkappiam : By S. S. Bharati. p. 121 and p. 216.

- Bhartrhari a Bauddha ? : By V. A. Ramasvami Sastri. p. 65.
- (A) Brief History of English Scholarship : By M. S. Sundaram. p. 18 and p. 94.
- (The) Growth of India's Population : By S. Subrahmanyam and S. Ramakrishnan. p. 47.
- (The) Horne in Purposivistic Psychology and Karma in the Gita—A Comparative Study : By P. S. Nayudu. p. 87.
- Lakshanavimarsah : By V. Subrahmanya Sastri.
- (A) Note on the Spirit and Pharmaceutical Industry of India : By K. Asvath Narain Rao. p. 156.
- Nyayakulisa : By R. Ramanujachariar and K. Srinivasachariar.
- On the 'The Objectivistic Dogma in Scientific Methodology' : By P. S. Nayudu. p. 1.
- Optical scattering by colloidal Suspensions and Emulsions : By S. Ramachandra Rao and N. Muthuswami. p. 107.
- (The) Present status of the study of Human Emotions : By P. S. Nayudu. p. 206.
- (The) Semantic Principle of Expansion : By A. Chidambaranatha Chettiar. p. 147.
- Siddhitraya : By R. Ramanujachariar and K. Srinivasachariar.
- Sixty years of Madras Cereal-Prices : By S. Subrahmanyam and S. Ramakrishnan. p. 39.
- Some Notes on 'Sir Gawayn and the Greene Knight' : By V. S. Krishnan. p. 26.
- Some Experiments on the Utilisation of Indigenous Raw Materials : By K. Asvath Narain Rao. p. 198.
- (The) Tariff and the Handloom—Some Aspects : By M. K. Munisvami, p. 103.
- Tholkappia Araichi : By S. S. Bharati : p. 139 and p. 230.
- Unemployment—Its Causes and Cure : By B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu, p. 30.
- University Notes : By B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu, p. 70, p. 159 and p. 241.
- (On) Waring's Problem III, IV, and VI : By S. S. Pillai. p. 50, p. 54 and p. 171.

## SUBJECTS

- Chemistry.* Asvath Narain Rao (K.) and Narasimha Rao (P.L.) Action of Sulphuric Acid on Glucose and Sucrose. p. 155.
- Asvath Narain Rao (K.) A Note on the Spirit and Pharmaceutical Industry of India. p. 156.
- Asvath Narain Rao (K.) Some Experiments on the Utilisation of Indigenous Raw Materials. p. 198.
- Economics.* Narayanaswami Naidu (B.V.) Unemployment—Its Causes and Cure. p. 30.
- Subrahmanyam (S.) and Ramakrishnan (S.) Sixty Years of Madras Cereal-prices. p. 39.
- Subrahmanyam (S.) and Ramakrishnan (S.) The Growth of India's Population. p. 47.
- Munisvami (M.K.) The Tariff and the Handloom—Some Aspects. p. 103.
- English Language and Literature.* Sundaram (M.S.) A Brief History of English Scholarship. pp. 18 and 94.
- Krishnan (V.S.) Some Notes on 'Sir Gawayn and the Greene Knight'. p. 26.
- Mathematics.* Pillai (S.S.) On Waring's Problem III, IV and VI. pp. 50, 54, and 171.
- Miscellaneous.* Narayanaswami Naidu (B.V.) University Notes. pp. 70, 159, and 241.
- Physics.* Ramachandra Rao (S.) and Muthuswami (N.) Optical scattering by Colloidal Suspensions and Emulsions. p. 107.

- Philosophy*. Nayudu (P.S.) On the Objectivistic Dogma in Scientific Methodology. p. 1.
- The Horne in Purposivistic Psychology and Karma in the Gita—a Comparative Study. p. 87.
- The present status of the Study of Human Emotions. p. 206.
- Sanskrit Language and Literature*. Ramaswami Sastri (V.A.) Bhartrhari a Bauddha ? p. 65.
- Ramanujachariar (R.) and Śrinivasachariar (K.) Siddhitraya.
- Nyayakulisa.
- Subrahmanya Sastri (V.) Lakshanavimarsah.
- Tamil Language and Literature*. Bharati (S.S.) The Age of Tholkappiam. pp. 121 and 216.
- Tholkappia Araichi. pp. 139 and 230.
- Chidambaranatha Chettiar (A.) The Semantic Principle of Expansion. p. 147.

#### REVIEWS

- B. V. N. *Economic conditions in Southern India*—By Dr. A. Appadorai. p. 72.
- A survey of Motor-Bus Transportation in six districts of the Bombay Presidency*—By D. R. Gadgil and L. V. Gogate. p. 81.
- Conflicting tendencies in Indian Economic Thought*—By S. C. Dutt. p. 82.
- Indian Sugar Industry*—By M.P. Gandhi. p. 83.
- Decay of Indian Industries*—By P. R. Ramachandra Rao. p. 83.
- C. W. B. Z. *A study of Economic Depression in Rural Kistna*—By ch. Sitharama Sastri and C. Sriramanarasimham. p. 168.
- K. A. N. *Tandava Laksanam or the Fundamentals of Ancient Hindu Dancing*—By Dr. B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu. p. 84.
- Prolegomena to the New Reforms*—By S. K. Dutta. p. 86.
- K. A. N. R. *The Mysore University English Kannada Dictionary*. p. 167.
- P. E. S. *Acoustics*—By Mr. R. K. Visvanathan. p. 163.
- S. K. *Dasopanisads*—By the Pandits of Adyar. p. 85.
- V. G. R. *Some Aspects of Economic Planning*—By N. S. Subba Rao. p. 80.
- V. S. *Svarasiddhanta Candrika*—By K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastri. p. 243.



**I. A. R. I. 75.**

IMPERIAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH  
INSTITUTE LIBRARY  
NEW DELHI.

[illegible]